United States District Court, M.D. Alabama, Northern Division.

Desmond BRADLEY, individually and as father and next friend of C.B. and A.B., minors, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

BIG’S TRUCKING, et al., Defendants.

Charasma Moseley, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

Big’s Trucking, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL CASE NO. 2:23-cv-122-ECM, CIVIL CASE NO. 2:23-cv-262-ECM

|

Signed September 4, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Andrew Ted Citrin, Brett W. Aaron, William Bradford Kittrell, Andy Citrin Injury Attorneys, PC, Daphne, AL, Rickman Edgar Williams III, Pitts Williams & Jones, Selma, AL, for Plaintiffs Desmond Bradley, Andrea Thomas, Paul C. Harris, Brian Buerkle in No. 2:23-cv-122.

William Bradford Kittrell, Andy Citrin Injury Attorneys P.C., Daphne, AL, for Plaintiff Tracy Powell in No. 2:23-cv-122.

Eric David Bonner, Clark Hair & Smith PC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Ricky Gray.

Big’s Trucking, Grand Ridge, FL, Pro Se.

Ricky Gray, Milton, FL, Pro Se.

Pamela Tarter, Grand Ridge, FL, Pro Se.

Jeffrey Tarter, Grand Ridge, FL, Pro Se.

Outlaw Express, LLC, Grand Ridge, FL, Pro Se.

Michael Glen Strickland, Strickland & Kendall LLC, Montgomery, AL, for Plaintiffs in No. 2:23-cv-262.

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 Now pending before the Court are motions for summary judgment filed by Defendant Commercial Express, Inc. (“Commercial Express”) on June 18, 2024 (doc. 105 in Bradley v. Big’s Trucking, 2:23-cv-122-ECM (“Bradley”)); Defendant AmerisourceBergen Drug Corporation (“ABDC”) on May 29, 2024 (doc. 98 in Bradley); Commercial Express on June 18, 2024 (doc. 82 in Moseley v. Big’s Trucking, 2:23-cv-262 (“Moseley”)); and ABDC on June 13, 2024 (doc. 77 in Moseley).¹ The motions are fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, ABDC and Commercial Express’ motions for summary judgment (docs. 77, 82, 98, and 105) are due to be GRANTED.

I. JURISDICTION

The Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Personal jurisdiction and venue are uncontested, and the Court concludes that venue properly lies in the Middle District of Alabama. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“Summary judgment is proper if the evidence shows ‘that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Hornsby-Culpepper v. Ware, 906 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “[A] court generally must view all evidence and make all reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1252 (11th Cir. 2016). However, “conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts have no probative value.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 924–25 (11th Cir. 2018). If the record, taken as a whole, “could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” then there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact. Hornsby-Culpepper, 906 F.3d at 1311 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)).

The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, and the movant must identify the portions of the record which support this proposition. Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). The movant may carry this burden “by demonstrating that the nonmoving party has failed to present sufficient evidence to support an essential element of the case.” Id. The burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish, by going beyond the pleadings, that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id. at 1311–12.

The Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant plaintiffs and draws all reasonable inferences in their favor. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In assessing whether there is any ‘genuine issue’ for trial, the court ‘must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party’ and ‘resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.’ Moreover, the court must avoid weighing conflicting evidence or making credibility determinations.” (citations omitted)).

III. BACKGROUND

*2 These matters arise from a series of vehicular accidents that occurred in Lowndes County, Alabama. On March 13, 2022, a collision caused all northbound traffic to completely stop on Interstate 65 (“I-65”) near mile marker 154. Following this collision, at approximately 3:44 p.m., a tractor-trailer driven by Defendant Ricky Gray (“Gray”) crashed into a line of stopped vehicles, which included Charasma Moseley’s vehicle (“Moseley”). Moseley allegedly sustained physical injuries in the accident and her eleven-year-old daughter, K. A. H. M., died. The Moseley Plaintiffs² subsequently filed their lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama on March 24, 2023, (doc. 1-2 at 3 in Moseley), and ABDC removed the case to federal court on April 26, 2023 (doc. 1 in Moseley).³

The Bradley Plaintiffs,⁴ also in the line of stopped vehicles, similarly allege that they sustained injuries as the result of Gray’s conduct. Accordingly, they filed their lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Lowndes County, Alabama on March 18, 2022, (doc. 1-2 at 3 in Bradley), and ABDC removed the case to federal court on March 2, 2023, following service of the third amended complaint (doc. 1 at 3, para. 9 in Bradley).⁵

According to Gray, he was working for Big’s Trucking⁶ and driving from Commercial Express’ warehouse in Pensacola, Florida to ABDC’s distribution center in Buford, Georgia. (Doc. 98-2 at 10, 29:7–9; id. at 49:16–51:12). ABDC contracted with Commercial Express to transport its products. Because Commercial Express has no transport trucks of its own, it contracts with hundreds of vendors across the country to transport goods for a variety of customers. In 2009, Kenneth Branch on Branch LLC’s behalf, entered into a contractual agreement with Commercial Express. Branch LLC then coordinated with Pamela Tarter and Jeffrey Tarter d/b/a Big’s Trucking for Gray to drive the tractor-trailer involved in the March 13, 2022 crash. The Tarters, Brian Lipford, and Kenneth Branch are all family members.

*3 The Moseley Plaintiffs assert claims of negligence and wantonness under Alabama state law as to ABDC and Commercial Express for the selection and supervision of Gray, along with their alleged failure to comply with Federal Motor Carrier Safety regulations. (Doc. 1-2 at 14–16, paras. 52–58 in Moseley). And the Bradley Plaintiffs assert a litany of claims against ABDC and Commercial Express for negligent/wanton selection, failure to provide/verify insurance, and loss of consortium due to negligence—all of which sound in Alabama state law. (Doc. 42 at 9–15, paras. 30–45 in Bradley).

IV. DISCUSSION

ABDC and Commercial Express⁷ move for summary judgement in both Moseley and Bradley, in part, on the basis that the claims asserted by the Plaintiffs⁸ against them are preempted by federal law. (Doc. 82-1 at 7 in Moseley) (Commercial Express’ brief in support of motion for summary judgment in Moseley); (doc. 78 at 1 in Moseley) (ABDC’s brief in support of motion for summary judgment in Moseley); (doc. 99 at 1 in Bradley) (ABDC’s brief in support of motion for summary judgment in Bradley); (doc. 105-1 at 8–9 in Bradley) (Commercial Express’ brief in support of motion for summary judgment in Bradley). Specifically, ABDC and Commercial Express contend that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994’s (“FAAAA”) preemption provision, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), applies and that its subsequent savings clause, codified at 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), does not apply. (Doc. 82-1 at 7 in Moseley); (doc. 78 at 1 in Moseley); (doc. 99 at 1 in Bradley); (doc. 105-1 at 8–9 in Bradley). Because this issue is dispositive, the Court’s analysis of the motions for summary judgment begins—and ends—with preemption.

