Broker - Central Analysis Bureau

Ritchey v. Tanager Logistics, LLC

United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Laredo Division

June 6, 2024, Decided; June 6, 2024, Filed; June 7, 2024, Entered

CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:24-CV-23

Reporter

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101504 *

STEPHANIE RITCHEY et al. VS. TANAGER LOGISTICS, LLC et al.

Core Terms

preemption, broker, federal question, state law claim, preempts, freight, removal, federal issue, motor carrier, federal jurisdiction, preemption provision, district court, cases, negligence claim, cause of action, federal court, state law, well-pleaded, subject matter jurisdiction, argues, federal law, persuasive, hiring

Counsel: [*1] For Robby Ritchey, Stephanie Ritchey, Plaintiffs: Jeffery Mark Kershaw, LEAD ATTORNEY, Kershaw Anderson King, PLLC, Dallas, TX.

For RTD Carriers, Inc., DG Rodriguez Express, Inc., Martin Monreal-Alvarado, Defendants: Aidan Perales, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chaves, Obregon & Perales, LLP, Corpus Christi, TX; Douglas E Chaves, LEAD ATTORNEY, Chaves Obregon et al, Corpus Christi, TX.

For Tanager Logistics, LLC, Defendant: Nicholas Arthur Parma, LEAD ATTORNEY, Farmer House Osuna Jackson & Olvera, San Antonio, TX.

For Niagara Bottling, LLC, Defendant: Jason L. West, LEAD ATTORNEY, Brock Guerra Strandmo Dimaline Jones, P.C., Tx, San Antonio, TX.

For H-E-B, LP, Defendant: Martina Danielle Meritz, LEAD ATTORNEY, Meritz Reddy, PLLC, San Antonio, TX.

Judges: Marina Garcia Marmolejo, United States District Judge.

Opinion by: Marina Garcia Marmolejo

Opinion

ORDER

Plaintiffs Stephanie and Robby Ritchey have moved for remand in this personal injury dispute, arguing that Defendants have failed to establish federal question jurisdiction (Dkt. No. 11). Having considered the arguments, record, and applicable authorities, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ motion (Dkt. No. 11) and REMANDS this case to the 406th Judicial District Court for Webb County, [*2] Texas. Plaintiffs have persuasively shown that no federal question underpins this action.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This suit arises out of a motor vehicle accident that occurred on April 27, 2023 (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 7-8). Plaintiff Stephanie Ritchey and her eight-year-old son, B.R., were traveling northbound on Highway 35 from Austin, Texas to Pilot Point, Texas after a field trip to the Texas State Capitol (id. at 7). Traveling southbound at the same time was Defendant Martin Monreal-Alvarado, driving Defendant RTD Carriers, Inc.’s freightliner and towing Defendant DG Rodriguez Express, Inc.’s trailer (id.). The trailer contained Defendant H-E-B, L.P.’s products, originating from Defendant Niagara Bottling, L.L.C.’s Dallas, Texas facility (id.).

While in transit, the tractor allegedly overheated from poor maintenance, causing the wheel bearings to melt, and setting loose a hub and set of dual tires on the highway (id.). Despite Plaintiff Stephanie Ritchey’s attempt to swerve to safety, the hub and dual tires crashed into her vehicle, killing her son on impact (id. at 7-8).

About two months after the accident, on June 21, 2023, Plaintiffs Stephanie Ritchey and Robby Ritchey, her husband and [*3] B.R.’s father, sued Defendants Alvarado, RTD Carriers, and DG Rodriguez for negligence and gross negligence in the 406th Judicial District Court for Webb County, Texas (Dkt. Nos. 1-2; 1-3 at 1; 11 at 10). Six-and-a-half months later, they amended their petition to add H-E-B, Niagara, and Tanager Logistics as defendants, bringing negligence and gross negligence claims against them as well (Dkt. Nos. 1-2; 11 at 10). Plaintiffs alleged Tanager was the federally licensed freight broker who negligently selected the driver and motor carrier for the shipment of goods here (Dkt. No. 1-2 at 15-16).

Tanager then removed this action to federal court, arguing that the Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction here because (1) the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”), 49 U.S.C. § 14501, preempts Plaintiffs’ state law claims, and (2) Plaintiffs’ state law claims raise significant federal issues (Dkt. No. 1 at 2-4). Plaintiffs moved for remand (Dkt. No. 12), Tanager responded (Dkt. No. 13), and Plaintiffs replied (Dkt. No. 14), all timely.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Removal

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, an action [*4] filed in state court may be removed to federal court when (1) federal jurisdiction exists, and (2) the removal procedure provided by 28 U.S.C. § 1446 is properly followed. Motions to remand to state court are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which provides that “[i]f at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” The removing party “bears the burden of establishing that federal jurisdiction exists and that removal was proper.” Manguno v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 276 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 2002). Any doubt about the propriety of removal is resolved in favor of remand. See Acuna v. Brown & Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000); Walters v. Grow Grp., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 (S.D. Tex. 1995).

