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Bits & Pieces

Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sentry Cas. Co.

Court of Appeals of Michigan

June 22, 2023, Decided

No. 361259

FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, and GEORGE CIALDELLA, Intervening Plaintiff-Appellee, v SENTRY CASUALTY COMPANY, SENTRY INSURANCE, SENTRY SELECT INSURANCE COMPANY, SENTRY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, ACE CAPITAL TITLE REINSURANCE COMPANY, ACE FIRE UNDERWRITERS INSURANCE COMPANY, and ACE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendants, and ACE PROPERTY AND CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Notice: THIS OPINION IS UNCORRECTED AND SUBJECT TO REVISION BEFORE FINAL PUBLICATION IN THE MICHIGAN COURT OF APPEALS REPORTS.

Prior History:  [*1] Oakland Circuit Court. LC No. 2020-185275-CK.


Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sentry Cas. Co, 2022 Mich. App. LEXIS 4230 (Mich. Ct. App., July 20, 2022)

Core Terms

registered, truck, registration, no-fault, coverage, trailer, reciprocal, transporters, benefits, apportioned, insurer, motor vehicle, proportionally, licensing, carrier, driven, registration requirement, calendar year, proportional, nonresident, interstate, provisions, travel, nonresident owner, highway

Case Summary

Overview

HOLDINGS: [1]-In an insurance dispute involving a Michigan truck driver who fell from a truck in Indiana, the Illinois trucking company did not have to carry Michigan no-fault insurance because a truck primarily registered outside of Michigan with an apportioned registration under the International Registration Plan (IRP) that includes Michigan is not thereby compelled to carry Michigan no-fault insurance; [2]-MCL 500.3102(1) did not apply to require Michigan no-fault insurance because the truck involved in the fall was never operated in Michigan.

Outcome

Reversed and remanded.

LexisNexis® Headnotes

Insurance Law > … > No Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

HN1  Personal Injury Protection, Medical Benefits

Proportional registration under the International Registration Plan (IRP), standing alone, does not compel the purchase of Michigan no-fault insurance.

Civil Procedure > … > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law > Appropriateness

Governments > Legislation > Interpretation

Civil Procedure > Judgments > Summary Judgment > Entitlement as Matter of Law

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > De Novo Review

Civil Procedure > … > Summary Judgment > Appellate Review > Standards of Review

HN2  Entitlement as Matter of Law, Appropriateness

The court reviews the denial of summary disposition and issues of statutory interpretation de novo, without deference to the trial court. MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.

Insurance Law > … > No Fault Coverage > Personal Injury Protection > Medical Benefits

HN3  Personal Injury Protection, Medical Benefits

Under MCL 500.3114(1), a person seeking no-fault benefits must generally look first to his or her own insurer for PIP coverage, unless one of the exceptions in MCL 500.3114(2), (3), or (5) applies.

Counsel: For FRANKENMUTH MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff – Appellee: CHARLES LOVELL.

For GEORGE CIADELLA, Intervening Plaintiff: STEFFANI CHOCRON.

Judges: Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and HOOD and MALDONADO, JJ.

Opinion by: Elizabeth L. Gleicher

Opinion

Gleicher, C.J.

Trucking plays a critical role in the economy of our state and nation. Maintaining a steady flow of goods and products is essential to economic growth. Launched 50 years ago, the International Registration Plan (IRP) simplified the licensing and registration barriers that once encumbered interstate truck travel. Under the program, which Michigan joined in 1985, a commercial vehicle pays full registration and licensing fees in its home jurisdiction, and apportioned registration fees in other jurisdictions based on the distances the truck or fleet travels on those jurisdictions’ roads. An apportioned plate and cab card are the only credentials a trucker needs to drive through a member jurisdiction.

This case presents a novel question regarding the IRP’s proportional registration system: whether a truck primarily registered outside of Michigan with an apportioned registration including Michigan must carry Michigan no-fault [*2]  insurance. HN1 We hold that proportional registration, standing alone, does not compel the purchase of Michigan no-fault insurance. We reverse the trial court’s contrary decision and remand for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

This insurance dispute involves events and people in three states: Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois. George Cialdella is a Michigan resident and a named insured on a personal Michigan no-fault automobile insurance policy issued by plaintiff Frankenmuth Mutual Insurance Company. In December 2019, Cialdella worked as a truck driver for CHI Logistics, Inc. The parties dispute whether Cialdella was a CHI employee or an independent contractor, but his employment status does not affect our analysis.