Under the Supremacy Clause, the United States Constitution and federal law “made in Pursuance thereof” are the “supreme law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Thus, the Supremacy Clause invalidates any “state laws that ‘interfere with, or are contrary to’ federal law.” Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1266 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824)). “Put simply, federal law preempts contrary state law.” Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 578 U.S. 150, 162 (2016). This Court may consider preemption when evaluating a motion for summary judgment. See Bartholomew v. AGL Res., Inc., 361 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2004). The Eleventh Circuit recognizes three types of preemption in which state law must yield to federal law: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1266 (citing Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1094 (11th Cir. 2021)). Here, the Court only considers express preemption, which “occurs when Congress displaces state law ‘by so stating in express terms.’ ” Id. (quoting Taylor v. Polhill, 964 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2020)).

*4 The FAAAA expressly preempts contrary state law and bars states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). After concluding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property burdened interstate commerce and American consumers, Congress enacted the FAAAA’s preemption provision to limit states’ reach into the trucking industry. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (citing City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440 (2002)). In Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., the Supreme Court held that § 14501(c)’s phrase “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier” embraces state laws that have “a connection with or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services, whether directly or indirectly.” Id. at 260 (quotations omitted) (emphasis added). Put differently, the breadth of the preemption provision is expansive. See Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1266–67.

Although the FAAAA’s preemption provision is expansive, it is not without limit. For example, though “a connection with or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services” may be direct or indirect, it does not preempt state laws that do so “in only a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral … manner.’ ” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., 569 U.S. at 261 (quoting Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 371 (2008)). In addition, the FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles … or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). This savings clause’s first component stating that the preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles” is known as the FAAAA’s “safety exception.” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1268. And for the safety exception to apply to negligence claims, (1) the negligence standard must constitute an exercise of the state’s “safety regulatory authority,” and (2) that authority must have been exercised “with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1264.

In enacting the FAAAA’s express preemption provision, Congress borrowed language from the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (“ADA”), which sought to deregulate the domestic airline industry years earlier. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc., 569 U.S. at 255. Because the sole difference between the ADA and FAAAA preemption provisions is the FAAAA’s inclusion of the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property,” the Eleventh Circuit looks to ADA preemption case law to interpret the FAAAA preemption provision at issue here. Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1266 n.2.

The FAAAA’s preemption provision expressly references industry participants, including motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders. For those unfamiliar with the trucking industry, a “shipper” is the “ ‘person who … owns the goods being transported’—like a manufacturer, retailer, or distributor,” id. at 1264 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13)); a “broker” is “one who ‘sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out … as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation,’ ” id. at 1267 (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2)); a “motor carrier” is “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation,” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14); and a “freight forwarder” is “a person holding itself out to the general public … to provide transportation of property for compensation,” who typically “assembles and consolidates … shipments,” and “assumes responsibility for the transportation from the place of receipt to the place of destination[,] and [ ] uses for any part of the transportation a carrier …” id. at § 13102(8). The FAAAA further defines “transportation” to include “services related to” “the movement of … property,” “including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, … and interchange of … property.” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1267 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23)).

*5 With this background in mind, the Court proceeds to whether the FAAAA preempts the Plaintiffs’ claims against ABDC and Commercial Express. To do so, the Court considers whether the Plaintiffs’ claims fall within the scope of the FAAAA preemption clause and whether those same claims fall outside the scope of the FAAAA’s safety exception. Importantly, this means that the Court must assess the type of claims asserted by the Plaintiffs, rather than the precise factual scenario surrounding the claims. See Gauthier v. Hard to Stop LLC, 2024 WL 3338944, at *2 (11th Cir. July 9, 2024) (“Our holding in Aspen that a challenge to a broker’s front-end selection of a motor carrier is preempted in no way turned on the back-end injury suffered as a result of the allegedly negligent selection.”). As such, though the motions at issue are for summary judgment, the Court references the Plaintiffs’ operative complaints to elucidate the types of claims which the Plaintiffs assert against ABDC and Commercial Express, and not to determine factual issues. At the same time, the Court keeps in mind that “[a] plaintiff may not amend [their] complaint through argument in a brief opposing summary judgment.” Gilmour v. Gates, McDonald & Co., 382 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2004).

A. Preemption as to Claims Against ABDC

In their operative complaint, the Bradley Plaintiffs describe ABDC as being a “broker and/or shipper” liable for their injuries because ABDC “negligently/wantonly breached their duty of care by hiring and/or contracting with [Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Big’s Trucking, and/or Outlaw Express, LLC] to transport said load when [D]efendants [Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Big’s Trucking, and/or Outlaw Express, LLC] had a demonstrated disregard for safety.” (Doc. 42 at 6, paras. 22–23 in Bradley). Similarly, in their complaint, the Moseley Plaintiffs describe ABDC as “the broker and/or shipper for the load being transported … at the time of the crash,” (doc. 1-2 at 5, para. 8 in Moseley), who breached its “duty of care by hiring and/or contracting with Defendants Big’s Trucking, Outlaw Express[, LLC], Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, and/or Fictitious Defendants … to transport a load of cargo from Buford, Georgia when Defendants Big’s Trucking, Outlaw Express[, LLC], Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, and/or Fictitious Defendants had a demonstrated disregard for safety and compliance with [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act].” (Id. at 9, para. 27 in Moseley).

The FAAAA preempts state law claims regarding negligent hiring of a motor carrier in a personal injury case. In a 2023 case about cargo theft, the Eleventh Circuit examined the FAAAA’s preemption provision and held that a state law negligent hiring claim is connected to broker services regarding the transportation of property, and such a claim is thus preempted by the FAAAA. Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1264, 1272. The FAAAA’s preemption provision expressly applies when a claim relates to the “service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). In Aspen, the selection of a motor carrier to transport shipments, “is precisely the brokerage service that” a negligent hiring claim against a broker challenges: the broker’s “allegedly inadequate selection of a motor carrier to transport … shipment[s].” See id. at 1267. Indeed, an allegation of negligence “against a transportation broker for its selection of a motor carrier to transport property in interstate commerce” relates to a broker’s “core transportation-related services.” Id. at 1268. Accordingly, Aspen held that a plaintiff’s state law negligent hiring claim against a broker is preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA. Id. at 1268, 1272. Similarly, the Plaintiffs’ state law negligent hiring claims against ABDC are preempted.

