2020 WL 7260045
CHECK OHIO SUPREME COURT RULES FOR REPORTING OF OPINIONS AND WEIGHT OF LEGAL AUTHORITY.
Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Guernsey County.
A.D. TRANSPORT EXPRESS, INC. Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
LLOYDS TOWING SERVICE & SALES, LLC, et al. Defendants-Appellees
Case No. 19CA000053
|
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: December 8, 2020
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 18 CV 000261
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
Attorneys and Law Firms
APPEARANCES: For Plaintiff-Appellant PETER D. TRASKA, TRASKA LAW FIRM, LLC, 4352 Pearl Road, Suite A, Cleveland, Ohio 44109
For Defendants-Appellees CLAUDIA L. SPRIGGS, ERIC S. BRAVO, LANE ALTON, Two Miranova Place, Suite 220, Columbus, Ohio 43215
JUDGES: Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P. J. Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. Hon. John W. Wise, J.

OPINION
By: Wise, J.
*1 Wise, J.

{ ¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant A.D. Transport and the Traska Law Firm, LLC, appeal the decision of the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas imposing sanctions against them and ordering them to pay attorney fees.

{ ¶2} Defendants-Appellees are Lloyd’s Towing Service & Sales, LLC, and Lloyd McGilton. Jr.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{ ¶3} The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows:

{ ¶4} Appellant, A.D. Transport, Inc., (ADT) is a Michigan corporation engaged in the business of over-the-road hauling.

{ ¶5} On December 7, 2017, a multi-vehicle accident occurred on Interstate 70 near Cambridge, Ohio, involving two semi-tractor-trailer trucks and a passenger vehicle in a chain-type, rear-end accident. Appellant’s semi-tractor-trailer truck was the second in the line of the three collided vehicles.

{ ¶6} The Ohio State Highway Patrol (OSHP) contacted Lloyd’s Towing Service & Sales, LLC, owned by Lloyd McGilton (Appellees), to the scene to clear the A.D. Transport truck. OSHP provided Lloyd’s with information that included a description that a Dodge Durango was stuck under ADT’s trailer. Lloyd’s selected the vehicles, equipment and personnel it determined was necessary based on the information from the dispatcher.

{ ¶7} Appellee Lloyd’s invoiced Appellant ADT $6,298.04 for its services.

{ ¶8} On May 17, 2018, following receipt of the invoice, Appellant A.D. Transport filed a Complaint in the Guernsey County Court of Common Pleas alleging one cause of action: fraud. Appellant alleged that Appellee Lloyd’s inflated the charges in said invoice. The Complaint contained a demand for judgment in excess of $25,000, the “amount representing the difference between the the (sic) sum actually charged to and paid by the Plaintiff, and the reasonable value of the services provided” and for “Attorney fees … with all costs and expenses” and for “PUNITIVE DAMAGES.” Attached to the Complaint were three photos and the Invoice.

{ ¶9} Appellees filed an Answer denying the allegations, asserting affirmative defenses, and requesting recovery of attorney fees and expenses pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11.

{ ¶10} On April 9, 2019, Appellees filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. ADT did not oppose the motion.

{ ¶11} By Entry filed May 13, 2019, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees, holding that after reviewing the record and evidence in a light most favorable to ADT, the charges and entries on the Invoice were “reasonable”, “necessary” and “customary” and further, “there is no factual evidence that the Invoice was fraudulent.” ADT did not appeal this Entry.

{ ¶12} On June 12, 2019, Lloyd’s filed a Motion for Attorney Fees and Expenses pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11. Attached to the Motion were affidavits stating that ADT engaged in frivolous conduct and a pattern of behavior intended to harass and maliciously harm Lloyd’s business reputation with the purpose of having Lloyd’s Towing taken off of the rotation list of wreckers used by the OSHP, resulting in legal fees and other related expenses.

*2 { ¶13} A non-oral hearing was set for July 5, 2019.

{ ¶14} On July 3, 2019, Lloyd’s filed a Notice of Submission of Evidence.

{ ¶15} On July 3, 2019, ADT filed a motion to continue the hearing and to enlarge the time to file its opposition.