CHI is based in Illinois and operates an interstate trucking business. CHI owned or leased the truck at issue from another Illinois trucking company, KZ, Inc.1 KZ registered the truck in Illinois and proportionally registered the truck in 48 of the United States, including Michigan. No evidence supported that the truck had ever been driven in Michigan.

In December 2019, a supervisor at CHI asked Cialdella to take the truck from Chicago, Illinois, to Indiana for refueling. [*3]  As Cialdella alighted from the truck’s cab in Indiana, a step gave way. Cialdella fell and sustained severe injuries.

Frankenmuth paid Cialdella’s personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits, which totaled over $500,000. It brought this action seeking a declaratory judgment that CHI’s insurance carrier, defendant ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company, was highest in priority to pay Cialdella’s PIP benefits under MCL 500.3114(2) and (3).2 ACE moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10), arguing that it was not liable for PIP benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act because the truck was registered in Illinois, the accident occurred in Indiana, and the truck was never operated in Michigan for more than 30 days in a calendar year. ACE argued that the truck was not required to be registered in Michigan under MCL 500.3101(1) or MCL 500.3102(1), and thus Michigan’s no-fault act did not apply.

Frankenmuth asked the court to deny ACE’s motion and to grant judgment in its favor under MCR 2.116(I)(2), contending that because the truck was proportionally registered in Illinois under the IRP, it was fully registered in every jurisdiction where CHI does business, including Michigan. In Frankenmuth’s estimation, the proportional registration combined with Cialdella’s [*4]  status as a CHI employee meant that ACE was a higher priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(3), entitling it to judgment in its favor.

The trial court determined that because there was no factual dispute regarding the ownership of the truck, the sole question presented was whether registration under the IRP was sufficient to deem the truck registered in Michigan for purposes of Michigan’s no-fault act. The court agreed with Frankenmuth that the IRP registration sufficed to regard the truck as registered in Michigan and that ACE was the highest priority insurer under MCL 500.3114(3). ACE now appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

HN2 We review the denial of summary disposition and issues of statutory interpretation de novo, without deference to the trial court. Jesperson v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 499 Mich 29, 34; 878 NW2d 799 (2016). MCR 2.116(C)(10) provides that summary disposition is appropriate when “[e]xcept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment or partial judgment as a matter of law.”

A. THE PROPORTIONALLY REGISTERED TRUCK WAS NOT REQUIRED TO BE REGISTERED IN MICHIGAN

Michigan’s no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., requires Michigan drivers to maintain no-fault automobile insurance. At the time of Cialdella’s accident, MCL 500.3101(1) provided that “the owner or registrant [*5]  of a motor vehicle required to be registered in this state shall maintain security for payment of benefits under [PIP] and property protection insurance as required under this chapter, and residual liability insurance.” (Emphasis added.) Even nonresident owners or registrants of motor vehicles not registered in Michigan must maintain security for the payment of no-fault benefits if the motor vehicle is “operated in this state for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year.” MCL 500.3102(1).

The truck involved in Cialdella’s fall was never operated in Michigan, so MCL 500.3102(1) does not apply. If CHI or KZ were obligated to purchase no-fault insurance for the vehicle, that obligation necessarily flowed from MCL 500.3101(1), which mandates no-fault coverage for vehicles that are “required to be registered” in this state.

The Michigan Vehicle Code, MCL 257.1 et seq., states a general rule requiring the Michigan registration of all motor vehicles driven our state’s roads, followed by two relevant exceptions:

Every motor vehicle, recreational vehicle, trailer, semitrailer, and pole trailer, when driven or moved on a street or highway, is subject to the registration and certificate of title provisions of this act except the following:

(a) A vehicle driven or moved [*6]  on a street or highway in conformance with the provisions of this act relating to manufacturers, transporters, dealers, or nonresidents. [MCL 257.216(1) (emphasis added).]

CHI and KZ are “transporters” and “nonresidents.” But that does not end the analysis, because as “transporters,” an additional registration requirement is in play.

We start with “nonresidents.” Usually, a “nonresident” vehicle owner whose car is licensed and registered in another state need not obtain a Michigan registration — think tourists and other visitors. MCL 257.243(1) explains this concept as follows:

A nonresident owner, except as otherwise provided in this section, owning any foreign vehicle of a type otherwise subject to registration under this act may operate or permit the operation of the vehicle within this state without registering the vehicle in, or paying any fees to, this state if the vehicle at all times when operated in this state is duly registered in, and displays upon it a valid registration certificate and registration plate or plates issued for the vehicle in the place of residence of the owner.

