Broker - Central Analysis Bureau

Pruitt v. Hansen & Adkins, Inc.

United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama, Northern Division

July 12, 2023, Decided; July 12, 2023, Filed

CIVIL CASE NO. 2:23-cv-167-ECM (WO)

MICHAEL G. PRUITT, et al., Plaintiffs, v. HANSEN & ADKINS, INC., et al., Defendants.

Core Terms

preemption, preempted, brokers, freight, state-law, transportation, legislative history, negligent hiring, attorney’s fees, motor carrier, state law, removal, state court, federal-question, courts, intent of congress, freight broker, remedies, intend, objectively reasonable, personal injury, federal court, federal law, persuasive, preemptive, stemming, hiring

Counsel: [*1] For Michael G. Pruitt, II, Individually and on Behalf of Minor Child, J.P., Donna M. Pruitt, Individually and on Behalf of Minor Child, J.P., Alicia Tucker, On Behalf of Minor Child, H.T., Plaintiffs: Patrick Lamont Hays, Jr, LEAD ATTORNEY, The Hays Law Firm, LLC, Greenville, AL.

For Hansen & Adkins, Inc., Hansen & Adkins Auto Transport, Inc., Royal Truck Leasing LLC, Hansen & Adkins Auto Logistics, Inc., James B. Woodfork, Defendants: Brandi Branton Frederick, Richard Wayne Lewis, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Austill Lewis Pipkin & Maddox PC, Birmingham, AL; Joseph Edward Bishop Stewart, LEAD ATTORNEY, Austill Lewis Pipkin & Maddox, Alabama, Birmingham, AL; William Eugene Pipkin, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, Austill, Lewis & Pipkin, Mobile, AL.

For Mamuye Ayane Takelu, Defendant: Jannea Suzanne Rogers, LEAD ATTORNEY, Adams & Reese LLP, Mobile, AL; Blake T. Richardson, Adams and Reese LLP, Mobile, AL.

For Samsara, Inc., Defendant: Scott Burnett Smith, LEAD ATTORNEY, Hunter Wade Pearce, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Huntsville, AL; Charles Andrew Stewart, III, Bradley Arant Boult Cummings LLP, Montgomery, AL.

For Volvo Group North America, LLC, doing business asVolvo Trucks North America, Defendant: James [*2] MacDonald Russell, Jr., LEAD ATTORNEY, J. MacDonald Russell, Jr., Greenville, AL; John Calhoun Morrow, LEAD ATTORNEY, Burr & Forman LLP, Birmingham, AL.

For MoLo Solutions, Inc., Defendant: Joel Hartley Pearson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, Montgomery, AL.

For Arcbest Corporation, Defendant: Dennis Oscar Vann, Jr., Thomas Lee Oliver, II, William Charles Johnson, LEAD ATTORNEYS, Carr Allison, Birmingham, AL.

Judges: EMILY C. MARKS, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: EMILY C. MARKS

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Now pending before the Court is the Plaintiffs’ motion to remand. (Doc. 26). On February 27, 2023, the Plaintiffs sued various defendants in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Alabama, for claims stemming from a traffic accident. (Doc. 26-2 at 4-39). Relevant to this motion, the Plaintiffs sued Defendant MoLo Solutions, LLC (“MoLo”), for negligently or wantonly hiring a tractor-trailer operator to haul freight for its clients (Count XIV) and for vicarious liability (Count XV). MoLo removed the case to this Court, asserting federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction. (Doc. 1). MoLo argues this Court has federal jurisdiction because the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1), completely [*3] preempts state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. (Id. at 9-10). The Plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court. (Doc. 26). After careful consideration of the motion, briefs, and applicable law, the Court finds that this case is due to be remanded back to state court.¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Though a plaintiff is the master of his claim, his power is not plenary. Instead, a defendant may remove from state court to federal court any “action[] that originally could have been filed” in that federal court. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441). Federal courts, however, are courts of limited jurisdiction—they possess only the power authorized by the Constitution and statute. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). Courts should presume that a case lies outside this limited jurisdiction, with the party asserting federal jurisdiction bearing the burden of establishing the contrary. Id. When a plaintiff properly moves to remand a removed case, any questions or doubts as to jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of returning the matter to state court. Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir. 1994). Finally, a court must evaluate its jurisdiction as of the time of removal. Ehlen Floor Covering, Inc. v. Lamb, 660 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2011).

III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This matter arises from a tragic vehicular accident that occurred [*4] on July 19, 2021. The adult Plaintiffs in this case attempted to rescue children from a van that caught on fire as a result of this accident. Unable to do so, all Plaintiffs, including the minor children, witnessed the fire engulf the van and kill its eight minor occupants. The accident occurred when a tractor-trailer driven by Mamuye Takelu (“Takelu”) crashed into the back of a vehicle driven by Candice Gulley (“Gulley”), who was transporting the eight minors. Takelu was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Asmat Investment, LLC (“Asmat”), and he was hauling a load under MoLo’s motor carrier authority. MoLo arranged to have the load hauled by Takelu on the day of the accident. All eight minors in Gulley’s vehicle died as a result of the accident. The Plaintiffs, who allegedly witnessed the fire, filed this lawsuit in the Circuit Court of Butler County, Alabama.