{ ¶16} By Judgment Entry filed July 5, 2019, the trial court granted the motion, allowing ADT to file its opposition by July 19, 2019.

{ ¶17} On July 22, 2019, ADT filed its opposition.

{ ¶18} On July 26, 2019, Lloyd’s filed its Reply

{ ¶19} On July 19, 2019, ADT filed a Civ.R 60(B)(1) motion, asking the trial court to vacate its May 13, 2019, Entry granting summary judgment to Lloyd’s due to multiple problems encountered by ADT’s counsel.

{ ¶20} On July 26, 2019, Lloyd’s filed its opposition to the Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion.

{ ¶21} A non-oral hearing was set for August 13, 2019, for both parties’ motions, instructing the parties to file all pleadings and information to be considered prior to the hearing date.

{ ¶22} Subsequently, the trial court combined the non-oral hearings to an evidentiary Oral Hearing set for October 10, 2019. (See Entry, 8/6/2019.)

{ ¶23} At the oral hearing, the trial court heard ADT’s Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion and Lloyd’s sanctions motion. The trial court received additional evidence and heard sworn testimony from five witnesses. Counsel for both parties presented oral argument on both motions, and the parties rested their cases. All evidence was taken under submission. (Entry, 10/16/2019.)

{ ¶24} By Judgment Entry filed November 12, 2019, the trial court denied ADT’s Civ.R. 60(B)(1) motion and granted Lloyd’s sanctions motion, awarding the full amount of attorney fees and expenses incurred by Lloyd’s against ADT and Attorney Traska, joint and severally.

{ ¶25} On December 12, 2019, ADT filed a second Civ.R. 60(B) motion, seeking relief under subsections (2) new evidence, (3) fraud and (5) any other reason, claiming Lloyd’s and witness Staff Lt. James Tracy (OSHP), gave perjured testimony at the oral hearing that “H&K Towing” (hereafter “H&K”) towed the Durango from the accident scene.

{ ¶26} The trial court ordered Lloyd’s to file its Opposition to ADT’s second Civ.R. 60(B) motion by March 9, 2020, and ordered ADT to file its Reply by March 12, 2020,

{ ¶27} On March 4, 2020, however, ADT filed another brief titled “Plaintiff’s Request for In-Person Hearing” on its second Civ.R. 60(B) motion. ADT included excerpts of multiple audio recordings between two non-parties as well as a series of emails exchanged between one of the speakers and ADT’s counsel. This motion requested that the trial court re-open the Oral Hearing to add “newly-discovered evidence” which had not been offered by ADT on October 10, 2019, which ADT argued would support vacating the Entry of November 12, 2019.

{ ¶28} On March 12, 2020, ADT filed its Reply to Lloyd’s opposition.

{ ¶29} By Judgment Entry filed March 13, 2020, the trial court denied ADT’s second Civ.R. (60)(B) motion.

{ ¶30} On March 31, 2020, ADT filed an Amended Notice of Appeal, assigning error to the Entry of March 13, 2020.

{ ¶31} Appellant now appeals, assigning the following errors for review:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
*3 { ¶32} “I. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS CONCERNING THE PHYSICAL FACTS RELATING TO THE APPELLEES’ FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY ANY CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.

{ ¶33} “II. THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDINGS CONCERNING THE APPELLANT’S PRE-SUIT INVESTIGATION FAILED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE APPELLANT’S DOCUMENTARY AND TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE.

{ ¶34} “III. THE TRIAL COURT REFUSED TO ACCOUNT FOR A TELEPHONE RECORDING DIRECTLY REFUTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY THE APPELLEES AT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

{ ¶35} “IV. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REFUSING TO HOLD AN IN-PERSON HEARING, WHILE IN RECEIPT OF THE RECORDING REFUTING THE FALSE TESTIMONY PRESENTED BY THE APPELLEES.”

I., II
{ ¶36} In its first and second assignments of error, Appellant challenges the trial court’s November 12, 2019, Judgment Entry denying its Civ.R. 60(B) motion and granting Appellees’ motion for attorney fees. We disagree.

Motion for Sanctions
{ ¶37} Appellees’ motion for sanctions was brought pursuant to R.C. § 2323.51 and Civ.R. 11.

