Broker - Central Analysis Bureau

Heselton v. Espinoza

United States District Court, S.D. Illinois.

STACEY HESELTON, LANETTE HESELTON, Plaintiffs,

PEDRO ESPINOZA, ROLINE EXPRESS, INC., and FLOCK FREIGHT, INC., Defendants.

Case No. 21-cv-1592-DWD

10/24/2023

DAVID W. DUGAN, United States District Judge

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

*1 DUGAN, District Judge:

In this matter, Plaintiffs Stacey and LaNette Heselton assert multiple claims for negligence and loss of consortium against Defendants Pedro Espinoza, Roline Express, Inc., and Flock Freight, Inc., following a vehicle accident on September 26, 2021 in Effingham, Illinois (Doc. 48). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts a negligence claim against Defendant Espinoza, the driver of the tractor trailer which struck Plaintiff Stacey Heselton’s vehicle (Count 1). Plaintiff also asserts a vicarious liability claim (Count 2) and negligent hiring claim (Count 3) against Defendants Roline Express and Flock Freight, Inc. for their involvement in the employment of Espinoza and contract for transporting the freight load carried by Espinoza at the time of the accident. Now before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss Without Prejudice (Doc. 62) and Supplement in Support (Doc. 64). Defendants Pedro Espinoza, Roline Express, Inc., and Flock Freight, Inc. oppose the Motion (Docs. 65, 66, 68).

Discussion

As further explained in the Court’s prior Order at Doc. 64, the Court construes Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss as a request for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) because Defendants Espinoza and Roline Express, Inc. have already filed answers in this matter, and Defendants do not consent to Plaintiffs’ request for dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) permits the Court to dismiss a case on “terms that the court considers proper.” Dismissals under Rule 41(a)(2) are “within the sound discretion of the district court.” Kovalic v. DEC Int’l, Inc., 855 F.2d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 1988). “The district court abuses that discretion ‘only when it can be established that the defendant will suffer plain legal prejudice as the result of the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s action.’ ” Solomon v. Armor Corr. Health, Inc., No. 19-CV-12-JPS, 2020 WL 407127 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 23, 2020) (internal citations omitted). The following factors indicate whether the defendant will suffer “plain legal prejudice” if the action is dismissed without prejudice:

(1) the effort and expense of preparing for trial; (2) plaintiff’s delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting the action; (3) ‘insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal’ and (4) whether the defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment.

Id. (citing Pace v. S. Exp. Co., 409 F.2d 331, 334 (7th Cir. 1969)).

Defendants oppose dismissal (Docs. 65, 66). All Defendants argue that they will suffer “plain legal prejudice” if this case is dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiffs intend to pursue this action in a different district, specifically the Superior Court of California, Los Angeles County where Plaintiffs filed a second lawsuit against Defendants on September 25, 2023 (Doc. 65-1). Defendants Espinoza and Roline Express, Inc. argue that they will be prejudiced by a dismissal because Defendants have conducted extensive discovery and incurred substantial costs in litigating this matter here, in addition to having expert depositions scheduled (Doc. 66). Defendant Flock Freight also argues that dismissal at this stage will allow Plaintiffs to “reset the [discovery] clock” and re-litigate this case for a second time in California (Doc. 65).

*2 In addition to the extensive discovery and late stage of these proceedings, Defendant Flock Freight further contends that it will be prejudiced by a dismissal because it believes Plaintiffs are forum shopping to avoid an adverse ruling on Defendant’s pending Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 65). Defendant Flock Freight filed its Motion to Dismiss on September 1, 2023 (Doc. 56). In its Motion, Flock Freight argues that the Seventh Circuit’s recent decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023) bars Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claims against it because Defendant is a federally licensed freight broker (Doc. 65, p. 6). In Ye, the Seventh Circuit held that negligent hiring claims against a federally licensed freight broker are entirely preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). See Ye, 74 F.4th at 453.

Plaintiffs filed their response to Defendant’s Motion on September 29, 2023 (Doc.

59), just five days prior to filing their current Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss. Thus, Defendant Flock suggests that Plaintiffs are motivated to litigate this matter in California, in part, to avoid a ruling on the pending Motion to Dismiss and instead proceed in an apparently more favorable venue. In support of this argument, Defendant Flock maintains that precedent out of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals may be more favorable to Plaintiffs on the specific preemption issue presented here, and thus litigating this matter in California would be prejudicial to Defendant’s position in this Court. See, e.g., Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding that negligent hiring claims against a federally licensed freight broker fell within the FAAAA’s preemption exception for “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles”). Accordingly, as an alternative argument, Defendant Flock Freight asks the Court to first rule on the merits of its Rule 12(b)(6) Motion before considering Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss. See Mezyk v. U.S. Bank Pension Plan, No. 3:09-CV-384-JPG, 2011 WL 147303, at *2 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 18, 2011) (“[D]ismissal without prejudice may be inappropriate where the plaintiff seeks to avoid an adverse ruling by the Court.”) (citing Kapoulas v. Williams Ins. Agency, Inc., 11 F.3d 1380, 1385 (7th Cir. 1993). Defendant Flock Freight further asks the Court to award it reasonable attorney fees and costs pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d).

Although Plaintiffs’ original motion did not provide an explanation for their need to dismiss this case, Plaintiffs filed a Supplement explaining that dismissal is sought here because litigating this case in California will be more convenient and appropriate (Doc. 67). According to Plaintiffs, after extensive discovery they learned of Defendant Flock Freight’s involvement in this case, and subsequently confirmed that all Defendants are located in California (Doc. 67). Plaintiffs also represent that all of Defendant Espinoza’s former employers, in addition to Plaintiffs’ only other witness to the collision, are all located and employed in California. Plaintiffs further indicate that they have been unable to successfully serve their fact witnesses in California because multiple witnesses have refused to comply with their service attempts, which has hindered the pursuit of Plaintiffs’ case. Accordingly, Plaintiffs now believe that it is in their best interests to pursue their claims in California because all Defendants and all evidence is located there. Plaintiffs thus ask that the Court dismiss this action.

