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Green v. RXO Last Mile, Inc.

United States District Court for the District of Connecticut

August 24, 2023, Decided; August 24, 2023, Filed

No. 3:19-cv-1896 (JAM)

LEON GREEN and WALDO TEJADA, Plaintiffs, v. RXO LAST MILE, INC., Defendant.

Prior History: Green v. XPO Last Mile, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 60, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 222716, 2020 WL 7021704 (D. Conn., Nov. 30, 2020)

Counsel:  [*1] For Leon Green, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Waldo Tejada, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs: Benjamin Weber, Harold L. Lichten, Olena Savytska, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Lichten & Liss-Riordan, P.C., Boston, MA; Zachary L. Rubin, LEAD ATTORNEY, Lichten & Liss-Riordan,-P.-C, Boston, MA.

For RXO Last Mile, Inc., Defendant: Adam Lewis Lounsbury, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Jackson Lewis, PC, Richmond, VA; Carolyn A. Trotta, LEAD ATTORNEY, Jackson Lewis PC, Hartford, CT; David R. Golder, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Jackson Lewis – P.C. Htfd, CT, Hartford, CT; Juan Obregon, LEAD ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, Holland & Hart, LLP, Denver, CO.

Judges: Jeffrey Alker Meyer, United States District Judge.

Opinion by: Jeffrey Alker Meyer

Opinion


ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs Leon Green and Waldo Tejada have filed this action on behalf of a class of delivery drivers alleging that defendant RXO Last Mile, Inc. (“RXO”) took illegal deductions from their wages in violation of Connecticut law and that RXO was unjustly enriched by misclassifying their drivers as independent contractors rather [*2]  than employees.

RXO has filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the terms of the contract between RXO and independent business entities formed by the delivery drivers preclude both claims. In the meantime, the plaintiffs have cross-moved for partial summary judgment to seek a finding that they and class members are employees of RXO under Connecticut state law. Because I conclude that RXO has shown that there are no genuine issues of fact to support the plaintiffs’ claim for unlawful wage deductions and for unjust enrichment, I will grant RXO’s motion for summary judgment and deny as moot the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for summary judgment.


Background

RXO—formerly known as XPO Last Mile, Inc.—is a third-party logistics coordinator and freight forwarder that arranges and facilitates deliveries of large footprint consumer goods on behalf of retailers to the customers who purchase them.1 RXO engages with retailers such as Costco and Lowe’s to coordinate “last-mile” deliveries of consumer goods to the homes of customers.2

RXO then contracts with motor carriers—which RXO refers to as Delivery Service Providers (“DSPs”)—to complete these deliveries.3 The contractual relationship between RXO [*3]  and motor carriers is reflected in a standardized Delivery Service Agreement.4

Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, each DSP must be a motor carrier authorized by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and own and operate an independent delivery business, typically a limited liability company (“LLC”).5 Motor carriers contracting with RXO may earn revenue on either a per-delivery-stop basis or by means of a flat, daily rate that varies based on services offered, locations, and the addition of services like “walk up” deliveries or fuel surcharges evaluated on an ad hoc basis.6 The exact revenue structure for each motor carrier is set forth in Schedule A appended to each Agreement.7

The Delivery Service Agreement includes a provision for “Loss or Damage to Product.”8 It states that the contract carrier “shall be fully liable for the loss, theft, or destruction of or any damage to any merchandise in its custody or control in the delivery process” and that RXO “shall have the right to offset such damages from Contract Carrier’s reconciliation for services performed under this Agreement, provided such amounts are reasonably substantiated.”9 The Delivery Service Agreement [*4]  includes a similar provision for “Damage to Property.”10 And the Agreement provides for an escrow fund to pay for damage or loss claims.11

The Delivery Service Agreement states that “Payment shall be made pursuant to any Schedule A(s) attached hereto and made part of this Agreement,” but that RXO shall engage in a weekly reconciliation process to “reconcile the amount of Payments due to Contract Carrier for services rendered under this Agreement with any offsets for claims or losses resulting from Contract Carrier’s services under this Agreement as set forth in Sections 6, 7 and 8 above” relating to loss or damage to products or property.12 Following this reconciliation, RXO then transfers the remaining sum of money to CMS/Openforce, a third-party settlement administrator, to make the actual payment to the carriers.13

The Delivery Service Agreement does not otherwise provide for any deductions to be made from payments for service. It does, however, require that the carrier assume certain expenses. For example, the carrier must “[b]ear all expenses associated with the employment of such persons [whom it hires as employees], including, without limitation, wages, salaries, employment [*5]  taxes, workers’ compensation coverage, health care, retirement benefits and insurance coverages.”14 And it further provides that the carrier “at its own expense . . . shall maintain insurance of the kinds and amounts specified in” Schedule D to the Agreement.15 Schedule D in turn prescribes specific insurance coverage requirements for motor truck and cargo liability, general liability and personal injury liability, excess liability, and workers’ compensation (“As required by state authorities”).16

The Agreement specifies that it constitutes a contract between RXO and the independent business entity only, and that the carrier “retains complete and exclusive direction and control over its employees and all those working for it in any capacity.”17 The Agreement states that it “is strictly between two independent entities and does not create an employer/employee relationship for any purpose.”18

The plaintiffs Leon Green and Waldo Tejada own and operate DSP entities that contracted with RXO—LG Family LLC and Tejada Express LLC, respectively.19 They have filed this action on behalf of a class of similarly situated delivery drivers alleging that RXO made illegal wage deductions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e (Count [*6]  One) and that RXO was unjustly enriched by misclassifying its drivers as independent contractors rather than as employees because the misclassification allowed it to shift business costs to the plaintiffs that RXO would otherwise have had to bear (Count Two).

At the outset of this litigation, I denied RXO’s motion to compel arbitration. I found that because the Delivery Service Agreements were between the limited liability companies and RXO only, RXO had not shown that individual drivers such as the plaintiffs should be bound by the Agreement’s arbitration clause. See Green v. XPO Last Mile, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 3d 60 (D. Conn. 2020).

I later granted a motion for class certification of about 275 delivery drivers working for RXO, with Green and Tejada as named plaintiffs. See Green v. XPO Last Mile, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171324, 2022 WL 4380959 (D. Conn. 2022). The class I certified did not include all persons who drove trucks for RXO. Instead, it was limited to “[a]ll individuals who personally or on behalf of their business entity, signed a Delivery Service Agreement with [RXO] and who personally performed deliveries for [RXO] full-time in Connecticut between November 2017 and the present.” 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171324, [WL] at *2. Thus, the class excluded persons who were drivers or employees of the carrier companies but who had not themselves signed a Delivery Service [*7]  Agreement with RXO.

RXO now moves for summary judgment on both counts of the complaint.20 The plaintiffs have cross-moved for partial summary judgment to seek a finding that they and class members are employees rather than independent contractors.21


Discussion

The principles governing my review of a motion for summary judgment are well established. Summary judgment may be granted only if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough—if eventually proved at trial—to allow a reasonable jury to decide the case in favor of the opposing party. My role at summary judgment is not to judge the credibility of witnesses or to resolve close contested issues of fact but solely to decide if there are enough facts that remain in dispute to warrant a trial. See generally Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 656-57, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 188 L. Ed. 2d 895 (2014) (per curiam); Union Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Ace Caribbean Mkt., 64 F.4th 441, 445 (2d Cir. 2023).22


Count One—illegal wage deductions

RXO moves for summary judgment as to Count One of the complaint which alleges that RXO engaged in unlawful wage deductions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e. That [*8]  statute provides in relevant part that an employer may not “withhold or divert any portion of an employee’s wages unless . . . the employer has written authorization from the employee for deductions on a form approved by the commissioner.”

RXO argues that, even assuming the plaintiffs were RXO employees, the deductions it made from the gross amounts payable to the plaintiffs’ LLCs did not amount to the “withhold[ing] or divert[ing] [of] any portion of an employee’s wages” as is prohibited under § 31-71e. Its argument critically turns on the definition of “wages” under Connecticut law. Connecticut law defines “wages” as “compensation for labor or services rendered by an employee, whether the amount is determined on a time, task, piece, commission or other basis of calculation.” Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71a(3). Although the plaintiffs rely on that portion of the statute that measures wages by reference to compensation as determined by means of “time, task, piece, [or] commission,” RXO relies on the ending words of this definition that refer in open-ended terms to compensation as determined by any “other basis of calculation.” Ibid.