In their complaint filed in state court, among claims against other defendants, the Plaintiffs sued MoLo for negligently hiring Takelu and Asmat to haul freight (Count XIV) and for vicarious liability as the motor carrier for the driver allegedly causing the accident (Count XV). These claims, along with all other claims in the [*5] complaint, were brought under state law. MoLo removed the case, arguing that this Court has federal-question jurisdiction and supplemental jurisdiction because the Plaintiffs’ claims against it are completely preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA. The Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that even if the claims are subject to ordinary preemption under § 14501(c)(1), as a federal defense, ordinary preemption does not confer federal-question jurisdiction. The parties also dispute whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorney’s fees and costs incurred in responding to MoLo’s removal of the case.

IV. DISCUSSION²

A. Complete Preemption

MoLo contends that this Court has jurisdiction because the FAAAA completely preempted all state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. MoLo argues, the Court has federal-question jurisdiction, which requires that the action “aris[e] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In deciding whether a federal question exists, courts apply the well-pleaded complaint rule, which looks only to the face of the complaint rather than to any defense asserted by the defendant. See Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392.

The Plaintiffs do not raise any federal issues on the face of the complaint. [*6] However, an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the “complete preemption” doctrine. Id. at 393. Complete preemption occurs in the rare instance that Congress so “completely preempt[ s] a particular area that any civil complaint . . . is necessarily federal in character.” Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63, 67, 107 S. Ct. 1542, 95 L. Ed. 2d 55 (1987). Complete preemption is jurisdictional in nature and focuses on whether Congress intended to make a plaintiff’s cause of action federal and removable even though the complaint only pleads state-law claims. Cotton v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 402 F.3d 1267, 1281 (11th Cir. 2005).

MoLo argues that the Plaintiffs’ claims are completely preempted under the FAAAA because the claims against MoLo regarding its hiring of Takelu and Asmat directly relate to its service as a freight broker for the transportation of property. The FAAAA provides that “a State . . . may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). MoLo asks the Court to interpret the phrase “rate, route, or service” broadly to completely preempt state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. (Doc. [*7] 29 at 21).

However, MoLo focuses much of its argument on the contention that § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA preempts the state-law negligence claims against it under ordinary preemption principles. An ordinary preemption defense cannot provide grounds for removal. See Cmty. State Bank v. Strong, 651 F.3d 1241, 1261 n.16 (11th Cir. 2011). Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine, and thus “is distinct from ‘ordinary’ or ‘defensive’ preemption,” which “allows a defendant to defeat a plaintiff’s state-law claim on the merits by asserting the supremacy of federal law as an affirmative defense.” Id. Ordinary preemption, however, does not create federal jurisdiction. See id. In other words, “a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393. A state-law claim may be subject to ordinary preemption by a federal statute “but not completely preempted for jurisdictional purposes.” Ammedie v. Sallie Mae, Inc., 485 F. App’x 399, 402 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Cotton, 402 F.3d at 1281).

Therefore, the cases upon which MoLo relies concerning ordinary preemption do not support its complete preemption argument. See, e.g., Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 128 S. Ct. 989, 169 L. Ed. 2d 933 (2008); Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 569 U.S. 641, 133 S. Ct. 2096, 186 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2013); Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998); McCarter v. Ziyar Express, Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4552, 2023 WL 144844 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2023); Ga. Nut Co. v. C.H. Robinson Co., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177269, 2017 WL 4864857 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017); Deerskin Trading Post, Inc. v. United Parcel Serv. of Am., Inc., 972 F. Supp. 665 (N.D. Ga. 1997). Likewise, the cases cited [*8] by MoLo that ruled on ordinary preemption at the motion to dismiss stage are not informative on the jurisdictional question before the Court. See, e.g., Volkova v. C.H. Robinson Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19877, 2018 WL 741441 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 2018); Krauss v. IRIS USA, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74922, 2018 WL 2063839 (E.D. Pa. May 3, 2018); Krauss v. Iris USA, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127660, 2018 WL 3632107 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2018); Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12, 2018); Loyd v. Paul Salazar, 416 F. Supp. 3d 1290 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 20, 2019); Estate of Flanagan v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262586, 2021 WL 9667999 (S.D. Iowa Nov. 19, 2021); Gauthier v. Hard to Stop, LLC, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20564, 2022 WL 344557 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 4, 2022); Lee v. Werner Enters., Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 200848, 2022 WL 16695207 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 3, 2022).

Complete preemption, rather, is “a rare doctrine.” Cmty. State Bank, 651 F.3d at 1261 n.16. The Supreme Court has applied the doctrine “to only three federal statutes: § 301 of the [Labor-Management Relations Act], the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1132, and §§ 85 and 86 of the National Bank Act.” Atwater v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n, 626 F.3d 1170, 1176 n.7 (11th Cir. 2010). Moreover, the Supreme Court cautioned “that complete preemption can be found only in statutes with ‘extraordinary’ preemptive force.” Geddes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 321 F.3d 1349, 1353 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393; Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 65). The three statutes wherein the Court has found complete preemption evidenced the “extraordinary preemptive force” required to manifest “the clearly expressed intent of Congress.” Id.