As mentioned above, the dismissal of a plaintiff’s complaint without prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) is within the district court’s sound discretion. See Tyco Lab’ys, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 627 F.2d 54, 56 (7th Cir. 1980). In deciding whether to grant a Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss, courts should consider a variety of factors, including: “the defendant’s effort and expense of preparation for trial, excessive delay and lack of diligence on the party of the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, insufficient explanation for the need to take a dismissal, and the fact that a motion for summary judgment has been filed by the defendant.” Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 627 F.2d at 56; see also Stern v. Barnett, 452 F.2d 211, 213 (7th Cir. 1971) (“In exercising its discretion the court follows the traditional principle that dismissal should be allowed unless the defendant will suffer some plain legal prejudice other than the mere prospect of a second lawsuit.”). There is no mandate that each and every factor be resolved in favor of the moving party before dismissal is appropriate; the factors are merely a guide for the courts. Id.; see also Ripper v. Leisure Properties, LLC, No. 18-CV-1719-SMY-RJD, 2019 WL 2422356 (S.D. Ill. June 10, 2019).

*3 Here, the relevant factors in this case weigh in favor of voluntary dismissal. This litigation, although pending since December 2021, is not at an advanced stage procedurally. Discovery is still on-going, and trial is not set until March 2024, although the parties recently moved to continue this date (Doc. 60). While Defendants have expended effort in motion practice and discovery, here such efforts do not amount to “plain legal prejudice.” See Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 627 F.2d at 56 (the commencement of discovery alone does not create plain legal prejudice needed to defeat dismissal without prejudice). Nor is it apparent that these discovery efforts will be rendered worthless by a dismissal. Id. at 56 (rejecting argument that extensive discovery would be tantamount to “plain legal prejudice” when parties agreed at oral argument to the utilization of evidence discovery in the dismissed case in plaintiff’s subsequently filed case); in accord Elliott v. Abbott Lab’ys, Inc., No. 3:13-CV-000480-NJR, 2019 WL 8268546, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2019) (Finding “the efforts and expenses expended by [Defendant] thus far in this Court would also be useful and relevant in other courts without being wasted.”). And even though this case has been pending since December 2021, the current record before the Court does not support a finding of excessive delay or lack of diligence.

Finally, no plain legal prejudice would ensue with dismissal. Contrary to Defendant Flock Freight’s presumption, it is not a foregone conclusion that its motion to dismiss would be granted or that it would be conclusively dispositive. Indeed, the federal preemption argument Defendant relies on is an affirmative defense which Defendant bears the burden of proof. Further, this analysis may require a factual finding as to whether Defendant Flock was a trucking broker opposed to a motor carrier, a fact which the parties currently dispute. Compare Doc. 48, ¶¶ 10, 29 (Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Flock is a registered motor carrier) with Doc. 56, pp. 3-4 (Defendant Flock insists that Flock has never been a “registered motor carrier” and construes Plaintiffs’ allegations as a “blatant misstatement … that is factually incorrect.”). If such factual dispute is indeed relevant to the preemption question, Defendant has not yet shown how the Court is to resolve this factual dispute on a Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss. See, e.g., Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 751 n.1 (7th Cir. 2012) (“A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) can be based only on the complaint itself, documents attached to the complaint, documents that are critical to the complaint and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice”).¹ Nevertheless, without commenting on the merits of Defendant Flock’s Motion, “the pendency of [a dispositive] motion is not enough to show prejudice. See Simons v. Fox, 725 F. App’x 402, 406 (7th Cir. 2018) (unpublished) (citing Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 627 F.2d at 56). Nor does the fact that Plaintiffs plan to litigate a second lawsuit result in prejudice. Tyco Laboratories, Inc., 627 F.2d at 56 (“[W]e expressly observed that the prospect of a second lawsuit would not be sufficient to meet [the plain legal prejudice] standard.”); Stern, 452 F.2d at 213.

Conclusion

For these reasons, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) (Doc. 62) is GRANTED over Defendants’ objections. This matter is DISMISSED without prejudice. All pending motions are DENIED, as moot, and without prejudice. All deadlines and hearings are hereby terminated. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, and to close this case.

Finally, Defendant Flock Freight’s request for attorney fees and costs under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 41(d) is DENIED. When a plaintiff who previously dismisses an action in any Court files an action based on or including the same claim against the same defendant, the Court may order the plaintiff to pay all or part of the costs of the previous action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(d)(1). The decision to award fees and costs is left to the Court’s discretion. Esposito v. Piatrowski, 223 F.3d 497, 500–01 (7th Cir. 2000). The purpose of this rule is to prevent forum shopping and vexatious litigation. Esposito, 223 F.3d at 500-01. Thus, a “judge who reasonably believed that the plaintiff had imposed a gratuitous expense on the defendant by filing in the wrong court and now wanted to dismiss without prejudice in the expectation of refiling in the right court would therefore be justified in conditioning voluntary dismissal on the plaintiff’s reimbursing some or all of the defendant’s expenditures in litigating the jurisdictional issue.” Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Younan Properties, Inc., 737 F.3d 465, 468 (7th Cir. 2013). However, any fee award should “reimburse the defendant for expenses incurred in preparing work product that will not be useful in subsequent litigation of the same claim.” Id.

*4 Here, Defendant Flock Freight provides no argument or basis to support an award of fees or costs. Further, the facts and circumstances do not warrant the costs in this instance. It is not clear to the Court that Plaintiffs are engaged in forum shopping; rather Plaintiffs are pursuing their claims in two jurisdictions that both have jurisdiction to hear their claims. Moreover, it appears that the expenses incurred by Defendant in preparing work product in this case will be useful in subsequent litigation, and Defendant has not otherwise shown that it has incurred “gratuitous expense” in the three months Defendant Flock Freight has been involved in this litigation, having first entered its appearance on August 16, 2023 (Doc. 53).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 24, 2023

DAVID W. DUGAN

United States District Judge

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2023 WL 7003467

Footnotes

In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Flock appears to have copied a screenshot from a federal website to support its argument that it was not acting as a registered motor carrier (Doc. 56, p. 4). However, the screenshot is partially illegible, and Defendant does not otherwise explain how the Court can take judicial notice of this fact from an unidentified source. See, e.g. Fed. R. Evid. 201.

