Martinez v. ITF LLC - Central Analysis Bureau

2023 WL 3236030

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Alwin MARTINEZ, Plaintiff–Respondent,

ITF LLC, et al., Defendants,

Yesenia Camacho, Defendant–Respondent,

J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Defendant–Appellant.

Yesenia Camacho, Plaintiff–Respondent,

ITF LLC, et al., Defendants,

J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Defendant–Appellant,

Alwin Martinez, Defendant–Respondent.

185-, 186-, 187

Index Nos. 20977/18E, 25135/18E

Case Nos. 2022-01483, 2022-01494, 2022-05075

Entered May 4, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, brought personal-injury action against operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer, alleging that operator’s negligence caused accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s stopped automobile. The Supreme Court, Bronx County, Ben R. Barbato, J., entered order granting plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on issue of liability and dismissing lessee’s affirmative defense of comparative negligence on part of driver and later entered order denying lessee’s motion to renew. Lessee appealed.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, held that:

^[1] operator and lessee were liable for driver’s and motorist’s injuries;

^[2] emergency doctrine did not apply;

^[3] driver was not negligent;

^[4] call that driver made to motorist for assistance did not constitute intervening act that broke chain of causation; and

^[5] new evidence did not warrant allowing lessee to renew its opposition to motions for summary judgment.

Affirmed.

[1] Automobiles Care required of following vehicle

Operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer were liable for personal injuries that driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, sustained in accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s automobile, since tractor–trailer rear-ended motorist’s stopped automobile.

[2] Automobiles Rear-end collision

Rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle.

[3] Automobiles Acts in emergencies

Emergency doctrine did not apply and thus did not preclude imposing liability on operator of tractor–trailer and lessee of trailer regarding collision in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of stopped automobile of motorist, who drove to scene to help driver of automobile that became disabled on highway, and allegedly caused injuries to motorist and driver; operator was driving over speed limit while talking on his cellphone just before collision, and operator had unobstructed view of highway with no other traffic in the area and saw motorist’s automobile for at least ten seconds before impact, yet he made no attempt to stop, move to the left, or blow his horn.

[4] Automobiles Vehicles stopped for repairs

Driver of automobile that became disabled on highway was not negligent, precluding affirmative defense of comparative negligence regarding driver’s personal-injury action that was brought against lessee of trailer and that arose from collision in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of stopped automobile of motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, where driver parked his disabled automobile completely on right shoulder of highway, outside flow of traffic.

[5] Automobiles Proximate cause of injury

Call that driver of automobile that became disabled on highway made to motorist for assistance did not constitute intervening act that broke chain of causation between negligence of operator of tractor–trailer in crashing into rear of motorist’s stopped automobile and injuries sustained by driver and motorist, and thus call did not preclude imposing liability on lessee of trailer, although motorist parked her automobile partially in rightmost lane of highway; fact that motorist could share some responsibility for injuries sustained by herself and driver did not absolve lessee from liability, as there could be more than one proximate cause of injuries.

[6] Summary Judgment Renewed or successive motions

New evidence offered by lessee of trailer did not warrant allowing lessee to renew its opposition to motions for summary judgment as to liability that driver of automobile, which became disabled on highway, and motorist, who drove to scene to help driver, filed in their personal-injury action arising from accident in which tractor–trailer crashed into back of motorist’s stopped automobile; new evidence would not have changed trial court’s determination even had it been offered on original motions, and at most, new evidence was relevant to credibility of expert for driver and motorist, which was collateral issue.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Coffey Modica O’Meara Capowski LLP, White Plains (John F. Watkins of counsel), for appellant.

Pollack, Pollack, Isaac & DeCicco, LLP, New York (Brian J. Isaac of counsel), for Alwin Martinez, respondent.

Avanzino & Moreno, P.C., Brooklyn (Stuart Long of counsel), for Yesenia Camacho, respondent.

Manzanet–Daniels, J.P., Singh, Moulton, Rodriguez, Pitt–Burke, JJ.