The Court next considers whether the FAAAA’s safety exception applies to the Plaintiffs’ claims against ABDC. The FAAAA’s preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). Although the FAAAA’s preemption provision is limited by the safety exception, that limit does not apply here because claims regarding negligent hiring are not “with respect to motor vehicles.” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1272. Here, the gravamen of the Plaintiffs’ claims in their complaints against ABDC are its selection of a motor carrier while it was acting as a “broker and/or shipper.” The preemption clause of § 14501(c)(1) is designed to capture this exact scenario because, like Aspen, the claims stem from an entity’s “core transportation-related services,” and do not directly relate to a motor vehicle, even if ABDC acted solely as a shipper.⁹ See id. at 1268, 1272; Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 813 n.6 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (“Although Wal-Mart is a shipper rather than a broker, the negligent hiring claim against Wal-Mart stems entirely from Kirsch’s broker services [of hiring the motor carrier]. Because the claim against Wal-Mart indirectly attempts to regulate broker services, it must be preempted as well.”); Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372 (holding that a Maine regulation on shippers would ultimately result in carriers altering their services, thus the claims at issue were preempted by the FAAAA).

*6 The Bradley and Moseley Plaintiffs argue that Aspen is only applicable to claims involving cargo theft and not claims that involve tort claims for personal injury. (Doc. 107 at 11 in Bradley)¹⁰. Subsequent to the Plaintiffs making these arguments, a panel of the Eleventh Circuit found such arguments to be unavailing in Gauthier. 2024 WL 3338944, at *2. Specifically, the Gauthier panel wrote:

[The Gauthier plaintiff] also contends that cases arising from traffic accidents (like this one) should be treated differently than cases arising from property loss (like Aspen). But the nature of the injury is not what matters for purposes of the [FAAAA’s] preemption provision. Any claim that a broker negligently selected a driver to haul a load of property clearly falls within Section 14501(c)(1) because, as just noted, that claim seeks to regulate the broker’s “performance of [its] core transportation-related services.” [Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1268.] And such claims do not arise from an exercise of “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which requires that the relevant state law “have a direct relationship to motor vehicles,” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1271. We made that clear in Aspen by holding that negligent-selection-of-broker claims necessarily lack a direct relationship because “the services [a broker] provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1272 (quoting Miller[v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc.], 976 F.3d [1016,] 1031 [(9th Cir. 2020)] (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Our holding in Aspen that a challenge to a broker’s front-end selection of a motor carrier is preempted in no way turned on the back-end injury suffered as a result of the allegedly negligent selection.

Id. Particularly persuasive to this Court is that Gauthier directly addresses allegations which mirror the Plaintiffs’ allegations against ABDC. Compare id. at *1 (stating that the Gauthier plaintiff alleged that the broker at issue failed to “ensure that the motor carriers with whom it arranged transportation of goods were reasonably safe”), with (doc. 42 at 6, paras. 22–23 in Bradley; doc. 1-2 at 9, para. 27 in Moseley).

In supplementary briefing, the Plaintiffs argue that the Gauthier panel “made the wrong decision on FAAAA preemption as it relates to common law negligence claims because the Aspen panel got its decision wrong.” (Doc. 116 at 2 in Bradley).¹¹ In so doing, the Plaintiffs stack a series of arguments about the interplay between the phrases “with respect to” and “related to” to conclude that Aspen does not control here because it ignores Supreme Court precedent. (Id. at 2–7). The Court disagrees and finds these arguments unconvincing. Putting aside that the Court finds both Aspen and Gauthier to be persuasive, the fact remains that Aspen is binding precedent and Gauthier—though unpublished and not binding—further clarified what Aspen already held.

With that said, the evidentiary record and the parties’ filings offer a different account of ABDC’s role than the version described in the Plaintiffs’ complaints. Instead of demonstrating that ABDC directly selected Big’s Trucking, Outlaw Express, LLC, Pamela Tarter, and Jeffrey Tarter to transport ABDC’s products, the record indicates that ABDC (acting as a shipper) selected Commercial Express (acting as a motor carrier/freight forwarder),¹² who in turn selected Branch LLC, and so forth until the hiring of Big’s Trucking or Outlaw Express, LLC as the ultimate motor carrier which, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, was the problematic choice in the chain. (Doc. 107 at 4–6 in Bradley (Plaintiffs’ joint response describing the relationships amongst the various parties); doc. 98-7 in Bradley (carrier services agreement between ABDC and Commercial Express);¹³ doc. 98-5 at 6, 14:6–15:5 in Bradley; doc. 42 at 7, para. 23 in Bradley; doc. 1-2 at 9, para. 27 in Moseley). As such, the Plaintiffs are attempting to hold ABDC (the shipper) liable for the selection of a motor carrier by an entity at some point in the chain between ABDC and Gray—a claim which is preempted regardless of which entity in the chain made the problematic selection. See Creagan, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 813 n.6 (“Although Wal-Mart is a shipper rather than a broker, the negligent hiring claim against Wal-Mart stems entirely from Kirsch’s broker services [of hiring the motor carrier]. Because the claim against Wal-Mart indirectly attempts to regulate broker services, it must be preempted as well.”).

*7 Again, even if the Court took the Plaintiffs’ complaints at face value while ignoring their later representations and the evidentiary record,¹⁴ the Court would reach the same conclusion because the Plaintiffs’ claims in their complaints stem from ABDC’s alleged negligent selection of a motor carrier to transport property in interstate commerce. In other words, ABDC essentially acted as a broker by selecting a carrier, as acknowledged by the Plaintiffs’ complaints referring to ABDC as a “broker and/or shipper.” (See doc. 1-5 at 9, para. 21 in Bradley; doc. 1-2 at 5, para. 8 in Moseley). Accordingly, while officially a shipper, holding ABDC liable for its alleged selection of a motor carrier would allow states to indirectly intervene into the services market of the trucking industry in a manner which the FAAAA sought to prevent. See Creagan, 354 F. Supp. 3d at 813 n.6; Rowe, 552 U.S. at 372 (holding that a Maine regulation on shippers would ultimately result in carriers altering their services, thus the claims at issue were preempted by the FAAAA); see also Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1267 (citing Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370).

At bottom, the claims against ABDC by the Plaintiffs stem from the actions of entities acting as motor carriers or freight forwarders, entrusted with arranging and transporting ABDC’s products and selecting other motor carriers. The claims against ABDC by the Plaintiffs are expressly preempted by the FAAAA, as codified at § 14501(c)(1), and the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not apply here because the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles.” See Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1272. Therefore, ABDC’s motions for summary judgment (doc. 98 in Bradley and doc. 77 in Moseley) are due to be granted.