B. Federal Question Jurisdiction & Well-Pleaded Complaints

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts exercise subject matter jurisdiction over all claims “arising under” federal law. “Generally, a case arises under federal law only where a federal question is presented on the face of a well-pleaded complaint, that is, a complaint that asserts the plaintiff’s right to recovery based on federal law.” La. Indep. Pharms. Ass’n v. Express Scripts, Inc., 41 F.4th 473, 478 (5th Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). The well-pleaded complaint rule precludes a defendant from removing an action to federal court unless the plaintiff pleaded a federal question on the face of his complaint. See Manyweather v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 40 F.4th 237, 242 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Stump v. Potts, 322 F. App’x 379, 380 (5th Cir. 2009) (“It is not sufficient for the federal question [*5] to be raised in the answer or in the petition for removal.”).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs argue that removal was improper because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over their state law claims (Dkt. No. 11 at 10-13). Tanager counters that jurisdiction is proper because (1) the FAAAA completely preempts Plaintiffs’ state law claims, and (2) Plaintiffs’ state law claims raise substantial federal issues under Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 125 S. Ct. 2363, 162 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2005) (Dkt. No. 12 at 2). Both of Tanager’s arguments are unavailing.

A. Complete Preemption

“One exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is complete preemption.” Gerred v. FedEx Ground Packaging Sys., Inc., No. 4:21-CV-1026-P, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187602, 2021 WL 4398033, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2021) (citation omitted). Complete preemption occurs when the federal statute “so forcibly and completely displace[s] state law that the plaintiff’s cause of action is either wholly federal or nothing at all.” New Orleans & Gulf Coast Ry. Co. v. Barrois, 533 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish complete preemption, a defendant must show that: “(1) the statute contains a civil enforcement provision that creates a cause of action that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law; (2) there is a specific jurisdictional grant to the federal courts for enforcement of the right; and (3) there is a clear congressional intent that the federal cause of [*6] action be exclusive.” Mitchell v. Advanced HCS, L.L.C., 28 F.4th 580, 585 (5th Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

Complete preemption is not to be confused with “defensive preemption (i.e., ‘conflict preemption’ or ‘ordinary preemption’),” which “does not create federal jurisdiction and simply ‘declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim.'” Elam v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 635 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting Barrois, 533 F.3d at 331). Thus, “as a general matter, complete preemption is less common and more extraordinary than defensive or ordinary preemption.”¹ Id.

The relevant statute here is the FAAAA. Congress passed the FAAAA in 1994 to deregulate the trucking industry and avoid “a State’s direct substitution of its own governmental commands for ‘competitive market forces’ in determining (to a significant degree) the services that motor carriers will provide.” See Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 372, 128 S. Ct. 989, 169 L. Ed. 2d 933 (2008) (citing Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1992)). Congress then enacted the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”) in 1995, which amended the FAAAA by recodifying former 49 U.S.C. § 11501(h) as 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c). See 29 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 563 § 2.

Two provisions of the FAAAA are central to this dispute—49 U.S.C. §§ 14501(b) and (c)(1):

• Section 14501(b)(1) provides that no state may “enact or enforce any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the force and effect of law relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate [*7] services of any freight forwarder or broker.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(b)(1).

• Section 14501(c)(1) provides that no state may “enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).²

These provisions “limit state authority to regulate prices, routes, and services of motor carriers, freight forwarders, and brokers.” Torres v. Minnaar, No. 4:23-CV-486-SDJ, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32266, 2024 WL 778383, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2024).

Whether the FAAAA completely preempts state law claims is unclear. The Fifth Circuit has not decided this issue. But it has evaluated the scope of the Airline Deregulation Act’s preemption provision, which the FAAAA’s preemption provisions follow closely. Hodges v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 44 F.3d 334 (5th Cir. 1995); see also Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 252, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 185 L. Ed. 2d 909 (2013) (noting that § 14501(c)(1) tracks the ADA’s preemption provision with one alteration).

In Hodges, a plaintiff injured during a flight brought a state law negligence claim against an airline to recover for her injuries and related medical expenses. 44 F.3d at 335. The Fifth Circuit determined that the ADA did not completely preempt the plaintiff’s claims because nothing in the statute’s text or legislative history indicated that Congress [*8] “intended to displace the application of state tort law to personal physical injury inflicted by aircraft operations.” Id. at 338. Moreover, “[t]his silence takes on added significance in light of Congress’s failure to provide any federal remedy for persons injured by such conduct” because “[i]t is difficult to believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial recourse.” Id. Because the FAAAA’s preemptive language parallels the ADA’s, courts have treated Hodges as persuasive authority in FAAAA cases as well. See, e.g., Finley v. Dyer, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182482, 2018 WL 5284616, at *4 (N.D. Miss. 2018) (“Insofar as the ‘[t]he FAAAA’s preemption provision is in pertinent part identical to the preemption provision of the ADA and is generally construed in pari materia,’ the Court deems this authority extremely persuasive, if not binding.” (citation omitted)); DNOW, L.P. v. Paladin Freight Sols., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-3369, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5585, 2018 WL 398235, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 12, 2018) (similarities between preemption provisions in ADA and FAAAA meant Hodges was “tantamount to binding authority” in FAAAA case).