{ ¶38} The imposition of sanctions under R.C. § 2323.51 requires the trial court to find frivolous conduct. R.C. § 2323.51 provides that a court may award court costs, reasonable attorney fees, and other reasonable expenses incurred in connection with the civil action or appeal to any party to the civil action or appeal who was adversely affected by frivolous conduct. Prior to awarding damages under R.C. § 2323.51, the trial court must hold a hearing “to determine whether particular conduct was frivolous, to determine, if the conduct was frivolous, whether any party was adversely affected by it, and to determine, if an award is to be made, the amount of that award[.]” R.C. § 2323.51(B)(2)(a).

{ ¶39} “Frivolous conduct” is the conduct of a party to a civil action or of the party’s counsel that satisfies any of the following four criteria:
(i) It obviously serves merely to harass or maliciously injure another party to the civil action or appeal or is for another improper purpose, including, but not limited to, causing unnecessary delay or a needless increase in the cost of litigation.
(ii) It is not warranted under existing law, cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, or cannot be supported by a good faith argument for the establishment of new law.
(iii) The conduct consists of allegations or other factual contentions that have no evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are not likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.
(iv) The conduct consists of denials or factual contentions that are not warranted by the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are not reasonably based on a lack of information or belief.

{ ¶40} R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(i)–(iv).

{ ¶41} The question of what constitutes frivolous conduct may be either a factual determination or a legal determination. Ferron, 2009-Ohio-3133, 2009 WL 1836486 at ¶ 44. No single standard of review applies in R.C. § 2323.51 cases. Wiltberger v. Davis, 110 Ohio App.3d 46, 51, 673 N.E.2d 628 (10th Dist.1996). The finding of frivolous conduct under R.C. 2323.51 is determined without reference to what the individual knew or believed. Namenyi, 2014-Ohio-4509, 2014 WL 5089113 at ¶ 16. A determination that the conduct is not warranted under existing law and cannot be supported by a good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of existing law requires a legal analysis. Ferron, 2009-Ohio-3133, 2009 WL 1836486 at ¶ 44. With respect to purely legal issues, we follow a de novo standard of review and *1248 need not defer to the judgment of the trial court. Id. However, we do find some degree of deference appropriate in reviewing a trial court’s factual determinations and will not disturb such factual determinations where the record contains competent, credible evidence to support such findings. Id.

*4 { ¶42} Civ.R. 11 governs the signing of motions, pleadings, and other documents. The rule states that “[e]very pleading, motion, or other document of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record * * *.” By signing the pleading or motion, the attorney certifies that the attorney has read the motion; to the best of the attorney’s knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support the motion; and that the motion is not interposed for delay. See Civ.R. 11.

{ ¶43} To impose a sanction under Civ.R. 11, the trial court must determine whether the attorney met the three standards. Namenyi v. Tomasello, 2nd Dist. Greene No. 2013–CA–75, 2014-Ohio-4509, 2014 WL 5089113, ¶ 14. “Civ.R. 11 employs a subjective bad faith standard.” Ferron v. Video Professor, Inc., 5th Dist. Delaware No. 08-CAE-09-0055, 2009-Ohio-3133, 2009 WL 1836486, ¶ 77 quoting Stone v. House of Day Funeral Serv., Inc. 140 Ohio App.3d 713, 721, 748 N.E.2d 1200 (6th Dist.2000). “If any one of the three Civ.R. 11 requirements is not satisfied, the trial court must then determine whether the violation was willful as opposed to merely negligent.” Namenyi, 2014-Ohio-4509, 2014 WL 5089113 at ¶ 14 quoting Ponder v. Kamienski, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23270, 2007-Ohio-5035, 2007 WL 2781197, ¶ 36. The attorney’s actual intent or belief is relevant to the determination of willfulness. Ferron, 2009-Ohio-3133, 2009 WL 1836486 at ¶ 77. If the trial court finds the Civ.R. 11 violation was willful, it may impose an appropriate sanction. Namenyi, 2014-Ohio-4509, 2014 WL 5089113 at ¶ 14.

{ ¶44} A trial court’s decision to impose sanctions cannot be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Ferron, 2009-Ohio-3133, 2009 WL 1836486 at ¶ 77.