“Transporters” pose a different problem. “A nonresident owner of a foreign vehicle operated within this state for the transportation [*7]  of persons or property for compensation” must “register the vehicle and pay the same fees for its registration as is required with reference to like vehicles owned by residents of this state.” MCL 257.243(2). In other words, the statute binds nonresident transporters to the same registration requirements as resident transporters.

Enter the IRP.

MCL 257.243(2), the statute requiring that commercial vehicles traveling through our state obtain Michigan registration, was enacted in 1949. See 1949 PA 300. The IRP was adopted in 1985. The Legislature paved the way for the adoption of the IRP by creating an organization called the Highway Reciprocity Board, and empowering the board to enter into reciprocal registration agreements with other states. MCL 3.161 et seq. Foreshadowing the IRP, MCL 3.166 provided:

A compact, agreement or arrangement entered into under the authority of this act, may contain provisions authorizing the registration or licensing in another jurisdiction of vehicles located in or operated from a domicile in the other jurisdiction, which vehicles otherwise would be required to be registered or licensed in this state; and in such event the exemptions and privileges extended by the compact, agreement or arrangement shall apply to such vehicles. [*8] 3

With the adoption of the IRP, trucking companies operating in Michigan are no longer required to register their trucks here in addition to their home jurisdictions, as long as the trucks are proportionally registered in Michigan.

This Court has described the IRP as “an apportioned registration plan” between 48 states and most Canadian provinces. Behnke, Inc v State, 278 Mich App 114, 116; 748 NW2d 253 (2008). “Because interstate carriers must register in each jurisdiction in which they operate, the IRP permits them to register their trucks annually in one ‘base’ jurisdiction and to obtain credentials to operate in other IRP jurisdictions.” Id. at 117. As we explained in Behnke, an IRP-registered interstate carrier “pays a full annual registration fee to its base jurisdiction, which, in turn, transmits a percentage of that registration fee to the various IRP jurisdictions in which the carrier operates, apportioned according to the mileage driven by the carrier during the preceding year in each jurisdiction.” Id. The plan’s primary benefit is that it allows commercial trucks to obtain licensing and registration in one state or province, and to travel freely in the others without undertaking the financial and bureaucratic efforts for full licensure in reciprocal jurisdictions. [*9] 

A brief review of Behnke‘s facts contributes to a fuller understanding of the IRP. The plaintiffs in Behnke were Michigan-based trucking companies that registered their trucks in Michigan, but registered their trailers in other states, particularly Maine. Id. at 115. The Michigan State Police issued the plaintiffs civil infraction citations for failing to register the trailers in Michigan. The plaintiffs sued, seeking a declaration that they were not required to register their trailers in Michigan because the trailers were proportionally registered in other states under the IRP. Id. at 116. This Court agreed, holding that a section of the IRP specifically authorized interstate carriers to register their trailers in any IRP member jurisdiction under that jurisdiction’s registration laws. Id. at 120. We concluded, “Michigan must grant full and free reciprocity to trailers properly registered in any member jurisdiction under § 404 [of the IRP].” Id. at 121.

CHI and KZ are nonresident owners of proportionally registered vehicles, and like the trailers in Behnke, their tractors may travel freely in Michigan without additional registration. CHI acknowledges that some trucks in its Illinois-based fleet operate in Michigan “for the transportation [*10]  of . . . property for compensation[.]” According to ACE, KZ fulfilled Michigan’s registration requirement for its entire fleet by obtaining proportional registration of its trucks, including the truck that caused Cialdella’s injuries. But by doing so, Frankenmuth retorts, CHI and KZ automatically became subject to our state’s no-fault insurance mandate.

The truck involved in Cialdella’s injury does not fall within MCL 257.243(2)‘s mandatory registration requirement because it was never operated in Michigan. Perhaps recognizing this reality, Frankenmuth makes no effort to argue that either CHI or KZ were “required” to register that truck in Michigan. Instead, Frankenmuth maintains, the truck was registered in Michigan through the IRP. Therefore, Frankenmuth reasons, even though that truck’s tires had never graced a Michigan roadway, its owner was required to purchase Michigan no-fault coverage for the vehicle. We find no support for this argument in logic or the law.