Tanager argues that Hodges is distinguishable from the case at bar because “[a]irlines are akin to motor carriers, not brokers,” as brokers do not provide transportation services themselves (Dkt. No. 12 at 8). While this point is well taken, the complete preemption inquiry turns on whether [*9] Congress provided a federal cause of action “that both replaces and protects the analogous area of state law.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 585 (citation omitted). Like the ADA, the FAAAA does not provide a federal remedy for individuals injured by negligent conduct. See Torres, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32266, 2024 WL 778383, at *4; accord Gulf Winds Int’l Inc. v. Almanzar, No. 4:20-CV-04136, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187181, 2021 WL 4481340, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2021) (noting that § 14501 does not contain any cause of action). Because § 14501 does not contain a replacement cause of action for negligent conduct, there is “an exceptionally strong presumption against complete preemption.” See Lyles v. Wren, No. 2:23-CV-00051-JM, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81258, 2023 WL 3318695, at *2, *4 (E.D. Ark. May 9, 2023) (citation omitted).

Tanager attempts to overcome this presumption by directing the Court to cases from the Western District of Texas, Seventh Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit, which allegedly demonstrate that the FAAAA completely preempts Plaintiffs’ state law claims (Dkt. No. 12 at 19-25) (citing Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, No. 19-cv-1378-XR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020); Zamorano v. Zyna LLC, No. 20-cv-151-XR, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061 (W.D. Tex. May 11, 2020); Derouen v. Swan Transp. Servs., Ltd., No. 1:23-cv-193-LY, ECF No. 6 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2023); Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453 (7th Cir. 2023), Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2023)). All these cases are distinguishable and unpersuasive.³

1. Western District of Texas

Tanager argues that the Court should follow some unpublished decisions from the Western District of Texas in holding that the FAAAA completely preempts state law claims (Dkt. No. 12 at 19).⁴ See Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *6; Zamorano, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061, at *1 n.1, *4-5 (citing Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *2, *5). In Gillum, an accident victim sued a freight broker for negligently hiring a motor carrier involved in the accident. [*10] 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *1. Defendants removed the case and plaintiff moved to remand, which the court denied on the grounds that the FAAAA completely preempted plaintiff’s state law claims. 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, [WL] at *6.

But the line of cases which the court in Gillum found most persuasive examined ordinary preemption in the motion to dismiss context rather than complete preemption as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction, muddling the two standards. See 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, [WL] at *5 (collecting cases); see also Malone v. Russell, No. 3:23-CV-0001-S, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98028, 2023 WL 3854265, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June 6, 2023) (citation omitted) (discussing how Gillum did not cite the Fifth Circuit’s complete preemption standard and “instead appeared to evaluate ordinary preemption”); accord Gregg v. Rodriguez, No. 23-cv-1031, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105542, 2023 WL 4053590, at *4 (D. Kan. June 16, 2023) (“While the court in Gillum discussed the complete preemption doctrine, the court’s decision was based on an ordinary preemption analysis and courts have declined to find the decision persuasive on that basis.”); Est. of Wray v. Kennedy Bros. Logistics, Inc., No. 22-cv-70, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 197815, 2022 WL 16550315, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 31, 2022) (“Gillum‘s analysis . . . fails to distinguish between complete preemption and ordinary preemption, and draws upon ordinary preemption principles in its complete preemption analysis.”). Because Gillum did not properly analyze complete preemption, the Court declines to follow its reasoning here.

The remaining two Western District cases Tanager points to are unpersuasive [*11] along the same lines (see Dkt. No. 12 at 3 (citing Zamorano, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061; and Derouen, No. 23-cv-193-LY)). Zamorano adopted Gillum‘s reasoning and thus the case “suffers from the same flaw.” 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82289, 2020 WL 2316061, at *4-5 (citing Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *5); Ubaldo, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824, 2024 WL 1904545, at *4. The court in Derouen granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss where the defendant asserted ordinary preemption as an affirmative defense and the plaintiffs failed to respond. No. 1:23-cv-193-LY, ECF No. 6. Thus, these cases are inapposite and do not help Tanager carry its burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. See Ubaldo, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824, 2024 WL 1904545, at *4 (noting same).

2. Seventh Circuit

Tanager also relies upon Ye, a Seventh Circuit case, in arguing that the FAAAA completely preempts Plaintiffs’ state law negligence claims (see Dkt. No. 12 at 2, 23-24). However, in Ye, the Seventh Circuit did not address whether the FAAAA provides a federal cause of action necessary for complete preemption and, by extension, federal jurisdiction. See 74 F.4th 453; Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 585. In Ye, a motorcyclist’s surviving spouse sued a freight broker for negligently hiring a motor carrier whose truck collided with and killed the motorcyclist. Id. at 455-56. The broker moved to dismiss the negligent hiring claim, arguing that the FAAAA preempted the claim. Id. The district court granted dismissal, and on [*12] appeal the Seventh Circuit affirmed because the negligent hiring claim fell within § 14501(c)(1)’s express prohibition on enforcing state laws related to broker services for transporting property. Id. at 458.

Unlike here, the Seventh Circuit in Ye reviewed defensive preemption in the motion to dismiss context. Id. at 456 (“The district court granted the motion [to dismiss] as to [the plaintiff’s] negligent hiring claim, finding the claim to be barred by the [FAAAA].”). Thus, Ye is also unavailing as regards complete preemption and the threshold issue: whether the Court has jurisdiction to hear this case. See Torres, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32266, 2024 WL 778383, at *4 n.2 (considering Ye “inapposite” because it addressed defensive preemption, not the complete preemption doctrine).