Three main factors are critical to finding complete preemption. First, the “touchstone of the federal district court’s removal jurisdiction is . . . the intent of Congress.” Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66. Second, the federal law at issue must not simply preempt the state-law claim; it must also “displace” the state-law claim with a federal cause of action. Id. at 64. Third, the federal law at issue must be similar to the jurisdictional grant provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) and the Labor-Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), two of the statutes in which the Supreme Court held complete preemption. [*9] Id. at 65; see also Blab T.V. of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Comms., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 856 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[C]omplete preemption occurs only when a federal cause of action features jurisdictional language that closely parallels that of section 301 of the LMRA as well as an express statement within the legislative history that Congress intends for all related claims to arise under federal law in the same manner as section 301.”).

Therefore, courts must first “identify the domain expressly pre-empted” by Congress. Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 185 L. Ed. 2d 909 (2013) (citation omitted). This task requires courts to “focus first on the statutory language, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” Id. (quotations and citation omitted). The Eleventh Circuit has also looked to the legislative history for the federal law at issue. See Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 857. As an example of clear congressional intent to completely preempt state laws, ERISA’s legislative history unambiguously described Congress’ intent to treat employee retirement actions “as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.” Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 65-66 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 93-1280, at 327 (1974)).

The Supreme Court in Rowe has already identified the domain expressly preempted by the statute relevant to this case. The FAAAA preempted state trucking regulation because Congress found “state governance [*10] of intrastate transportation of property had become unreasonably burdensome to free trade, interstate commerce, and American consumers.” Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 256 (alteration adopted) (quotation and citation omitted) (quoting Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370). The phrase “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier” in § 14501(c), the Court held, embraced state laws that have “a connection with or reference to carrier rates, routes, or services, whether directly or indirectly.” Id. at 260 (quotations omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit recently held that a state-law negligent hiring claim is connected to a freight broker’s services regarding the transportation of property, and such a claim is thus preempted by the FAAAA. See Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023). Selecting a carrier to transport shipments, according to Aspen, “is precisely the brokerage service that” a negligence hiring claim against a freight broker challenges: the broker’s “allegedly inadequate selection of a motor carrier to transport . . . shipment.” Id. at 1267. An allegation of negligence “against a transportation broker for its selection of a motor carrier to transport property in interstate commerce” relates to a freight broker’s “core transportation-related services.” Id. at 1268. Accordingly, Aspen held that a plaintiff’s state-law negligent [*11] hiring claim against a freight broker is preempted—according to ordinary preemption principles—by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA.

While Aspen may inform this Court as to the standard for ordinary preemption under § 14501(c)(1), it does not dictate the conclusion on the jurisdiction matter before the Court. Indeed, the court in Aspen evaded a complete preemption determination altogether, clarifying that because it already had “federal jurisdiction in [the] case because of the parties’ diverse citizenship, [it took] no position on whether § 14501(c)(1) satisfies the standard for complete preemption.” 65 F.4th at 1266 n.1. And so, the Court finds no conclusion in Aspen as to whether Congress intended the FAAAA to have such an “‘extraordinary’ preemptive force” that it completely preempts state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. Geddes, 321 F.3d at 1353; see also Lyles v. Wren, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81258, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (E.D. Ark. May 9, 2023) (finding that since the Aspen court did not “address[] the scope of the express preemption provision of the FAAAA . . . in the context of a complete preemption analysis, [it] do[es] not guide this Court’s decision); Malone v. Russell, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98028, 2023 WL 3854265, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2023) (finding the same); Ruff v. Reliant Transp., Inc., 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91472, 2023 WL 3645719, at *2 (D. Neb. May 25, 2023) (finding the same); Estate of Peterson by Peterson v. Rodriguez, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105540, 2023 WL 4053599, at *3 (D. Kan. June 16, 2023) (“The fact that a federal statute may expressly preempt a state law, however, does not render a state-law claim removable to federal court.”). The Court finds the last two [*12] factors of the complete preemption analysis more indicative of Congress’ intent on whether § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA completely preempts the claims here.

A court’s second task in complete preemption analysis is to determine whether Congress introduced federal remedies for the underlying claims. Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 64; Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 144, 111 S. Ct. 478, 112 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1990) (holding relevant to complete preemption analysis is whether the federal statute “set[s] forth a comprehensive civil enforcement scheme”). The Supreme Court noted in Ingersoll-Rand that § 502(a) of ERISA completely preempted state laws by providing the exclusive remedy for employee retirement rights guaranteed by ERISA. Id. According to the Court, Congress’ policy choice in “the inclusion of certain remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal scheme” provided “strong evidence that Congress did not intend to authorize other remedies” under state law. Id. Therefore, “the exclusive remedy provided by § 502(a)” in ERISA was precisely the kind of special feature that warranted complete preemption in that case. Id. (alteration adopted).