{ ¶45} Here, the trial court found, based on the evidence presented, that “there is no indication of fraud on the part of [Appellee] in this matter and that any reasonable investigation in the mater conducted by [Appellant] prior to the filing of suit in this matter would have revealed the same.” (Nov. 12, 2019, JE at 3). The court further found “there is no meritorious defense or claim is [sic] available to the [Appellant] in this matter.” Id.

{ ¶46} The trial court went on to find that Atty. Spriggs’ fee of $250 an hour was reasonable and customary in Ohio for similar litigation and that the amount of time spent was reasonable and necessary to defend and represent Appellees in this matter.

{ ¶47} Appellant does not challenge the amount or the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded by the trial court.

{ ¶48} We find, based upon the above and the evidence and arguments presented in the lower court, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court’s decision was not arbitrary, unconscionable or unreasonable.

Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
{ ¶49} Here, Appellant’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion was brought under section B(1), asserting that ADT’s trial counsel had personal problems which prevented him from opposing Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

{ ¶50} To prevail on a motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B), the movant must demonstrate that: (1) the party has a meritorious defense to present if relief is granted; (2) the party is entitled to relief under one of the grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a reasonable time, and where the grounds of relief are Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or (3), not more than one year after the judgment. GTE Automatic Electric Company, Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc. (1976), 47 Ohio St.2d 146, 351 N.E.2d 113, paragraph two of the syllabus. The GTE Automatic factors are “independent and conjunctive, not disjunctive.” Blaney v. Kerrigan (Aug. 4, 1986), Fairfield App. No. 12-CA-86. “[F]ailing to meet one is fatal, for all three must be satisfied in order to gain relief.” Id. at 5.

*5 { ¶51} Our standard of review of a court’s decision as to whether to grant a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is abuse of discretion. Strack v. Pelton (1994), 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 637 N.E.2d 914. An abuse of discretion is more than an error of judgment; it means that the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140. An abuse of discretion demonstrates “perversity of will, passion, prejudice, partiality, or moral delinquency.” Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd. (1993), 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 614 N.E.2d 748. When applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. Id.

{ ¶52} Initially, we find that Appellant failed to appeal the trial court’s May 13, 2019, Judgment Entry granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

{ ¶53} Civ.R. 60(B) was intended to provide relief from a final judgment in specific, enumerated situations and cannot be used as a substitute for a direct, timely appeal. See Doe v. Trumbull County Children Services Board (1986), 28 Ohio St.3d 128, 502 N.E.2d 605, at paragraph two of the syllabus. “If a party raises the same question in a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as [it] could have raised on a direct appeal, [that party] could get an indirect extension of time for appeal by appealing the denial of the Civ.R. 60(B) motion.” Newell v. White, Pickaway App. No. 05CA27, 2006–Ohio–637, at ¶ 15, citing Parke–Chapley Construction Co. v. Cherrington (C.A.7, 1989), 865 F.2d 907, 915. Thus, “[w]hen a Civ.R. 60(B) motion is used as a substitute for a timely appeal, and when the denial of that motion is subsequently appealed, the proper response is the dismissal of the appeal.” Garrett v. Gortz, Cuyahoga App. No. 90625, 2008–Ohio–4369, at ¶ 14, citing State ex rel. Richard v. Cuyahoga Cty. Commrs., 89 Ohio St.3d 205, 729 N.E.2d 755, 2000–Ohio–135. See, also, Elliott v. Smead Mfg. Co., Hocking App. Nos. 08CA13 & 08AP13, 2009–Ohio–3754, at ¶ 12–13.

{ ¶54} Appellant cannot now present these arguments through an appeal of a motion to vacate because “[a] party may not use a Civ.R. 60(B) motion as a substitute for a timely appeal” and res judicata bars their efforts. Doe v. Trumbull Cty. Children Services Bd., 28 Ohio St.3d 128, 502 N.E.2d 605 (1986) paragraph 2 of the syllabus.

{ ¶55} Based on the foregoing, this Court finds Appellant’s first assignment of error not well-taken and overrules same.

III., IV.
{ ¶56} In its third and fourth assignments of error, Appellant challenges the trial court’s March 13, 2020, Judgment Entry denying its second Civ.R. 60(B) motion.