End of Document

Cornejo v. Dakota Lines, Inc.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, Third Division

September 27, 2023, Opinion Filed

No. 1-22-0633

FRANCINE CORNEJO, Individually and as Mother and Next Friend of Gustavo Cornejo Jr., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DAKOTA LINES, INC.; GORDON LEWIS; and ALLIANCE SHIPPERS, INC., Defendants (Alliance Shippers, Inc., Defendant-Appellant).

Prior History: [**1] Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 17 L 003274. Honorable Bridget J. Hughes, Judge, presiding.

Disposition: Reversed.

Core Terms

driver, truck, carrier, broker, transportation, shipper, load, trailer, independent contractor, delivery, agency relationship, hauling, trial court, container, hired, freight, route, time of an accident, amended complaint, right to control, manufacturer, employees, shipment, shipping, tractor, matter of law, dictate, insured, cargo, deliver

Counsel: Michael Resis, of Amundsen Davis, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.

Bradley M. Cosgrove, Yvette Loizon, and Jack J. Casciato, of Clifford Law Offices, P.C., of Chicago, for appellee.

Judges: JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Hoffman and Martin concurred in the judgment and opinion.

Opinion by: LAMPKIN

Opinion

[*P1] Gustavo Cornejo Jr., was severely injured when he was standing near his family’s vehicle on the shoulder of a highway and was struck by an 18-wheel tractor-trailer. Plaintiff Francine Cornejo brought a negligence suit on behalf of her son against defendants Gordon Lewis, the truck driver; his employer, the carrier Dakota Lines, Inc. (Dakota); and Alliance Shippers, Inc. (Alliance), the shipping broker that contracted with Dakota to transport automotive parts on behalf of Alliance’s client. Dakota admitted that Lewis was its agent at the time of the accident.

[*P2] The jury answered a special interrogatory by finding that Dakota was Alliance’s agent at the time of the accident. Accordingly, the jury found that Lewis, Dakota, and Alliance were liable to plaintiff [**2] and awarded plaintiff $18,150,750.

[*P3] Alliance appealed the judgment, arguing that it is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict (judgment n.o.v.) because, as a matter of law, Dakota was an independent contractor and neither Lewis nor Dakota were agents of Alliance. Alliance also argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence and the trial court committed multiple instructional and evidentiary errors. Further, Alliance argues that it is entitled to a new trial on damages or a remittitur and that the trial court erred by awarding prejudgment interest. Neither Dakota nor Lewis appealed the judgment entered against them.

[*P4] For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the trial court entered against Alliance.

[*P5] I. BACKGROUND

[*P6] The accident at issue here occurred in 2016, and plaintiff filed her first complaint against Lewis and Dakota in 2017. Prior to trial, plaintiff filed several amended complaints that added and removed various parties. We concern ourselves only with plaintiff’s seventh amended complaint, which was the operative pleading at the time of trial, and eighth amended complaint, which was filed [**3] postjudgment.

[*P7] In her seventh amended complaint, plaintiff alleged (1) negligence on the part of Alliance and that Lewis was an actual, implied, and/or apparent agent, servant, and/or employee of Alliance at the time of the accident, (2) negligence on the part of Dakota, and that Lewis was an actual, implied, and/or apparent agent, servant, and/or contractor of Dakota at the time of the accident, and (3) Lewis’s own negligence in regard to the accident.

[*P8] The issue in this case is whether a principal-agency relationship was established between the shipping broker Alliance and the carrier trucking company Dakota and its agent and driver Lewis. The following is a summary of the trial testimony relevant to the issue of whether Lewis and Dakota were Alliance’s agents.

[*P9] Since the 1990s, Dakota had contracted with Alliance to transport automotive parts for Alliance’s client, Fiat Alfa Romeo Chrysler. At the time of the accident, Lewis was driving his truck, or tractor, under Dakota’s operating authority and was towing an empty shipping container, or trailer, owned by J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (J.B. Hunt). Alliance, as part of an interchange agreement with J.B. Hunt, agreed to use only J.B. Hunt [**4] trailers for transporting goods at an agreed upon rate. Alliance did not own any tractors or trailers. Dakota had 70 to 100 trucks under its operating authority.

[*P10] The arrangement between Dakota and Alliance provided that Alliance would notify Dakota, via a system known as an electronic data interchange (EDI), that a shipment of parts was ready for transport. A driver employed by Dakota first would travel to a railyard in Sauk Village, Illinois, and retrieve an empty cargo container owned by J.B. Hunt. If a J.B. Hunt trailer was unavailable in Sauk Village, Dakota was required to source one from another location at Dakota’s expense. The driver would move the empty container to a location in Portage, Indiana, known as Portage Exel, where the empty container would be swapped for a container full of automotive parts. This process was part of Dakota’s obligation to Alliance to meet “pool requirements” by ensuring that Alliance had a steady supply of empty containers for loading cargo. The driver then drove the loaded container to a location in Detroit, Michigan, known as Detroit Link.

[*P11] Dakota hired Lewis, trained him, gave him Dakota’s driver’s handbook, paid him, and withheld taxes from [**5] his paychecks. Lewis did not communicate with anyone directly employed by Alliance. Alliance did not instruct Lewis on what roads to take between Sauk Village and Portage Exel or between Portage Exel and Detroit Link. Alliance did not provide Lewis with any tools, equipment, or materials. Alliance did not own the tractor or trailer. Alliance did not have the power to hire or fire Dakota drivers but could request that a driver be removed from a route. Alliance was Dakota’s second or third largest customer but Dakota was not Alliance’s primary carrier.

[*P12] The contract between Alliance and Dakota specified that Dakota was an independent contractor, Dakota and Alliance would not be considered the agent of the other, and Dakota was solely responsible for its employees and agents. A contractual provision required Dakota to list Alliance as an additional insured on Dakota’s auto and comprehensive general liability insurance and indemnify, defend Alliance, and hold Alliance harmless from all claims for death or injury arising out of the transportation of property. Dakota was forbidden from subcontracting or delegating any work given to it by Alliance. In fact, doing so would have voided the contract. [**6] Dakota was free to accept trucking work from other companies, and Alliance was free to use the transportation services of other carriers besides Dakota. However, if Dakota accepted freight from Alliance’s clients, then Dakota had to share 10% of any such revenue with Alliance.

[*P13] Alliance told Dakota when and where to pick up goods, how long Dakota had to deliver them, and whether the delivery had to be on a flatbed or by a container. Alliance did not require Dakota to use particular tools, but did specify the type of container and chassis (the part of the trailer upon which the container is mounted) that Dakota had to use. Alliance also required Dakota to use the EDI system to communicate the particulars of shipments. If a shipment that Dakota was transporting was delayed because of an accident or other problem, Dakota had to notify Alliance immediately and typically would need to send another driver to “rescue the load.” Dakota had to pay Alliance the full value of the goods if a shipment was lost, damaged, or not delivered. If issues arose regarding payment, Dakota was forbidden from contacting Alliance’s client and could only receive payment from Alliance.

[*P14] Dakota had to maintain a [**7] “satisfactory” rating with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, was required to notify Alliance if that rating fell to “conditional” or “unsatisfactory,” and had to provide an explanation of how Dakota planned to change that rating. Pursuant to Alliance’s website, it made a “perfect shipment” commitment to its customers (i.e., on-time pickups and deliveries with the load’s integrity intact and an accurate freight bill). Accordingly, Alliance had requirements for Dakota regarding seal integrity, freight bills, and cargo security for drivers pulling loaded containers. As part of its business dealings, Alliance maintained a “perfect shipment exception report,” which was given to Dakota every month. That report scored Dakota on how frequently it picked up and delivered a shipment on time. Dakota had to maintain an on-time percentage of 98.7% to avoid jeopardizing its future business with Alliance.

[*P15] Plaintiff’s transportation expert, Professor Carl Berkowitz, testified that Alliance and Dakota’s subcontracting restriction was different from the rest of the shipping industry at large. He also testified that carriers like Dakota were typically required to have insurance, but they [**8] usually were not required to indemnify other companies. Berkowitz based his opinion regarding the relationship between Dakota and Alliance on the contract requirements regarding insurance/indemnity provisions, the limitations on Dakota’s solicitation of Alliance’s customers and employees, the nondelegation of Dakota’s duties and obligations under the contract, and Alliance’s instructions regarding pickups and drops, seal integrity, rate changes, and accessorial charges. He opined that Alliance had “serious control, almost complete control [over Dakota], because [Alliance] laid out exactly what they want[ed] Dakota to do, and if Dakota didn’t do it, [Alliance] had the option of not using Dakota in the future.” Lewis’s actions had no bearing on the issues plaintiff asked Berkowitz to review concerning control, and Berkowitz did not analyze the relationship between Lewis and Alliance in forming his opinion.

[*P16] Dakota’s vice-president, Gary Blom, testified that Dakota was an independent contractor; Dakota was not Alliance’s agent for any purpose; Dakota could do business with other brokers; Dakota’s drivers handled all the details of how a load moved between the Portage and Detroit sites; [**9] and Lewis was not under Alliance’s control or direction when he was on his 10-hour Department of Transportation mandated break, while moving the empty container to his drop yard overnight at the time of the accident. Blom also testified that Alliance could give Dakota work, but was not required to do so, and Dakota did not have to accept the work Alliance offered to Dakota.

[*P17] Alliance moved for a directed verdict at the close of plaintiff’s case and again at the close of the evidence. In denying Alliance a directed verdict before closing arguments, the trial court referred to evidence of Alliance’s marketing material mentioning timely deliveries and the ability to request another Dakota driver, even though Alliance could not fire any Dakota driver, as examples of Alliance’s control over Lewis.

[*P18] Over Alliance’s objection, the trial court issued a special interrogatory that read, “Do you find that defendant Dakota Lines, Inc. was the agent of Alliance Shippers, Inc. at the time of the occurrence?” No analogous interrogatory, asking the jury to decide if Lewis was an agent of Alliance, was given.

[*P19] The jury found that Lewis, as Dakota’s admitted agent, was negligent and answered the special [**10] interrogatory that Dakota was Alliance’s agent. The trial court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict in favor of plaintiff and against Lewis, Dakota, and Alliance in the amount of $18,150,750.

[*P20] Thereafter, the trial court entered an order that denied Alliance’s posttrial motion and granted plaintiff’s motion seeking leave to file an eighth amended complaint. That complaint, like the seventh amended complaint, alleged that Dakota was negligent, that Lewis was Dakota’s agent at the time of the accident, and that Lewis himself was negligent. Whereas the seventh amended complaint alleged Alliance’s negligence by way of Lewis as Alliance’s agent, the eighth amended complaint alleged that Dakota was Alliance’s agent and, thus, Alliance controlled Dakota and Dakota’s agents like Lewis. The trial court’s order also awarded $466,161.20 in prejudgment interest.

[*P21] II. ANALYSIS

[*P22] Alliance raises eight separate arguments before this court, but we need not address any beyond the first. Alliance argues that the trial court erred by refusing to grant Alliance a judgment n.o.v. because Alliance was not vicariously liable for Lewis’s negligence, since neither Lewis nor Dakota were Alliance’s agents. We [**11] agree.