3. Eleventh Circuit

Tanager’s reliance on Aspen, an Eleventh Circuit case, is likewise misplaced (see Dkt. No. 12 at 21-24). In Aspen, the Eleventh Circuit did not consider whether the FAAAA completely preempted state law claims. See 65 F.4th at 1266 n.1 (“Because we have federal jurisdiction in this case because of the parties’ diverse citizenship, we take no position on whether the FAAAA satisfies the standard for complete preemption.”). Thus, Aspen does not persuade the Court that federal jurisdiction is proper here under the complete preemption [*13] doctrine.

In sum, Tanager has failed to establish that the FAAAA completely preempts Plaintiffs’ claims—therefore, the Court cannot exercise subject matter jurisdiction on this basis.

B. Grable Doctrine

Tanager also argues that Plaintiffs’ state law claims raise a substantial federal question, thereby creating federal question jurisdiction under Grable (see Dkt. No. 12 at 11-19). See 545 U.S. at 312 (citation omitted). Grable applies to a “special and small category” of cases where:

(1) Resolving a federal issue is necessary to resolution of the state-law claim;

(2) The federal issue is actually disputed;

(3) The federal issue is substantial; and

(4) Federal jurisdiction will not disturb the balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.

Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 699, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 165 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2006); The Lamar Co., L.L.C. v. Miss. Transp. Comm’n, 976 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 2020). “The type of claim that creates a federal question under Grable is typically a state-law claim premised on some component of federal law.” Mitchell, 28 F.4th at 588 (citation omitted). “Like most federal question doctrines, Grable is applied in the shadow of the well-pleaded complaint rule,” so “the court looks to the face of a plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint to determine whether the issues it raises implicate Grable.” Id. (citations omitted).

Here, Tanager argues that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims implicate Grable [*14] for the following reasons:

(1) Plaintiffs’ right to relief requires resolution of a federal issue, i.e., “the standard of care for a federally-authorized freight broker under the FAAAA.”

(2) The federal issue is actually disputed because “every single Federal Circuit Court addressing this issue has found that state law negligence claims against freight brokers are preempted. . .”

(3) The federal issue is substantial because allowing negligence claims against freight brokers to proceed would “undermine Congress’s deregulation efforts” and result in a “patchwork of 50 different rules, regulations and standards for freight brokers.”

(4) The federal issue can be resolved without disrupting the federal and state balance approved by Congress because “the states’ authority to regulate broker’s services has been preempted.”

(Dkt. Nos. 1 at 3; 12 at 13-18).

As to the first Grable prong, Tanager argues that 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) establishes the controlling standard of care (Dkt. No. 12 at 10, 17). Section 371.2(a) defines a broker as “a person who, for compensation, arranges, or offers to arrange, the transportation of property by an authorized motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a). Tanager argues that there is no breach because, as required, it selected an authorized [*15] motor carrier, Defendant RTD Carriers, to handle the shipment (Dkt. No. 12 at 17). But Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against Tanager draw from state law, rather than any breach of § 371.2(a) (see Dkt. No. 1-2 at 13-14). Thus, even assuming, without finding, that the definition in § 371.2(a) forms a federal standard of care, this would be a defensive issue rather than a federal question lying in the shadow of Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded complaint.

Tanager also rehashes many of its complete preemption points in its Grable analysis, citing the split of authority discussed above to argue that there is a genuine federal dispute (see Dkt. No. 12 at 14-15 (citations omitted)). Although Tanager calls this split “the heart of the dispute” (id. at 15), no element of Plaintiffs’ claims, whether found on the face of the complaint or in its shadow, relies on a determination of the FAAAA’s express preemption provision. See Lyles, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81258, 2023 WL 3318695, at *4 (declining to exercise Grable jurisdiction because “no elements of Plaintiff’s [negligence] claims rely on a determination of the FAAAA’s express preemption provision”); see also Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987) (“[I]t is now settled law that a case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, including the defense of [*16] pre-emption, even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff’s complaint, and even if both parties concede that the federal defense is the only question truly at issue.”) (emphasis omitted). Therefore, Tanager has failed to establish that the Court can exercise Grable jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, Tanager has not met its burden of showing that the Court can exercise federal question jurisdiction here. Since any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in favor of remand, the Court finds that it does not have subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against Tanager. As the other Defendants have not put forward any other basis for removal, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against them. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Dkt. No. 11) is GRANTED and this case is REMANDED to the 406th Judicial District Court for Webb County, Texas. Because the Court lacks jurisdiction, it will not address the remaining motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 2). The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a certified copy of this Order to the Clerk of the 406th Judicial District [*17] Court for Webb County, Texas, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1447.

It is so ORDERED.

SIGNED June 6, 2024.

/s/ Marina Garcia Marmolejo

Marina Garcia Marmolejo

United States District Judge

FINAL JUDGMENT

The Court has granted Plaintiffs Stephanie and Robby Ritchey’s motion to remand (Dkt. No. 11). Accordingly, the Court ENTERS this final judgment. This case is REMANDED to the 406th Judicial District Court for Webb County, Texas. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to close this civil action.

