United States District Court,

E.D. Louisiana.

Andre HOLT

v.

RANDY & BROTHERS TRUCKING, INC. et al.

 

Civil Action No 11–2759.

Jan. 10, 2013.

 

Scott Eric Silbert, Silbert & Garon, LLP, New Orleans, LA, Donald George D’Aunoy, Jr., Waldon Michael Hingle, Michael Hingle & Associates, Inc., Slidell, LA, for Andre Holt.

 

Mark W. Verret, Dax Christopher Foster, Jeffrey E. McDonald, Philip Gipson Smith, Allen & Gooch, Metairie, LA, for Randy & Brothers Trucking, Inc. et al.

 

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH S. VANCE, District Judge.

*1 Before the Court are defendants’ three motions in limine.FN1 Defendants’ motions requesting the Court exclude the testimony of Dr. Rice, FN2 and portions of the testimony of Dr. Voorhies,FN3 are rendered moot by Mr. Holt’s stipulation FN4 and because intervenor Betty Taylor has not listed Dr. Rice or Dr. Voorhies as potential witnesses.FN5

 

FN1. R. Doc. 41; R. Doc. 42, R. Doc. 43.

 

FN2. R. Doc. 41.

 

FN3. R. Doc. 43.

 

FN4. R. Doc. 44.

 

FN5. R. Doc. 33.

 

Defendants’ remaining motion to prohibit plaintiff and intervener from calling defendants’ expert witnesses during their case-in-chief is unopposed by Mr. Holt,FN6 but opposed by Ms. Taylor.FN7 The Court will now address this remaining motion.

 

FN6. R. Doc. 44.

 

FN7. R. Doc. 56.

 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Andre Holt, and intervenor, Betty Taylor, bring this lawsuit seeking damages arising from an automobile accident. Defendants’ have moved this Court to preclude Ms. Taylor from calling defendants’ experts in her case-in-chief.FN8

 

FN8. R. Doc. 42.

 

II. DISCUSSION

One month after this Court’s scheduling deadline for designating expert witness, Taylor sought to designate two of defendants’ experts as witnesses in her case-in-chief. Defendants argue that presenting their witness in intervenor’s case-in-chief will prejudice their case.

 

This Court has broad discretion to control “the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence.” Fed.R.Evid. 611(a); Fed.R.Evid. 403. The Court is instructed to exercise this discretion in order to “(1) make those procedures effective for determining the truth; (2) avoid wasting time; and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.” Fed.R.Evid. 611(a).

 

Taylor’s designation was untimely, and allowing intervenor to introduce defendants’ experts will prejudice the defendants because it would allow intervenor to “piggyback[ ] on another party’s trial preparation.” Ferguson v. Michael Foods, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 408, 409 (D.Minn.1999). Further, presenting the defendants’ experts will confuse the jury. See Peterson v. Willie, 81 F.3d 1033, 1037 (11th Cir.1996); Rubel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 160 F.R.D. 458, 460 (S.D.N.Y.1995) (“[P]ermitting one party to call an expert previously retained or consulted by the other side entails a risk of very substantial prejudice stemming rom the fact of the prior retention, quire apart from the substance of the testimony.”).

 

Moreover, introducing defendants’ experts in the intervenor’s case-in-chief is unnecessary as defendants’ will be introducing these witnesses and intervenor will have an opportunity to cross-examine them on their testimony.FN9 This is not a case where the experts’ testimony will be entirely absent from the trial. Cf. Rubel, 160 F.R.D. at 460–461; Sanchez v. Dupnik, 362 Fed. App’x 679, 680 (9th Cir.2010) (affirming district court’s decision not to allow plaintiff to call defendant’s expert in his case-in-chief where plaintiff was “permitted to fully cross-examine his opponent’s expert during trial”). Accordingly, defendants’ motion is granted and intervenor will not be permitted to present defendants’ experts in her case-in-chief.

 

FN9. R. Doc. 42–1 (“Plaintiff an intervener will have ample opportunity to cross-examine these experts on their testimony.”)

 

III. CONCLUSION

*2 For the above reasons, defendants’ motion is granted.