We begin with the law. No Michigan cases specifically mention the IRP other than Behnke. But we find compelling support for our holding in Parks v DAIIE, 426 Mich. 191; 393 N.W.2d 833 (1986). Like this case, Parks was a priority dispute regarding PIP coverage. The injured party, Wayne Parks, worked [*11]  for Roadway Express, a Delaware corporation based in Ohio. He suffered a hernia while lifting a box of brass fittings while inside a Roadway trailer. The trailer was registered in Tennessee and “several states other than Michigan,” while the tractor was registered in Michigan. Id. at 196. The trailer had been operated in Michigan for only three days at the time of the accident. Parks sought to recover no-fault benefits from Roadway, or his personal no-fault insurer (DAIIE), or the assigned claims facility. Id. at 197.

The parties agreed that the trailer in which Parks was injured was a “motor vehicle” under the no-fault act, and that it was appropriate to “look to the registration of the trailer to determine which insurer is liable.” Id. at 198 (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court first considered MCL 500.3101(1), which provides that the owners or registrants of motor vehicles “required to be registered in this state” must carry PIP insurance. Next, the Court scrutinized MCL 500.3102(1), which requires no-fault coverage of a vehicle operated in Michigan for an aggregate of more than 30 days per calendar year. Parks, 426 Mich at 199. The Supreme Court concluded that the trailer in which Parks was injured did not fall within either statute. Id. The Court’s reasoning [*12]  guides our decision in the case before us.

The Court observed that MCL 500.3101(1) “applies only to owners or registrants of vehicles ‘required to be registered in this state.'” Parks, 426 Mich at 199. That provision did not apply, because the trailer was registered in Tennessee, and “[u]nder a compact entered into by the State of Michigan and the State of Tennessee,” the trailer was not required to be registered in Michigan. Id. at 200. The Court elaborated: “The Legislature created the Highway Reciprocity Board and has authorized it to enter into reciprocal compacts with other states regarding the operation of trailers engaged in interstate commerce. MCL 3.161 et seq. . . .” Parks, 426 Mich at 199-200. In a footnote, the Court specifically acknowledged that MCL 257.216 would require registration in Michigan, but for the reciprocal agreement. Parks, 426 Mich at 200 n 2. But because the trailer was not required to be registered in Michigan, it “was not subject to the mandatory security requirement in § 3101(1).” Parks, 426 Mich at 200.

Like the truck involved in Cialdella’s accident, the trailer in Parks was registered in another state through a “reciprocal agreement” governing registrations. That registration permitted the truck to be driven in Michigan without separately registering here. Although Parks does not specifically mention the IRP (which [*13]  Michigan adopted several years after Parks’ accident), we glean from that case that a reciprocal, proportional registration that includes Michigan does not subject a truck used in Michigan to MCL 500.3102(1), Michigan’s mandatory no-fault coverage statute. Distilled to its essence, the holding in Parks is that the owner of a vehicle that is not required to be registered in Michigan is not required to purchase no-fault coverage.4

This result makes sense. The purpose of reciprocal registration under the IRP is to relieve trucking companies of the burden of complying with 48 different state registration requirements. Section 105 of the IRP stated at the time of Cialdella’s accident and continues to state:

The fundamental principle of the Plan is to promote and encourage the fullest possible use of the highway system by authorizing apportioned registration of Fleets of Apportionable Vehicles and the recognition by each Member Jurisdiction of the registration of Vehicles apportioned by other Member Jurisdictions, thus contributing to the economic and social development and growth of the Member Jurisdictions. [International Registration Plan, Amended January 1, 2019, available at < https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.irponline.org/resource/resmgr/jurisdiction_info_2/the_plan_1_1_19.pdf> [*14]  (accessed May 25, 2023).5]

Freedom of truck movement through the states and Canada enhances economic growth for all of the cooperating jurisdictions. Mandating no-fault insurance coverage for all trucks proportionally registered in Michigan under the IRP — including those that have never actually traveled in Michigan — undermines the purpose of the plan.

A recent opinion of our Supreme Court illustrates the continuing relevance of Parks. Turner by Sakowski v Farmers Ins Exch, 507 Mich 858; 953 NW2d 204 (2021), began as a consolidated appeal in this Court involving two priority disputes. Turner by Sakowski v Farmers Ins Exch, 327 Mich App 481; 934 NW2d 81 (2019). In one of the cases, the involved vehicle was registered in Maryland and owned by a non-Michigan corporation referred to in the opinion as Enterprise. Id. at 486-487. In the other case, the vehicle was registered in Pennsylvania and owned by Enterprise. Id. at 490. Neither vehicle had been operated in Michigan for more than 30 days when the plaintiff passengers were injured. Id. at 487, 490. This Court determined that because Enterprise was the self-insured owner and registrant of the vehicles, it was the highest priority insurer. Id. at 507. We specifically rejected Enterprise’s argument that the priority provisions of the no-fault act did not apply because the vehicle was not “required to be registered in this state,” and [*15]  therefore exempt from the mandatory no-fault rule. Id. at 502-507.

The Supreme Court reversed, explaining that:

Here, as in Parks, it is undisputed that the vehicles at issue owned by the Enterprise appellants which the injured individuals were occupying at the time of the respective accidents were (1) out-of-state vehicles, (2) not required to be registered in this state, and (3) not subject to the security provisions of the no-fault act because they had not been operated in this state for more than 30 days within the calendar year. See MCL 500.3101(1); MCL 500.3102(1). [Turner, 507 Mich at 859.]

Although the no-fault priority statutes do “not expressly condition an insurer’s priority for no-fault benefits upon the vehicle’s being required to be registered in Michigan or otherwise being subject to the security provisions of the no-fault act because it has been operated within the state for more than 30 days within the calendar year,” the Supreme Court declared that “such a condition is implicit . . . when the no-fault act is read as a whole.” Id. The Court summarized that “because the[] self-insured Enterprise appellants . . . were not required under either MCL 500.3101(1) or MCL 500.3102(1) to obtain no-fault insurance the vehicles at issue, the Enterprise appellants could not have [*16]  constituted the ‘insurer of the owner or registrant of the vehicle occupied'” under the relevant priority statute. Turner, 507 Mich at 860.

The truck involved in Cialdella’s accident was not required to have been registered in Michigan, as Frankenmuth implicitly concedes. The “reciprocal registration” discussed in Parks is indistinguishable from the proportional registration involved here. Because neither form of registration constitutes “required” registration under Michigan law, Parks and Turner compel the conclusion that neither KZ nor CHI were not statutorily obligated to purchase no-fault coverage for the truck.

B. THE ACE INSURANCE POLICY DID NOT INCLUDE NO-FAULT INSURANCE

Frankenmuth argues that the ACE policy actually includes first-party no-fault coverage and therefore ACE stands first in priority for Cialdella’s PIP coverage. We rejected a virtually identical argument in Besic v Citizens Ins Co, 290 Mich App 19; 800 NW2d 93 (2010).

The relevant portion of the ACE policy provides:

b. Out-of-state Coverage Extensions

While a covered “auto” is away from the state where it is licensed, we will:

(1) Increase the Limit of Insurance for Covered Autos Liability Coverage to meet the limit specified by a compulsory or financial responsibility law of the jurisdiction where the covered [*17]  “auto” is being used. This extension does not apply to the limit or limits specified by any law governing “motor carriers” of passengers or property.

(2) Provide the minimum amounts and types of other coverages, such as no-fault, required of out-of-state vehicles by the jurisdiction where the covered “auto” is being used.

We will not pay anyone more than once for the same elements of “loss” because of these extensions. [Emphasis added.]

This language echoes the language we construed in Besic, 290 Mich App at 28. In that case we held that the plain language “out-of-state coverage extension” did not provide Michigan no-fault coverage “because at the time of the accident Besic undisputedly was using the covered ‘auto’ in Ohio, a state that does not have a no-fault liability scheme.” Id. at 28-29.

Here, the truck was being used in Indiana at the time of Cialdella’s accident. Indiana does not require no-fault coverage, and as discussed above, neither KZ nor CHI were required to purchase no-fault coverage for the truck.

C. PRIORITY

HN3 Under MCL 500.3114(1), a person seeking no-fault benefits must generally look first to his or her own insurer for PIP coverage, unless one of the exceptions in MCL 500.3114(2), (3), or (5) applies. Farmers Ins Exch v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich, 272 Mich App 106, 111; 724 NW2d 485 (2006). The only potentially relevant [*18]  exception here is MCL 500.3114(3), which addresses the priority of coverage for injuries sustained while an occupant of a vehicle owned or registered by an employer. That exception is inapplicable, however, because even if we assume that Cialdella was employed by CHI, the ACE policy does not include Michigan no-fault benefits. The ACE policy does not, therefore, fall within any order of priority. See Titan Ins Co v American Country Ins Co, 312 Mich App 291, 300; 876 NW2d 853 (2015) (“[W]e discern a general rule that when an exception to subsection (1) should apply but insurance is not available, the general rule of subsection (1) applies.”).