It is so ORDERED.

SIGNED June 6, 2024.

/s/ Marina Garcia Marmolejo

Marina Garcia Marmolejo

United States District Judge

End of Document

¹“In fact, the United States Supreme Court has found complete preemption only three times.” Gerred, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 187602, 2021 WL 4398033, at *2 (citing Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 8, 11, 123 S. Ct. 2058, 156 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2003) (complete preemption found only under the Labor Management Relations Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, and, in Anderson, the National Bank Act)).

²Also of note is the FAAAA’s “safety exception,” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A), which states that the FAAAA “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” In Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., the Ninth Circuit found that a negligent hiring claim against a broker was sufficiently “related to” the broker’s services to trigger preemption under the FAAAA. 976 F.3d 1016, 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2020). But the safety exception saved the claim from preemption because states have traditionally exercised the power to “regulate safety through commonlaw tort claims” like negligent hiring. See id. at 1026-27. While Tanager relies on Miller to argue that negligence claims are preempted from a defensive standpoint, defensive preemption is not the same as complete preemption. Elam, 635 F.3d at 803 (noting that defensive preemption does not create federal jurisdiction) (citation omitted). Although the two may appear to be similar concepts, for the Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction here, the FAAAA must completely preempt Plaintiffs’ state law claims. See id.

³On June 5, 2024, Tanager filed an advisory addressing a recent Eastern District of Texas decision that purportedly shows that the Court can properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims (Dkt. No. 15 (citing Hamby v. Wilson, No. 6:23-cv-249-JDK, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90897, 2024 WL 2303850 (E.D. Tex. May 21, 2024)). While Tanager contends that Hamby addressed the “same issue” presented here (id. at 1), this is not so. As Tanager notes, Hamby “recognized the FAAAA expressly preempts claims for negligent brokering” (id. at 2 (emphasis added) (citing Hamby, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90897, 2024 WL 2303850, at *4)). But the threshold inquiry for subject matter jurisdiction is complete preemption, which Hamby did not address. As discussed above, complete preemption is not to be confused with “defensive preemption (i.e., ‘conflict preemption’ or ‘ordinary preemption’),” which “does not create federal jurisdiction and simply ‘declares the primacy of federal law, regardless of the forum or the claim.'” Elam, 635 F.3d at 803 (citation omitted).

⁴The Western District is split as to whether the FAAAA completely preempts state law claims. Compare Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, with Ubaldo v. F&A Border Transp., LLC, No. EP-24-CV-47-KC, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79824, 2024 WL 1904545, at *6 (W.D. Tex. May 1, 2024) (rejecting defendant broker’s argument that FAAAA completely preempted plaintiff’s state law negligence claims and remanding case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).

Hamby v. Wilson

United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Tyler Division

May 21, 2024, Decided; May 21, 2024, Filed

Case No. 6:23-cv-249-JDK

Reporter

2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90897 *; 2024 WL 2303850

ASHLEY HAMBY, et al., Plaintiffs, v. JAMES WILSON, et al., Defendants.

Core Terms

brokering, preemption, motor carrier, transportation, preempted, motor vehicle, motion to dismiss, negligent hiring, leave to amend, route, load, amended complaint, state law, regulation, motor vehicle safety, preemption clause, negligence claim, force and effect, gross negligence, cause of action, freight, courts, amend

Counsel: [*1] Paul M. Boyd, Mediator, Pro se, Tyler, TX.

For Ashley Hamby, Next Friend of Minors MMH, MJH, MSH, Ashley Webb, Next Friend of Minors GKW, EKW, IKW, Plaintiffs: Justin C Dewett, Morris & Dewett, LLC, Louisiana, Shreveport, LA; Steven Robert Samples, Samples Ames PLLC – Hurst, Hurst, TX; Wade Austin Barrow, Barrow Law, PLLC, Fort Worth, TX.

For James Wilson, Defendant: David George Allen, LEAD ATTORNEY, David Allen Law Group, PLLC, TX, Dallas, TX; Richard Ramirez, LEAD ATTORNEY, David Allen Law Group, PLLC, Dallas, TX.

For Euro Express, LLC, Defendant: David Patrick Helmey, Nicholas Samuel Van Cleve, The Fuentes Firm, PC, Spring, TX.

For Damir Arnaut, Defendant: David Patrick Helmey, LEAD ATTORNEY, The Fuentes Firm, PC, Spring, TX.

For J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Defendant: Van Edward Parham, III, Mayer LLP – Dallas, Dallas, TX.

Judges: JEREMY D. KERNODLE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Opinion by: JEREMY D. KERNODLE

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

Before the Court is Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Docket No. 35.¹ For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS the motion.

For purposes of this order, the Court accepts as true [*2] Plaintiffs’ well-pleaded facts in their Second Amended Complaint. Campbell v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 781 F.2d 440, 442 (5th Cir. 1986).