{ ¶57} In their second Civ.R. 60(B) motion, Appellant argued that Appellees’ witnesses presented perjured testimony and that Appellees perpetrated fraud upon the trial court. Appellant also claimed to have newly discovered evidence in the form of a witness who would testify that ADT had a meritorious claim.

{ ¶58} In its Entry denying Appellant’s second motion for relief from judgment, the trial court found that Appellant had “offered no evidence sufficient under the law to meet the standards of Rule 60(B)” and that Appellant had offered no expert testimony that the invoice of the [Appellees] was unreasonable or extraordinary in the matter.” (March 13, 2020, JE at 3).

{ ¶59} Upon review, and for the same reasons as set forth above, we find Appellant’s second successive Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment is barred by the doctrine of res judicata as it challenges the same May 13, 2019, Judgment Entry granting Appellees’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

*6 { ¶60} Appellant’s third and fourth assignments of error are overruled.

{ ¶61} Accordingly the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas, Guernsey County, Ohio, is affirmed.

Gwin, J., and Hoffman, J., concur.
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2020 WL 7260045, 2020 -Ohio- 5630

673753 Ont. v. Hdz Logistics
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, Orlando Division
December 2, 2020, Decided; December 2, 2020, Filed
Case No: 6:19-cv-506-Orl-40LRH

Reporter
2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230702 *

673753 ONTARIO LIMITED and GOLDEN VISION FLOWER, INC., Plaintiffs, v. HDZ LOGISTICS, LLC, Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
TO THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT:
This cause came on for consideration without oral argument on the following motion filed herein:
MOTION: RENEWED MOTION FOR FINAL DEFAULT JUDGMENT (Doc. 28)
FILED: May 11, 2020
THEREON it is respectfully RECOMMENDED that the motion be GRANTED.

I. Background
Plaintiff 673753 Ontario Limited d/b/a/ Traffix (“Plaintiff”) is a federally licensed property broker that arranged for Defendant HDZ Logistics LLC (“Defendant”), an authorized motor carrier, to transport orchids from California to Apopka, Florida. (Docs. 11 at ¶¶ 2, 4, 10-11; 11-1). The Defendant accepted the orchids in good order and condition, but while the orchids were in its possession and control they were frozen and ruined. (Id. at ¶¶ 12-13). The actual value of the shipment was $80,640.00 and, as a result of the loss, the Plaintiff was [*2] obligated to pay that amount to the party that was supposed to receive the orchids. (Id. at ¶ 14). The Plaintiff made a timely claim upon the Defendant for the value of the shipment, but the Defendant and its insurance carrier refused to pay the claim. (Id. at ¶¶ 15-16). Therefore, the Plaintiff adjusted the claim and filed this action against the Defendant asserting a single claim under the Carmack Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14706 et seq, (the “Carmack Amendment”) to recover, among other things, $80,640.00. (Id. at ¶¶ 8-17 (“Complaint”)).
The Defendant’s registered agent was served with process in Texas on April 18, 2019 (Doc. 12-1), but the Defendant did not timely respond to the Complaint. As a result, the Plaintiff moved for default on May 23, 2019 (Doc. 13), and the Clerk entered default against the Defendant on May 28, 2019 (Doc. 14).
On July 9, 2019, the Plaintiff moved for final default judgment. (Doc. 18). I denied that motion because the Plaintiff did not show that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant, a Texas limited liability company, and because the Plaintiff sought default judgment on a claim for breach of contract that was not asserted in the Complaint. [*3] (Doc. 19). On October 25, 2019, the Plaintiff filed its second motion for final default judgment. (Doc. 20). I denied that motion because the Plaintiff had still not shown that the Court had personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. (Doc. 25). On April 29, 2020, the Plaintiff filed its third motion for final default judgment. (Doc. 26). I denied that motion because the Plaintiff focused on the Court’s personal jurisdiction over the Defendant without addressing the Defendant’s liability under the Carmack Amendment and damages. (Doc. 27).
Apparently the fourth time is the charm. The Plaintiff has filed its fourth motion for final default judgment against the Defendant, arguing that the allegations in the Complaint establish that the Defendant is liable for the damaged orchids under the Carmack Amendment. (Doc. 28 (“Motion”)). The Plaintiff requests an award of $80,640.00 in damages, and no other relief. (Id. at 14-15). In support, the Plaintiff attaches the bill of lading (Doc. 28-1) and an affidavit from its chief executive officer, Lorne Charles Snow, in which he avers, among other things, that the value of the ruined orchids was $80,640.00 (Doc. 28-2).1 The Motion has been referred to me for a [*4] report and recommendation and is now ripe for consideration.2

