Coverage - Central Analysis Bureau

Acuity, a Mutual Ins. Co. v. RRR Trucking, LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division.

ACUITY, A MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

RRR TRUCKING, LLC, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 4:21 CV 1114 RWS

03/22/2023

RODNEY W. SIPPEL, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

*1 On October 27, 2020, a multi-car accident took place on a highway near Eureka, Missouri. A tractor–trailer owned by Defendant RRR Trucking, LLC and driven by Defendant Tony Pope collided with pedestrians and vehicles that were stopped because of an earlier collision. Multiple individuals involved in the accident have asserted or may assert claims against RRR Trucking and Pope for personal injuries and property damage. Plaintiff Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company, the insurer of both RRR Trucking and Pope, filed this suit to interplead its insurance policy proceeds and to obtain a declaration that its total liability for the accident is limited to $1,000,000. Acuity moves for summary judgment on its claim for declaratory relief. For the reasons explained below, I will grant Acuity’s motion.

Legal Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis of its motion and identifying those portions of the affidavits, pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file which it believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). When such a motion is made and supported by the movant, the nonmoving party may not rest on their pleadings but must produce sufficient evidence to support the existence of the essential elements of their case on which they bear the burden of proof. Id. at 324.

In resisting a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to designate specific facts creating a triable controversy. Crossley v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 355 F.3d 1112, 1113 (8th Cir. 2004). They “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. Rather, “[t]hey must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor.” Nat’l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)).

Background

The parties do not dispute that Defendants Tony Pope and RRR Trucking may be liable for the injuries sustained by the other Defendants in the motor vehicle accident. Nor is it disputed that RRR and Pope were insureds under Accuity’s insurance policy. The central disputed issue is whether the limit of coverage for the accident under Acuity’s insurance policy number ZC3153 is $1,000,000 or $2,000,000. In its complaint Acuity asserts a claim for interpleader (Count I) and a claim for a declaratory judgment (Count II). Acuity seeks summary judgment on Count II, contending that the language of its policy clearly establishes that its liability coverage for this accident is limited to $1,000,000.

Discussion

*2 Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), a court “may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.”

It is undisputed that the insurance policy at issue is governed by Missouri law. As a result, Missouri law applies to the analysis of the policy. J.E. Jones Const. Co. v. Chubb & Sons, Inc., 486 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Under Missouri law, I must “read a contract as a whole and determine the intent of the parties, giving effect to that intent by enforcing the contract as written.” Thiemann v. Columbia Public School Dist., 338 S.W.3d 835, 839-40 (Mo. Ct. App. 2011). Contractual language is construed according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When language is ambiguous, it should be interpreted as the individual insured would have interpreted it. Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. German St. Vincent Orphan Ass’n, Inc., 54 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001). “Insurance policies are to be given a reasonable construction and interpreted so as to afford coverage rather than to defeat coverage.” Id. “Whether a policy is ambiguous is a question of law. An ambiguity exists when there is duplicity, indistinctness, or uncertainty in the meaning of the language in the policy. Language is ambiguous if it is reasonably open to different constructions.” Gulf Ins. Co. v. Noble Broad., 936 S.W.2d 810, 813–14 (Mo. 1997) (cleaned up). “When policy language is ambiguous, it must be construed against the insurer.” Id. at 814. Additionally, provisions should be viewed in the context of the entire policy and construed in a way that avoids rendering any provisions superfluous. Nooter Corp. v. Allianz Underwriters Ins. Co., 536 S.W.3d 251, 264 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017).

Acuity asserts that the policy in this matter clearly caps their liability at $1,000,000 for any one accident and that the policy is not ambiguous regarding that limitation. The policy includes Declarations pages which state in Item Two: Schedule of Coverages and Covered Autos that the liability limit of insurance for each accident is $1,000,000. [Doc. # 61, Pl.’s Statement of Uncontroverted Material Facts, Ex. B at 47] The Declarations pages next contain Item Three: Schedule of Coverages and Premium Detail that separately lists each tractor and trailer that is covered, provides a premium for each vehicle, and states that the vehicle’s limitation of liability is $1,000,000 for each accident. [Id. at 48-53] The tractor involved in the accident had a premium of $4,448.00 and the trailer had a premium of $217.00.