This case arises from a December 11, 2021 tractor-trailer accident in Panola County, Texas. Defendant James Wilson was driving a tractor-trailer as an employee of Defendants Euro Express, LLC and Damir Arnaut. Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 14-17. Wilson rear-ended a passenger truck, resulting in the vehicle’s complete destruction and the deaths of driver Kaleb Hamby and passenger Gabriel Webb. Id. ¶ 30. Defendant J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. was either retained as the motor carrier to transport the load Wilson was hauling during the collision, id. ¶ 61, or, alternatively, it brokered the load involved, id. ¶ 67. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant Great Hauler, Inc. brokered the load being hauled during the accident. Id. ¶ 72.

Plaintiffs bring negligence, negligence per se, and gross negligence causes of action against Defendants James Wilson, Euro Express, and Damir Arnaut; negligence and gross negligence causes of action against Defendant J.B. Hunt; and a negligence cause of action against Defendant Great Hauler. Id. at 5-13.

Defendant J.B. Hunt now moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ gross negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, [*3] negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision claims because Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint fails to plead sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. J.B. Hunt also moves to dismiss the claims of negligent brokering, selection, and monitoring of a motor carrier as preempted by the Federal Aviation Authorization Administration Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 14501, et seq. (the “FAAAA”).

II.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

A complaint that fails to state a claim may be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) are “viewed with disfavor and are rarely granted.” Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Test Masters Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Singh, 428 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 2005)). A claim cannot be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) unless the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts or [*4] any possible theory that [it] could prove consistent with the allegations in the complaint.” Muhammad v. Dallas Cty. Cmty. Supervision & Corrs. Dep’t, 479 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). When ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept “all well-pleaded facts in the complaint as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Raj v. La. State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 330 (5th Cir. 2013). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

III.

The Court first addresses J.B. Hunt’s argument that the Second Amended Complaint fails to plead facts sufficient to support the gross negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision claims against J.B. Hunt. Docket No. 36. In their response, Plaintiffs essentially agree and concede that their direct negligence claims against J.B. Hunt are deficient. Docket No. 43 at 11. Accordingly, the Court grants the motion to dismiss these claims against J.B. Hunt.

Plaintiffs, however, also seek leave to amend their complaint to cure the identified deficiencies. Id. at 11-12. The deadline to move for leave to amend pleadings was December 8, 2023. Docket No. 16 at 4. Plaintiffs asked to amend their complaint on February 13, [*5] 2024. Docket No. 43. Defendant J.B. Hunt did not respond to this request.

When a party seeks to amend its pleadings after the deadline in the Court’s scheduling order, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b) governs. Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008). Rule 16(b)(4) allows that a “schedule may be modified only for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” In determining whether a party has shown good cause, the Court considers four factors: “(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice.” Fahim, 551 F.3d at 348 (quoting S&W Enters., LLC v. Southtrust Bank of Ala., NA, 315 F.3d 533, 536 (5th Cir. 2003)). The Court considers the four factors “holistically” instead of “mechanically count[ing] the number of factors that favor each side.” E.E.O.C. v. Serv. Temps, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95667, 2009 WL 3294863, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2009).

Once the moving party demonstrates good cause under Rule 16(b), the Court considers the motion for leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), which provides that courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Whether to grant leave to amend pleadings under Rule 15 is “within the discretion” of the district court. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330, 91 S. Ct. 795, 28 L. Ed. 2d 77 (1971).

Plaintiffs seek leave to amend only under Rule 15(a)(2) and do not address Rule 16(b). Docket No. 42 at 12-13. Further, Plaintiffs have not attached a proposed amended complaint, as Local Rule CV-7(k) requires [*6] for a motion for leave to amend a complaint. Further, Defendants did not respond to this request, so the Court is unclear on Defendants’ position on the matter. Accordingly, the Court denies Plaintiffs’ request without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their complaint through an appropriate motion fully addressing the governing factors under Rules 16(b) and 15(a)(2) and providing a copy of their proposed amended complaint.

IV.

Defendant J.B. Hunt also seeks to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of negligent brokering, including negligent selection of a motor carrier and negligent monitoring of a motor carrier, as preempted by the FAAAA. Docket No. 37. The FAAAA’s preemption clause provides that a state:

may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . or any motor private carrier, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.

49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

J.B. Hunt argues that the preemption clause should be broadly construed to bar Plaintiff’s negligent brokering claims because these common-law claims are “related” to the “service” of brokering “the transportation of property.” Docket [*7] No. 37 at 4-9. J.B. Hunt further argues that § 14501(c)(2)(A)’s “safety exception” does not save a negligent brokering claim from preemption. This provision of the FAAAA carves out an exception to the preemption clause, explaining that preemption “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” J.B. Hunt contends that a negligent brokering claim is not an exercise of the state’s safety and regulatory authority and is not “with respect to motor vehicles,” as the exception requires. Id. at 10-12.

Plaintiffs oppose dismissal for two reasons. First, Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint leaves open whether J.B. Hunt was the broker or the motor carrier for the load involved in the accident. Docket No. 43 at 4-5. And, Plaintiffs note, J.B. Hunt’s preemption argument applies only to a broker, not a motor carrier. This fact question, Plaintiff asserts, renders dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) inappropriate. Id. at 4. Second, even if J.B. Hunt acted as the broker, Plaintiffs contend that their negligence claim is exempt from preemption under the safety exception. Id. at 5-11.

The Fifth Circuit has not addressed FAAAA preemption of state law tort claims. But other courts have generally [*8] taken three different approaches to the question. See Bertram v. Progressive Se. Ins. Co, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131251, 2021 WL 2955740, at *2 (W.D. La. July 14, 2021).

First, some courts have found that § 14501’s express preemption language does not apply to state tort claims because negligent hiring or brokering claims are not sufficiently “related to” the “price, route, or service” of a broker. E.g., Meek v. Toor, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 38206, 2024 WL 943931, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 5, 2024) (“The Court is not convinced by the rationale that hiring and oversight of transportation companies is so central to the services of freight brokers that negligent hiring claims would significantly impact the services of a freight broker.”); Scott v. Milosevic, 372 F. Supp. 3d 758, 769 (N.D. Iowa 2019) (holding that “the FAAAA does not preempt personal injury claims” against a broker); Mann v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117503, 2017 WL 3191516, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 27, 2017) (explaining that “a negligent hiring claim as an avenue for imposing liability for an accident does not have anything more than a ‘tenuous, remote, or peripheral’ connection to the ‘price, route, or service’ of a broker”).

Second, some courts have found that although § 14501’s express preemption language does apply to state tort claims, such claims are saved from preemption by the safety regulatory exception. E.g., Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2020); Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 512-16 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (“The Court thus finds Plaintiffs’ negligent-hiring claim falls within the scope of the safety regulation exception.”); Johnson v. Herbert, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 234716, 2023 WL 9503459, at *6-7 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2023) (“[T]he Court holds that the exception under Section 14501(c)(2)(A) applies [*9] to Johnson’s negligent hiring claim and thus that the FAAAA does not preempt her cause of action.”).

Third, some courts have determined that § 14501’s express preemption applies to state tort claims and that the safety exception does not save them from preemption. Ye v. GlobalTranz Enters., Inc., 74 F.4th 453, 464 (7th Cir. 2023) (“We thus conclude that Ye’s negligent hiring claim against GlobalTranz does not fall within the scope of § 14501(c)(2)’s safety exception. The claim is preempted and therefore properly dismissed by the district court.”); Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc., 65 F.4th 1261, 1272 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Aspen’s negligence claims are not ‘with respect to motor vehicles’ under the FAAAA’s safety exception. They are thus barred by its express preemption provision.”); Gillum v. High Standard, LLC, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *5-6, 7 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 27, 2020).

As explained below, the Court finds the reasoning of this third group most persuasive because they most clearly honor the statutory text. The Court thus concludes that § 14501’s express language preempts a negligent brokering claim and that the safety exception does not save the claim from preemption.

The Court first considers whether a negligent brokering claim falls within the FAAAA’s express preemption provision.

Congress can indicate its preemptive intent either expressly, through a statute’s plain language, or impliedly, through its “structure and purpose.” Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. City of Palestine, 41 F.4th 696, 704 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting [*10] Altria Grp., Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76, 129 S. Ct. 538, 172 L. Ed. 2d 398 (2008)). When a statute includes an express preemption clause—as here—”the court does not indulge ‘any presumption against preemption but instead focus[es] on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ preemptive intent.'” Young Conservatives of Tex. Found. v. Smatresk, 73 F.4th 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 125, 136 S. Ct. 1938, 195 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2016)).

As noted above, the FAAAA’s preemption clause prohibits a state from enacting or enforcing “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

The first question is thus whether a common law negligence claim is “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law.” It is. Because “a common-law rule clearly has ‘the force and effect of law,'” such rules “fall comfortably within the language” of preemption provisions like the FAAAA’s. Northwest, Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281-82, 134 S. Ct. 1422, 188 L. Ed. 2d 538 (2014); see also Ye, 74 F.4th at 459; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1266; Lopez, 458 F. Supp. 3d at 512.

The second question is whether a negligent brokering claim is “related to a price, route, or service” of a broker. “[T]he key phrase ‘related to’ expresses a ‘broad pre-emptive purpose.'” Northwest, 572 U.S. at 280 (considering preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act); see also Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 260, 133 S. Ct. 1769, 185 L. Ed. 2d 909 (2013) (interpreting the FAAAA’s preemption clause). But “‘related [*11] to’ does not mean the sky is the limit.” Dan’s City Used Cars, 569 U.S. at 261. And § 14501(c)(1) “does not preempt state laws affecting carrier prices, routes, and services in only a tenuous, remote, or peripheral . . . manner.” Id. (quoting Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transport A’ssn, 552 U.S. 364, 371, 128 S. Ct. 989, 169 L. Ed. 2d 933 (2008)) (internal quotations omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations supporting their negligent brokering claim go directly to the services of a broker. A broker’s service is “selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2) (defining “broker”). In other words, selecting a motor carrier to transport a load is the essential service of the broker. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges that J.B. Hunt “had a duty to select a competent motor carrier” and “had an ongoing duty to monitor Euro Express to ensure it was a competent motor carrier” to transport the load involved in the accident leading to this case. Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 69, 70. And Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim stems from J.B. Hunt’s alleged breach of that duty. Id. ¶ 71. Thus, the negligent brokering claim is fundamentally “related to” the broker’s service of selecting a competent motor carrier. Ye, 74 F.4th at 459; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1267-68; Miller, 976 F.3d at 1024-25; Gillum, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14820, 2020 WL 444371, at *4 (finding that Texas negligence claims against a freight broker “relate to” the broker’s services). [*12]

Because Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim is “a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law” that is “related to a price, route, or service” of a broker, the plain language of the FAAAA expressly preempts Plaintiffs’ claim here unless it falls within one of the statute’s exceptions.