[*P23] A judgment n.o.v. is properly entered in those limited cases where all the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the opponent, so overwhelmingly favors the movant that no contrary verdict based on that evidence could ever stand. McClure v. Owens Corning Fiberglas Corp., 188 Ill. 2d 102, 132, 720 N.E.2d 242, 241 Ill. Dec. 787 (1999); Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern R.R. Co., 37 Ill. 2d 494, 504-05, 510, 229 N.E.2d 504 (1967); see also People v. Rosochacki, 41 Ill. 2d 483, 490, 244 N.E.2d 136 (1969) (although some evidence, when viewed alone, may seem substantial, “courts are to decide when weak evidence has so faded in the strong light of all of the proof that only one verdict is possible of rendition”). Judgment n.o.v. is not appropriate if reasonable minds might differ as to inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts presented. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 132. A trial court cannot reweigh the evidence and set aside a verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions, or because the court feels that other results are more reasonable. Id. Likewise, the appellate court should not usurp the function of the jury and substitute its judgment on questions of fact fairly submitted, tried, and determined from the evidence which did not greatly preponderate either way. Id.

[*P24] “In ruling on a motion for a judgment n.o.v., a court does not weigh the evidence, nor is it concerned with the credibility of the witnesses; [**12] rather it may only consider the evidence, and any inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the party resisting the motion.” Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 453, 603 N.E.2d 508, 177 Ill. Dec. 438 (1992). A judgment n.o.v. may not be granted merely because a verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. In fact, a court has no right to enter judgment n.o.v. if there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome. Id. at 454. We review de novo a trial court’s decision on a motion for judgment n.o.v. McClure, 188 Ill. 2d at 132.

[*P25] Generally, a person injured by someone’s tortious action must seek a remedy from the person who caused the injury. Grinyov v. 303 Taxi, L.L.C., 2017 IL App (1st) 160193, ¶ 26, 411 Ill. Dec. 232, 72 N.E.3d 1238. However, the principal-agent relationship provides an exception to the general rule. Id. “‘Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a principal may be held liable for the tortious actions of an agent which cause a plaintiff’s injury, even if the principal does not himself [or herself] engage in any conduct in relation to the plaintiff.'” Id. (quoting Woods v. Cole, 181 Ill. 2d 512, 517, 693 N.E.2d 333, 230 Ill. Dec. 204 (1998)).

[*P26] A principal is vicariously liable for the conduct of its agent but not for [**13] the conduct of an independent contractor. Sperl v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 408 Ill. App. 3d 1051, 1057, 946 N.E.2d 463, 349 Ill. Dec. 269 (2011). The difference is defined by the level of control over the manner of work performance. Id. An agency is a consensual relationship in which a principal has the right to control an agent’s conduct and an agent has the power to affect a principal’s legal relations. Id. “An independent contractor relationship is one in which an independent contractor undertakes to produce a given result but, in the actual execution of the work, is not under the order or control of the person for whom he does the work.” Id. Any labels given by the parties in a written agreement are not dispositive of employment status. Id. Although a carrier-broker agreement, like the one between Dakota and Alliance, is a factor to consider, it does not, as a matter of law, determine an individual’s or entity’s agency status. See id.

[*P27] Instead, the facts and circumstances of each case determine whether a person is an agent or an independent contractor. Grinyov, 2017 IL App (1st) 160193, ¶ 27. The cardinal consideration is whether that person retains the right to control the manner of doing the work. Id. Other factors courts consider include (1) the question of hiring, (2) the right to discharge, (3) the manner of direction [**14] of the servant, (4) the right to terminate the relationship, and (5) the character of the supervision of the work done. Id. The presence of one or more of these facts and indicia merely serves as a guide to resolving the primary question of whether the alleged agent is truly an independent contractor or is subject to control. Id. “The issue of a defendant’s retained control may be decided as a matter of law where the evidence is insufficient to create a factual question.” Carney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 41, 412 Ill. Dec. 833, 77 N.E.3d 1 (deciding the issue in the context of a summary judgment motion). In determining whether a defendant acted as an agent versus an independent contractor, the analysis hinges on whether the principal controlled either the “mere result” or the manner in which that result was achieved. Perkinson v. Manion, 163 Ill. App. 3d 262, 266, 268, 516 N.E.2d 977, 114 Ill. Dec. 822 (1987).

[*P28] The trial court erred when it denied Alliance’s motion for judgment n.o.v. because all the evidence—when viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff—so overwhelmingly favors Alliance by showing, as a matter of law, that Lewis and Dakota were not agents of Alliance that no contrary verdict based on that evidence can stand. Alliance did not pay Dakota’s drivers and withhold taxes from their pay; hire, train or fire the drivers; dispatch [**15] or speak to the drivers; control the drivers’ routes or provide them with tools, equipment, or materials; or own the tractors or trailers the drivers used. It is undisputed that Dakota and Alliance adhered to the terms of their agreement, which provided that Dakota had full control over its personnel and would perform services as an independent contractor. Moreover, Dakota and Alliance did not have an exclusive relationship; Dakota was free to haul freight for other brokers and was not Alliance’s primary carrier. Dakota hired, trained, and fired its drivers; paid them; and withheld taxes from their paychecks.

[*P29] Plaintiff’s facts in support of an agency relationship are that Dakota was required to maintain a minimum number of empty trailers at the Indiana site; Dakota was required to add Alliance as an additional insured on Dakota’s insurance and indemnify Alliance; Alliance had requirements regarding seal integrity, freight bills, and cargo security; Alliance would designate if a delivery had to be on a flatbed or by a container; Alliance required Dakota to EDI, e-mail, and fax Alliance multiple times a day regarding pickup and delivery times; Dakota was required to notify Alliance immediately [**16] regarding issues like a crash or problem that prohibited Dakota from moving a load, and then Alliance would decide whether Dakota should send another driver to “rescue the load”; Alliance could charge Dakota for damages if a delivery was late, damaged, or lost; and Alliance kept a scorecard of the timeliness of Dakota’s deliveries. A decrease in Dakota’s score could jeopardize future freight orders. But none of these facts show the degree of control over the work performed (here, hauling loads) that Illinois courts have required when finding that an agency relationship exists.