There is no “special feature” providing for a federal cause of action in the FAAAA for injuries stemming from freight brokers’ negligent acts. Congress’ decision not to provide express remedies for the Plaintiffs’ negligence [*13] claims against MoLo, as a freight broker, “provides compelling evidence that Congress did not intend to completely preempt this area of law.” Hentz v. Kimball Transp., Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193952, 2018 WL 5961732, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 14, 2018); cf. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334, 338 (5th Cir. 1995) (en banc) (noting that Congress’ failure to provide remedies in the ADA for injuries stemming from negligent acts “takes on added significance” because it is “difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct”). Therefore, the lack of express federal remedies in the FAAAA for the claims in this case indicates that Congress did not intend to completely preempt personal injury negligence claims against freight brokers stemming from accidents involving tractor-trailers.

The third and final task for the Court is to compare the jurisdictional grant in the FAAAA to the grants in ERISA and the LMRA. In Blab T.V., the Eleventh Circuit held that Congress did not intend the Cable Act, 47 U.S.C. § 532, to completely preempt state laws because nowhere in the legislative history or the statute’s language did Congress indicate the Cable Act carried the same preemptive power as § 301 of the LMRA. Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 857. The Blab T.V. court looked to the Supreme Court’s analysis of ERISA. In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court found congressional intent to [*14] completely preempt state law because, in part, ERISA’s legislative history expressly indicated Congress intended the statute to created federal-question jurisdiction “in like manner as § 301 of the LMRA.” Metro. Life, 481 U.S. at 66. The Conference Report on ERISA stated the purpose for the civil enforcement provision of ERISA, § 502(a): “All such actions in Federal or State courts are to be regarded as arising under the laws of the United States in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947.” Id. at 65-66 (emphasis omitted).

The Eleventh Circuit in Blab T.V. held that the omission of this provision in the legislative history of the Cable Act indicated Congress did not intend it to completely preempt state law. 182 F.3d at 857. The legislative history and the words of the Cable Act did not contain a grant of federal-question jurisdiction similar to that found in ERISA or the LMRA. Though not dispositive, the omission of “any indication in the Cable Act’s legislative history that [its] jurisdictional language [was] intended to function in the same manner as section 301 of the LMRA” was important to finding against complete preemption. Id. Similarly, MoLo does not point the Court to a provision in the FAAAA granting federal-question jurisdiction as in § 301 of the LMRA, and the Court cannot find one. Like the Court in Blab T.V., this Court finds “the absence [*15] of such a statement in the legislative history to be a persuasive argument against finding complete preemption in this case.” Id.

Finally, MoLo cites to only two federal court decisions that found complete preemption under similar circumstances; decisions which this Court finds unpersuasive. See, e.g., Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020); Zamorano v. Zyna LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2020) (providing the same analysis as the Gillum decision). MoLo asserts that Gillum is directly on point as to whether negligence hiring claims against freight brokers stemming from traffic accidents are preempted by § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA. The Gillum court first noted that there was “neither persuasive nor binding authority from any circuit court” on this matter, and that “federal district courts [were] sharply divided on how to apply these guiding principles to personal injury claims alleging negligence by brokers in selecting motor carriers for the transportation of property.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *3. After it noted the diverging lines of cases, the court found that negligent hiring claims against freight brokers “go to the core of what it means to be a careful freight broker and, as a such, they are preempted.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, [WL] at *5 (quotation and citation omitted). The court then found, based on this ordinary preemption analysis, that the plaintiff’s [*16] “negligence and gross negligence claims against the freight broker [were] completely preempted by the FAAAA.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, [WL] at *6.

This Court finds the Gillum decision and its progeny unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Gillum court did not satisfactorily consider the distinction between ordinary and complete preemption. See Estate of Peterson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105540, 2023 WL 4053599, at *4 (“While the court in Gillum discussed the complete preemption doctrine, the court’s decision was based on an ordinary preemption analysis and courts have declined to find the decision persuasive on that basis.”); Estate of Mergl v. Lee, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197807, 2022 WL 16550316, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (“Gillum‘s analysis, however, fails to distinguish between complete preemption and ordinary preemption, and draws upon ordinary preemption principles in its complete preemption analysis.”). Specifically, the two Supreme Court cases on which Gillum relies for its complete preemption analysis dealt with ordinary preemption. See, e.g., Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370; Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261. Therefore, like the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Aspen, while Gillum‘s reasoning may be persuasive regarding ordinary preemption, it is not persuasive in determining whether the Plaintiffs’ negligent hiring claim against MoLo is completely preempted under the FAAAA.

Second, this Court disagrees with Gillum‘s conclusion, after discussing [*17] the divergent case law on whether the FAAAA preempts personal injury negligence claims against freight brokers, “that a conflict of authority renders retaining jurisdiction the better approach.” Popal v. Reliable Cargo Delivery, Inc., 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57592, 2021 WL 1100097, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021) (disagreeing with the Gillum court’s complete preemption analysis). The Gillum court predicated its approach to complete preemption, in part, on the fact that there had been no decision from any circuit discussing the issue. However, when faced with any questions or doubts as to whether to retain jurisdiction, as the Gillum court faced here, a court should resolve the dispute in favor of returning the matter to state court rather than retaining jurisdiction. See Burns, 31 F.3d at 1095. Accordingly, this Court declines to following the reasoning in Gillum.