D. SUMMARY

A nonresident transporter may primarily register a truck outside of Michigan with an apportioned registration including Michigan under the IRP and avoid separate registration requirements in this state. If that truck is operated in Michigan “for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year,” the nonresident owner will be required by MCL 500.3102(1) to secure no-fault automobile insurance. If it is not operated in Michigan, or operated for less than 30 days, no-fault insurance is not required. As the truck in this case was registered in Illinois and was not driven in Michigan, neither CHI nor KZ was required to secure no-fault insurance for the vehicle. The trial [*19]  court erred in placing other insurance purchased by CHI and KZ into the order of priority to provide no-fault coverage for Cialdella’s injuries.

We reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher

/s/ Noah P. Hood

/s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado


End of Document


Whether CHI leased or owned the truck is also irrelevant.

Subsection 3114(2) applies to an “operator or a passenger of a motor vehicle operated in the business of transporting passengers,” and clearly does not apply here. Subsection 3114(3) applies to “[a]n employee . . . who suffers accidental bodily injury while an occupant of a motor vehicle owned or registered by the employer[.]”

Executive Order 2007-15 abolished the Highway Reciprocity Board and transferred its powers to the Department of State, effective July 15, 2007.

That said, we acknowledge that if the vehicle is operated in Michigan “for an aggregate of more than 30 days in any calendar year,” MCL 500.3102(2) would require that the owner purchase no-fault insurance coverage.

5 See also International Registration Plan, Amended January 1, 2021, available at < https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.irponline.org/resource/resmgr/jurisdiction_info_2/Plan_1_1_21.pdf > (accessed May 25, 2023).

Hughes v. Ace American Insurance Company

HUGHES

v.

ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY.

A23A0609

May 26, 2023

Synopsis

Background: Driver of truck involved in automobile collision brought, inter alia, direct action claim against insurer of van for employer’s parent company, as well as the company, seeking to recover for damages sustained in collision after van’s driver made improper lane change. The Superior Court, Gwinnett County, Shawn F. Bratton, J., entered summary judgment for insurer. Victim appealed.

[Holding:] The Court of Appeals, Brown, J., held that driver was not entitled to bring direct action claim against insurer.

Affirmed.

West Headnotes (4)

[1] Insurance Direct action by injured person, in general  

The purpose of permitting joinder of an insurance company in a Motor Carrier Act direct action claim against a motor carrier is to further the policy of the Act, that is, to protect the public against injuries caused by the motor carrier’s negligence. Ga. Code Ann. § 40-1-112(c).    

[2] Insurance

The purpose of permitting joinder of an insurance company in a Motor Carrier Act direct action claim against a motor carrier enables injured persons to recover compensation more efficiently and quickly, and encourages insurers to resolve legitimate claims by settlement. Ga. Code Ann. § 40-1-112(c).    

[3] Insurance

Direct action statute permitting direct action against motor carrier’s liability insurer is in derogation of common law, and its terms require strict compliance. Ga. Code Ann. § 40-1-112(c).    

[4] Insurance

Direct action by injured person, in general  

Van used to transport residents of group home was not “public conveyance” as term was used in definition of “passenger” under direct action statute and, thus, driver of truck involved in collision with van was not entitled to bring direct action claim against insurer of van for home’s parent company; van was not used to transport people for compensation but, rather, was used to drive residents to medical appointments, a drug store to pick up prescriptions, the library, a park, special events, or a ride if a resident was restless. Ga. Code Ann. §§ 40-1-100(13), 40-1-112(c).  

Attorneys and Law Firms

Anna Green Cross, Nola D. Jackson, Michael L. Werner, Atlanta, Trevor Everton Brice, Jenna Hough, for Appellant.

Matthew A. Boyd, Tiffany Bianca Harlow, Atlanta, for Appellee.

Opinion

Brown, Judge.

*1 Kenneth Hughes appeals from the trial court’s order granting Ace American Insurance Company’s (“Ace Insurance”) motion for summary judgment. Hughes asserts that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether a passenger van insured by Ace was owned or operated by a “motor carrier” under OCGA § 40-1-100 et seq. For the reasons explained below, we disagree and affirm.

To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, warrant judgment as a matter of law. We review de novo a trial court’s [grant or] denial of summary judgment, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Mornay v. Nat.Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA., 331 Ga. App. 112, 769 S.E.2d 807 (2015).

So viewed, the record shows that a seven-passenger Dodge Caravan driven by Jeremiah Belk collided with a Chevrolet Colorado truck driven by Kenneth Hughes after Belk made an improper lane change. Hughes filed a complaint, as amended, against Belk’s employer, Normal Life of Georgia, Inc. (“Normal Life”), Res-Care, Inc. (“Res-Care”), the parent company of Res-Care, and Ace Insurance, the insurance carrier of Res-Care, asserting various theories of liability for the negligent and/or reckless conduct of Belk. Hughes asserted a direct action claim against Ace Insurance pursuant to OCGA § 40-1-112, based on his contention that Normal Life and Res-Care are motor carriers under OCGA § 40-1-100. The trial court subsequently granted Ace Insurance’s motion for summary judgment based on its conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether any of the defendants were a motor carrier.

[1] [2] [3]Georgia’s direct action provision of the Georgia Motor Carrier Act (“the Act”) states: “It shall be permissible under this part for any person having a cause of action arising under this part to join in the same action the motor carrier and the insurance carrier, whether arising in tort or contract.” OCGA § 40-1-112 (c). See generally Sapp v. Canal Ins. Co., 288 Ga. 681, 682-683 (1), 706 S.E.2d 644 (2011). “The purpose of permitting joinder of [an insurance company] in a claim against a [motor] carrier is to further the policy of the Motor Carrier Act, that is, to protect the public against injuries caused by the motor carrier’s negligence.” Andrews v. Yellow Freight System, 262 Ga. 476, 421 S.E.2d 712 (1992). See also Reis v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, 303 Ga. 659, 664, n.12, 814 S.E.2d 338 (2018) (Noting that former OCGA § 46-7-12 (c) provided: “ ‘It shall be permissible under this article for any person having a cause of action arising under this article to join in the same action the motor carrier and the insurance carrier, whether arising in tort or contract.’ ”). Additionally, it “enables injured persons to recover compensation more efficiently and quickly and encourages insurers to resolve legitimate claims by settlement.” Grissom v. Gleason, 262 Ga. 374, 378 (3), 418 S.E.2d 27 (1992). “Importantly, the direct action statute is in derogation of common law, and its terms require strict compliance.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Stubbs Oil Co. v. Price, 357 Ga. App. 606, 616 (4), 848 S.E.2d 739 (2020). Cf. Record Truck Line v. Harrison, 220 Ga. 289, 291 (1), 138 S.E.2d 578 (1964) (holding different provision of statutory scheme governing motor carriers in derogation of common law and must be strictly construed).

*2 The first step of the analysis is to determine whether Normal Life and Res-Care fall within the definition of “motor carrier” in the Act. OCGA § 40-1-100 (12) (A) provides that this term

means: [e]very person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any motor vehicle, including the lessees, receivers, or trustees of such persons or receivers appointed by any court, used in the business of transporting for hire persons, household goods, or property or engaged in the activity of nonconsensual towing pursuant to Code Section 44-1-13 for hire over any public highway in this state.

(Emphasis supplied.) OCGA § 40-1-100 (8) defines “ ‘for hire’ ” to mean “an activity relating to a person engaged in the transportation of goods or passengers for compensation.” (Emphasis supplied.) And,

“[p]assenger” means a person who travels in a public conveyance by virtue of a contract, either express or implied, with the carrier as to the payment of the fare or that which is accepted as an equivalent therefor. The prepayment of fare is not necessary to establish the relationship of passenger and carrier, although a carrier may demand prepayment of fare if persons enter his or her vehicle by his or her permission with the intention of being carried; in the absence of such a demand, an obligation to pay fare is implied on the part of the passenger, and the reciprocal obligation of carriage of the carrier arises upon the entry of the passenger.

OCGA § 40-1-100 (13). Finally, “ ‘[c]arrier’ ” is defined to mean “a person who undertakes the transporting of goods or passengers for compensation.” OCGA § 40-1-100 (1). Taken together, it is clear from the plain language of the statute that the term “motor carrier” depends in turn on the definition of “for hire,” which in turn depends upon the definition of “passenger” found in OCGA § 40-1-100 (13).

Hughes contends that record evidence shows that Normal Life and Res-Care “operate as a joint enterprise” with both companies “employing” and “directing” Belk’s activities,1 which included transporting their clients. In his view, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to “whether the for-profit companies that charged to provide services including transportation over Georgia roadways” fall within the definition of motor carrier. He argues that “[t]he law just requires that one purpose of the vehicle falls within the statutory definition of ‘motor carrier’ — there is no percentage allocation or analysis of whether the statutorily enumerated services of a motor carrier are ‘ancillary’ to a business goal.”

Ace Insurance, on the other hand, asserts that the van was not used for “the business of transporting people for compensation” and that it was “an entirely ancillary part of [Normal Life’s] service of providing home health care.” According to Ace, the defendant companies “are solely in the business of providing rehabilitative home health care support to individuals with disabilities. Neither company … [is] compensated for transporting residents — they are paid for caregiving services and would be paid exactly the same if they never transported any resident, ever.”

*3 Sharae McMasters, an OCGA § 9-11-30 (b) (6) representative for Normal Life, testified that she is the executive director of southeast operations for Normal Life. She explained that Normal Life, which is a subsidiary of Res-Care, “managed the healthcare and pretty much every aspect of people with intellectual disabilities …. Basically, taking care of them … in a group home or in a personal home[.]” For the most part, Normal Life followed policies and procedures developed by Res-Care. A “Res[-]Care Corrective Action Form” states: “The Company’s mission is to be the best diversified health and human services provider in serving populations of various needs in our communities; creating optimal environments that foster independence, safety, and outcomes, through best-in-class services, an innovative and technology-led approach, and highly engaged people.” The declarations page for the business auto policy covering the Dodge Caravan listed Res-Care’s business as “job training and vocational rehabilitation services.”

Belk worked for Normal Life as direct support staff at two particular group homes and driving was a regular part of his job duties. The Dodge Caravan was used to drive residents of the group home to medical appointments, a drug store to pick up prescriptions, the grocery or a big box store, the library, a park, special events, or just a ride if a resident was restless. Basically, the residents of the group home could “go anywhere they need[ed] or want[ed] to go” in the Dodge Caravan, which would be driven by Normal Life staff. At the time of the accident, Belk was transporting a resident back to the group home; the reason for the trip cannot be determined from the record before us.

In an affidavit submitted at the same time as Ace Insurance’s motion for summary judgment, Normal Life’s 30 (b) (6) representative averred that

Normal Life is paid to provide group residential home services for its disabled clients — assisting them with eating, bathing, dressing, mobility, behavioral monitoring and redirection, and other activities of daily living, including general supervision in the home….

As an adjunct to those core activities, Normal Life employees sometimes drive clients to various appointments, doctor/medical/psychiatric visits, and similar errands….

Normal Life does not charge extra or separately for transporting clients. Normal Life’s expenses for transporting its clients are paid from its general operating budget. Normal Life does not transport residents for its own benefit or revenue, but as a service ancillary to its primary function of operating residential homes for disabled individuals….

Normal Life provides transportation for its clients only, and its transportation services are not held out for hire to the general public.

[4]Having considered the particular facts and circumstances of this case, the requirement that we must strictly construe the Act, and all other relevant rules of statutory construction, see, e.g., McIver v. State, 314 Ga. 109, 119-120 (2) (b), 875 S.E.2d 810 (2022), we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether the Dodge Caravan was a “public conveyance” as that term is used in the statutory definition of “passenger.” OCGA § 40-1-100 (13). See Harlan v. Six Flags over Georgia, 250 Ga. 352, 353, 297 S.E.2d 468 (1982) (noting that “elevators, taxicabs, buses, and railroads” are public conveyances). See also Haulers Ins. Co. v. Davenport, 344 Ga. App. 444, 446-448 (2), 810 S.E.2d 617 (2018) (holding ordinary, plain, and unambiguous meaning of term “public conveyance” means the vehicle must be held out indiscriminately to the general public for hire). We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment favor of Ace Insurance.

Judgment affirmed.

McFadden, P. J., and Markle, J., concur.

All Citations

Footnotes

  1. Ace asserts that whether the companies acted as a joint venture is irrelevant to whether either entity qualifies as a “motor carrier.”  

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