[*P30] For example, in Sperl, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 1058, this court found that the jury’s finding of an agency relationship was not against the manifest weight of the evidence based on the high degree of control the broker exerted over the driver. Specifically, the broker directly hired, paid, and dispatched the driver and directed delivery to the broker’s own warehouse. Id. at 1053-55, 1058-59. The broker also specified the trailer length, required the driver to take the trailer temperature regularly, required the driver to stay in constant communication with the broker, and imposed delivery times on the driver that were enforced by fines the broker directly imposed on [**17] the driver. Id. at 1053-55, 1058. The driver testified that the broker imposed an impossible fine-enforced schedule, and she had to violate federal hours-of-service regulations to deliver the load on time and avoid the fines. Id. at 1055, 1058. The court ruled that the broker controlled the manner by which the driver drove the load by dictating a fine-enforced schedule. Id. at 1058.

[*P31] Here, in contrast, the evidence is undisputed that Dakota hired and paid Lewis. Only Dakota, and not Alliance, had the power to fire Lewis, and Alliance had no ability to fine him. Also, Lewis never communicated with Alliance; Dakota dispatched Lewis for his work. If Alliance was unsatisfied with Lewis, the most it could do was request that Dakota assign a different driver. There is no evidence that Alliance controlled the manner by which the load was hauled.

[*P32] Furthermore, in Powell v. Dean Foods Co., 2013 IL App (1st) 082513-B, ¶¶ 74-75, 379 Ill. Dec. 837, 7 N.E.3d 675, this court upheld the jury’s finding of an agency relationship between the shipper, the carrier, and the carrier’s drivers because the evidence showed that the shipper exerted sufficient control over the manner in which the carrier’s drivers performed the work to establish agency. The carrier Alco of Wisconsin, Inc. (Alco), employed the driver, and the Alder Group, Inc. (Alder), [**18] owned the tractor. Id. ¶ 1. The driver testified that Alco was part of Alder. Id. ¶ 14. The shipper, Dean Foods Company (Dean Foods), owned the trailer. Id. ¶ 1. At the time of the accident, the relationship between Dean Foods, Alder, and Alco had been in place for 60 years, and Alder/Alco transported exclusively for Dean Foods. Id. ¶ 69. Dean Foods’ logo appeared on the truck tractor and trailer and on the uniforms of the Alder/Alco employees. Id. ¶ 64.

[*P33] This court rejected Dean Foods’ argument that it was entitled to judgment n.o.v. and held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Dean Foods had the right to control the actions of Alder/Alco’s drivers. Id. ¶¶ 64, 69. Specifically, Alder had received the “Partners in Distribution Award” from Dean Foods, and Alder/Alco’s assistant safety director and driver trainer used Dean Foods’ letterhead, including when he reprimanded drivers. Id. ¶ 69. Alder’s driving manual stated that the Alder/Alco drivers were part of Dean Foods’ fleet and instructed them to wear Dean Foods’ clothing and act in a manner that would encourage positive opinions about Dean Foods. Id. The manual specifically stated, “‘When you step out of your truck, [**19] you are immediately recognized as DEAN FOODS.'” Id.

[*P34] Here, in contrast, no evidence showed that Dakota was intertwined with Alliance the way that Alder/Alco was deeply intertwined with Dean Foods in Powell. There was no evidence that Lewis was trained using materials that said he was part of Alliance’s fleet or otherwise associated with Alliance. He did not wear clothing or use equipment bearing Alliance’s name or otherwise hold himself out as an employee of Alliance the way drivers in Powell did. Indeed, unlike Dean Foods, Alliance did not provide any of the equipment Lewis used. See id. Also, the relationship between Alliance and Dakota was not an exclusive relationship like that between Dean Foods and Alder/Alco. See id. Further, while not dispositive, the fact that the Dakota-Alliance contract specified that Dakota was an independent contractor with sole responsibility for its employees cannot be ignored. See Carney, 2016 IL 118984, ¶ 41 (describing the written agreement as the “best indicator of whether the defendant retained control” over a contractor’s work).

[*P35] Finally, in McHale v. Kiswani Trucking, Inc., 2015 IL App (1st) 132625, 396 Ill. Dec. 46, 39 N.E.3d 595, this court upheld a jury’s finding of an agency relationship among a shipping broker, a carrier, and the carrier’s drivers. There, a truck driver [**20] was employed by carrier Kiswani Trucking, Inc. (Kiswani), which was in turn contracted by shipping broker Transfreight, LLC (Transfreight), to move auto parts for Toyota. Id. ¶¶ 1, 4-5. The broker owned the loaded trailer that the driver was hauling at the time of the collision. This court rejected broker Transfreight’s arguments for a judgment n.o.v. or ruling that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence, noting that the jury heard “days of conflicting testimony regarding the relationship between the parties and the factors to be considered in determining whether an agency relationship exits.” Id. ¶¶ 54, 70.

[*P36] Regarding the considerable evidence showing that broker Transfreight controlled the manner in which carrier Kiswani and the driver performed their work, the contract between Transfreight and Toyota stated that Transfreight would have exclusive control over the manner in which employees and subcontractors performed the transportation services and that those hired by Transfreight would be considered Transfreight’s employees or subcontractors. Id. ¶ 68. Transfreight and Kiswani’s broker-carrier contract, which designated the carrier as the broker’s subcontractor, expressly incorporated [**21] the Transfreight-Toyota contract that gave broker Transfreight exclusive control over how the subcontractors performed all transportation services and required the carrier’s express agreement to support Transfreight’s contractual obligations to Toyota. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8, 10, 54, 68-71, 82, 85. Transfreight also determined whether a particular shipment would have a solo driver or a team and dictated what route would be used, including the time windows. Id. ¶ 69. Drivers had to report their progress and had to follow Toyota’s standards for loading, delivery, and freight verification. Id. Also, an expert witness testified that the driver was an employee of both Transfreight and Kiswani (id.), and the general manager of Kiswani testified that Kiswani was Transfreight’s agent (id. ¶ 20).