Given the doubts as to whether Congress intended § 14501(c)(1) of the FAAAA to completely preempt state-law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers, the Court finds there is no federal-question jurisdiction here.³ See Estate of Peterson, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105540, 2023 WL 4053599, at *5 (“[T]he statutory text of the FAAAA contains no clear Congressional intent to include claims involving personal injury as a result of broker negligence.”); Estate of Wray by and through Wray v. Kennedy Bros. Logistics, Inc., 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197815, 2022 WL 16550315, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (“[T]he statutory text of the FAAAA contains no clear Congressional intent to [*18] engulf the entire area of personal injury and wrongful death claims involving transportation brokers and motor carriers.”); Moyer v. Simbad LLC, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64158, 2021 WL 1215818, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2021) (finding the defendant “failed to identify ‘clear congressional intent’ for the FAAAA to engulf the entire area of personal injury and wrongful death claims involving transportation brokers and motor carriers”). And because complete preemption is the only grounds on which MoLo removed this case (doc. 1 at 9-10), the Court remands the case back to state court.

B. Attorney’s Fees

The Plaintiffs request that, in conjunction with a remand order, the Court award attorney’s fees based on the lack of an objectively reasonable basis for removal. A district court may require “payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees, incurred as a result of the removal.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Absent unusual circumstances, courts generally “award attorney’s fees under § 1447(c) only where the removing party lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Conversely, when an objectively reasonable basis exists, fees should be denied.” Bauknight v. Monroe County, 446 F.3d 1327, 1329 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 546 U.S. 132, 141, 126 S. Ct. 704, 163 L. Ed. 2d 547 (2005)). A district court retains the “discretion to consider whether unusual circumstances warrant a departure from the rule in a given case. [*19] For instance, a plaintiff’s delay in seeking remand or failure to disclose facts necessary to determine jurisdiction may affect the decision to award attorney’s fees.” Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. “There is no presumption in favor of awarding attorney’s fees and costs under Section 1447(c).” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Hanover Ins. Co., 995 F.3d 1289, 1296 (11th Cir. 2021).

The Court finds that MoLo had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal. Neither the Eleventh Circuit nor the Supreme Court has weighed in on this complete preemption matter. At least some case precedent, albeit nonbinding, supports MoLo’s contention that 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1) is applicable to this action due to complete preemption. See, e.g., Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *5-6 (finding defendant satisfied 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c)(1)(A)); Zamorano, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061 (finding the same). While the Court declines to adopt the reasoning of these decisions for the reasons stated above, the Court cannot say MoLo “lacked an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal” based upon those decisions. Martin, 546 U.S. at 141. Therefore, the Plaintiffs’ request for attorney’s fees is due to be denied.

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, for the reasons stated, and for good cause, it is

ORDERED as follows:

1) The Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (doc. 26) is GRANTED.

2) The Plaintiffs’ motion for attorney’s fees (doc. 26) is DENIED.

3) This action is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of Butler [*20] County, Alabama.

4) The Clerk of the Court is DIRECTED to take the appropriate steps to effectuate the remand.

DONE this 12th day of July, 2023.

/s/ Emily C. Marks

EMILY C. MARKS

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

End of Document

¹Also pending before the Court are other motions. Because the Court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction over this matter, it does not have jurisdiction to rule on any of the other motions.

²Also pending before the Court are three separate cases stemming from this traffic accident. Like this case, those cases come before the Court on MoLo’s complete preemption removal argument. Because the arguments in all four cases are similar regarding whether the state-law negligence claims against MoLo are completely preempted, the Court’s analysis across the four cases is also similar.

³The Court makes no determination as to whether the Plaintiffs’ claims against MoLo run afoul of ordinary preemption principles. Because the Court has “concluded that [it] lack[s] jurisdiction under the complete preemption doctrine, [it] necessarily must avoid further consideration of these issues, which go directly to the merits of [the Plaintiffs’] claims.” Blab T.V., 182 F.3d at 859.

Malone v. Russell

United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division

June 6, 2023, Decided; June 6, 2023, Filed

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:23-CV-0001-S

MOLLIE MALONE and DIDRAIL JENNINGS v. BRIAN LOUIS RUSSELL, RUSSELL TRUCKING, LLC, DM TRANS, LLC d/b/a ARRIVE LOGISTICS, LUIS ALBERTO LOVO, Individually and d/b/a LOVO TRANSPORTS, ARMSTRONG TRANSPORT GROUP, LLC, NAVISTAR, INC, and SOUTHWEST INTERNATIONAL TRUCKS, INC.