Accuity asserts that the policy language clearly imposes a $1,000,000 limitation per accident no matter how many of its insured vehicles are involved in an accident. The relevant limiting language is found in Section II- Liability Coverage:

C. LIMIT OF INSURANCE

Regardless of the number of covered autos,¹ insureds, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the accident, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and covered pollution cost or expense combined, resulting from any one accident is the Limit of Insurance for Liability Coverage shown in the Declarations.

*3 All bodily injury, property damage and covered pollution cost or expense resulting from continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same conditions will be considered as resulting from one accident.

[Id. at 60]

Acuity argues that this section defines the maximum limit of its liability for any one accident as the limitation found in Item Two of the Declarations in the amount of $1,000,000 regardless of the number of auto’s insured or number of premiums paid.

Defendants claim that the policy is ambiguous because they read the Limit of Insurance paragraph above stating “regardless of number of vehicles involved in the accident” is not the same as Accuity’s reading that it means “regardless of the number of covered autos involved in the accident.” Defendants assert that because the language used does not directly link the phrase “regardless of the number of covered autos” with “involved in the accident” then the individual liability limitation for both the tractor and the trailer found in Item Three of the Declarations pages should be available. That is, $1,000,000 for the tractor and $1,000,000 for the trailer for a total of $2,000,000. Defendants argue that because both of these covered autos were involved in the accident, and a separate premium was paid for each covered auto, the limitation of liability for each should be apply for the same accident.²

Acuity’s states that neither the Missouri Supreme Court nor the Missouri Court of Appeals have addressed the exact issue in this case. That is, whether a policy’s liability limitation per accident applies if more than one insured vehicle is involved in the accident. However, Acuity cites cases that have considered similar policy language, deemed “anti-stacking” provisions, where one insured vehicle was involved in an accident and the insured had other vehicles covered in the same policy or related policies that were not involved in the accident. In Rodriguez v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1991), the Missouri Supreme Court addressed an insurance policy’s anti-stacking provision regarding an underinsured motorist claim. The policy language read:

*4 The limit of liability shown in the schedule for this coverage is our maximum limit of liability for all damages resulting from any one accident. This is the most we will pay regardless of the number of: “Insureds”; Claims made; Vehicles or premiums shown in the Declarations; or Vehicles involved in the accident.

Id. at 381. 381 (Mo. 1991). The Court found this language to be clear, unambiguous, and enforceable in limiting the insurer’s liability despite the fact that the term “Vehicles or premiums show in the Declarations” was not immediately linked to the phrase “involved in the accident.” Similarly, the case of Haulers Ins. Co. v. Wyatt, 172 S.W.3d 880 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) contains a limitation of liability statement like the limitation of liability statement in the case before me. The statement provided:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for the total of all damages and “covered pollution cost or expense” combined, resulting from any one “accident” involving a covered “auto” is the Each “Accident” Limit of Insurance—“Garage Operations”—Covered “Autos” for Liability Coverage shown in the declarations [$500,000].

Id. at 883. The court found this statement limiting the liability per accident to $500,000 to be unambiguous. Id. at 884.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concluded that a similar limitation of insurance section of a policy was not ambiguous in Munroe v. Continental Western Cas. Co., 735 F.3d 783 (8th Cir. 2013). The court determined that the uninsured motorist coverage in the Missouri policy at issue could not be stacked to increase the liability amount above the amount referred to in the limitation of insurance statement in the policy. That statement provided:

Regardless of the number of covered “autos”, “insureds”, premiums paid, claims made or vehicles involved in the “accident”, the most we will pay for all damages resulting from any one “accident” is the limit of Underinsured Motorists Coverage shown in the Schedule or Declarations.

Id. at 790.

These cases all reach the conclusion that the limitation of liability statement was not ambiguous despite the fact that other vehicles were insured or additional premiums were paid under the policy. Defendants seek to distinguish these cases by noting that they all involved only one covered vehicle in an accident and the insured was seeking to stack coverage for other vehicles and premiums paid in the same or related policies. Defendants argue that when two vehicles covered by the same policy are involved in an accident, the limitation of liability statement becomes ambiguous because an insured would believe that each vehicle’s liability limitation limit would be available in an accident. In the present case Defendants assert that the $1,000,000 limit for the tractor and the $1,000,000 limit for the trailer listed in Item Three of the Declarations pages should be available to pay claims related to the accident.