[*P37] Here, in contrast, the jury did not hear conflicting testimony, and the undisputed facts established that Alliance did not dictate Dakota drivers’ routes. Also, the contract between Dakota and Alliance stated that Dakota retained sole control over its employees. Although plaintiff’s expert opined that Alliance exercised “serious control” over Dakota, Dakota’s vice-president testified that Dakota was still an [**22] independent contractor, did not have to accept work Alliance offered it, and was not an agent of Alliance. Moreover, while an expert in McHale testified that the driver was an employee of both the broker and the carrier, plaintiff’s expert here admitted that he did not even analyze the relationship between driver Lewis and broker Alliance. See id. ¶ 69.

[*P38] Although plaintiff’s expert testified that Alliance had “serious control, almost complete control, because they laid out exactly what they want Dakota to do, and if Dakota didn’t do it, they had the option of not using Dakota in the future,” that is not incompatible with our conclusion, based on the case law discussed here, that Dakota was not an agent of Alliance. Alliance specifying the result it wanted Dakota to accomplish vis-à-vis tasks such as moving empty containers or shipping cargo is different from dictating the manner in which the work of hauling the containers would be performed. At best, Alliance’s requirements on Dakota were indicative of Alliance controlling the result or matters ancillary to the work to be performed.

[*P39] Meanwhile, courts applying Illinois law consistently have declined to find an agency relationship when a company [**23] hires an independent driver to deliver a load to designated persons at designated times but does not reserve the right to control the manner of delivery.

[*P40] In Shoemaker v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 916, 917, 652 N.E.2d 1037, 210 Ill. Dec. 61 (1994), the plaintiff sued the shipper, which sold construction materials; the carrier, Lawrence Trucking, Inc.; and the truck driver, who owned the truck involved in the accident but had leased it to carrier Lawrence Trucking. Lawrence Trucking entered into equipment leases with drivers so it could service customers when its own truck drivers were busy. Although Lawrence Trucking leased tractors and trailers, it did not have physical possession of the equipment. Id. at 918. Lawrence Trucking obtained hauling jobs from the shipper and kept 5% of the total compensation, while the remainder went to the driver, who did not receive employment benefits from Lawrence Trucking. Id. The driver would go to jobs as directed by Lawrence Trucking, but he had no agreement with the shipper, and the shipper never provided the driver with any rules about how his truck was to be driven. Id. The driver controlled the maintenance on his tractor and trailer, and customers like the shipper could not pay the driver directly. Id. The shipper could not terminate the [**24] driver’s arrangement with Lawrence Trucking. Id. Employees of the shipper might help drivers load the truck, but after the truck departed, the shipper had no contact with the drivers and did not dictate routes or the manner in which the truck was driven. Id. at 919.

[*P41] The jury was given a special interrogatory asking whether the shipper had the right to control the driver’s actions. Id. The jury responded affirmatively and found in favor of the plaintiff against the shipper. Id. This court, however, reversed the jury’s verdict, ruling that no agency relationship existed as a matter of law because the shipper did not have the right to control the manner in which the driver performed his job hauling loads. Id. at 921. The shipper did not pay the driver, could not hire or fire him directly, and was not his employer. The shipper did not control the driver’s driving or other conduct in hauling the load. The shipper’s weighing the truck and assisting or overseeing the loading of the truck were preliminary tasks necessary before the driver could begin to perform his job. Id. Also, the shipper’s instructing the driver where he should deliver the load did not control the manner in which the job was done but rather [**25] specified the particular hauling task. Id.

[*P42] Lewis’s and Dakota’s relationships with Alliance are like that present in Shoemaker, where the shipper had no contact with the carrier’s drivers and did not dictate routes or the manner in which the truck was driven. Like the shipper in Shoemaker, Alliance specified only the particular hauling task (i.e., the mere result), rather than controlling the manner in which the work was done. See id. Even if an entity requires an exclusive relationship with the driver, has the power to fire the driver, and sets rules governing the manner of loading the trucks, no agency relationship exists if that entity does not have the power to control the details of the manner of the hauling work performed. See Dowe v. Birmingham Steel Corp., 2011 IL App (1st) 091997, ¶ 31, 963 N.E.2d 344, 357 Ill. Dec. 391 (ruling that no agency relationship existed between the shipper and driver of the tractor-trailer, who was employed, paid, and insured by the carrier trucking company, where the driver chose his own route, controlled his own hours, performed his job according to the rules he received from his carrier employer, and provided and maintained his own equipment).

[*P43] In Petersen v. U.S. Reduction Co., 267 Ill. App. 3d 775, 777, 641 N.E.2d 845, 204 Ill. Dec. 415 (1994), the aluminum manufacturer contracted with Cardinal Transport, which leased a fleet of trucks to carrier Coleman [**26] Movers, which employed the driver. The driver was shot and killed as he drove away from a picket line that he crossed at the manufacturer’s plant. Id. The driver’s wife sued the manufacturer for failing to warn the driver of threats against replacement drivers hired to work during the strike. Id. Whether the manufacturer had a duty to warn the driver turned in part on whether he was the manufacturer’s agent. Id. at 779. This court held that the driver’s relationship to the manufacturer was that of an independent contractor because the only control the manufacturer exerted over him was to specify a delivery schedule and require him to use special vats to transport the manufacturer’s molten metal. Id. at 783-84.

[*P44] Here, the fact that Lewis was required to pick up and deliver the J.B. Hunt trailer is no proof of an agency relationship. If the mandated use in Petersen of specialized vats, necessary for transporting molten metal, was not enough to establish agency, then the generalized requirement that Dakota’s drivers obtain and transport J.B. Hunt containers did not demonstrate agency.