Plaintiffs argue that their negligent brokering claim is not preempted due to the safety exception in § 14501(c)(2)(A). Docket No. 43 at 5-11. The Court disagrees. See, e.g., Ye, 74 F.4th at 460-65; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1268-72.

Under § 14501(c)(2)(A), the FAAAA’s preemption clause “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” To meet this exception, a common law negligence claim must be (1) within a state’s “safety regulatory authority” and (2) “with respect to motor vehicles.” Because the Court concludes that a negligent brokering claim is not “with respect to motor vehicles,” it need not consider the first half of the exception. See Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1273 (Jordan, J., concurring).

“By limiting the safety exception to apply to state laws ‘with respect to motor vehicles,’ Congress narrowed the scope of the exception to those laws concerning a ‘vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer . . . used on a highway in transportation.'” [*13] 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16) (defining “motor vehicle”). Ye, 74 F.4th at 460. This narrow exception requires a direct link between the state law in question and motor vehicle safety. Id.; Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1271. And there is no direct link between Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim and motor vehicle safety.

In its thorough analysis of the statute, the Ye court found a clear delineation between brokers and motor vehicle safety. Id. at 460-64. For example, after implementing the broad preemptive provision of § 14501(c)(1), Congress carved out specific exceptions for state laws for motor vehicle safety, cargo loads, motor carrier insurance, transportation of household goods, and two truck operations. Id. at 461 (citing § 14501(c)(2)). But despite specifically mentioning brokers in § 14501(c)(1), Congress conspicuously failed to mention brokers in any of the preemption exceptions. The Ye court also points out that while § 14501(b)(1) preempts state laws “relating to intrastate rates, intrastate routes, or intrastate services of any freight forwarder or broker,” Congress omitted a safety exception for brokers in § 14501(b) paralleling that of § 14501(c)(2). Id.; see also Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1271-72 (similarly holding that the safety exception applies only to state laws that have a direct relationship to motor vehicles based on the Supreme Court’s finding that a similar phrase in [*14] § 14501(c)(1) “massively limits” the scope of preemption and because allowing an indirect relationship would render portions of § 14501(c)(2)(A) non-operative or redundant).

The Court thus concludes that the safety exception excepts from preemption only state laws or regulations that have a direct relationship to motor vehicle safety. And a negligent hiring or brokering claim is not directly related to motor vehicle safety. Indeed, in their negligent brokering claim, Plaintiffs allege that J.B. Hunt breached its duty by failing to select a competent motor carrier. Docket No. 28 ¶¶ 67-71. But this section of the complaint “does not purport to enforce any standard or regulation on the ownership, maintenance, or operation of” a motor vehicle as defined by 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16). See Aspen Am. Ins., 65 F.4th at 1272. And the “attenuated connection” between the broker and the safety of the motor vehicles operated by the motor carrier “is simply too remote for the safety exception” to apply to a negligent brokering claim. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

As mentioned, Plaintiffs argue that the complaint leaves open whether J.B. Hunt was the broker or motor carrier for the load at issue, and that the Court should therefore deny J.B. Hunt’s motion [*15] to dismiss the negligent brokering claim at this stage of the case. See Docket No. 43 at 4-5. The Court disagrees. If J.B. Hunt was the broker, then the claim should be dismissed as preempted, as discussed above. If, on the other hand, J.B. Hunt was the motor carrier, then the claim should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Either way, dismissal of the negligent brokering claim is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6).

For the reasons explained above, the Court GRANTS Defendant J.B. Hunt’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 35) Plaintiffs’ gross negligence, negligent entrustment, negligent hiring, negligent retention, negligent training, and negligent supervision claims against J.B. Hunt. Plaintiffs’ request to amend their complaint as to these claims is DENIED without prejudice. Plaintiffs may seek leave to amend their complaint through an appropriate motion.

Further, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim is preempted by 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1) and is not excepted from preemption by the safety exception clause of § 14501(c)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant J.B. Hunt’s motion to dismiss (Docket No. 35) Plaintiffs’ negligent brokering claim.

So ORDERED and SIGNED this 21st day of May, 2024.

/s/ Jeremy [*16] D. Kernodle

JEREMY D. KERNODLE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

End of Document

¹Defendant J.B. Hunt filed its motion as a standalone four-page docket entry (Docket No. 35). It then filed a separate seven-page brief supporting its argument to dismiss Plaintiffs’ direct negligence claims (Docket No. 36) and yet another twelve-page brief supporting its argument to dismiss Plaintiffs’ negligent broker claims (Docket No. 37). The Court reminds the parties that Local Rule CV-7(c) requires that a motion and any briefing be contained in a single document. Further, Local Rule CV-7(a)(2) limits non-case-dispositive motions to fifteen total pages. As per the Court’s Order Governing Proceedings (Docket No. 10), counsel are instructed to review the most recent versions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for the Eastern District of Texas.