In Mytych v. May Department Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002), the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed how to define what constitutes “wages” under Connecticut [*9]  law. The facts in Mytych involved a class of plaintiff salespersons who were employed at department stores and who earned compensation in accordance with a commission sales agreement. The agreement provided for compensation in the amount of an 8% commission on “net sales” which was defined in relevant part to mean gross sales minus customer returns. Id. at 155-56. The plaintiffs argued that the reduction of their compensation for customer returns amounted to an improper withholding or diversion of their wages in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e. They also argued this reduction was a violation of Connecticut’s anti-kickback law—Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-73(b)—which provides in relevant part that “[n]o employer . . . shall, directly or indirectly, demand, request, receive or exact any refund of wages . . . or deduct any part of the wages agreed to be paid, upon the representation or the understanding that such refund of wages . . . or deduction is necessary to secure employment or continue in employment.”

The Connecticut Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments, concluding in essence that what the plaintiffs chose to characterize as improper deductions from wages were in fact inherent by the terms of the employment agreement to the very definition [*10]  of what constituted “wages” in the first place. The court explained that while Connecticut laws provide “an enhanced remedy for the collection of wages,” they do “not embody substantive standards to determine the amount of wages that are payable.” Id. at 162. Citing the statutory definition of “wages” under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71a(3), the court concluded that Connecticut law “expressly leaves the determination of the wage to the employer-employee agreement, assuming some specific conditions, such as a minimum hourly wage, are met.” Id. at 163 (emphasis added).

Thus, the court rejected “the plaintiffs[‘] claim that wages accrue at the time the service is rendered; in this case, at the time the sale of shoes is completed” and that “any deduction that occurs after the rendering of services, i.e., after the completed sale, is a deduction from wages and prohibited by statute.” Ibid. Instead, the “wages” due to the plaintiffs were calculated by reference to “the specific commission agreement . . . [which] provided that wages would accrue or vest after the agreed to calculations were made to the plaintiffs’ gross sales, including the deduction of the plaintiffs’ pro rata share of unidentified returns.” Id. at 163-64.

The Connecticut Supreme [*11]  Court would later recognize Mytych to stand for the proposition that “when an employee has agreed to a specific formula for the calculation of . . . wages, the part of the formula that allows deductions does not constitute a deduction from earned wages.” Ziotas v. Reardon Law Firm, P.C., 296 Conn. 579, 592, 997 A.2d 453 (2010). Still later, the Connecticut Supreme Court has again cited and quoted Mytych with approval for the propositions that “the wage statutes, as a whole, do not provide substantive rights regarding how a wage is earned” and that “the Connecticut wage statutes do not purport to define the wages due; they merely require that those wages agreed to will not be withheld for any reason.” Geysen v. Securitas Sec. Services USA Inc., 322 Conn. 385, 394, 142 A.3d 227 (2016) (internal quotations and bracket omitted).

The Second Circuit has recently applied Mytych to conclude that wages include agreed-upon deductions from a worker’s earned revenue. See Mujo v. Jani-King Int’l, Inc., 13 F.4th 204 (2d Cir. 2021). The plaintiffs in Mujo were franchisees who contracted with a company to perform cleaning services for clients under the company name. Id. at 207-08. The franchise agreement between the plaintiffs and the company required the plaintiffs to pay “accounting fees, royalty fees, advertising fees, and insurance fees,” which the company collected “by deducting them from the revenue it receives from [*12]  customers.” Id. at 208.

The Second Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ claims that these fees amounted to unlawful wage deductions. The court concluded that the gross customer revenue was “not the baseline ‘wage’ from which the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act prohibits deductions.” Id. at 211. Rather, “even assuming that the [plaintiffs] are employees . . . their wages under the franchise agreement are the funds that remain after Jani-King deducts its fees under the franchise agreement.” Ibid.

The same holds true in this case. The plaintiffs’ theory rests on the notion that their “wages” are solely those payments to which they are entitled to under Schedule A of the Agreement in terms of the payment rate for their particular services performed.23 But the Agreement itself explicitly lays out the process by which revenue earned under Schedule A is reconciled with the value of lost or damaged goods before being paid out to the carriers. A “contract must be viewed in its entirety, with each provision read in light of the other provisions . . . and every provision must be given effect if it is possible to do so.” Cruz v. Visual Perceptions, LLC, 311 Conn. 93, 103, 84 A.3d 828 (2014). When read in its entirety, the Agreement here makes clear that the final sum owed to the carrier includes [*13]  deductions for losses and damages. And just as in Mytych and Mujo, any deductions provided for in the Agreement are inherent to the very definition of what the plaintiffs’ “wages” are in the first place.

The plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Weems v. Citigroup, Inc., 289 Conn. 769, 961 A.2d 349 (2008), a case involving whether an employer company’s enforcement of certain stock forfeiture provisions violated Connecticut’s wage statutes. For those employees in Weems who voluntarily left their employment with or were fired by the employer, they lost interests in stock that had been purchased during the course of their employment by means of employee contributions to a stock purchase plan. Id. at 773-74.

According to the plaintiffs, “the Court [in Weems] concluded that deductions taken from the employees’ gross payments were deductions under the Connecticut Minimum Wage Act even though they were agreed to.”24 But that is not true. The Connecticut Supreme Court stated only that it was assuming without deciding that the employee contributions were deductions from wages. See id. at 783-84 (noting that “[w]e begin by assuming, without deciding, that the contributions to the plans were deductions from wages under § 31-71a(3), as explained by Mytych v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 260 Conn. 152, 159-60, 793 A.2d 1068 (2002)” and that “we assume that, under the plaintiffs’ employment [*14]  agreement with the defendants, the wages due to them would be the gross compensation amount that had accrued during the relevant pay period, with the contribution to the plans being, therefore, a deduction from that gross amount”). The Connecticut Supreme Court in Weems only assumed a proposition and did not purport to retreat from or overrule its decision in Mytych.

The plaintiffs further argue that the deductions allowed by the Agreement for loss and damage cannot be considered to be a part of their wages because they do not know in advance how much the deductions will be. But that is no different from the compensation schemes in Mytych and Mujo. In Mytych, deductions were defined in part as a percentage of customer returns, see 260 Conn. at 155-56, and a salesperson could not know in advance whether a customer was going to return an item. Likewise, in Mujo, deductions were defined in part to include fees for accounting, royalties, advertising, and insurance, see 13 F.4th at 208, and there was no suggestion that the franchisees knew those specific amounts in advance when they performed their services. Whether the deductions are a part of wages turns on whether they were agreed to in accordance with a calculation procedure [*15]  or formula, not whether the specific amount of deductions was known by the plaintiffs at the time that they rendered their services.

Beyond deductions or offsets for loss or damage to goods, the complaint alleges that there were “deductions for insurances (including auto liability, cargo, general liability, umbrella and workers’ compensation insurance), gift cards, administrative costs such as processing fees, uniforms.”25 But the parties’ statements of material facts address only the issue of deduction for loss or damage to goods.26 Moreover, although the Agreement required contractors to assume some costs such as for insurance, it did not provide that these costs would be deducted by RXO from the amounts that RXO paid, much less that they be “withheld” or “diverted” as required to violate Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e.

Regardless, even assuming that there were such deductions for items other than loss or damage to goods, the plaintiffs do not show that they were made in a manner that is not provided for or inconsistent with the terms of the Delivery Service Agreement. Instead, the plaintiffs’ theory is that the Agreement improperly allowed for such deductions or offsets. At oral argument, plaintiffs made clear that [*16]  their claim is based on deductions authorized by the Agreement, not on the basis of deductions outside the scope of the Agreement.27 It is undisputed that RXO made payments “in accordance with the contractually specified reconciliation process.”28 Therefore, any such claims with respect to such additional deductions or offsets fail for the same reasons that I have explained with respect to deductions for lost or damaged goods—that is, because they were an agreed-to component of the calculation of the plaintiffs’ wages rather than an unlawful deduction from wages.