Defendants’ interpretation of the policy attempts to create an ambiguity where none exists. The Limit of Insurance language in Section II- Liability Coverage of the policy is clear and unambiguous. The limit of liability for any one accident is the amount set out in Item Two of the Declarations pages, that is, $1,000,000. As the court decisions above found their policy’s language clearly limited liability in the anti-stacking cases, the same / similar language in the policy in this case limits Accuity’s liability for any one accident regardless of how many covered autos or premiums paid are contained in the policy. As a result, I find that Accuity is entitled to summary judgment and will declare that the total liability limit under the policy is $1,000,000.

*5 Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Acuity, A Mutual Insurance Company’s motion for summary judgment on Count II in its complaint [60] is GRANTED.

IT IS FURTHER DECLARED that the total limit of coverage available under policy number ZC3253 is $1,000,000 for all injuries and damages arising out of the accident of October 27, 2020.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this matter is set for a status hearing on April 26, 2023 at 10:30 a.m. in person in Courtroom 16 South.

RODNEY W. SIPPEL

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated this 22nd day of March, 2023.

All Citations

Footnotes

The Policy also defines “auto” as: “A land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads;” [Id. at 64]
Defendants argue that insuring a trailer by itself is nonsensical if its coverage is limited when both the tractor and the trailer are involved in an accident. They assert that there is no need to insure the trailer by itself when it is not being pulled by a tractor because trailers alone do not cause accidents. Accuity refutes this argument by providing cases where unattached trailers caused accidents when left on the side of a road or in other dangerous locations among other incidents. Moreover, the risk of trailers being involved in accidents by themselves is reflected in the premiums charged for their coverage. The premium for the tractor in this case was $4,448.00 for $1,000,000 in coverage. The premium for the trailer was $217.00 for $1,000.000. The policy’s limitation of liability of $1,000,000 per accident when a covered tractor and its trailer are both involved in a single accident is a reasonable construction of the policy based on the low risk of a trailer alone causing an accident.

End of Document

Superior Towing and Transport, LLC v. J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc.

2023 WL 2163467

Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

SUPERIOR TOWING AND TRANSPORT, LLC, Plaintiff,

J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT INC., et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 21-cv-00900-PGS-LHG

Signed February 21, 2023

Filed February 22, 2023

Attorneys and Law Firms

Timothy Donald Barrow, Grist Mill Square, Lebanon, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Anthony D. Luis, Rawle & Henderson LLP, New York, NY, for Defendants J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc.

Stephen V. McHugh, Kent & McBride, PC, Cherry Hill, NJ, for Defendant Progressive Mountain Insurance Company.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PETER G. SHERIDAN, United States District Judge

*1 This matter is before the Court on a Motion to Enforce a Judgment filed by plaintiff Superior Towing and Transport, LLC’s (“Plaintiff” or “Superior Towing”). (ECF No. 42). Superior Towing seeks to enforce a money judgment it previously obtained as to M & C Express Transport Inc. (“M & C Express”) against defendant Progressive Mountain Insurance Company (“Progressive”), the insurer of M & C Express, under the federally mandated policy endorsement (Form MCS–90).

On January 19, 2021, Superior Towing commenced the instant action against defendants J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., M & C Express, Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc. and Progressive. Superior Towing seeks to recover clean-up and storage costs that stem from a motor vehicle accident that occurred when an M & C Express driver lost control of a freightliner and crashed into a guard rail on I-78 in Clinton, New Jersey. At the request of the police, Superior Towing responded to the scene of the accident, and undertook clean-up services at the site. These services included towing, transporting, impounding and storing of the freightliner as well as its cargo (food grade metal lids) strewn across the highway.

Previously, Superior Towing filed a motion for default judgment against M & C Express for the clean-up charges incurred (ECF No. 17),¹ and a motion to dismiss the complaint by Progressive for failure to state a claim (ECF No. 26). As time passed, Superior Towing’s storage charges continued to grow, so the Court granted Superior Towing’s Motion for Default Judgment against M & C Express as to liability under its quantum meruit theory, but denied the motion as to damages. (ECF No. 31). Additional proof was required to determine the reasonable value of the storage charges. Contemporaneously, Progressive sought dismissal of the Complaint under Rule 12. (ECF No. 26). Progressive argued that any obligation to Superior Towing would only arise when a final judgment against M & C Express is entered. As such, Progressive asserted that the suit against it was premature.

Thereafter, Superior Towing submitted an invoice of costs incurred and a Certification by a representative of Superior Towing attesting to the reasonableness of the damages. (ECF No. 32). At oral argument, Superior Towing addressed the amount of damages against M & C Express. Progressive’s counsel did not object to the entry of the judgment against M & C Express, but instead reserved Progressive’s rights and defenses, including its right to challenge Superior Towing’s recovery of the final judgment from Progressive. (Oct. 19, 2021 Hearing T. 3:13-4:16; 7:35-8:4). The Court entered judgment in favor of Superior Towing and against M & C Express in the amount of $217,333.32 plus $402.00 in costs. (ECF No. 34). Subsequent thereto, Progressive filed its Answer to Superior Towing’s Complaint (ECF No. 41); but never asserted that it had any problem with the merits of the litigation up to and including entry of the judgment against M & C Express.

II.

*2 Superior Towing brings this motion to enforce its judgment against Progressive for failing to indemnify Superior Towing in the amount of the default judgment against M & C Express. In opposition, Progressive recognizes its obligation under Form MCS–90, but it argues that Superior Towing’s damages consist of excessive storage costs and miscellaneous administrative fees for which Progressive is not obligated to pay. To resolve the issue, Progressive requests discovery, including the deposition of a representative of Superior Towing with knowledge of the damages, a representative of the highway department with knowledge of the accident, and a representative of the New Jersey State Police Department. (ECF No. 47, Opp. Br. at 10). In addition, Progressive asserts it shall mount a defense to evaluate Superior Towing’s final judgment. (Id.) Such discovery could have been conducted earlier. Previously, the Court accepted Progressive’s theory that its obligation to Superior Towing rests on a “final judgment,” and payment was not due until one was entered; but it never clearly stated further discovery was necessary. Now that a “final judgment” has been entered, Progressive contends it has a right to defend itself against that judgment.

To enforce Superior Towing’s judgment against Progressive now without discovery would have the effect of thwarting Progressive’s ability to litigate the remaining claim against it, and to compel Progressive to make payment without the benefit of a defense or discovery. As such, the Court will deny the Motion to Enforce without prejudice, and allow Progressive to undertake discovery and defend itself in this matter.

The Court’s makes its decision to deny the Motion to Enforce reluctantly. This result is unfair and prejudicial to Superior Towing since Progressive had the opportunity to defend against the amount of the final judgment earlier. Progressive has been present in this case from its inception, but it declined to participate in the Motion for Default Judgment against its insured, M & C Express. (ECF No. 17). After the Motion for Default Judgment was granted as to liability (ECF No. 31), Progressive failed to object to the amount of the final judgment against M & C Express. Only now, at the eleventh hour after the final judgment has been entered, has Progressive challenged the final judgment. This circuitous course of action not only frustrates judicial economy, but it also forces the parties to unnecessarily expend resources. With that said, the attorney for Superior Towing may, in its discretion, apply for some appropriate relief, if any, that is just and reasonable.

ORDER

IT IS on this 21^st day of February, 2023,

ORDERED that plaintiff Superior Towing and Transport, LLC’s Motion to Enforce against defendant Progressive Mountain Insurance Company (ECF No. 42) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and

ORDERED that the parties shall proceed with discovery as to damages under the oversight of Magistrate Judge Goodman.

All Citations

Footnotes

The Court’s September 30, 2021 Memorandum (ECF No. 31) also granted the Motion to Dismiss by defendants Crown Cork & Seal USA, Inc. and J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. as to Counts I and II, and denied the motion as to Count III.

End of Document