Opinion

*1 Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Ben R. Barbato, J.), entered on or about March 28, 2022, which, to the extent appealed from as limited by the briefs, granted plaintiffs’ motions for summary judgment on liability and dismissed defendant J.B. Hunt Transport Inc.’s affirmative defense alleging comparative negligence by plaintiff Alwin Martinez, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Order, same court and Justice, entered on or about November 2, 2022, which denied J.B. Hunt’s motion to renew, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Plaintiffs were injured in an incident in which Martinez’s vehicle became disabled on the highway and plaintiff Yesenia Camacho drove to the scene to help him. Camacho testified that although she first parked behind Martinez on the shoulder, she eventually moved her vehicle so that it extended partially into the right-hand lane of the highway so that she could help jump start Martinez’s vehicle. While plaintiffs were waiting for Martinez’ vehicle to charge, a tractor–trailer driven by defendant Furdat Yuldashev crashed into the back of Camacho’s vehicle, injuring both plaintiffs. Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. was the lessee of the trailer.

^[1] ^[2]Plaintiffs established entitlement to summary judgment on liability, as a rear-end collision with a stopped vehicle establishes a prima facie case of negligence on the part of the driver of the rear vehicle (Reyes v. Gropper, 212 A.D.3d 565, 565, 183 N.Y.S.3d 369 [1st Dept. 2023]). In opposition, defendants failed to provide an adequate nonnegligent explanation for the accident, as no party disputes that Yuldashev’s tractor–trailer rear-ended Camacho’s stopped vehicle (see id.).

^[3]Furthermore, the emergency doctrine is inapplicable, since Yuldashev himself created the emergency (see Vanderhall v. MTA Bus Co., 160 A.D.3d 542, 542–543, 74 N.Y.S.3d 548 [1st Dept. 2018]; Johnson v. Phillips, 261 A.D.2d 269, 271, 690 N.Y.S.2d 545 [1st Dept. 1999]). As the evidence in the record makes clear, just before the collision, Yuldashev was driving over the speed limit while talking on his cellphone. In addition, the dash cam video showed he had an unobstructed view of the roadway with no other traffic in the area and saw Camacho’s vehicle for at least 10 seconds before the impact, yet he made no attempt to stop, move to the left, or blow his horn (see Fernandez v. Ortiz, 183 A.D.3d 443, 444, 121 N.Y.S.3d 867 [1st Dept. 2020]; Acevedo v. Akhtar, 204 A.D.3d 596, 597, 165 N.Y.S.3d 314 [1st Dept. 2002]).

^[4] ^[5]Supreme Court correctly dismissed J.B. Hunt’s affirmative defense with respect to Martinez’s comparative negligence, since the evidence shows that he parked his disabled vehicle completely on the right shoulder of the roadway, outside the flow of traffic. Furthermore, we reject J.B. Hunt’s argument that Martinez’s call to Camacho for assistance constituted an intervening act that broke the chain of causation. Although the record shows that Camacho parked her vehicle partially in the rightmost lane of the highway, that Camacho may share some responsibility for plaintiffs’ injuries does not absolve J.B. Hunt from liability, as there may be more than one proximate cause of an injury (see Hain v. Jamison, 28 N.Y.3d 524, 530, 46 N.Y.S.3d 502, 68 N.E.3d 1233 [2016]).

*2 ^[6]Finally, Supreme Court properly denied J.B. Hunt’s motion to renew. The new evidence offered on the motion would not have changed the court’s determination even had it been offered on the original motion. At most, the new evidence was relevant to the credibility of plaintiff’s expert, which is a collateral issue (see Crooms v. Sauer Bros. Inc., 48 A.D.3d 380, 381–382, 853 N.Y.S.2d 29 [1st Dept. 2008]).

We have considered J.B. Hunt’s remaining arguments and find them unavailing.

All Citations

— N.Y.S.3d —-, 2023 WL 3236030, 2023 N.Y. Slip Op. 02385

End of Document