The plaintiffs argue that the Agreement’s payment formula violates Connecticut’s anti-kickback statute, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-73(b). But that same argument was rejected in both Mytych and Mujo, because the deductions were agreed-upon and therefore under Connecticut law a component of the calculation of wages, rather than an unlawful refund or kickback of wages. See Mytych, 260 Conn. at 165 (noting that “the defendant’s policy here does not violate §§ 31-71e and 31-73(b))”); Mujo, 13 F.4th at 213-14 (“[W]hile § 31-73(b) prohibits employers from seeking a ‘refund of wages,’ § 31-73(a) defines ‘refund of wages’ as ‘[t]he return by an employee to his employer . . . of any sum of money actually paid or owed to the employee in return [*17]  for services performed,’ and ‘the sum of money . . . owed to the employee’ is defined by the employment contract”).29

The plaintiffs additionally argue that the Agreement is void against public policy because it misclassifies employees as independent contractors.30 But as the Second Circuit observed in Mujo, “even if the [plaintiffs] should have been classified as employees under Connecticut law, Mytych forecloses the . . . § 31-71e claim.” 13 F.4th at 211. Regardless of any misclassification, the holding in Mytych applies to employees and independent contractors alike: both can enter into a contractual agreement that defines wages to include deductions for certain items.

Lastly, the plaintiffs point out that—as I previously ruled when I denied RXO’s motion to compel arbitration—the Delivery Service Agreements are between the motor carriers as corporate entities and RXO, rather than between the plaintiffs personally and RXO. So, according to the plaintiffs, the deductions were not agreed to by them because they were not even parties to the Agreements.

But this argument is self-defeating. After all, the plaintiffs’ theory of recovery in this case is that they were entitled to “wages” as calculated by [*18]  payments due under Schedule A of the Agreement. Yet if the plaintiffs want to argue that—as non-parties to the Agreement—they did not agree to its provisions for deductions, then this same argument must also mean that they have no contractual right to be paid under Schedule A as they insist.

The plaintiffs must take the bitter with the sweet. Indeed, when I queried plaintiffs’ counsel at oral argument that “I didn’t think that there was any dispute here that your contention is they’re entitled to be paid as stated in Schedule A,” counsel responded: “Correct.”31 Plaintiffs’ counsel went on to argue: “I’m not trying to say that the agreement is completely void. They had this agreement. I’m just dealing with the deductions because deductions have a special place in the Connecticut statutes. And if it is a deduction, that it has to meet the requirements of the statute.”32

Apart from my conclusions concerning the formal contractual signatories at the early stage of this case when I addressed the motion to compel arbitration, the full summary judgment record now shows that the plaintiffs by their course of conduct personally agreed to be paid in accordance with all of the terms of the Agreement [*19]  including to be subject to the deductions specified in the Agreement. A contrary conclusion would mean that the plaintiffs have no rights at all under the Agreement, including as they claim the rights to be paid as calculated under Schedule A of the Agreement.

In short, there is no genuine issue of fact remaining to support the plaintiffs’ claim that they were subject to unlawful wage deductions in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-71e. Accordingly, I will grant RXO’s motion for summary judgment as to Count One of the complaint.33


Count Two—unjust enrichment

Count Two of the complaint alleges a claim for unjust enrichment. To establish a claim of unjust enrichment under Connecticut law, a plaintiff “must prove (1) that the defendants were benefited, (2) that the defendants unjustly did not pay the plaintiffs for the benefits, and (3) that the failure of payment was to the plaintiffs’ detriment.” Vertex, Inc. v. City of Waterbury, 278 Conn. 557, 573, 898 A.2d 178 (2006).

Unjust enrichment is a broad and flexible remedy, and “the ultimate question for courts . . . is whether, under a given set of circumstances, the party liable, to the detriment of someone else, obtained something of value to which the party liable was not entitled.” Mujo, 13 F.4th at 213 (citing Town of New Hartford v. Conn. Res. Recovery Auth., 291 Conn. 433, 452, 970 A.2d 592 (2009)). In order to survive summary judgment [*20]  on an unjust enrichment claim, plaintiffs must provide “hard evidence . . . from which a reasonable inference” may be drawn that the defendants unjustly obtained a benefit to the detriment of the plaintiffs. Id. at 214.

Plaintiffs argue that Connecticut law bars an employer from contracting around its statutory obligation to furnish workers’ compensation insurance for its employees. See Conn. Gen. Stats. §§ 31-284(b), 31-290; Welch v. Arthur A. Fogarty, Inc., 157 Conn. 538, 545, 255 A.2d 627 (1969). According to the plaintiffs, because RXO misclassified them as independent contractors rather than employees, this allowed RXO to be unjustly enriched by allowing it to shift the burden to the plaintiffs to pay for workers’ compensation insurance rather than RXO’s assuming the burden itself.

As noted above, the Agreement required contract carrier companies to “[b]ear all expenses” for their own employees, including for “workers’ compensation coverage.”34 And it further required that the carrier company provide “at its own expense” such workers’ compensation insurance “[a]s required by state authorities.”35 But even accepting that the contract carrier companies were required to assume such expenses, there is no evidence that RXO required the plaintiffs themselves to pay for their own workers’ compensation insurance. [*21] 

The plaintiffs point to business ledgers from a third party, CMS/Openforce, that show regular deductions for items including “Workers Compensation Insurance” and “Occupational Accident.”36 But these statements reflect money paid by RXO to the contract carriers, not to the individual plaintiffs. The ledger for plaintiff Green, for example, indicates that it was “[p]repared for LG Family LLC.”37 Because RXO’s contractual agreement was with the LLCs, not the individual drivers, it would make no sense for RXO to pay the plaintiffs directly. So while the statements show that deductions were taken from the amount paid by RXO to the contract carriers, they do not show that the plaintiffs themselves bore any of those costs, much less that RXO required them to do so.

Nor do the plaintiffs demonstrate that amounts paid by the contract carriers for workers’ compensation or occupational accident insurance went toward the plaintiffs’ own insurance coverage, rather than for other employees of the contract carriers. Green and Tejada did not testify that they received workers’ compensation from their own carrier companies (Green stated that he instead took out an occupational accident policy [*22]  but did not elaborate).38 But Tejada Express LLC and LG Family LLC provided its other employees, including helpers and other drivers, with workers’ compensation plans.39 This shows that the insurance deductions reflected in the Openforce statements paid for coverage of other employees of the companies rather than for Tejada or Green.

These other employees of the contract carriers are not necessarily members of the class, and there is no claim that they also should have been considered employees of RXO. See XPO Last Mile, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171324, 2022 WL 4390959 (certifying a class composed only of delivery drivers who signed contract carrier agreements with RXO). And so even if RXO had classified the plaintiffs as its employees, the contract carriers would still have had to pay for workers’ compensation and other insurance coverage for their non-plaintiff employees. The “detriment” of these insurance costs is therefore not traceable to RXO’s alleged misclassification of the plaintiffs as independent contractors rather than employees.

An unjust enrichment claim may also involve a transfer of a benefit from a third party to a defendant “when the plaintiff has a superior equitable entitlement to that benefit.” Geriatrics, Inc. v. McGee, 332 Conn. 1, 25, 208 A.3d 1197 (2019). But the standard [*23]  for such an indirect unjust enrichment claim is high—”the plaintiff must prove that it has a better legal or equitable right to the disputed benefit than the defendant” and that “its right is both recognized, and accorded priority over the interest of the defendant.” Ibid. Because it appears that the insurance deductions went towards coverage for the contract carriers’ other employees rather than the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs cannot show that their interest in the insurance deductions was a “paramount interest of the kind recognized in law or equity,” and so any indirect claim for unjust enrichment based on the plaintiffs’ third-party status also fails. Ibid.

