United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

SCHLUMBERGER TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION, Plaintiff—Appellee,

v.

CAROLINA CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 22-40271

FILED February 27, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, No. 6:20-CV-0035, David S. Morales, U.S. District Judge

Attorneys and Law Firms

David W. Green, Esq., Hartline Barger, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Michael George Terry, Hartline Barger, L.L.P., Corpus Christi, TX, for Plaintiff—Appellee.

Jon M. Hughes, Scott W. McMickle, Attorney, McMickle Kurey Branch, L.L.P., Alpharetta, GA, Greg C. Wilkins, Attorney, Wilkins Gire, P.L.L.C., Beaumont, TX, for Defendant—Appellant.

Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Per Curiam:^*

*1 Defendant-Appellant Carolina Casualty Insurance Company appeals the district court’s summary judgment determination that it was obligated to defend Plaintiff-Appellee Schlumberger Technology Corporation—as an “Additional Insured”—against negligence claims that Robert and Linda Smith previously asserted against Schlumberger in state court litigation. Because the district court erred in its interpretation and application of relevant portions of the insurance policy at issue, we REVERSE and RENDER judgment in favor of Defendant-Appellant Carolina Casualty Insurance Company.

I.

On August 22, 2014, a four-vehicle accident involving two tractor-trailers, a Chevrolet Cobalt, and the Ford F-150 truck that Robert Smith (“Smith”) was driving occurred at the intersection of U.S. Hwy 87 and FM 953 in Dewitt County, Texas. The four vehicles were traveling on U.S. 87. Darrel Campbell, an employee of Spotted Lakes, LLC, was driving one of the tractor-trailers northbound; Ryan Edison, a Schlumberger employee, was driving the other tractor-trailer southbound. In the lane behind Edison were the Chevrolet Cobalt, Smith’s Ford F-150, and an automobile driven by Smith’s wife, Linda Smith. Despite Campbell’s evasive efforts (steering left), the right front of his northbound tractor-trailer struck the right rear of Edison’s southbound tractor-trailer when Edison unsuccessfully attempted to complete a left turn (in front of Campbell) onto FM 953. Still moving forward, the tractor-trailer driven by Campbell then struck Smith’s truck, which at that time was proceeding along the highway’s paved shoulder.¹

Smith suffered various physical injuries as a result of the collision. Linda Smith was not physically injured but, having seen the accident, asserted a bystander claim. The Smiths eventually filed a suit for damages in Texas state court. Initially, they sued only Schlumberger and Edison, asserting both had acted negligently.² However, after Schlumberger and Edison asserted a third-party claim against Spotted Lakes and Campbell, alleging their negligence and seeking contribution relative to any damages that Schlumberger and Edison might be required to pay, the Smiths amended their petition to add negligence claims against Spotted Lakes and Campbell. See “Plaintiff’s Fifth Amended Petition.”

Schlumberger and the Smiths eventually reached a settlement of the Smiths’ claims against Schlumberger and Edison. Thereafter, because the Spotted Lakes tractor-trailer was transporting sand for Schlumberger at the time of the accident, pursuant to a “Master Transportation Services Agreement” with indemnity and insurance requirements, Schlumberger filed the instant action against Spotted Lake’s insurer, i.e., Carolina. Contending that Carolina should have defended it—as an “additional insured”—against the Smiths’ claims, Schlumberger seeks to recover its defense costs, the full amount paid to settle the Smiths’ claims, and any statutory damages, penalties, attorney fees, interest, and costs to which it may be entitled.³

*2 Reviewing cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted partial summary judgment in Schlumberger’s favor relative to its “duty to defend” claim. The district court denied Schlumberger’s motion relative to its claim for indemnity, however, concluding that material facts are disputed.

II.

An appellate court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “applying the same standard as the district court.” Moon v. City of El Paso, 906 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine dispute of material fact exists ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.’ ” Kitchen v. BASF, 952 F.3d 247, 252 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A party that asserts that there is a genuine dispute as to any material fact must support its assertion by citing to particular parts of materials in the record. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A). “The district court’s interpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law that we [ ] review de novo.” Ferrer & Poirot, GP v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 36 F.4th 656, 658 (5th Cir. 2022) (per curiam).

III.

As indicated above, Schlumberger and Spotted Lakes are parties to a “Master Transportation Services Agreement,” per which Spotted Lakes agreed to transport dry bulk products from origin to destination utilizing drivers and equipment furnished by it. The “Master Transportation Services Agreement” includes indemnity and insurance requirements. The indemnification provision states, in pertinent part:

10. INDEMNIFICATION

Carrier [Spotted Lakes] shall defend, indemnify, and hold Shipper [Schlumberger], … harmless from and against all claims, demands, causes of action, judgments, proceedings, awards, damages, losses, fines, penalties, costs, expenses and liabilities, including court and litigation costs and reasonable attorney’s fees which may be brought or made against Shipper or which it may sustain, pay or incur (“Claim(s)”) arising out of death, illness or injury, or property loss or damage or any other loss, damage or cost, as a result of or in connection with (i) the negligent acts (including concurrent negligence) or omissions of Carrier, its subcontractors (if applicable) and all of their respective Directors, Officers, agents, Representatives, Employees and Consultants (“Carrier Group”) during performance of services under this Agreement, or (ii) Carrier’s breach of Carrier’s obligations, warranties or representations under this Agreement.

Regarding insurance, the “Master Transportation Services Agreement” provides, in pertinent part:

11. INSURANCE

Before providing any services, Carrier shall provide Shipper with certificates of insurance as described in this section. Without limiting Carrier’s liability under the indemnification provisions in section 10 above, Carrier, at its sole cost and expense, shall maintain the following insurance during the validity of this Agreement with licensed insurance companies acceptable to Shipper.

* * *

[Commercial General Liability (including but not limited to Contractual Liability Coverage, with limits in respect of third party liability and property damage); Automotive Liability Insurance (as may be required by statutes or similar regulations in the country of operations); Excess Liability Insurance; Employer’s Liability Insurance and Workman’s compensation covering personal injury (including death); Carrier Cargo Insurance.]

*3 Carrier’s policies provided under this section shall be endorsed to (i) name Shipper as an additional insured in respect of the policies listed; (ii) operate as primary in relation to any policies carried by Shipper; (iii) call for no contribution by any insurance carried by Shipper; (iv) provide waivers of subrogation in favor of Shipper; (v) provide for not less than 30 days written notice of cancellation or material change and (vi), name Carrier as loss payee.

Additional Insured: Schlumberger Technology Corporation.

Carolina issued a commercial transportation insurance policy to Spotted Lakes—Policy Number CGT362084P, effective May 1, 2014 to May 1, 2015 (“the Carolina Policy”).⁴ The Carolina Policy provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE FORM

Various provisions in this policy restrict coverage. Read the entire policy carefully to determine rights, duties and what is and is not covered.

Throughout this policy, the words “you” and “your” refer to the Named Insured shown in the Declarations. The words “we,” “us” and “our” refer to the company providing this insurance. Other words and phrases that appear in quotation marks have special meaning. Refer to Section VI – Definitions.

SECTION I – COVERED AUTOS

* * *

SECTION II – COVERED AUTOS LIABILITY COVERAGE

A. Coverage

We will pay all sums an “insured” legally must pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to which this insurance applies, caused by an “accident” and resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of a covered “auto”.

* * *

We will have the right and duty to defend any “insured” against a “suit” asking for such damages…. However, we have no duty to defend any “insured” against a “suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” … to which this insurance does not apply. We may investigate and settle any claim or “suit” as we consider appropriate. Our duty to defend or settle ends when the Covered Autos Liability Coverage Limit of Insurance has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements.

1. WHO IS AN INSURED

The following are “insureds”:

a. You for any covered “auto”.

b. Anyone else while using with your permission a covered “auto” you own, hire or borrow except:

(1) The owner, or any “employee”, agent or driver of the owner, or anyone else from whom you hire or borrow a covered “auto”.

(2) Your “employee” or agent if the covered “auto” is owned by that “employee” or agent or a member of his or her household.

(3) Someone using a covered “auto” while he or she is working in a business of selling, servicing, repairing, parking or storing “autos” unless that business is yours.

(4) Anyone other than your “employees”, partners (if you are a partnership), members (if you are a limited liability company), a lessee or borrower of a covered “auto” or any of their “employees”, while moving property to or from a covered “auto”.

(5) A partner (if you are a partnership), or member (if you are a limited liability company) for a covered “auto” owned by him or her or a member of his or her household.

c. The owner or anyone else from whom you hire or borrow a covered “auto” that is a “trailer” while the “trailer” is connected to another covered “auto” that is a power unit, or, if not connected, is being used exclusively in your business.

d. The lessor of a covered “auto” that is not a “trailer” or any “employee”, agent or driver of the lessor while the “auto” is leased to you under a written agreement if the written agreement between the lessor and you does not require the lessor to hold you harmless and then only when the leased “auto” is used in your business as a “motor carrier” for hire.

*4 e. Anyone liable for the conduct of an “insured” described above but only to the extent of that liability.

The Carolina Policy also contains a “Blanket Additional Insured Endorsement,” which provides as follows:

THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.

PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY.

BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED ENDORSEMENT

This endorsement modifies the insurance provided under the following:

BUSINESS AUTO COVERAGE

MOTOR CARRIER COVERAGE

TRUCKERS COVERAGE

Sections II. A. 1. c. for Business Auto Coverage and II.A.1.e. for Motor Carrier Coverage and Truckers Coverage are deleted and replaced by the following:

Any person or organization that requires you under an “insured contract” to provide insurance is considered an “insured” but only to the extent of your [Spotted Lakes’] negligence arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a “covered auto.”

The Carolina Policy defines “insured” and “insured contract” as follow:

G. “Insured” means any person or organization qualifying as an insured in the Who Is an Insured provision of the applicable coverage. Except with respect to the Limit of Insurance, the coverage afforded applies separately to each insured who is seeking coverage or against whom a claim or “suit” is brought.

H. “Insured contract” means:

* * *

5. That part of any other contract or agreement pertaining to your business … under which you assume the tort liability of another to pay for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to a third party or organization. Tort liability means a liability that would be imposed by law in the absence of any contract or agreement.”

Under Texas law, “insurance policies are interpreted by the same principles as contract construction.” Terry Black’s Barbecue, L.L.C. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 22 F.4th 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. 2010)). “The policy’s terms are given their ordinary and generally-accepted meaning unless the policy shows the words were meant in a technical or different sense.” Gilbert Tex. Const., L.P. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. 2010). “Where a policy’s terms can be given definite or certain legal meanings, it is unambiguous.” Ferrer & Poirot, GP, 36 F.4th at 658. “The paramount rule is that courts enforce unambiguous policies as written.” Id. (quoting Pan Am Equities, Inc. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 959 F.3d 671, 674 (5th Cir. 2020)).

Schlumberger argues that the Carolina Policy’s “Blanket Additional Insured Endorsement” can reasonably be construed to confer additional insured status upon it relative to any otherwise covered claim for monetary damages that also asserts the named insured’s concurrent negligence. In other words, Schlumberger maintains that it enjoys additional insured status by virtue of the fact that the Smiths alleged that the August 2014 accident was caused by the negligent and grossly negligent conduct of Schlumberger and its driver-employee, Edison, and the negligent conduct of Spotted Lakes, the named insured, and its driver-employee, Campbell.

*5 The district court agreed with Schlumberger. Respectfully, we do not. Rather, having considered the pertinent provisions of the Carolina Policy, the allegations of the Smiths’ “Fifth Amended Petition,” and the parties’ arguments and cited authorities, we conclude that the only reasonable interpretation of the relevant policy language is that urged by Carolina. Specifically, the “Blanket Additional Insured Endorsement” confers insured status on Schlumberger only with respect to claims premised on the negligence of the named insured, i.e., Spotted Lakes. Thus, because the only alleged negligence for which the Smiths sought to hold Schlumberger financially responsible is its own and that of its employee, Schlumberger is not an additional insured under the Carolina Policy as to the Smiths’ claims.

The reasons provided by the district court in support of its contrary determination are not persuasive. Although the district court correctly notes that language such as “arising out of ownership, maintenance or use” or “arising out of the named insured’s operations” is regularly construed broadly by courts, that matters little here. In this instance, the endorsement’s “arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a ‘covered auto’ ” verbiage delimits the named insured’s negligence and thus is relevant only when a claim premised on the named insured’s negligence is asserted against a purported additional insured. As noted, such is not the case here.

Indeed, the district court’s suggestion that Carolina could have effectively limited its “additional insured” coverage by utilizing “available language” seemingly overlooks the fact that the Carolina Policy’s endorsement does use the type of limiting language (insured status provided “only to the extent of your [the named insured’s] negligence”) that the Texas courts have referenced for that purpose. See Evanston Ins. v. Atofina Petrochemicals, 256 S.W.3d 660, 666 and n. 20 (Tex. 2008) (insurer could have limited coverage by including terms such as “vicarious liability” or “negligence of the named insured”); Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Chevron Pipe Line Co., 205 F.3d 222, 229 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).

Finally, Schlumberger’s assertion that limiting insured status in the manner argued by Carolina would render the blanket additional insured endorsement meaningless, given that Section II.A.1.e. of the standard policy language addresses vicarious liability, is similarly not compelling. That argument fails to recognize that the endorsement plainly states that Section II.A.1.e. is “deleted and replaced” by the endorsement’s language. And the endorsement, unlike Section II.A.1.e. of the policy, specifically addresses insurance required by “insured contracts.” Finally, we are unaware of any requirement under Texas law that endorsements substantially broaden the coverage otherwise provided by the policy.⁵

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we find that the district court erred in its assessment of Schlumberger’s “insured” status vis-à-vis Spotted Lakes’ commercial auto insurance policy and the Smiths’ negligence claims. Because Schlumberger lacks “insured” status relative to the Smiths’ claims, Carolina owed Schlumberger neither defense nor indemnity in the underlying state court action. And absent a duty of defense and/or indemnity, Schlumberger’s claims alleging a breach of Carolina’s duty of good faith and fair dealing, and seeking awards of damages, interest, penalties, attorney fees, and costs under the Texas Insurance Code, likewise fail. See Tex. Ins. Code Ann. §§ 541.151–152, 542.060; State Farm Lloyds v. Page, 315 S.W.3d at 532; USAA Tex. Lloyds Co. v. Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d 479, 486–501 (Tex. 2018); see also Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London v. Lowen Valley View, L.L.C., 892 F.3d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 2018).

V.

*6 For the reasons stated herein, we REVERSE and RENDER a judgment of dismissal in favor of Carolina Casualty Insurance Company.

All Citations

Footnotes

1. Smith apparently had moved to and was driving on the road’s shoulder in hopes of bypassing the waiting line of vehicles.  
2. The Smiths alleged that Edison operated the Schlumberger tractor-trailer he was driving in a negligent manner, including attempting an improper left turn. In addition to alleging Schlumberger’s respondeat superior liability for Edison’s conduct, the Smiths also alleged that Schlumberger had acted negligently by failing to exercise ordinary care in hiring, qualifying, training, and supervising its employee.  
3. Schlumberger asserts that it demanded defense and indemnity at least as of March 24, 2017.  
4. According to the Carolina Policy’s Declarations, the “Named Insured” is D & T Holdings, LLC dba Spotted Lakes, LLC dba 1845 Oil Field Services; D & T Trucking LLC; Rowdy Farms, LLC dba 1845 Oil Field Transport; Gila Hotshot LP dba Gila Trucking, LLC.  
5. To the extent that Schlumberger wanted the trucking company with whom it contracted to provide it with more extensive insurance coverage under the trucking company’s liability policy—including coverage for Schlumberger’s own independent negligence—it should have taken additional steps to confirm that that coverage actually was obtained.  

End of Document

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

ACUITY, A MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.

RRR TRUCKING, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:21 CV 1114 RWS

03/22/2023

RODNEY W. SIPPEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

*1 On October 27, 2020, a multi-car accident took place on a highway near Eureka, Missouri. A tractor–trailer owned by Defendant RRR Trucking, LLC and driven by Defendant Tony Pope collided with pedestrians and vehicles that were stopped because of an earlier collision. Multiple individuals involved in the accident have asserted or may assert claims against RRR Trucking and Pope for personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiff Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer of both RRR Trucking and Pope, filed this suit to interplead its insurance policy proceeds and to obtain a declaration that its total liability for the accident is limited to $1,000,000. Acuity moves for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory relief. For the reasons explained below, I will grant Acuity’s motion.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on their pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the essential elements of their case on which they bear the burden of proof. Id. at 324.

In resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy. Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). They “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, “[t]hey must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

Background

The parties do not dispute that Defendants Tony Pope and RRR Trucking may be liable for the injuries sustained by the other Defendants in the motor vehicle accident. Nor is it disputed that RRR and Pope were insureds under Accuity’s insurance policy. The central disputed issue is whether the limit of coverage for the accident under Acuity’s insurance policy number ZC3153 is $1,000,000 or $2,000,000. In its complaint Acuity asserts a claim for interpleader (Count I) and a claim for a declaratory judgment (Count II). Acuity seeks summary judgment on Count II, contending that the language of its policy clearly establishes that its liability coverage for this accident is limited to $1,000,000.

Discussion

*2 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”

It is undisputed that the insurance policy at issue is governed by Missouri law. As a result, Missouri law applies to the analysis of the policy. J.E. Jones Const. Co. v. Chubb & Sons, Inc., 486 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under Missouri law, I must “read a contract as a whole and determine the intent of the parties, giving effect to that intent by enforcing the contract as written.” Thiemann v. Columbia Public School Dist., 338 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). Contractual language is construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When language is ambiguous, it should be interpreted as the individual insured would have interpreted it. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. German St. Vincent Orphan Ass’n, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). “Insurance policies are to be given a reasonable construction and interpreted so as to afford coverage rather than to defeat coverage.” Id. “Whether a policy is ambiguous is a question of law. An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy. Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 813–14 (Mo. 1997) (cleaned up). “When policy language is ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer.” Id. at 814. Additionally, provisions should be viewed in the context of the entire policy and construed in a way that avoids rendering any provisions superfluous. Nooter Corp. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 536 S.W.3d 251, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).

Acuity asserts that the policy in this matter clearly caps their liability at $1,000,000 for any one accident and that the policy is not ambiguous regarding that limitation. The policy includes Declarations pages which state in Item Two: Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos that the liability limit of insurance for each accident is $1,000,000. [Doc. # 61, Pl.’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts, Ex. B at 47] The Declarations pages next contain Item Three: Schedule of Coverages and Premium Detail that separately lists each tractor and trailer that is covered, provides a premium for each vehicle, and states that the vehicle’s limitation of liability is $1,000,000 for each accident. [Id. at 48-53] The tractor involved in the accident had a premium of $4,448.00 and the trailer had a premium of $217.00.

Accuity asserts that the policy language clearly imposes a $1,000,000 limitation per accident no matter how many of its insured vehicles are involved in an accident. The relevant limiting language is found in Section II- Liability Coverage:

C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

Regardless of the number of covered autos,¹ insureds, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and covered pollution cost or expense combined, resulting from any one accident is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.

*3 All bodily injury, property damage and covered pollution cost or expense resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions will be considered as resulting from one accident.

[Id. at 60]

Acuity argues that this section defines the maximum limit of its liability for any one accident as the limitation found in Item Two of the Declarations in the amount of $1,000,000 regardless of the number of auto’s insured or number of premiums paid.

Defendants claim that the policy is ambiguous because they read the Limit of Insurance paragraph above stating “regardless of number of vehicles involved in the accident” is not the same as Accuity’s reading that it means “regardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident.” Defendants assert that because the language used does not directly link the phrase “regardless of the number of covered autos” with “involved in the accident” then the individual liability limitation for both the tractor and the trailer found in Item Three of the Declarations pages should be available. That is, $1,000,000 for the tractor and $1,000,000 for the trailer for a total of $2,000,000. Defendants argue that because both of these covered autos were involved in the accident, and a separate premium was paid for each covered auto, the limitation of liability for each should be apply for the same accident.²

Acuity’s states that neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the Missouri Court of Appeals have addressed the exact issue in this case. That is, whether a policy’s liability limitation per accident applies if more than one insured vehicle is involved in the accident. However, Acuity cites cases that have considered similar policy language, deemed “anti-stacking” provisions, where one insured vehicle was involved in an accident and the insured had other vehicles covered in the same policy or related policies that were not involved in the accident. In Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1991), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed an insurance policy’s anti-stacking provision regarding an underinsured motorist claim. The policy language read:

*4 The limit of liability shown in the schedule for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: “Insureds”; Claims made; Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or Vehicles involved in the accident.

Id. at 381. 381 (Mo. 1991). The Court found this language to be clear, unambiguous, and enforceable in limiting the insurer’s liability despite the fact that the term “Vehicles or premiums show in the Declarations” was not immediately linked to the phrase “involved in the accident.” Similarly, the case of Haulers Ins. Co. v. Wyatt, 172 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) contains a limitation of liability statement like the limitation of liability statement in the case before me. The statement provided:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and “covered pollution cost or expense” combined, resulting from any one “accident” involving a covered “auto” is the Each “Accident” Limit of Insurance—“Garage Operations”—Covered “Autos” for Liability Coverage shown in the declarations [$500,000].

Id. at 883. The court found this statement limiting the liability per accident to $500,000 to be unambiguous. Id. at 884.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that a similar limitation of insurance section of a policy was not ambiguous in Munroe v. Continental Western Cas. Co., 735 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2013). The court determined that the uninsured motorist coverage in the Missouri policy at issue could not be stacked to increase the liability amount above the amount referred to in the limitation of insurance statement in the policy. That statement provided:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one “accident” is the limit of Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations.

Id. at 790.

These cases all reach the conclusion that the limitation of liability statement was not ambiguous despite the fact that other vehicles were insured or additional premiums were paid under the policy. Defendants seek to distinguish these cases by noting that they all involved only one covered vehicle in an accident and the insured was seeking to stack coverage for other vehicles and premiums paid in the same or related policies. Defendants argue that when two vehicles covered by the same policy are involved in an accident, the limitation of liability statement becomes ambiguous because an insured would believe that each vehicle’s liability limitation limit would be available in an accident. In the present case Defendants assert that the $1,000,000 limit for the tractor and the $1,000,000 limit for the trailer listed in Item Three of the Declarations pages should be available to pay claims related to the accident.

Defendants’ interpretation of the policy attempts to create an ambiguity where none exists. The Limit of Insurance language in Section II- Liability Coverage of the policy is clear and unambiguous. The limit of liability for any one accident is the amount set out in Item Two of the Declarations pages, that is, $1,000,000. As the court decisions above found their policy’s language clearly limited liability in the anti-stacking cases, the same / similar language in the policy in this case limits Accuity’s liability for any one accident regardless of how many covered autos or premiums paid are contained in the policy. As a result, I find that Accuity is entitled to summary judgment and will declare that the total liability limit under the policy is $1,000,000.

*5 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment on Count II in its complaint [60] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER DECLARED that the total limit of coverage available under policy number ZC3253 is $1,000,000 for all injuries and damages arising out of the accident of October 27, 2020.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is set for a status hearing on April 26, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. in person in Courtroom 16 South.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 22nd day of March, 2023.

All Citations

Footnotes

1. The Policy also defines “auto” as: “A land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads;” [Id. at 64]  
2. Defendants argue that insuring a trailer by itself is nonsensical if its coverage is limited when both the tractor and the trailer are involved in an accident. They assert that there is no need to insure the trailer by itself when it is not being pulled by a tractor because trailers alone do not cause accidents. Accuity refutes this argument by providing cases where unattached trailers caused accidents when left on the side of a road or in other dangerous locations among other incidents. Moreover, the risk of trailers being involved in accidents by themselves is reflected in the premiums charged for their coverage. The premium for the tractor in this case was $4,448.00 for $1,000,000 in coverage. The premium for the trailer was $217.00 for $1,000.000. The policy’s limitation of liability of $1,000,000 per accident when a covered tractor and its trailer are both involved in a single accident is a reasonable construction of the policy based on the low risk of a trailer alone causing an accident.

End of Document