[*P45] In Manahan v. Daily News-Tribune, 50 Ill. App. 3d 9, 365 N.E.2d 1045, 8 Ill. Dec. 659 (1977), the court ruled that the newspaper deliveryman was an independent contractor as a matter of law where the agreement provided that [**27] the driver was to deliver papers at designated hours to designated persons but the driver had the right to determine the routes to be taken and was to pay all taxes. The agreement also provided that the newspaper should not exercise control over the driver’s operation as an independent contractor. Here, it is undisputed that Dakota and Alliance adhered to the terms of their agreement, which provided that Dakota had full control over its personnel and would perform services as an independent contractor.

[*P46] The Seventh Circuit’s treatment of Illinois law has also been consistent with the cases we have cited here concerning the lack of an agency relationship. In Kolchinsky v. Western Dairy Transport, LLC, 949 F.3d 1010, 1011 (7th Cir. 2020) (per curiam), William Bentley, the sole owner of carrier Bill Bentley Trucking, LLC, rear-ended a car while en route to pick up a load arranged by shipping broker WD Logistics (WD). The plaintiff sued Bentley, WD, and Western Dairy Transport, LLC (Western Dairy), which was a carrier owned by the same parent company as WD but had the distinct roles of owning and leasing trucks and trailers and hauling freight. Western Dairy supplied the trailer used by Bentley. Id. at 1011-12.

[*P47] While WD instructed Bentley to transport the cargo to its destination, [**28] the route to be used was entirely up to Bentley. Id. at 1012. Bentley provided regular freight-transportation for WD, pursuant to a carrier-broker agreement, and the contract provided that Bentley was an independent contractor and retained full control over Bentley’s personnel. Id. When Bentley accepted a job from broker WD, Bentley agreed to call WD daily with status updates, protect the freight, and notify the broker of any damage. Id.

[*P48] The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of WD and Western Dairy, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1013. The court reasoned that WD’s requirement that Bentley contact it while carrying its loads, including a daily status call, and the fact that WD could charge Bentley Trucking for damage failed to demonstrate the same degree of control that existed in Sperl and Powell. Id. at 1013-14. The court further found that it was undisputed that WD and Bentley adhered to the terms of their agreement, which stated that Bentley had full control over its personnel, was solely responsible for operational costs and equipment, and would perform services as an independent contractor. Id. at 1014. Additionally, WD did not deduct income taxes or social security contributions from Bentley like it would for an [**29] employee, and either party could terminate the relationship at any time. Id. Bentley was solely responsible for all payroll-related expenses. Id.

[*P49] Similarly here, the facts that Alliance gave Dakota directions concerning pickups and drops, daily status updates, seal integrity, cargo security, and freight bills and that Alliance imposed fees on Dakota for late or damaged deliveries are insufficient to establish an agency relationship because those directions pertained to ancillary aspects of the transportation itself. Accessorial charges, rate and cost adjustments, and fuel surcharges relate to billing for transportation services and do not dictate control over the transportation itself. See id. at 1013; see also Ying Ye v. Global Sunrise, Inc., No. 18-cv-1961, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210879, 2021 WL 5083753, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 2, 2021) (applying Illinois law and ruling that rate confirmation specifying pickup and delivery schedule, denying accessorial charges, and imposing 15% rate reduction for late delivery was inadequate to support agency relationship).

[*P50] Plaintiff’s remaining points do not support finding an agency relationship. The fact that Dakota was required to insure Alliance as an additional insured and indemnify it simply showed the parties’ intent to keep the risk of loss with Dakota and its liability insurer. [**30] See Oliveira-Brooks v. Re/Max International, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 127, 136, 865 N.E.2d 252, 309 Ill. Dec. 889 (2007) (evidence of naming the defendant as an additional insured could not, “as a matter of law, create a genuine issue of material fact to establish an actual agency relationship without some indicia of the right to control the day-to-day real estate business operations”); Sperl, 408 Ill. App. 3d at 1058 (focusing on the employer’s right to control behavior). Moreover, Alliance’s non-solicitation clause had no connection to Dakota’s drivers and their transportation of the trailers. See The T. Le v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC, 2018 OK CIV APP 71, ¶ 22, 431 P.3d 366 (non-solicitation clause did not evidence shipper’s control over driver). Evidence regarding performance metrics scoring delivery drivers has also been rejected as legally insufficient to establish agency. Scheinman v. Martin’s Bulk Milk Service, Inc., No. 09 C 5340, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 172599, 2013 WL 6467525, at *10-11 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 2013) (setting performance standard of 98% on-time deliveries and requiring an electronic software program for communications did not reasonably suggest how the driver was to haul the load). Furthermore, plaintiff’s references to Alliance’s marketing and advertising did not support an agency relationship between Alliance and Dakota/Lewis. See Kolchinsky, 949 F.3d at 1015 (finding no apparent agency where plaintiffs could not have relied on broker’s logo at time of accident).

[*P51] Alliance exercised little, if any control over Dakota’s and its drivers’ performance of [**31] the transportation work, as opposed to control over the result of the assigned task or matters ancillary to the work to be performed. Furthermore, “the distinguishing characteristic of an agent is that he represents another contractually.” Petersen, 267 Ill. App. 3d at 784. “An agent, ‘[w]hen properly authorized, *** makes contracts or other negotiations of a business nature on behalf of his principal, by which his principal is bound.'” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting Sobel v. Franks, 261 Ill. App. 3d 670, 679, 633 N.E.2d 820, 199 Ill. Dec. 24 (1994)). Here, Dakota had no authority to bind Alliance contractually to a third party because the contract between Alliance and Dakota forbade Dakota from subcontracting any of Alliance’s work.

[*P52] The evidence, together with reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, does not demonstrate a substantial factual dispute, and the assessment of witness credibility or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is not decisive to the outcome. All the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiff, overwhelmingly favors the conclusion the Lewis and Dakota were not Alliance’s agents. No contrary verdict based on the evidence could ever stand.

[*P53] III. CONCLUSION

[*P54] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court entered against Alliance [**32] is reversed. This ruling does not affect the judgment against Dakota and Lewis, who were not parties to this appeal.

[*P55] Reversed.

End of Document