Because there is no genuine fact issue to suggest that RXO required the plaintiffs themselves to personally pay for workers’ compensation insurance, I will dismiss the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim to the extent that it is based on the plaintiffs’ claim that RXO was unjustly enriched by requiring the plaintiffs to pay workers’ compensation insurance premiums that the law required RXO to pay in the first instance. While Count Two of the complaint additionally lists “employer payroll taxes, administrative fees, fuel and vehicle [*24]  maintenance costs” as examples of business costs RXO shifted to the plaintiffs, the claim is underdeveloped in light of subsequent briefing and the record at summary judgment which focus almost exclusively on workers’ compensation as the cost that was allegedly unjustly shifted to the plaintiffs in violation of Connecticut law.40 In any event, the plaintiffs do not show that it was against public policy for RXO to shift these additional costs to the contract carriers. Nor do they show a genuine issue of fact that RXO was unjustly enriched by any such shifting of these costs.

All in all, there is no “hard evidence . . . from which a reasonable inference” may be drawn that RXO unjustly obtained a benefit to the detriment of the plaintiffs. Mujo, 13 F.4th at 214. Accordingly, I will grant RXO’s motion for summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ unjust enrichment claim. See Mujo v. Jani-King Int’l, Inc., 431 F. Supp. 3d 18, 43-44 (D. Conn. 2019) (granting summary judgment on unjust enrichment claim where plaintiffs failed to identify the fees added beyond the value of the franchise agreement), aff’d on other grounds Mujo, 13 F.4th 204; Levy v. World Wrestling Ent., Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13538, 2009 WL 455258, at *3 (D. Conn. 2009) (dismissing employee misclassification claim of unjust enrichment stated as a “legal conclusion without factual substantiation” and noting that “[w]here parties [*25]  have an express contract which delineates the rights and obligations with respect to services to be provided and the compensation to be paid therefor, unjust enrichment does not lie”). Accordingly, I will grant RXO’s motion for summary judgment as to Count Two of the complaint.


CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the defendant RXO’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #111). In light of the granting of the defendant’s motion, the Court DENIES as moot the plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment with respect to their employment status (Doc. #114).

The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment and close this case.

It is so ordered. Dated at New Haven this 24th day of August 2023.

/s/ Jeffrey Alker Meyer

Jeffrey Alker Meyer

United States District Judge


End of Document


Doc. #111-2 at 1 (¶ 1) (RXO Rule 56(a)(1) statement of material facts); Doc. #130 at 1 (¶ 1) (Plaintiffs’ Rule 56(a)(2) statement of facts in opposition).

Doc. #130 at 1 (¶ 1); Doc. #116 at 2-3 (¶¶ 4, 6); Doc. #128-1 at 2-4 (¶¶ 4, 6). RXO takes issue with the plaintiffs’ representations that RXO “performs” deliveries or “provides” delivery services but does not otherwise deny that it contracts with specific businesses to arrange delivery of their goods to their customers’ homes.

Doc. #111-2 at 1 (¶ 2); Doc. #130 at 1-2 (¶ 2).

Doc. #111-2 at 2 (¶¶ 4-5); Doc. #130 at 2-3 (¶¶ 4-5). The record includes various examples of these Delivery Service Agreements. See, e.g., Doc. #19-4.

See, e.g., Doc. #128-5 at 2 (LG Family LLC Delivery Service Agreement).

Doc. #111-2 at 2 (¶ 10); Doc. #130 at 5 (¶ 10). The plaintiffs dispute that drivers are able to negotiate their rates but do not take issue with the statement that revenue schemes vary as set forth in each specific Agreement.

See Doc. #128-5 at 8 (¶ 9.2) (“Payment shall be made pursuant to any Schedule A(s) attached hereto.”); Doc. #144 (sample Schedule A).

Doc. #128-5 at 7 (¶ 7).

Ibid.

10 Id. at 7-8 (¶ 8).

11 Id. at 6-7 (¶¶ 6.1, 6.2, 6.3).

12 Id. at 8 (¶¶ 9.2, 9.3).

13 Doc. #111-2 at 3 (¶ 14); Doc. #130 at 6 (¶ 14).

14 Doc. #128-5 at 6 (¶ 5(c)).

15 Id. at 8 (¶ 12).

16 Doc. #90-1 (Schedule D).

17 Doc. #128-5 at 6 (¶ 5).

18 Id. at 4 (¶ 4.1).

19 Doc. #111-2 at 1 (¶ 3); Doc. #130 at 2 (¶ 3). The plaintiffs dispute this statement but their response does not refute that the two named plaintiffs in this action did own and operate DSPs that were legally separate corporate entities.

20 Doc. #111.

21 Doc. #114.

22 Unless otherwise indicated, this ruling omits internal quotation marks, alterations, citations, and footnotes in text quoted from court decisions.

23 Doc. #129 at 13 (plaintiffs’ contention that “the DSA expressly states that Plaintiffs are paid for completed delivery based on amounts listed in Schedule A which is attached to the DSA”).

24 Id. at 2-3.

25 Doc. #1 at 6-7 (¶ 25).

26 Doc. #130 at 5-6, 12-13 (¶¶ 11-13, 23); Doc. #128-1 at 28-29, 32-33 (¶¶ 73-75, 88).

27 Doc. #150 at 15. The plaintiffs likewise claimed at the class certification stage that all unlawful deductions were “pursuant to the DSA.” Doc. 73-1 at 5; see also id. at 18 (noting that the plaintiffs “signed identical DSAs” such that “[t]hey were subject to . . . the same policies for deductions”).

28 Doc. #130 at 10 (¶18).

29 The plaintiffs misplace their reliance on Lockwood v. Pro. Wheelchair Transp., Inc., 37 Conn. App. 85, 654 A.2d 1252 (1995), in which the Connecticut Appellate Court concluded that an employer violated the anti-kickback statute when it required an at-will employee to pay a $1,000 insurance deductible resulting from the employee’s involvement in a traffic accident involving the employer’s vehicle. Id. at 93. But Lockwood was decided before Mytych, and Mytych distinguished Lockwood on the ground that “[t]he amount of the deductible [in Lockwood] was not part of the employee’s wages” but “was an amount completely separate and distinct from the money he had earned in his employment pursuant to any wage agreement he might have had with the employer.” Mytych, 260 Conn. at 166.

30 Doc. #129 at 10.

31 Doc. #150 at 17.

32 Id. at 17-18 (emphasis added).

33 For the same reasons that the Second Circuit declined to certify to the Connecticut Supreme Court questions concerning the issue of how to define wages and lawful deductions under Connecticut law, see 13 F.4th at 214-16, I also decline plaintiffs’ request to certify such questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

34 Doc. #128-5 at 6 (¶ 5(c)).

35 Id. at 8 (¶ 12); Doc. #90-1 at 22 (Schedule D); see also Doc. #151-3 (Schedule D for Tejada Express requiring furnishing of certificate of insurance for workers’ compensation or occupational accident coverage).

36 Doc. #151 at 3; Doc. #151-6. The plaintiffs describe these worksheets as “pay statements” from CMS/Openforce but the actual sheets are titled “Self Employment Business Ledger.”

37 Doc. #151-6. The ledger for Tejada states that it was prepared for “Waldo Tejada” rather than for his LLC. See Doc. #151-7. As the defendant explains this is because Tejada contracted with CMS before he established Tejada Express LLC, the entity that contracted with RXO. See Doc. #156 at 6.

38 See Doc. #117-12 at 33 (Green deposition) (“Q. [D]id you get workers’ comp through LG Family LLC? A. No I took—what is it called? Q. An occupational accident policy? A. Yeah, yeah, that’s the one, yes.”); Doc. #128-9 at 15 (Tejada deposition) (“Q. Did Tejada Express LLC provide you with workers’ compensation insurance? A. For me? Q. Yes. A. I don’t remember that.”). To the extent Tejada and Green’s subsequent supplemental affidavits (Docs. #151-1 and #151-2) conclusorily contradict their prior deposition testimony, I decline to give weight to the later-filed contradictory affidavits. See In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., 707 F.3d 189, 193 (2d Cir. 2013) (noting that “the ‘sham issue of fact’ doctrine . . . prohibits a party from defeating summary judgment simply by submitting an affidavit that contradicts the party’s previous sworn testimony”).

39 See Doc. #128-10 at 5 (“Q. Did [Tejada Express] provide its employees workers’ compensation insurance? A. Yes.”); Doc. #128-9 at 15 (“Q. Did Tejada Express LLC provide Felix Olguin workers’ compensation insurance? A. Yes.”); Doc. #117-12 at 33 (“Q. Did LG Family LLC provide workers’ comp coverage for its employees? A. Yes, for—yes, for most of them, yes. Not the part-timers, but yes. Q. Just the full-timers? A. Yes. I believe it was all of them.”); see also Doc. #117-12 at 34 (“Q. LG Family offered workers’ compensation to James Searcy from November 2020 to November of 2021; is that correct? A. He had insurance, yes, but not on that truck” continuing a conversation about how the workers’ comp policies covered specific workers driving specific trucks).

40 See, e.g., Doc. #129 at 9-10; Doc. #155 at 1.

Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

December 5, 2022, Argued; July 18, 2023, Decided

No. 22-1805

YING YE, as Representative of the Estate of SHAWN LIN, deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GLOBALTRANZ ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

Prior History:  [*1] Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. No. 1:18-CV-01961 — Elaine E. Bucklo, Judge.

Core Terms

brokers, motor vehicle, motor carrier, negligent hiring, state law, transportation, regulations, brokerage services, preemption, motor vehicle safety, hired, saved, preempted, driver, freight, district court, express preemption provision, direct link, Authorization, provisions, route, preemption provision, regulatory authority, significant economic, effects, highway, interpretations, intrastate, indirect, shipping

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-Where the plaintiff sought to recover against the defendant, a freight broker, for her husband’s  highway accident death, alleging that the defendant negligently hired the motor carrier that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident, the express preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1), barred the claim, and the § 14501(c)(2)(A) safety exception did not save the claim; [2]-The negligent hiring claim had a direct relationship to broker services under the Act and subjecting such decisions to a common-law negligence standard would have significant economic effects such that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempted this claim; [3]-The Act’s § 14501(c)(2)(A) safety exception did not preclude preemption because Congress required motor carriers—not brokers—to bear responsibility for motor vehicle accidents.

Outcome

Decision affirmed.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Civil Procedure > … > Federal & State Interrelationships > Federal Common Law > Preemption

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Supreme Law of the Land

HN1  Federal Common Law, Preemption

Federal preemption doctrine owes its existence to U.S. Const. art. VI, which makes the Constitution, and federal law enacted pursuant to it, the supreme Law of the Land. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In short, the Supremacy Clause precludes courts from giving effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws. Courts recognize three types of federal preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > State Powers

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

HN2  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

The safety exception to the express preemption provision in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, provides that the express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1) shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > State Powers

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

HN3  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

In the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1), Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, but it made a specific carveout for laws within a state’s safety regulatory authority with respect to motor vehicles, even though such laws may burden interstate commerce.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

HN4  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

In the preemption context, the U.S. Supreme Court understands “related to” or “relating to” in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1), as having a “broad preemptive purpose.” To be “related to” broker services, the state law in question need only have a “connection with, or reference to” these services. A state law may be preempted even if the law’s effect on broker services “is only indirect.” But state laws with indirect effects still require a clear, articulable connection. The Act does not preempt state laws that impact broker services in only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” manner.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

HN5  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

The party seeking to establish preemption under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1), must show both that a state enacted or attempted to enforce a law and that the state law relates to broker rates, routes, or services either by expressly referring to them, or by having a significant economic effect on them.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

HN6  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

Common law tort claims fall comfortably within the language of the preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1), that, by its terms, applies to state laws, regulations, or other provisions having the force and effect of law.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Transportation Law > … > US Federal Aviation Administration > Notices & Orders > Judicial Review

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

HN7  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

A common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is with respect to motor vehicles under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(1).

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

HN8  Legislation, Interpretation

It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that absent provisions cannot be supplied by the courts.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

HN9  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501, text makes clear that Congress views motor vehicle safety regulations separately and apart from those provisions imposing obligations on brokers.

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Constitutional Law > Supremacy Clause > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > Federal Preemption

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

HN10  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. § 14501(c)(2)(A), requires state laws to have a direct link to motor vehicles to be saved from the preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1).

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > State & Local Regulation

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > US Federal Aviation Administration > Authorities & Powers

Transportation Law > … > US Federal Aviation Administration > Notices & Orders > Judicial Review

Transportation Law > Air & Space Transportation > Maintenance & Safety

Business & Corporate Compliance > … > Transportation Law > Interstate Commerce > State Powers

HN11  Air & Space Transportation, State & Local Regulation

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit joins the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in holding that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, 49 U.S.C.S. §§ 14501(c)(2)(A), requires a direct link between state laws and motor vehicle safety and that negligent hiring claims against brokers fall short of having that direct link.

Counsel: For YING YE, as Representative of the Estate of SHAWN LIN, deceased, Plaintiff – Appellant: Michael Cowen, Attorney, COWEN, RODRIGUEZ, PEACOCK, P.C., San Antonio, TX; Kenneth H. Levinson, Attorney, LEVINSON & STEFANI, Chicago, IL; Adina Hyman Rosenbaum, Attorney, PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP, Washington, DC.

For GLOBALTRANZ ENTERPRISES, INC., Defendant – Appellee: William P. Ryan, Attorney, Matthew Koch, Attorney, MARWEDEL, MINICHELLO & REEB P.C., Chicago, IL.

For COYOTE LOGISTICS, LLC, ECHO GLOBAL LOGISTICS, INC, UBER FREIGHT LLC, UBER FREIGHT US LLC, C.H. ROBINSON WORLDWIDE, INCORPORATED, Amicus Curiaes: Jason Orleans, Attorney, ORLEANS CANTY NOVY, LLC, Chicago, IL.

Judges: Before BRENNAN, SCUDDER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by: SCUDDER

Opinion

Scudder, Circuit Judge. This appeal presents a question of preemption under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. Ying Ye seeks to recover against GlobalTranz Enterprises, a freight broker, following the death of her husband in a highway accident. Ye claims GlobalTranz negligently hired the motor carrier [*2]  that employed the driver of the truck that caused the accident. The district court concluded both that the Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s claim and that the Act’s safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save the claim. We agree and affirm.


I

GlobalTranz is a freight broker that provides transportation logistics services to parties seeking to ship goods. In 2017 a company contacted GlobalTranz to provide such services for goods to be transported from Illinois to Texas. Global-Tranz hired the motor carrier Global Sunrise, Inc. to provide that shipping service. This arrangement meant that Global Sunrise provided the driver and vehicle to complete the shipping.

On November 7, 2017, the truck completing that shipping route, driven by a Global Sunrise employee, collided with a motorcycle driven by Ying Ye’s husband, Shawn Lin, on an interstate highway near Conroe, Texas. Lin sustained serious injuries and died two weeks later.

As Lin’s surviving spouse, Ye brought a diversity suit against Global Sunrise in its capacity as the motor carrier that employed the truck driver involved in the crash. Ye brought two Illinois tort claims—one for negligent hiring and another for vicarious liability—against [*3]  the motor carrier.

Ye later amended her complaint to add two Illinois tort claims against GlobalTranz for its role as the broker that hired Global Sunrise. Ye’s first claim—negligent hiring—alleged that GlobalTranz “was negligent in selecting Global Sunrise Inc. to transport freight on its behalf as they knew, or should have known, that Global Sunrise Inc. was an unsafe company with a history of hours of service and unsafe driving violations that would’ve alerted a reasonably prudent person to the same” and that this negligence proximately caused Lin’s death. Ye’s second claim—vicarious liability—alleged that GlobalTranz “exercised sufficient control over Global Sunrise” such that GlobalTranz “is vicariously liable for the negligence of Global Sunrise” and its driver.

Counsel for Global Sunrise withdrew from the litigation in May 2019. After more than two years passed without entry of new counsel, Ye moved for default judgment. The district court granted Ye’s motion and entered default judgment against Global Sunrise on both of Ye’s claims against the motor carrier. Following a hearing in April 2022, the court awarded Ye $10 million in survival damages and wrongful death damages against [*4]  Global Sunrise. No aspect of this appeal relates to Ye’s claims against Global Sunrise.

Meanwhile, Ye continued to litigate her separate claims against GlobalTranz. In November 2019 GlobalTranz moved to dismiss the claims, which the district court construed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The district court granted the motion as to Ye’s negligent hiring claim, finding the claim to be barred by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act. The court determined Ye’s negligent hiring claim was prohibited under the Act’s express preemption provision in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) and not saved by any of the Act’s exceptions, including the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). The court did not dismiss the vicarious liability claim on the pleadings, but after one year of discovery entered summary judgment for GlobalTranz on the merits of that claim.

Ye now appeals the district court’s dismissal of her negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz.


II

HN1 Federal preemption doctrine owes its existence to Article VI of the U.S. Constitution, which makes the Constitution, and federal law enacted pursuant to it, the “supreme Law of the Land.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. In short, the Supremacy Clause precludes courts from “giv[ing] effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.” Nationwide Freight Sys., Inc. v. Illinois Com. Comm’n, 784 F.3d 367, 372 (7th Cir. 2015) (alteration [*5]  in original) (quoting Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135 S. Ct. 1378, 191 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2015)).

Today’s law recognizes three types of federal preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption. See, e.g., Wigod v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 673 F.3d 547, 576 (7th Cir. 2012). Given that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act “states explicitly what states may and may not do with respect to” motor carriers and brokers, this case concerns express preemption. Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d at 373. Our task is one of statutory construction—to determine whether Ye’s state law claim falls within the Act’s express prohibition in § 14501(c)(1) and, if so, whether any of the Act’s exceptions save her claim from preemption.

We take a fresh look at Ye’s complaint to determine whether the district court correctly dismissed her negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz. See Costello v. BeavEx, Inc., 810 F.3d 1045, 1050 (7th Cir. 2016). In doing so, we owe no deference to the district court’s legal determination that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act preempts her claim.

A

In 1994 Congress enacted the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (which the parties call “F Quad A,” but which we refer to as the Act) as part of a greater push to deregulate interstate transportation industries. The initial effort began in 1978 with a focus on deregulating domestic air travel. See Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 255-56, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 185 L. Ed. 2d 909 (2013). With the [*6]  passage of the Act in 1994, Congress turned its attention to the trucking industry “upon finding that state governance of intrastate transportation of property had become ‘unreasonably burden[some]’ to ‘free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers.'” Id. at 256 (alteration in original) (quoting City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 440, 122 S. Ct. 2226, 153 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2002)). The Act includes several provisions barring such burdensome state regulations. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(1).

Ye’s appeal requires a close look at the Act’s express preemption provision and exceptions in 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c), which governs “Motor Carriers of Property.” By its terms, § 14501(c) provides that a state

may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier … or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Several exceptions then follow. See id. § 14501(c)(2), (3), (5).

We will come to focus on the so-called safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). HN2[] Under this exception, the express preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1)

shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles, the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of [*7]  the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo, or the authority of a State to regulate motor carriers with regard to minimum amounts of financial responsibility relating to insurance requirements and self-insurance authorization.

Id. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

Notice, then, the overarching statutory structure: HN3[] Congress broadly disallowed state laws that impede its deregulatory goals, but it made a specific carve-out for laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles,” even though such laws may burden interstate commerce. See Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 441 (observing that “a State could, without affront to the statute, pass discrete, nonuniform safety regulations” because the Act’s preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1) and its safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) achieve different goals).

B

Interpreting these statutory provisions, the district court first concluded that Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz falls within § 14501(c)(1)‘s express prohibition on the enforcement of state laws “related to a … service of any … broker … with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). We agree.

As always, we begin with the Act’s text, “which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 260 (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1993)). [*8]  HN4[] In the preemption context, the Supreme Court understands “related to” or “relating to” as having a “broad preemptive purpose.” See Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992) (interpreting an identical provision of the Airline Deregulation Act); see also Rowe v. New Hampshire Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370-71, 128 S. Ct. 989, 169 L. Ed. 2d 933 (2008) (explaining that interpretations of the Airline Deregulation Act directly apply to the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act). To be “related to” broker services, the state law in question need only have a “connection with, or reference to” these services. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370 (emphasis removed) (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384). A state law may be preempted even if the law’s effect on broker services “is only indirect.” Id. (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 386). But state laws with indirect effects still require a clear, articulable connection. The Act does not preempt state laws that impact broker services in only a “tenuous, remote, or peripheral” manner. Id. at 371 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 390).

Our court has implemented the Supreme Court’s instructions in Morales and Rowe with a two-part test. As HN5[] the party seeking to establish preemption, GlobalTranz must show both that a state “enacted or attempted to enforce a law” and that the state law relates to broker “rates, routes, or services ‘either by expressly referring to them, or by having a significant economic effect [*9]  on them.'” Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d at 373-74 (quoting Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996)).

Ye brought her negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz under Illinois’s common law of negligence. HN6[] Common law tort claims “fall comfortably within the language of the [ ] preemption provision” that, by its terms, “applies to state ‘law[s], regulation[s], or other provision[s] having the force and effect of law.'” Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281-82, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 188 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). So the first preemption requirement is easily met.

The question then becomes whether the Illinois law underlying Ye’s claim expressly refers to or has a significant economic effect on broker services. See Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d at 373-74. Nothing in Illinois tort law expressly refers to broker services. Rather, Ye roots her claim in a theory of negligent hiring more generally. Our focus must therefore be on whether Ye’s proposed enforcement of Illinois’s common law of negligence would have a significant economic effect on broker services.

Like the district court, we conclude the answer is yes. Ye alleges GlobalTranz “was negligent in selecting Global Sunrise Inc. to transport freight on its behalf.” As a broker, GlobalTranz offers services in the form of “selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” [*10]  49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (defining “broker”). By its terms, Ye’s claim strikes at the core of GlobalTranz‘s broker services by challenging the adequacy of care the company took—or failed to take—in hiring Global Sunrise to provide shipping services.

In our view, enforcement of such a claim—and the accompanying imposition of liability—would have a significant economic effect on broker services. By recognizing common-law negligence claims, courts would impose in the name of state law a new and clear duty of care on brokers, the breach of which would result in a monetary judgment. This is exactly what Ye seeks here against GlobalTranz. To avoid these costly damages payouts, GlobalTranz and other brokers would change how they conduct their services—for instance, by incurring new costs to evaluate motor carriers. Then, by changing their hiring processes, brokers would likely hire different motor carriers than they would have otherwise hired without the state negligence standards. Indeed, that is the centerpiece of Ye’s claim: that GlobalTranz should not have hired Global Sunrise.

In our view, then, Ye’s negligent hiring claim has much more than a tenuous, remote, or peripheral relationship to broker services. The [*11]  relationship is direct, and subjecting a broker’s hiring decisions to a common-law negligence standard would have significant economic effects. So Ye’s claim is expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1).

Our conclusion is consistent with the two other circuit courts that have considered this issue. See Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] claim that imposes an obligation on brokers at the point at which they arrange for transportation by motor carrier has a ‘connection with’ broker services.”); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1267 (11th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he [Act] makes plain that [the plaintiff’s] negligence claims relate to a broker’s services.”).

Ye’s arguments to the contrary are unpersuasive. She contends that the effects of enforcing negligent hiring claims against brokers are too tenuous to be “related to” broker services because negligent hiring laws regulate a broker’s broader duty to the public, not its narrower relationships with its customers. Ye insists this public—private distinction is important because she believes that Congress intended to preempt state laws regulating only a broker’s market relationships, not a broker’s relationship with the public. And she sees GlobalTranz as having breached a duty of care owed to a member of the public—her husband who was killed by [*12]  a Global Sunrise employee—and not a duty owed to its freight customer.

We find no support in § 14501(c)(1)‘s express preemption provision for Ye’s position. The purpose of Illinois tort law—whether aimed at a broker’s duty to the public or to private actors—has no bearing on the significant economic effects that will result by imposing state negligence standards on brokers. And these significant effects are what matter in determining that § 14501(c)(1) expressly preempts Ye’s Illinois tort claim rooted in a theory of negligent hiring. See Nationwide Freight, 784 F.3d at 373-76.

C

That brings us to the Act’s safety exception. Even if Ye’s claim is expressly preempted, it may be saved by one of several provisions excluding claims from § 14501(c)(1)‘s broad reach. Ye points us to the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A), which provides that laws within a state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles” are not preempted. Here, too, we agree with the district court that the Act’s safety exception does not save Ye’s claim from preemption.

To start, Ye asks us to examine the first half of the safety exception’s text and conclude that a state’s tort law is part of its “safety regulatory authority.” There is much to say in support of this argument, and many courts [*13]  agree with Ye’s line of reasoning. See, e.g., Miller, 976 F.3d at 1026-29; Aspen, 65 F.4th at 1268-70. But we do not need to reach this issue because we conclude that Ye’s claim fails to satisfy the second half of the safety exception’s text. HN7[] In short, a common law negligence claim enforced against a broker is not a law that is “with respect to motor vehicles.”

1

The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted “with respect to” to mean “concern[s].” See Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261. But more crucial to our analysis is Congress’s specification limiting the excepted laws to those that concern “motor vehicles.” Our focus, then, is on the entire phrase “with respect to motor vehicles”—language the Supreme Court has determined “massively limits the scope” of the safety exception. Id. (quoting Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 449 (Scalia, J., dissenting)). We must decide whether Ye’s negligent hiring claim is one “with respect to motor vehicles.” We conclude it is not because, in our view, the exception requires a direct link between a state’s law and motor vehicle safety. And we see no such direct link between negligent hiring claims against brokers and motor vehicle safety.

Once again we start with the statutory text. We first recognize Congress’s express use in § 14501(c)(2)(A) of a statutorily defined term—”motor vehicles.” [*14]  By limiting the safety exception to apply to state laws “with respect to motor vehicles,” Congress narrowed the scope of the exception to those laws concerning a “vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer … used on a highway in transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16) (defining “motor vehicle”). We see no mention of brokers in the safety exception itself or in Congress’s definition of motor vehicles, which suggests that such claims may be outside the scope of the exception’s plain text. See Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261-62 (concluding that a state’s law was not “with respect to transportation of property” under § 14501(c)(1) where it concerned post-towing storage, which does not constitute “transportation” as defined in § 13102(23)(B)).

Looking beyond the clause containing the safety exception, § 14501(c)(2)(A) goes on to preserve a state’s authority “to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of a motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo” and to regulate motor carriers’ “insurance requirements.” Notice the specificity throughout § 14501(c)(2)(A): after broadly preempting state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of brokers and motor carriers in § 14501(c)(1), Congress carefully excepted state laws for motor vehicle safety, cargo loads, and [*15]  motor carrier insurance.

Now notice what is missing from § 14501(c)(2)(A)—any reference to brokers or broker services. While it listed broker services in § 14501(c)(1)‘s express preemption provision, Congress declined to expressly mention brokers again in reference to states’ safety authority. Reading further, we see the same omission of brokers from § 14501(c)(2)‘s other savings provisions for “intrastate transportation of household goods” and “tow truck operations.” Id. § 14501(c)(2)(B), (C).

Remember, too, that § 14501(c) sets forth federal authority over “Motor Carriers of Property”—not brokers—so Congress’s inclusion of brokers in one subsection and exclusion in another suggests that the omission was intentional. See Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361, 205 L. Ed. 2d 291 (2019) (“Atextual judicial supplementation is particularly inappropriate when, as here, Congress has shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision.”). Congress could have chosen to save state safety laws enforced “with respect to motor carriers and brokers,” but it did not. We hesitate to read broker services into parts of the statute where Congress declined to expressly name them, especially when it contemplated them elsewhere within the same statutory scheme. See id. at 360-61 (HN8[] “It is a fundamental principle of statutory interpretation [*16]  that ‘absent provision[s] cannot be supplied by the courts.'” (alteration in original) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 94 (2012))).

Congress’s omission of brokers from the exceptions to § 14501(c)(1)‘s preemptive sweep is even more pronounced when we take a step back and examine other provisions within § 14501. What most stands out is § 14501(b), titled “Freight Forwarders and Brokers.” In § 14501(b)(1) Congress directly addressed state regulation of brokers by prohibiting states from enacting or enforcing laws “relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker.” Following this broad preemption provision, however, Congress did not include a safety exception—another telling omission given that Congress included safety exceptions to the parallel preemption provisions for motor carriers of property (at issue here) and motor carriers of passengers. See id. § 14501(a)(2), (c)(2)(A). Here, too, Congress’s decision not to write a safety exception for the broker-specific preemption provision indicates a purposeful separation between brokers and motor vehicle safety.

That brings us back to Ye’s claim. Absent unusual circumstances, the relationship [*17]  between brokers and motor vehicle safety will be indirect, at most. No better example than Ye’s complaint. She alleged that GlobalTranz was “negligent in selecting Global Sunrise” as the motor carrier and that Global Sunrise was the one “negligent in its entrustment of a tractor-trailer” to an unsafe driver. Ye’s allegations mirror practical realities: GlobalTranz does not own or operate motor vehicles like Global Sunrise does. Seeing the connection between GlobalTranz as a broker and motor vehicle safety requires an extra link to connect the alleged chain of events: GlobalTranz‘s negligent hiring of Global Sunrise resulted in Global Sunrise’s negligent entrustment of a motor vehicle to a negligent driver who, in turn, caused a collision that resulted in Shawn Lin’s death.

In our view, this additional link goes a bridge too far to bring Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz within the Act’s safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). HN9[] The Act’s text makes clear that Congress views motor vehicle safety regulations separately and apart from those provisions imposing obligations on brokers. And this separateness counsels a reading of “with respect to motor vehicles” that requires a direct connection [*18]  between the potentially exempted state law and motor vehicles. Any other construction would expand the safety exception’s scope without a clear, text-based limit. So we agree with the district court that the connection here—between a broker hiring standard and motor vehicles—is too attenuated to be saved under § 14501(c)(2)(A).

To be sure, Ye is right to observe that, at a higher level of generality, motor vehicles have some relationship to brokers and, in turn, to considerations of motor vehicle safety. But we do not see how Congress authorized such a broad reading of the safety exception, and Ye offers no limiting principle of her own. It is difficult to conclude that the same Congress that prescribed specific—often itemized—regulations for motor vehicle safety intended something broader than “motor vehicle” in a safety exception that immediately follows an express preemption provision regulating “motor carriers.” So we draw the line where Congress did—at state safety regulations directly related to “motor vehicles.”

2

Looking beyond § 14501 to the other provisions of Title 49 further reinforces our narrow reading of the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in § 14501(c)(2)(A)‘s safety exception. See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) (“[A] reviewing [*19]  court should not confine itself to examining a particular statutory provision in isolation [because] [t]he meaning … of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.”); see also Sackett v. EPA, 143 S. Ct. 1322, 1338, 215 L. Ed. 2d 579 (2023) (considering the broader context of the Clean Water Act to derive the meaning of “wetlands” in one provision of the Act (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco, 529 U.S. at 132)). We look to Title 49 for the limited purpose of informing our understanding of “motor vehicles” as Congress used the phrase in the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act and find that the broader statutory context underscores our conclusion that only state laws with a direct connection to motor vehicles are saved from the Act’s express preemption provision.

Where Congress regulates motor vehicle safety in Title 49, it addresses motor vehicle ownership, operation, and maintenance—but not broker services. Take, for instance, Subtitle VI, which covers “Motor Vehicle and Driver Programs.” Here Congress defined “motor vehicle safety” to mean “the performance of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction, or performance of a motor vehicle.” 49 U.S.C. § 30102(a)(9). [*20]  Congress went on to give the Secretary of Transportation authority to, among other things, set “standards for inspection of commercial motor vehicles,” id. § 31142(b); “ensure that commercial motor vehicles are maintained, equipped, loaded, and operated safely,” id. § 31136(a)(1); and “issue and require the display of an identification plate on a motor vehicle used in transportation,” id. § 31504(a)(1). These regulations, and many others, concern the ownership and operation of the vehicles themselves—without reference to broker services.

The regulation of motor carriers throughout Title 49 further illustrates the lack of evidence that Congress sees a direct link between brokers and motor vehicles. For example, § 113 created the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration and empowered its Administrator to “carry out duties and powers related to motor carriers or motor carrier safety.” Id. § 113(f)(1). The Administration has imposed standards for commercial motor vehicle drivers’ licenses, see 49 C.F.R. § 383.1; operation of motor vehicles, see id. §§ 392.3-392.5; and inspection of motor vehicle equipment, see id. § 392.7. The regulations apply to motor carriers and their drivers, without mention of brokers or other entities. See, e.g., id. § 392.4(b) (“No motor carrier shall require [*21]  or permit a driver to [drive under the influence of drugs].”). Congress also created a Motor Carrier Safety Assistance Program to fund state efforts to promote and enforce “effective motor carrier, commercial motor vehicle, and driver safety regulations and practices consistent with Federal requirements.” 49 U.S.C. § 31102(b)(3); see also id. § 31104. The Program, too, makes specific mention of motor carriers with respect to motor vehicle safety regulation, but not brokers. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 350.101-350.417.

Indeed, we find no evidence in Title 49 that Congress sees a direct relationship between broker services and motor vehicles. Its regulation of brokers instead seems to address the financial aspects of broker services, not safety. For instance, brokers must file a “surety bond, proof of trust fund, or other financial security” with the Secretary of Transportation to secure against any “claim against a broker arising from its failure to pay freight charges under its contracts, agreements, or arrangements for transportation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13906(b)(1)(A), (2)(A). Compare that approach with Congress’s regulation of the financial security of motor carriers in that same section. Where brokers need only secure against a failure to perform logistics services, motor carriers must [*22]  obtain liability insurance that covers “final judgment against the [motor carrier] for bodily injury to, or death of, an individual resulting from the negligent operation, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles.” Id. § 13906(a)(1). Put differently, Congress required motor carriers—not brokers—to bear responsibility for motor vehicle accidents.

We see, too, that the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration—which is tasked with motor vehicle safety as its top priority—requires brokers to maintain records of their transactions, abide by certain advertising standards, and avoid conflicts of interest with shippers. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 371.3, 371.7, 371.9. But nowhere do we see any indication that the Administration imposes safety standards on broker hiring or otherwise recognizes a relationship between brokers and motor vehicles.

A clear conclusion emerges from this broader review of Title 49 and the regulatory landscape: Congress’s references to motor vehicle safety do not impose obligations on brokers. Accordingly, when it comes to interpreting the Act’s safety exception, only those laws with a direct link to motor vehicles fall within a state’s “safety regulatory authority … with respect to motor vehicles.” Brokers are noticeably [*23]  absent from motor vehicle safety regulations throughout the statutory scheme, just as they are absent from the ambit of the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Our initial text-based determination therefore remains the same: HN10[] § 14501(c)(2)(A) requires state laws to have a direct link to motor vehicles to be saved from the preemption provision in § 14501(c)(1).

We thus conclude that Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz does not fall within the scope of § 14501(c)(2)‘s safety exception. The claim is preempted and therefore properly dismissed by the district court.


III

Our conclusion aligns squarely with the Eleventh Circuit’s recent decision in Aspen American Insurance Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023).

In Aspen, the Eleventh Circuit also considered a negligent hiring claim against a freight broker. Tessco Technologies hired the broker Landstar Ranger to transport cargo. While rendering its services, Landstar mistakenly gave Tessco’s cargo to an entity pretending to be a motor carrier, and the fraudulent entity ran off with Tessco’s goods. Tessco was reimbursed by its insurance company, Aspen American Insurance, who in turn brought a state tort claim against Landstar for its negligent selection of the thieving motor carrier. Landstar argued that the Act preempted Aspen’s negligent hiring claim. [*24]  See 65 F.4th at 1264-65.

The Eleventh Circuit first held, as we do here, that negligent hiring claims against brokers are expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1) under the Supreme Court’s broad reading of “related to.” See id. at 1268 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 386). The Aspen court then went on to analyze the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). The panel divided over whether to reach the question of whether a state’s “safety regulatory authority” includes state tort law, see id. at 1273 (Jordan, J., concurring) (declining to reach this issue), but the full panel concluded that negligent hiring claims against brokers are not “with respect to motor vehicles” and therefore not saved by the Act’s safety exception. See id. at 1270-72.

The court’s approach grounded itself in the language of § 14501(c). Using canons of construction to avoid redundancy and surplusage, the court concluded that the “phrase ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ limits the safety exception’s application to state laws that have a direct relationship to motor vehicles.” Id. at 1271 (emphasis in original). In cases of negligent hiring claims against brokers—regardless of whether the injury is lost property (as in Aspen) or bodily injury (as here)—the court held that “a mere indirect connection between state regulations and motor vehicles will not [*25]  invoke the [Act]’s safety exception.” Id. at 1272.

Our reasoning similarly roots itself in the language Congress employed in § 14501(c)(1) and § 14501(c)(2)(A), and we go one step further by taking a broader look at the surrounding regulatory scheme in the Act and within Title 49 more generally. HN11[] In the end, then, we join the Eleventh Circuit in holding that § 14501(c)(2)(A) requires a direct link between state laws and motor vehicle safety and that negligent hiring claims against brokers fall short of having that direct link.

The only other circuit court to have considered the issue presented is the Ninth Circuit. The dispute in Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020), arose from near-identical facts to those here: Allen Miller sought to recover damages from a freight broker that he alleged was negligent in hiring an unsafe motor carrier whose driver caused a highway accident leaving Miller a quadriplegic. See id. at 1020. Consistent with our analysis, the court first held that negligent hiring claims against brokers are expressly preempted by § 14501(c)(1) under its view that “related to” requires a broad construction. See id. at 1021-25.

From there, however, the court found Miller’s claim against the broker to be saved by the Act’s safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). The Ninth Circuit interpreted “with respect to motor vehicles” [*26]  broadly to support exemption of state laws with an indirect link to motor vehicles, including negligent hiring claims against brokers. See id. at 1030-31. We see three major analytical differences that account for our opposing interpretations of § 14501(c)(2)(A).

First, in our view, the Ninth Circuit unduly emphasized Congress’s stated deregulatory purpose in passing the Act at the expense of the insights that come from an analysis of the broader statutory scheme. Consideration of congressional purpose is wholly appropriate. But given the plain meaning and import of the text, both in § 14501(c) itself and throughout the rest of Title 49, we do not see how Congress’s deregulatory goals can overcome the clear statutory mandate that the exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) saves only those safety regulations directly concerning motor vehicles. See id. at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[A broker] and the services it provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles or their drivers. … That attenuated connection is simply too remote for the safety exception to encompass [the] negligence claim.”).

A second difference is the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on a presumption against preemption to resolve any ambiguity in the breadth [*27]  of the safety exception’s scope. See id. at 1021. In a later Ninth Circuit case, however, the court acknowledged that its reliance on the presumption against preemption—in Miller v. C.H. Robinson specifically—stood in direct conflict with the Supreme Court’s instruction to “focus on the plain wording of the clause” instead of “invok[ing] any presumption against pre-emption.” R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 29 F.4th 542, 553 n.6 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Franklin California Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 195 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2016)). Consistent with Franklin, we focus on the text of § 14501(c)(2)(A), which is “the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent,” 579 U.S. at 125 (quoting Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 594, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 179 L. Ed. 2d 1031 (2011)), and come to a different outcome than the Ninth Circuit. We cannot be sure how the Ninth Circuit would interpret § 14501(c)(2)(A) absent such a presumption against preemption.

Finally, we disagree with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that the phrase “with respect to” in § 14501(c)(2)(A) is “synonymous” with “relating to.” Miller, 976 F.3d at 1030 (citing Cal. Tow Truck Ass’n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 807 F.3d 1008, 1021 (9th Cir. 2015)). We read the Supreme Court’s decision in Dan’s City Used Cars to say that “with respect to” more narrowly means “concerns.” See 569 U.S. at 261. Given Congress’s choice in § 14501(c)(1) to use “relating to,” its use of “with respect to” in § 14501(c)(2)(A) implies a different scope. No doubt “with respect to” is broad, but we decline to equate it to “relating to.” Our different view of this phrase offers another reason why our construction of the safety exception [*28]  is narrower than the Ninth Circuit’s.

* * *

In the end, the plain text and statutory scheme indicate that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) bars Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz and that the Act’s safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A) does not save it from preemption.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM.


End of Document

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