B. Preemption as to Claims Against Commercial Express

The Court now turns to the Plaintiffs’ claims against Commercial Express. In their operative complaint, the Bradley Plaintiffs describe Commercial Express as the “broker and/or shipper” liable for their injuries because Commercial Express “negligently/wantonly breached their duty of care by hiring and/or contracting with [Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Big’s Trucking, and/or Outlaw Express, LLC] to transport said load when [D]efendants [Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Big’s Trucking, and/or Outlaw Express, LLC] had a demonstrated disregard for safety.” (Doc. 42 at 6, paras. 22–23 in Bradley). And in their respective complaint, the Moseley Plaintiffs describe Commercial Express as “the broker and/or shipper for the load being transported … at the time of the crash,” (doc. 1-2 at 6, para. 9 in Moseley), who breached its “duty of care by hiring and/or contracting with Defendants Big’s Trucking, Outlaw Express[, LLC], Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, and/or Fictitious Defendants … to transport a load of cargo from Buford, Georgia when Defendants Big’s Trucking, Outlaw Express[, LLC], Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, and/or Fictitious Defendants had a demonstrated disregard for safety and compliance with [Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act].” (Id. at 9, para. 27 in Moseley).

Plaintiffs’ claims against Commercial Express—like their claims against ABDC—are preempted because the FAAAA preempts state law claims regarding negligent hiring of a motor carrier. Taking the operative complaints at face value, the claims lodged against Commercial Express by the Plaintiffs are preempted by the FAAAA because Commercial Express would be a broker¹⁵ defending against claims which stem from the alleged negligent hiring of a motor carrier. As previously discussed, the Eleventh Circuit held that a state law negligent hiring claim is connected to a broker’s services regarding the transportation of property, thus, such a claim is preempted by the FAAAA. Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1272. Indeed, such claims relate to a broker’s “core transportation-related services,” rather than in its capacity as a general member of the public. Id. at 1268.

*8 Much like the Plaintiffs’ varied descriptions of ABDC’s role, the complaints’ characterizations of Commercial Express’ role differ slightly from what the record evidence shows and what the parties now represent. In its motion for summary judgment briefing, Commercial Express characterized itself as blurred between a motor carrier and a freight forwarder. (Doc. 82-1 at 8 in Moseley and doc. 105-1 at 8 in Bradley) (both citing 49 U.S.C. § 13102(8)); (doc. 88 at 7 n.2 in Moseley and doc. 111 at 7 n.2 in Bradley) (“The possession of the product in which they are distributing blurs Commercial Express[ ]’ role between that of a motor carrier and freight forwarder.”). And, for their part, the Plaintiffs characterize Commercial Express as a freight forwarder. (Doc. 107 at 22). Moreover, the agreement between ABDC and Commercial Express indicates that Commercial Express blurred the line between motor carrier and freight forwarder by taking possession of ABDC’s products. (See generally doc. 98-7 in Bradley) (carrier services agreement between ABDC and Commercial Express).¹⁶ Indeed, additional record evidence demonstrates that the arrangement required Commercial Express to coordinate shipment of ABDC’s product, hold the product in Commercial Express’ warehouse, and complete final mile deliveries¹⁷ by other motor carriers. (See, e.g., doc. 105-4 at 21, 75:7–11 in Bradley).¹⁸ Under this arrangement, Commercial Express’ role closely resembles that of a freight forwarder. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(8) (defining freight forwarder).

Despite the parties’ characterization of Commercial Express’ role, the relevant interpretive question is whether Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claims relate to a “service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) (emphasis added). Here, Commercial Express’ alleged actions that form the basis of the Plaintiffs’ claims against it stem from its “core transportation-related services,” rather than in its capacity as a general member of the public. See Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1268. If Commercial Express was a freight forwarder, then it “assum[ed] responsibility for the transportation from the place of receipt to the place of destination[,] and [ ] use[d] for any part of the transportation a carrier,” by hiring or contracting with Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Big’s Trucking, and/or Outlaw Express, LLC. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(8). And if Commercial Express was a motor carrier, then it contracted with another motor carrier to further transport the shipment it was legally bound to transport, which is permissible under certain conditions. See Morales v. OK Trans, Inc., 2023 WL 2495065, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2023); 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a). Therefore, it is unnecessary to determine whether Commercial Express was a freight forwarder or motor carrier because the Plaintiffs’ claims are preempted under either scenario as falling squarely within the FAAAA’s preemption provision regarding the respective core transportation-related services of a freight forwarder or motor carrier. See Aspen, 65 F.4th 1268.

Finally, Plaintiffs’ claims find no refuge in the FAAAA’s safety exception. Plaintiffs’ claims against Commercial Express fall outside the FAAAA’s safety exception because claims regarding negligent hiring are not “with respect to motor vehicles.” Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1272. Like Plaintiffs’ claims against ABDC, their negligent hiring claims against Commercial Express do not directly relate to a motor vehicle and thus remain preempted by the FAAAA.

For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs’ claims against ABDC and Commercial Express are expressly preempted by the FAAAA’s preemption provision found at § 14501(c)(1) and are not captured by the subsequent savings clause at § 14501(c)(2)(A). Therefore, ABDC and Commercial Express’ motions for summary judgment (docs. 77, 82, 98, and 105) are due to be granted.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, it is hereby ORDERED as follows:

1. ABDC’s motion for summary judgment in Bradley (doc. 98 in Bradley) is GRANTED, and all claims against ABDC are DISMISSED;

2. Commercial Express’ motion for summary judgment in Bradley (doc. 105 in Bradley) is GRANTED, and all claims against Commercial Express are DISMISSED;

*9 3. ABDC’s motion for summary judgment in Moseley (doc. 77 in Moseley) is GRANTED, and all claims against ABDC are DISMISSED;

4. Commercial Express’ motion for summary judgment in Moseley (doc. 82 in Moseley) is GRANTED, and all claims against Commercial Express are DISMISSED.

Done this 4th day of September, 2024.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 4045467

Footnotes
1	Pursuant to its authority under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(a)(3), the Court consolidates the two actions for the limited purpose of considering ABDC and Commercial Express’ motions for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a)(3).
2	The Moseley Plaintiffs are Charasma Moseley and Ronald Moseley, as administrator Ad Litem for the Estate of K. A. H. M., deceased. (See generally doc. 1-2 in Moseley).
3	The Moseley Defendants are: ABDC, Commercial Express, Ricky Gray, Big’s Trucking, Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Outlaw Express, LLC, and several fictitious defendants. (See generally doc. 1-2 in Moseley). State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (“State Farm”) was a defendant, but upon motion of the Moseley Plaintiffs and State Farm, the Court dismissed State Farm from this case on September 18, 2023. (Doc. 40 in Moseley). Only ABDC and Commercial Express filed motions for summary judgment.
4	The Bradley Plaintiffs consist of Desmond Bradley and Andrea Thomas, individually and as parents and next friends of C.B. and A.B., minors; Paul C. Harris; Brian Buerkle; and Tracy Powell. (See generally doc. 42 in Bradley).
5	The Bradley Defendants are: ABDC, Commercial Express, Ricky Gray, Big’s Trucking, Pamela Tarter, Jeffrey Tarter, Outlaw Express, LLC, and several fictitious defendants. (See generally doc. 42 in Bradley). Geico Casualty Insurance Company (“Geico”) was initially a defendant, but on April 26, 2022, the Circuit Court of Lowndes County dismissed Geico upon a joint stipulation of dismissal by the parties. (Doc. 1-3 at 34 in Bradley). Only ABDC and Commercial Express filed motions for summary judgment.
6	In his deposition, Gray stated that Outlaw Express, LLC rebranded as Big’s Trucking. (Doc. 98-2 at 10, 29:7–21 in Bradley). This rebranding occurred between 2018 and 2019. (Doc. 107 at 5 in Bradley). Brian Lipford was the manager and registered agent of Outlaw Express, LLC prior to its dissolution. (Doc. 5-1 at 2 in Bradley; doc. 1-3 at 2 in Moseley).
7	Though not addressed by the parties, Commercial Express never filed an answer in either case. Failure to file an answer by a defendant moving for summary judgment does not preclude a court from entertaining such a motion. See Marquez v. Cable One, Inc., 463 F.3d 1118, 1120 (10th Cir. 2006); HS Resources, Inc. v. Wingate, 327 F.3d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 2003); INVST Fin. Grp., Inc. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391, 404 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Courts and commentators have acknowledged that no answer need be filed before a defendant’s motion for summary judgment may be entertained.”); Jones v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 601 F. Supp. 2d 297, 302 (D.D.C. 2009) (“A defendant, however, is not required to respond in the form of an answer before making a motion for summary judgment, which may be made by a defending party ‘at any time.’ ”); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(b) (authorizing a party to move for summary judgment “at any time” until 30 days after the close of discovery, unless otherwise specified by the court or local rule); First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 290, 299 (1968) (affirming summary judgment for a defendant despite said defendant’s failure to file an answer). The Court here, and elsewhere in the Opinion, cites to non-binding authority. While the Court recognizes that these cases are not precedential, the Court finds them persuasive.
8	The Court collectively refers to the Moseley Plaintiffs and the Bradley Plaintiffs as “the Plaintiffs.”
9	Contentions regarding the alleged failure to verify adequate insurance coverage are included within the same claim(s) as the alleged negligent/wanton hiring because conduct regarding the verification of insurance coverage would be encapsulated by the “services” of such actors. See Enbridge Energy, LP v. Imperial Freight Inc., 2019 WL 1858881, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 25, 2019) (citing Huntington Operating Corp. v. Sybonney Exp., Inc., 2010 WL 1930087, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 11, 2010)).
10	The Bradley and Moseley Plaintiffs filed a joint response to ABDC’s motions to dismiss, which is document 107 in Bradley and document 84 in Moseley. Thus, the responses filed in each case are identical and the Court will refer solely to the document in Bradley for consistency.
11	The same document is filed as document 94 in Moseley.
12	As later discussed in the Opinion, Commercial Express, at times, blurred the line between motor carrier and freight forwarder.
13	This is document 77-7 in Moseley.
14	This standard is more akin to the standard for a motion to dismiss rather than summary judgment. However, the Court uses this hypothetical to underscore that the Plaintiffs’ claims would be preempted regardless of the evidentiary standard utilized by the Court.
15	Though the complaints describe Commercial Express as a possible shipper, elsewhere in the complaints, the Plaintiffs state that the trailer (i.e., the goods) was owned by ABDC, (doc. 1-2 at 8, para. 24 in Moseley; doc. 42 at 3, para. 10 in Bradley), which would make ABDC the shipper in said scenario. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13) (defining “individual shipper”). And, of course, both parties now acknowledge that ABDC owned the goods and was the shipper. (Doc. 107 at 4) (stating that Gray was delivering drugs on behalf of ABDC); (doc. 105-1 at 4, para. 13 in Bradley; doc. 82-1 at 4, para. 14 in Moseley).
16	This is document 77-7 in Moseley.
17	“Final mile deliveries” refers to the final phase of transportation to a shipment’s ultimate destination. See Hamrick v. Partsfleet, LLC, 1 F.4th 1337, 1340 (11th Cir. 2021).
18	This is document 82-4 in Moseley.

End of Document 

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.  

United States District Court, S.D. Alabama, Southern Division.

CLARENCE L. ROBERTS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.

BENTARIUS FONTA STEWART, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 22-00187-KD-MU

|

Filed 10/22/2024

ORDER

KRISTI K. DuBOSE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 This action is before the Court on the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, (Doc. 81), and Brief in Support, (Doc. 82), filed by Defendant Unlimited Deliveries, LLC d/b/a MK Trucking (“Unlimited”); the Response, (Doc. 89), filed by Plaintiffs Clarence L. Roberts (“Roberts”) and Arkyla Miller (“Miller”) (collectively “Plaintiffs”); and the Reply, (Doc. 91), filed by Unlimited. Upon consideration, and for the reasons below, the partial motion for summary judgment is granted as to Counts III and IV.¹

I. Findings of Fact

The “facts,” as accepted at the summary judgment stage, “may not be the actual facts of the case.” Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1247 (11th Cir. 2013). For the purposes of summary judgment, the undisputed facts follow:

Bentarius Fonta Stewart (“Stewart”) attended truck driving school at Delta Technical College in Jackson, Mississippi. (Doc. 83-1 at 2 p. 13). After passing a road test and an “inspection test,” Stewart received a certificate and his commercial driver’s license (“CDL”) Class A in October or November 2017. (Id.). Stewart was then employed as a driver for several trucking companies. (Id.).

On July 26, 2018, Stewart was convicted of speeding (driving 93 MPH in a 70 MPH speed zone). (Doc. 89-10 at 2). On March 7, 2020, Stewart was issued a citation for careless driving. (Doc. 83-7 at 2).