II. Standard of Review
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure establish a two-step process for obtaining default judgment. First, when a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought fails to plead or otherwise defend as provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the Clerk enters default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after obtaining clerk’s default, the plaintiff must move for default judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b). Before entering default judgment, the court must ensure that it has jurisdiction over the claims and parties, and that the well-pled factual allegations of the complaint, which are assumed to be true, adequately state a claim for which relief may be granted. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Houston Nat’l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975).3
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This standard does not require detailed factual allegations, but does demand “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 173 L. Ed. 2d 868 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 L. Ed. 2d 929 (2007)). Thus, the “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on [*5] its face.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). To state a plausible claim for relief, a plaintiff must go beyond merely pleading the “sheer possibility” of unlawful activity by a defendant and offer “factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). If a plaintiff fails to meet this pleading standard, then the plaintiff will not be entitled to default judgment.
If the plaintiff is entitled to default judgment, then the court must consider whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief requested. If the plaintiff seeks damages, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to recover the amount of damages sought in the motion for default judgment. Wallace v. The Kiwi Grp., Inc., 247 F.R.D. 679, 681 (M.D. Fla. 2008). Unlike well-pled allegations of fact, allegations relating to the amount of damages are not admitted by virtue of default; rather, the court must determine both the amount and character of damages. Id. (citing Miller v. Paradise of Port Richey, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1342, 1346 (M.D. Fla. 1999)). Therefore, even in the default judgment context, “[a] court has an obligation to assure that there is a legitimate basis for any damage award it enters[.]” Anheuser Busch, Inc. v. Philpot, 317 F.3d 1264, 1266 (11th Cir. 2003); see Adolph Coors Co. v. Movement Against Racism and the Klan, 777 F.2d 1538, 1544 (11th Cir. 1985) (explaining that damages may be awarded on default judgment only if the record [*6] adequately reflects a basis for an award of damages). Ordinarily, unless a plaintiff’s claim against a defaulting defendant is for a liquidated sum or one capable of mathematical calculation, the law requires the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to fix the amount of damages. See Adolph Coors, 777 F.2d at 1543-44. However, no hearing is needed “when the district court already has a wealth of evidence from the party requesting the hearing, such that any additional evidence would be truly unnecessary to a fully informed determination of damages.” See S.E.C. v. Smyth, 420 F.3d 1225, 1232 n.13 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Wallace, 247 F.R.D. at 681 (“a hearing is not necessary if sufficient evidence is submitted to support the request for damages”).

III. Analysis

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The Plaintiff has consistently alleged that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter. (Docs. 1 at ¶ 5; 9 at ¶ 5; 11 at ¶ 5; see also Doc. 28 at 3-4). I find, as I did earlier in this case (Docs. 8; 10), that the Plaintiff has still not adequately alleged the Defendant’s citizenship and, therefore, has not shown that the Court has diversity jurisdiction over this matter.4 I, nevertheless, find that since the Plaintiff asserts a single federal cause of action (Doc. 11 at 2-3) against the Defendant [*7] the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

B. Personal Jurisdiction
The Court undertakes a two-step inquiry in determining whether it can exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 855 (11th Cir. 1990). First, the Court must determine whether the forum state’s long-arm statute provides a sufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. Sculptchair, Inc. v. Century Arts, Ltd., 94 F.3d 623, 626 (11th Cir. 1996). Second, if the Court finds that personal jurisdiction exists under the forum state’s long-arm statute, the Court “must determine whether sufficient minimum contacts exist between the defendant[ ] and the forum state so as to satisfy traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). The Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the Court has personal jurisdiction over the Defendant. United Techs. Corp. v. Mazer, 556 F.3d 1260, 1274 (11th Cir. 2009).