Core Terms

preemption, Broker, preempts, cause of action, removal, federal issue, federal court, federal law, state law, state-law, district court, federal question, transportation, crash

Counsel: [*1] For Mollie Malone, Didrail Jennings, Plaintiffs: Joseph Andrew Mokodean, LEAD ATTORNEY, Law Firm of Roger Walton, Arlington, TX; Roger D Walton, Law Firm of Roger ‘Rocky’ Walton PC, Arlington, TX.

For Brian Louis Russell, Russell Trucking LLC, Defendants: Jeffrey D Smith, Fletcher Farley Shipman & Salinas, LLP, Dallas, TX.

For DM Trans LLC, doing business asArrive Logistics, Defendant: Matthew Francis Popp, LEAD ATTORNEY, Christina K Schovajsa, Robert L Klawetter, PRO HAC VICE, Schouest Bamdas Soshea BenMaier & Eastham PLLC, Houston, TX.

For Luis Alberto Lovo, Individually, doing business asLovo Transports, Defendant: Brett David Timmons, LEAD ATTORNEY, Fee Smith & Sharp LLC, Dallas, TX; Adam J Strange, Michael P Sharp, Fee Smith & Sharp LLP, Dallas, TX.

For Armstrong Transport Group LLC, Defendant: Carlos A Balido, LEAD ATTORNEY, Laura A Wright, Walters Balido & Crain, LLP, Meadow Park Tower, Dallas, TX.

For Navistar Inc, Southwest International Trucks Inc, Defendants: Jeff S Patterson, LEAD ATTORNEY, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Plano, TX; Luke Charles Spencer, Bowman and Brooke, LLP, Plano, TX.

Judges: KAREN GREN SCHOLER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: KAREN GREN SCHOLER

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This [*2] Memorandum Opinion and Order addresses Plaintiffs Mollie Malone and Didrail Jennings’s Motion to Remand (“Motion”) [ECF No. 14]. The Court has reviewed and considered the Motion, Defendant Arrive Logistics, LLC’s Response in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand¹ (“Response”) [ECF No. 20], the arguments of counsel at the March 21, 2023, hearing on the Motion, and the applicable law. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises out of a July 19, 2022, motor vehicle crash. See Pls.’ First Am. Pet. [ECF No. 1-11] ¶¶ 21, 25. Malone stopped on the highway due to traffic caused by a crash involving Defendant Luis Alberto Lovo. Id. ¶ 22-23, 70. Defendant Brian Louis Russell, an employee of Russell Trucking, was driving a tractor-trailer behind Malone on the same highway, failed to stop, and crashed into Malone’s vehicle. Id. ¶¶ 24-25, 43. As a result of the crash, Malone is paralyzed from the waist down. Id. ¶ 32. Malone and her husband, Jennings, sued multiple individuals and entities, including Broker Defendants, for their alleged roles in the crash. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 50-52, 76-78. According to Plaintiffs, Arrive Logistics “acted as a broker [*3] to arrange the transportation of the goods being transported by Defendant Russell,” id. ¶ 50, and Armstrong “acted as a broker to arrange the transportation of the goods being transported by Defendant Lovo,” id. ¶ 76. Plaintiffs assert Texas state-law negligence and/or negligent hiring claims against Broker Defendants. Id. ¶¶ 50-52, 76-78.

Plaintiffs filed suit in the 192nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. Arrive Logistics removed the case, asserting that the Court has subject-matter jurisdiction because: (1) the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14501, preempts Plaintiffs’ claims; and (2) Plaintiffs’ claims raise significant federal issues.² See Notice of Removal by DM Trans, LLC d/b/a Arrive Logistics [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 6-11. Armstrong later consented to removal.³ See Consent to Removal by Carlos A. Balido [ECF No. 6-1].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Any civil action brought in a state court of which the district courts have original jurisdiction may be removed to the district court embracing the place where such action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A federal court must [*4] presume that a case lies outside its limited jurisdiction, and the party asserting jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing the contrary. Energy Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. City of Alexandria, 739 F.3d 255, 257 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). Because removal raises significant federalism concerns, the removal statute is strictly construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal jurisdiction is resolved in favor of remand. Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278, 281-82 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). The two principal bases upon which a district court may exercise removal jurisdiction are: (1) the existence of a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331; and (2) complete diversity of citizenship among the parties, see 28 U.S.C. § 1332.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Complete Preemption

Broker Defendants argue that the Court has federal question jurisdiction because Section 14501 completely preempts Plaintiffs’ state-law claims. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 6-8. Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, “[a] defendant cannot remove an action to federal court unless the plaintiff pleaded a federal question on the face of his complaint.” Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “The complete preemption doctrine is an exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule.” New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 330 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing McAteer v. Silverleaf Resorts, Inc., 514 F.3d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 2008)). The complete preemption doctrine provides a basis for federal question jurisdiction if “a federal statute so completely preempts a particular [*5] area that any civil complaint raising the select group of claims is necessarily federal in character.” La. Indep. Pharmacies Ass’n v. Express Scripts, Inc., 41 F.4th 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up).

Here, Broker Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiffs only bring state-law claims but contend that the Court has jurisdiction because federal law completely preempts those claims. In arguing that the Court should find complete preemption, Broker Defendants cite two provisions of Section 14501:

“[N]o State or political subdivision thereof and no intrastate agency or other political agency of 2 or more States shall enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1).

“[A] state, political subdivision of a State, or political authority of 2 or more States may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.

Id. § 14501(c)(1). According to Broker Defendants, each of these provisions “provide for preemption of Plaintiffs’ claims.” [*6] Resp. ¶ 11. Broker Defendants rely heavily on the “plain language” of each provision to argue in favor of preemption, but their arguments miss the mark because they focus on the wrong form of preemption. Id. ¶ 14.

Although Broker Defendants’ opposition to the Motion is ostensibly based on the complete preemption doctrine, they fail to cite the Fifth Circuit’s standard for complete preemption. “The Fifth Circuit has developed a stringent tripartite test to determine whether a statute is among the few falling within the complete preemption exception.” Rogers v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 661, 665 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (citing Aaron v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 876 F.2d 1157, 1164 (5th Cir. 1989)). First, federal law must “create[] a cause of action that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law.” Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 243 (citation omitted). Second, Congress must have “empowered federal courts to hear that cause of action.” Id. Third, Congress must have “clearly intended that grant of jurisdiction to be exclusive.” Id. “Once those conditions are met, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must show that the plaintiff ‘could have brought his state-law claims under th[at] federal cause of action.'” Id. (alteration in original). This analysis is “required under [the Fifth Circuit’s] precedents.” Bellfort Enters. Inc. v. PetroTex Fuels Inc., 339 F. App’x 416, 418 (5th Cir. 2009).

Broker Defendants confuse complete [*7] preemption with ordinary preemption.⁴ This error is significant because “complete preemption is less common and more extraordinary than defensive or ordinary preemption.” Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331 (citation omitted); see also Meade v. Avant of LLC, 307 F. Supp. 3d 1134, 1140 (D. Colo. 2018) (“The doctrine of complete preemption should not be confused with ordinary preemption, which occurs when there is the defense of ‘express preemption,’ conflict preemption,’ or ‘field preemption’ to state law claims.”). Unlike complete preemption, “[d]efensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction and simply declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim.” Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The ordinary preemption analysis asks “the more common question of whether a given federal law preempts a conflicting state cause of action.” Rogers, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 665. By contrast, “[t]he complete preemption doctrine applies only when Congress intends not merely to preempt a field in state law, but also intends to transfer jurisdiction of the subject matter from state to federal courts.” Id. at 671 (citation omitted). “Complete preemption is rare,” and the Supreme Court has only found complete preemption three times. Woodard-Hall v. STP Nuclear Operating Co., 473 F. Supp. 3d 740, 747 (S.D. Tex. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 510 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (setting forth contexts in which Supreme [*8] Court has found complete preemption).

Broker Defendants’ misunderstanding of the difference between complete and ordinary preemption is evident in the cases they cite, many of which do not contain the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption standard. For example, Broker Defendants rely on Gillum v. High Std., LLC, No. SA-19-CV-1378-XR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020). But as other district courts have noted, the Gillum court did not undertake the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption analysis and instead appeared to evaluate ordinary preemption. See, e.g., Moyer v. Simbad LLC, No. 2:20-CV-5405, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64158, 2021 WL 1215818, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 2021) (citation omitted), report and recommendation adopted by 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62056, 2021 WL 1209469 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2021). Other cases cited by Broker Defendants explicitly involve only ordinary preemption. See, e.g., Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (dismissing the plaintiff’s claims as “barred by [Section 14501‘s] express preemption provision”); McCarter v. Ziyar Express, Inc., No. 3:21-CV-2390, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4552, 2023 WL 144844, at *1-2 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 10, 2023) (conducting ordinary preemption analysis at motion to dismiss stage where jurisdiction was not disputed); Ga. Nut Co. v. C.H. Robinson Co., No. 17-C-3018, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177269, 2017 WL 4864857, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 26, 2017) (analyzing the defendant’s argument that Section 14501 “expressly preempts [the plaintiff’s] negligent hiring and negligent supervision claim”). Because “[o]nly complete preemption would give this Court federal question jurisdiction over [Plaintiffs’] claim[s],” Broker Defendants’ “arguments applying the [ordinary] preemption standard are erroneous.” Caulley v. Interprise/Southwest Interior & Space Design, Inc., No. 3:20-CV-03077-X, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108577, 2021 WL 2376720, at *2 (N.D. Tex. June 10, 2021).

For this reason alone, Broker Defendants [*9] have not carried their burden to justify removal. Even if the Court conducted the complete preemption analysis, however, Broker Defendants’ argument would fail at the first step. As noted above, for a federal statute to completely preempt a state-law cause of action, the federal law must “create[] a cause of action that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law.” Manyweather, 40 F.4th at 243 (citation omitted). But “[Section] 14501 doesn’t contain any cause of action.” Gulf Winds Int’l Inc. v. Almanzar, No. 4:20-CV-04136, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187181, 2021 WL 4481340, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2021); see also M, G, & B Servs. v. Buras, No. 04-1512, 04-1509, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16624, 2004 WL 1872718, at *4 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2004) (“[Section 14501] does not contain a civil enforcement provision that creates a private cause of action. . . . Without a civil enforcement provision, [Section 14501] cannot completely preempt [the plaintiffs] state law claims.”); Lyles v. Wren, No. 2:23-CV-00051-JM, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81258, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (E.D. Ark. May 9, 2023) (finding that “the absence of a replacement cause of action for negligence claims in Section 14501 “creates an exceptionally strong presumption against complete preemption” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The absence of a federal remedy makes it difficult to conclude that Congress intended to displace state law.” Rio Grande Underwriters, Inc. v. Pitts Farms, Inc., 276 F.3d 683, 686 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted) (affirming district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the federal statute at issue did not completely displace state-law remedies).

In sum, Broker Defendants did not provide the [*10] Court with the correct standard by which to evaluate its jurisdiction. And even if they had, the Court concludes that Section 14501 is not one of the rare statutes that completely preempts state law. “Fortifying the Court’s conclusion is the jurisdictional standard,” which requires the Court to resolve all doubts in favor of remand. Gerred v. Fedex Ground Packaging Sys., No. 4:21-CV-1026-P, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187602, 2021 WL 4398033, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) (citations omitted) (holding that Section 14501 did not completely preempt the plaintiffs state-law claims and remanding case). In reaching this conclusion, the Court expresses no opinion on the merits of Broker Defendants’ ordinary preemption arguments, which are more properly asserted in state court in support of a defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. See White v. Scotty’s Contr. & Stone, LLC, No. 1:21-CV-00161-GNS, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 177300, 2022 WL 4588417, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 29, 2022). In other words, Plaintiffs’ claims implicate Section 14501 only to the extent that Broker Defendants are likely to rely on it as a defense to Plaintiffs’ claims, and “the assertion of a defense of federal preemption of state law is insufficient to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.” Beers v. N. Am. Van Lines, Inc., 836 F.2d 910, 913 (5th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted), overruled on other grounds by Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003). As such, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

B. Significant Federal Issue

For largely the same reasons, the Court holds that Plaintiffs’ claims also are not removable on the ground that [*11] the claims raise a significant federal issue. “[E]ven when a state court petition pleads only state law causes of action,” a federal court has jurisdiction “if a federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Box v. PetroTel, Inc., 33 F.4th 195, 201 (5th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). “The category of cases that satisfy these requirements is ‘special and small.'” Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580, 588 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bd. Of Comm’rs of Se. La. Flood Prot. Auth.-E. v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 850 F.3d 714, 721 (5th Cir. 2017)).

Broker Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims raise a significant federal issue because their right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law, their allegations represent a dispute as to the effect and breadth of federal law concerning freight brokers, and their argument that state law applies to their claims will impact freight brokers’ selection of federally licensed motor carriers. Notice of Removal ¶ 11. All of these arguments go back to whether Section 14501 expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ claims, which, as stated above, is a defense to Plaintiffs’ claims. Broker Defendants’ “affirmative defense of [preemption] belongs in a responsive pleading, which cannot itself support federal [*12] jurisdiction.” Box, 33 F.4th at 202. “That is true even for federal defenses that are ‘inevitable.'” Id. (citation omitted); see also Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 588-89 (holding that the plaintiff’s claims did not raise a significant federal issue where preemption was raised as a defense because the federal issues “are neither raised nor disputed on the face of the complaint”); Lyles, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81258, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (concluding that the plaintiff’s claims did not raise a significant federal issue and rejecting arguments nearly identical to those asserted in the instant case).

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand [ECF No. 14]. This case is REMANDED to the 192nd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas.

SO ORDERED.

SIGNED June 6, 2023.

/s/ Karen Gren Scholer

KAREN GREN SCHOLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

End of Document

¹Defendant Armstrong Transport Group, LLC (“Armstrong”) also requests that the Court deny the Motion for the reasons set forth in the Response. See Def. Armstrong Transport Group, LLC’s Mem. Concerning Suppl. Jurisdiction [ECF No. 34] 3. The Court will refer to DM Trans d/b/a Arrive Logistics, LLC (“Arrive Logistics”), and Armstrong Transport Group, LLC, collectively as “Broker Defendants” throughout this Order.

²In its Response, Arrive Logistics no longer argues that Plaintiffs’ claims raise significant federal issues. Instead, Arrive Logistics argues only that removal was proper based on the complete preemption doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court will address both arguments below.

³Because the asserted bases for federal jurisdiction only apply to freight brokers, none of the other defendants have joined in the notice of removal. However, some of the defendants have requested that the Court exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the claims against them should the Court deny the Motion. See ECF Nos. 32, 33.

⁴There are three categories of ordinary preemption: (1) express, (2) field, and (3) conflict. See Washington v. Fred’s Stores of Tenn., Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 (S.D. Miss. 2006) (citation omitted). Broker Defendants’ arguments primarily go to the issue of express preemption.