On October 13, 2021, Stewart applied to work as a driver for Unlimited. (Doc. 83-2). The same day, Stewart met with Unlimited’s hiring manager, Shane Walley (“Walley”), and Unlimited’s safety manager, Josh Little (“Little”). (Doc. 83-1 at 3 pp. 34–35). Stewart was drug tested by Unlimited, which was negative. (Doc. 83-4). Unlimited also obtained Stewart’s medical card, which revealed no medical issues, (Doc. 83-5), and Unlimited obtained Stewart’s motor vehicle report (“MVR”), which contained no accidents, violations, or suspensions in the previous three years, (Doc. 83-6). Stewart drove for Unlimited from about October through December 2021. (Doc. 83-1 at 4 pp. 55–56).

On November 29, 2021, Stewart was offered the position of CDL instructor at Delta State Technical College. (Doc. 89-4 at 3). In December 2021, Stewart resigned from Unlimited because he “had a newborn.” (Doc. 83-1 at 4). On January 19, 2022, Stewart was fired from Delta State for being “excessively absent.” (Doc. 89-4 at 2).

In February 2022, Stewart returned to work for Unlimited. (Doc. 83-1 at 5 p. 59). Stewart took another drug test for Unlimited. (Id. at 6 p. 99). Unlimited obtained a new MVR, which showed a citation for careless driving in Mississippi issued on March 7, 2021. (Doc. 83-7 at 2). Stewart testifies that this citation was received because he had racing tires on his personal vehicle and that he did not tell Unlimited about the citation on his first application because he “had a family member working on it trying to get it thrown out.” (Doc. 83-1 at 4 pp. 53–55). Stewart testifies that he discussed the citation with Little during his second hiring and told him that he was not actually driving the vehicle when he received the citation. (Id. at 4 p. 55).

*2 In February 2022, Stewart received “Safer Hub” training for Cargo Securement, CDL Commercial Driver DOT Training, Clearinghouse Driver Orientation, Commercial Driver Defensive Driving Course, Commercial Vehicle Inspection Procedures, Driver Loading and Unloading Near a Truck Lift, MK Trucking—Safety Policies and Procedures, and Roadside Inspection—Interpersonal Skills. (Doc 83-8).

On March 15, 2022, Stewart ran through a stop sign and crashed into Plaintiff Roberts—who was driving on U.S. Highway 43 in Alabama. (Doc. 1-2; Doc. 89-1). The accident report indicates that Stewart’s dog was “underneath his legs preventing him from braking.” (Doc. 1-2 at 4). Stewart’s brother’s nephew was also riding in his vehicle when the accident occurred. (Doc. 89-5 at 2 p. 73). MK Trucking’s employee handbook prohibits pets and unauthorized passengers from riding in company vehicles. (Doc. 89-14). Stewart was not hauling a load at the time of the accident. (Doc. 83-3 at 2).

II. Standard of Review

Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if it “might affect the outcome” of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party,” a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id.

The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact.” FindWhat Inv’r Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1307 (11th Cir. 2011). The movant meets this burden by identifying affirmative evidence (pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, etc.) to support its claim that no genuine dispute of material fact exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). If the nonmovant bears the burden of persuasion at trial, the movant may also make a prima facie showing of summary judgment by demonstrating that the nonmovant’s evidence is insufficient to establish an essential element of its claim. Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Slaughter, 958 F.3d 1050, 1057 (11th Cir. 2020); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B).

If the movant meets its burden under Rule 56(c), summary judgment will be granted unless the nonmovant offers some competent evidence that could be presented at trial showing that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. If the movant met its burden by pointing “to specific portions of the record … to demonstrate that the nonmoving party cannot meet its burden of proof at trial,” the nonmovant must “go beyond the pleadings” to designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).

When assessing a summary judgment motion, the court’s function is not to make “credibility determinations” and “weigh the evidence.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. Instead, the court must “view all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” FindWhat, 658 F.3d at 1307. Thus, summary judgment is only proper when a movant shows that no reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant—even when the evidence and inferences are drawn in the nonmovant’s favor.

III. Analysis

*3 Unlimited moves for summary judgment as to Count III (Negligent Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision and/or Training) and Count IV (Wanton Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision, and/or Training) of Plaintiffs’ complaint. (Docs. 81, 82). Unlimited argues that Roberts’s claims for Negligent and Wanton Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision, and/or Training fail because Stewart was not an incompetent driver. (Doc. 82 at 7). Unlimited does not address Counts I, II, or V in its motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 81, 82). Alabama law applies because this case is before the court on diversity jurisdiction, the forum is Alabama, and the accident occurred in Alabama. See e.g., Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).

A. Negligent Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision, and/or Training

Alabama caselaw creates no distinction between wrongful supervision and wrongful training. Pritchett v. ICN Med. All., Inc., 938 So. 2d 933, 940 (Ala. 2006). Likewise, the general standard for negligent hiring, retention, monitoring, supervision, or training is the same under Alabama law. Plaintiffs must prove “that the employer knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that its employee was incompetent.” See e.g., Mason v. McGuffey, No. 2:20-CV-320-WKW, 2022 WL 3640301, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 23, 2022). “[I]mplicit in the tort of negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision is the concept that, as a consequence of the employee’s incompetence, the employee committed some sort of act, wrongdoing, or tort that caused the plaintiff’s injury.” Jones Exp., Inc. v. Jackson, 86 So. 3d 298, 305 (Ala. 2010).

Incompetence is defined as the “quality, state, or condition of being unable or unqualified to do something.” Incompetence, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). In Halford, the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed earlier and later editions of the Black’s Law Dictionary definition of “incompetence,” as well as caselaw, to explain that the concern is with “a person’s actual driving ability, not a legal disqualification.” Halford v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409, 415 (Ala. 2005). Thus, “the incompetence of a driver is measured by the driver’s demonstrated ability (or inability) to properly drive a vehicle.” Id. at 413–14.

Evidence of incompetence for purposes of negligent entrustment “may be established by evidence of prior acts of negligent or reckless driving, prior accidents, or prior acts of driving while intoxicated.” Davis as Next Friend J.W. v. Grant, No. CV 1:21-00005-KD-M, 2022 WL 1557377, at *10 (S.D. Ala. May 17, 2022) (citing Edwards v. Valentine, 926 So.2d 315, 321–322 (Ala. 2005)). “The same applies to the claim of negligent hiring and retention.” Id. However, the law “does not require that [the driver] have a record be completely free of mistake.” Askew v. R & L Transfer, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2009). “Alabama courts have been especially reluctant to allow a negligent hiring claim when the driver’s accidents or speeding tickets were in the distant past.” Claussen v. PowerSecure, Inc., No. 318CV00607ALBSMD, 2019 WL 4941109, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 7, 2019).

For example, in Pryor, the Alabama Supreme Court concluded that “two speeding tickets and a suspended prosecution of a DUI charge over a 10-year period—is not sufficient to support a claim of negligent entrustment” against the defendant. Pryor v. Brown & Root USA, Inc., 674 So. 2d 45, 52 (Ala. 1995). Likewise, in Askew, the court concluded that “no evidence in the record suggests that” the driver was incompetent despite having six citations because those incidents were considered “blemishes on an otherwise clean professional driving record.” Askew, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1303–04.

*4 Unlimited argues that Stewart was not an incompetent driver for several reasons. (Doc. 82 at 11). “At the time of the accident, Stewart had held a CDL for more than four (4) years.” (Id.). “During that time, Stewart had not been involved in any accidents, and had only received one citation for careless driving while operating his personal vehicle.” (Id.). In support, Unlimited compares Stewart to the driver in Craft v. Triumph Logistics, Inc., who the court determined was not incompetent despite “several moving violations.” 107 F. Supp. 3d 1218, 1225 (M.D. Ala. 2015).

In Craft, the driver “was a professional commercial driver with several years of experience.” 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. Here, Stewart is a professional commercial driver with several years of experience. (Doc. 83-1). The driver in Craft “earned his commercial driver’s license after receiving training and education at a technical college, and he passed the necessary tests to obtain his commercial license.” Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. Here, Stewart received training and education at a technical college, and Stewart passed the necessary tests to obtain a CDL. (Doc. 83-1 at 2 p. 13). In Craft, the driver “worked several different commercial-truck-driving jobs prior to and between his terms of employment at [the company in question], and he passed a road test when hired by [that company].” Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. Here, Stewart did the same. (Doc. 83-1 at 2 p. 13). Finally, the driver in Craft was trained in defensive driving and his CDL had “never been suspended or revoked” prior to the accident. Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1224. Here, Stewart completed several training courses—including defensive driving—and his CDL had never been suspended or revoked prior to the accident. (Doc 83-8).

Plaintiffs argue that Stewart was incompetent to drive a professional truck because “he lacks the temperament, morals, and character of a professional truck driver requires to operate a vehicle safely on the public roads.” (Doc. 89 at 5). In support, Plaintiffs cite Edwards v. Valentine for the proposition that “a plaintiff may prove negligent entrustment through evidence of habitual negligence OR general incompetence.” (Id.) (citing Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 322). But it is unclear how “temperament, morals, and character” show habitual negligence or general incompetence. In Edwards, the court stated that “specifically, proof [of negligent entrustment] may ‘be established by evidence of previous acts of negligent or reckless driving, … previous accidents, or previous acts of driving while intoxicated.’ ” Edwards, 926 So. 2d at 322. In that case, the driver had been “involved in three instances of driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance” and was apparently unable to obtain a driver’s license. Id. at 323. Edwards does not support Plaintiffs’ argument that Stewart was incompetent to drive a professional truck.

Further, Plaintiffs rely on two cases—Brewster v. S. Home Rentals, LLC, No. 3:11CV872-WHA, 2012 WL 5869282 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 19, 2012) and Trinidad v. Moore, No. 2:15CV323-WHA, 2016 WL 4267951 (M.D. Ala. Aug. 11, 2016)—that are distinguishable from the present case. In both Brewster and Moore, the court denied summary judgment as to the negligent entrustment claims against the employer but granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the wanton entrustment claims. Brewster, 2012 WL 5869282 at *6; Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *5.

In Brewster, the court denied summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ negligent entrustment claim because the driver in question had “three speeding tickets” and “had a hydroplaning wreck that was her fault shortly after starting work with” the company. Brewster, 2012 WL 5869282 at *2–4. The court also relied on evidence that the driver had “violations of two [company] policies” relevant to driver eligibility. Id. One policy provision stated that “if an employee has three or more minor moving violations, the employee will not be eligible to drive.” Id. at *2. The other provision required “notification of any wrecks of its drivers.” Id. Against company policies, the driver in Brewster was still driving despite having three speeding tickets, and the driver failed to disclose the hydroplaning accident. Id.

*5 In Trinidad, the court denied summary judgment on the negligent entrustment claim because “a question of fact [had] been created as to general incompetence” and “because there [were] questions of fact as to the cause of the accident.” Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *4. There, the driver had “three infractions before he was hired.” Id. at *3. After the driver was hired, he had “a speeding ticket, a preventable accident, and [company] policy violations including a failure to properly maintain equipment which resulted in air leaking from brakes and a falsification of logbooks.” Id. Moreover, the company’s representative testified that the driver’s “infractions were violations of the company’s policy.” Id. The court concluded that “a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that a reasonably prudent person with knowledge of [the driver’s] infractions and violations of safety policy ought to foresee injury resulting from the entrustment of a vehicle to [the driver].” Id. at *4.

Plaintiffs argue that “Stewart is just like the defendant drivers in Brewster and Trinidad.” (Doc. 89 at 6). Plaintiffs point to Stewart’s “reckless driving conviction” and an allegation that he “was out on bail for a rape charge.” (Doc. 89 at 6). Plaintiffs reference that Stewart was “caught going 93 in a 70-mph zone, which is reckless driving and considered a serious offense under Alabama law.” (Id.). Plaintiffs write that Stewart “lied on his application about the number of miles he traveled as a professional truck driver and lied about his citation for careless driving directly violating the FMCSRs.” (Id.). And Plaintiffs argue that “MK Trucking would have known about this had they performed any diligence whatsoever.” (Id.).

To start, Stewart’s record has far less blemishes than the drivers’ records in Brewster and Trinidad. Stewart’s record contains no accidents at all—either before or after being hired by Unlimited. The driver in Brewster was at fault for a hydroplaning accident while working for her company. Brewster, 2012 WL 5869282 at *2. The driver in Trinidad was involved in a “preventable accident” while working for his company. Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *3. Here, Stewart was issued one speeding ticket, and this ticket was issued more than three years before his initial hiring with Unlimited. (Doc. 89-10 at 2). The driver in Brewster had three speeding tickets, Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *3, and the driver in Trinidad had a speeding ticket while working for his company. Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *3. The driver in Trinidad also had three infractions before he was hired and violated his company’s policy by failing to maintain equipment “which resulted in air leaking from brakes and a falsification of logbooks.” Id. In short, Stewart’s record is much more similar to the driver in Craft who the court concluded was not incompetent despite “several moving violations.” Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1225.

Moreover, Plaintiffs provide no support for the allegation that Stewart was out on bail for a rape charge—which is irrelevant as to whether he was an incompetent driver. And Stewart’s lone speeding ticket was issued in 2018, more than three years prior to his first hire. (Doc. 89-10 at 2). This citation did not appear on Stewart’s MVR, and it was outside of the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations’ (“FMSCRs”) three-year reporting window. 49 CFR § 391.23(a)(1). Stewart’s March 7, 2020, citation for careless driving did appear on Stewart’s second MVR with Unlimited. (Doc. 83-7 at 2). This citation creates a blemish in Stewart’s record. But it does not show that Stewart is unable to properly drive a vehicle. See Askew, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1303 (“The law requires that a driver have had a ‘demonstrated ability to properly drive a vehicle,’ …; it does not require that he have a record completely free of mistake.”) (citation omitted)).

Likewise, Plaintiffs’ acknowledgement of Stewart’s application history is insufficient to prove that Stewart was an incompetent driver. “Infractions that are ‘administrative in nature’ do not bear on a driver’s ‘actual ability or inability to properly handle an automobile on the road.’ ” Lawson v. Parkwood Indus. LLC, 656 F. Supp. 3d 1283, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2023) (quoting Halford, 921 So. 2d at 413). “Evidence of violation of company policy may be relevant under some circumstances …. For example, when the policies violated relate to a driver’s eligibility to drive, they may bear on the competence inquiry.” Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951, at *3. Stewart’s inaccurate reporting of his professional driving miles and Stewart’s failure to disclose his careless driving citation are administrative in nature. Cf. Lawson, 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1290 (“[D]eficient logging habits and failure to comply with inspection obligations do not hinder [the driver’s] ability to safely operate a vehicle and are … administrative in nature.”). Plaintiffs have not demonstrated how Stewart’s eligibility to drive for Unlimited was in question or how Stewart was unable to safely operate a vehicle based on his application history.

*6 Finally, Stewart’s alleged violations of the law, regulations, and company policy at the time of the accident is not sufficient to prove that Unlimited knew or should have known that Stewart was incompetent. Even if it is determined that Stewart was negligent on this occasion, “[a] mistake or single act of negligence on the part of an employee does not establish incompetency ….” Southland Bank v. A & A Drywall Supply Co., 21 So. 3d 1196, 1216 (Ala. 2008). In other words: “Negligence is not synonymous with incompetency. The most competent may be negligent.” Id. (quoting Pritchett, 938 So. 2d at 941). “[O]ne who is habitually negligent may on that account be incompetent.” Prichett, 938 So. 2d at 941. Plaintiffs have shown that Stewart was violating company policy at the time of the accident by allowing a passenger and his dog in the vehicle. (Doc. 1-2 at 4; Doc. 89-5 at 2 p. 73; Doc. 89-14). But Plaintiffs have not shown that Stewart was habitually negligent. In Plaintiffs’ own words: “Stewart was not incompetent to drive a professional truck because of his habitual negligence ….” (Doc. 89 at 5).

In sum, the undisputed facts do not indicate that Stewart was an incompetent driver. Like the driver in Craft, Stewart had “several years of truck-driving experience and a commercial driver’s license in good standing, both demonstrating his ‘ability to properly handle an automobile on the road.’ ” Craft, 107 F. Supp. 3d at 1225 (quoting Halford, 921 So.2d at 414). Thus, no reasonable jury could determine that Unlimited knew or should have known that Stewart was an incompetent driver.

In fact, Stewart’s record has less blemishes than other drivers that Alabama courts have held were not incompetent as a matter of law. See Pryor, 674 So. 2d at 52 (“[T]wo speeding tickets and a suspended prosecution of a DUI charge over a 10-year period—is not sufficient to support a claim of negligent entrustment.”); Askew, 676 F. Supp. 2d at 1303–04 (“[N]o evidence in the record suggests that [the driver] was incompetent” despite two moving violations and four minor accidents.); Lawson, 656 F. Supp. 3d at 1290 (granting summary judgment in favor of trucking company despite driver having three minor infractions within one year of the accident). Accordingly, Unlimited’s motion for summary judgment against Plaintiffs as to Count III (Negligent Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision and/or Training) is granted.

B. Wanton Hiring, Retention, Monitoring, Supervision, and/or Training

Wantonness is defined as “the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.” Lafarge N. Am., Inc. v. Nord, 86 So. 3d 326, 333 (Ala. 2011) (quoting Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007)). Wantonness “is not to be confused with negligence (i.e., mere inadvertence).” Id. (quoting Tolbert v. Tolbert, 903 So. 2d 103, 114 (Ala. 2004)). Wantonness requires “a higher degree of culpability” than negligence. Id. (quoting Tolbert, 903 So. 2d at 114).

Wanton entrustment—like negligent entrustment—requires the plaintiff show that the employer knew, or should have known, that the employee was incompetent. Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Ala. 1985). But wanton entrustment also requires showing that the employer entrusted the vehicle “while knowing that entrustment would likely or probably result in injury to others.” Jordan ex rel. Jordan v. Calloway, 7 So. 3d 310, 317 (Ala. 2008).

The standard for wantonness is clearly higher than the standard for negligence. Indeed, the two cases that Plaintiffs use in support—Brewster and Trinidad—resulted in the granting of summary judgment for the employers on the plaintiffs’ wantonness claims. Brewster, 2012 WL 5869282 at *6; Trinidad, 2016 WL 4267951 at *5. Even with this higher standard, Plaintiffs’ claim for wanton hiring, retention, monitoring, supervision, and/or training turns on Stewart’s competency as a driver.

*7 Stewart is not an incompetent driver under Alabama law. See supra, Part III.A. Therefore, no reasonable jury could find that Unlimited knew or should have known that Stewart was incompetent. And no reasonable jury could find that Unlimited engaged in wanton hiring, retention, monitoring, supervision, and/or training with regard to Stewart. Thus, summary judgment is granted against Plaintiffs as to Count IV.

IV. Conclusion

Unlimited has demonstrated the absence of a genuine dispute of a material fact by identifying affirmative evidence regarding Stewart’s competency as a driver. Plaintiffs have failed to provide sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Stewart was an incompetent driver under Alabama law. Therefore, Plaintiffs have failed to sustain their burden as to the claims of negligent or wanton hiring, retention, monitoring, supervision, or training of Stewart. Unlimited’s motion for partial summary judgment as to Counts III and IV, (Doc. 81), is granted.

DONE and ORDERED this 22nd day of October 2024.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2024 WL 4544124

Footnotes
1	Unlimited has also moved to exclude or limit the testimony of Plaintiffs’ experts Dr. Todd Edmiston and Walter Guntharp (Doc. 84). The Court has not considered the testimony of either expert in ruling on partial summary judgment.

© 2024 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.  

End of Document