1. Florida’s Long-Arm Jurisdiction
The Plaintiff contends the Court has specific personal jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(7), which extends long-arm jurisdiction over a defendant that “[b]reach[es] a contract in [Florida] by failing to perform acts required by the contract to be performed in [Florida].” (Doc. 28 at 9-10). I agree. The Plaintiff contracted with the Defendant to transport [*8] orchids from California to Apopka, Florida. (Docs. 11 at ¶¶ 10, 12; 11-1). The Defendant accepted the orchids in good order and condition, but while the orchids were in its possession and control they were frozen and ruined. (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 12-13). The Defendant therefore breached the contract by delivering ruined orchids to Apopka, Florida. These allegations, which must be accepted as true, are sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction over the Defendant pursuant to Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(7). See Design-Build Concepts, Inc. v. Jenkins Brick Co., No. 3:06cv558/MCR/MD, 2008 WL 686150, at *5 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008) (finding specific jurisdiction under former version of Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(a)(7) – Florida Statute § 48.193(1)(g) (2008) – was appropriate where delivery of the subject product was to be in Florida, in conformity with certain specifications and without defect, and defendant allegedly failed to deliver conforming, non-defective products.); Advanced Bodycare Solutions LLC v. Thione Int’l, Inc., 514 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1330 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (same).

2. Due Process
The Court applies a three-part test in determining whether exercising specific jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant comports with due process: “(1) whether the plaintiff’s claims arise out of or relate to at least one of the defendant’s contacts with the forum; (2) whether the nonresident defendant purposefully availed himself [*9] of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefit of the forum state’s laws; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Mosseri, 736 F.3d 1339, 1355 (11th Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the first two prongs, and if the plaintiff does so, a defendant must make a compelling case that the exercise of jurisdiction would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The first part of the due process test requires the plaintiff to show that its claim either arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Id. at 1355. This inquiry focuses “on the direct causal relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the litigation.” Id. at 1355-56. Here, the Plaintiff’s allegations and the bill of lading attached to the Complaint show this case arises from the Defendant’s failure to deliver the orchids in good condition to Florida. (Docs. 11 at ¶¶ 10, 12-13; 11-1). The foregoing is sufficient to show a direct causal relationship between the Defendant, Florida, and the Plaintiff’s [*10] claim.
The second part of the due process test requires the plaintiff to show the defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that it has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum. Id. at 1355. This test — commonly referred to as the minimum contacts test — requires the Court to “assess the nonresident defendant’s contacts with the forum state and ask whether those contacts: (1) are related to the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) involve some act by which the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privileges of doing business within the forum; and (3) are such that the defendant should reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum.” Id. at 1357 (citation omitted). As discussed in the previous paragraph, the Plaintiff’s claim relates to the Defendant’s contact with Florida. (See supra pp. 7-8). Further, the Defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in this forum by agreeing to deliver the orchids to Florida. (Doc. 11-1); see Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Ft. Lauderdale-Palm Beach, Inc. v. Buffalo Rock Co., Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1559, 1564 (N.D. Ala. 1984) (“By . . . negotiat[ing] the terms of its purchase orders and [by performing], in Alabama, its obligations created by those purchase orders, all with the admitted intention of receiving pecuniary [*11] gain from the transaction they were to consummate, [the defendant] purposefully availed itself of the benefits of activities conducted in Alabama[.]”). Also, by failing to deliver the orchids to Florida in good condition, the Defendant should have reasonably anticipated that it would be sued in Florida. See id. In light of the foregoing, the Plaintiff has shown that the Defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum such that it has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Florida.
Having satisfied the first two prongs, the burden now shifts to the Defendant to present a “compelling case” that exercising jurisdiction over it would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 736 F.3d at 1355. Since the Defendant has defaulted, it has made no such showing. The Court must nevertheless consider whether exercising jurisdiction over the Defendant would violate traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In doing so, the Court must consider: 1) the burden on the defendant; 2) the forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute; 3) the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief; 4) the interstate judicial [*12] system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and 5) the shared interest of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies. Future Tech. Today, Inc. v. OSF Healthcare Sys., 218 F.3d 1247, 1251 (11th Cir. 2000) (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 466, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528 (1985)).
The record shows that the Defendant is a Texas limited liability company and, therefore, there is a likelihood that the Defendant would experience some burden litigating the case in Florida. However, the Court can only speculate as to the degree of burden that would be placed on the Defendant, given the Defendant’s failure to appear and, in turn, failure to provide any evidence on this point. Moreover, the Defendant has done business in Florida, failed to deliver the orchids in good condition in Florida, and Florida has a strong interest in this proceeding since the ruined orchids were destined to be delivered in Florida. (Doc. 11-1). Finally, there is nothing in the record to suggest that proceeding in Florida would be less efficient than if the case was to proceed in the Defendant’s’ home forum, Texas, and this Court has an interest in resolving disputes involving business conducted in Florida. For these reasons, I find that exercising jurisdiction over the Defendant would not violate traditional [*13] notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In light of the foregoing, I find the Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Defendant.5

C. Clerk’s Default
The Plaintiff served the Defendant’s registered agent, John C. Sims, with process on April 18, 2019. (Doc. 12-1). This was proper service. Fla. Stat. § 48.062(1). The Defendant thus had 21 days from the date of service, i.e., until May 9, 2019, to respond to the Complaint. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i). The Defendant has neither appeared nor responded to the Complaint, therefore the Clerk properly entered default against the Defendant. (Docs. 13; 14).

D. Liability
The Plaintiff asserts a single claim against the Defendant under the Carmack Amendment, which “makes common carriers liable for actual loss of or damage to shipments in interstate commerce.” A.I.G. Uruguay Compania de Seguros, S.A. v. AAA Cooper Transp., 334 F.3d 997, 1003 (11th Cir. 2003). “To establish a prima facie case of liability, plaintiff must show that the goods were delivered to defendant in good condition, that the good[s] arrived in damaged condition, and that this resulted in a specific amount of damage.” Scotlynn USA Division, Inc. v. Singh, No. 2:15-cv-381-FtM-29MRM, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121952, 2016 WL 4734396, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2016) (citing Offshore Aviation v. Transcon Lines, Inc., 831 F.2d 1013, 1014 (11th Cir. 1987)).6
The bill of lading attached to the Complaint establishes that the Plaintiff arranged for the Defendant to transport [*14] orchids from California to Florida. (Doc. 11-1). The Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant accepted the orchids in good condition and, while in the Defendant’s possession, the orchids were frozen and ruined, resulting in a total loss of $80,640.00. (Doc. 11 at ¶¶ 10-14; see Doc. 28-2 at ¶¶ 4-8). These allegations and the evidence attached to the Complaint, which must be accepted as true, are sufficient to establish that the Defendant is liable for the loss of the orchids under the Carmack Amendment.

E. Damages
The Plaintiff seeks to recover the actual value of the ruined orchids. A carrier of property in interstate commerce is liable for the “actual loss or injury to the property caused by” the carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 14706(a)(1). The Plaintiff has presented uncontroverted evidence from its CEO, Mr. Snow, that the value of the ruined orchids was $80,640.00. (Doc. 28-2 at ¶ 8). This is a sum certain and, therefore, there is no need to conduct a hearing to determine the Plaintiff’s damages. See Wallace, 247 F.R.D. at 681. I find Mr. Snow’s affidavit is sufficient to establish the Plaintiff’s actual loss and, therefore, find the Plaintiff should recover a total of $80,640.00 in damages from the Defendant.

IV. Conclusion
Accordingly, it is respectfully [*15] RECOMMENDED that:
1. The Motion (Doc. 28) be GRANTED;
2. The Court enter judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant in the total amount of $80,640.00.
3. The Clerk be directed to close the case.

NOTICE TO PARTIES
A party has fourteen days from this date to file written objections to the Report and Recommendation’s factual findings and legal conclusions. A party’s failure to file written objections waives that party’s right to challenge on appeal any unobjected-to factual finding or legal conclusion the district judge adopts from the Report and Recommendation. See 11th Cir. R. 3-1.
Recommended in Orlando, Florida on December 2, 2020.
/s/ Leslie R. Hoffman
LESLIE R. HOFFMAN
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE