CASES (2023)

Simmons v. NAPA Transportation, Inc.

Emmett T. SIMMONS, Plaintiff,

NAPA TRANSPORTATION, INC., et al., Defendants.

Case No.: 2:21-cv-01442-ACA

Signed March 28, 2023

Attorneys and Law Firms

Christin Renee French, G. Courtney French, Fuston, Petway & French, LLP, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

David M. Wilson, Jonathan Bain Metz, Gaines, Gault & Hendrix, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Defendant Dan Allen Thompson.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 While driving a tractor–trailer for Defendant NAPA Transportation, Inc., Defendant Dan Allen Thompson ran a red light and hit Plaintiff Emmett Simmons. Mr. Simmons has filed suit against NAPA and Mr. Thompson, asserting claims of: (1) negligence or wantonness against Mr. Thompson (“Count One”); (2) negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision against NAPA (“Count Two”); (3) negligent or wanton entrustment against NAPA (“Count Three”); and (4) negligent or wanton maintenance against NAPA and Mr. Thompson (“Count Four”). (Doc. 1-2 at 12–15). NAPA and Mr. Thompson concede that Mr. Thompson was negligent, but they seek summary judgment on the remaining claims. (Doc. 11). Because Mr. Simmons has not presented evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact about any of the challenged claims, the court WILL GRANT the motion for partial summary judgment and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Defendants’ favor and against Mr. Simmons on the part of Count One asserting wantonness and on all of Counts Two, Three, and Four.

I. BACKGROUND

In deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court “draw[s] all inferences and review[s] all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.” Hamilton v. Southland Christian Sch., Inc., 680 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks omitted).

On January 6, 2021, Mr. Simmons stopped his car at a red light and waited for his turn to drive through an intersection. (Doc. 11-2 at 15). When the light turned green, he entered the intersection and was immediately hit by a tractor–trailer driven by Mr. Thompson on behalf of NAPA. (Id.; doc. 1-2 at 9 ¶ 6; doc. 2 at 2 ¶ 6; see also doc. 11-5 at 20 (hereinafter “Pl. Exh. 7”)).

NAPA’s truck, which Mr. Thompson was driving, had a dash cam recording both the driver and the view in front of the truck. (Pl. Exh. 7). The dash cam video shows Mr. Thompson driving at forty-two miles per hour (he testified he “[thought he] was told [the speed limit] was forty” (doc. 11-4 at 19)) as he approached the intersection. (Pl. Exh. 7). As he drove toward the intersection, he looked away from the road for about three seconds while slowing to thirty-eight miles per hour. (Id. at 0:03–0:06). When Mr. Thompson looked back toward the road, Mr. Simmons had started pulling into the intersection. (Id.). About two seconds later, Mr. Thompson hit Mr. Simmons at thirty-seven miles per hour. (Id. at 00:06–00:08). Most of the video is too grainy to see the color of the light, but it is clear that when Mr. Thompson entered the intersection, he had a red light. (Pl. Exh. 7). In addition, the video shows another vehicle traveling in the opposition direction to Mr. Thompson stopping at the light about five seconds before the collision—just as Mr. Thompson was looking away from the road. (Id. at 00:04–00:05). Mr. Thompson testified that his light “was green just prior to getting to that intersection.” (Doc. 11-4 at 19).

Neither Mr. Thompson nor NAPA denies that Mr. Thompson was at fault in this accident. (See doc. 1 at 9 ¶ 6; doc. 2 at 2 ¶ 6). But they dispute whether Mr. Thompson acted wantonly and whether NAPA acted negligently or wantonly in hiring, supervising, training, and entrusting the truck to him. Determination of those issues requires a review of Mr. Thompson’s driving history.

*2 Mr. Thompson has been a truck driver on and off since the late 1970s. (Doc. 11-4 at 25). In 1998—over two decades before the accident at issue in this case—he was involved in a very serious trucking accident that he was told was not his fault. (Doc. 11-4 at 5–6, 8). The 1998 accident caused Mr. Thompson brain damage that resulted in significant memory problems. (Id. at 5, 8). But no doctor has ever told Mr. Thompson he should not drive a tractor–trailer. (Id. at 25–26).

Mr. Thompson was unable to work for five years after that accident, but in 2003 he began driving a truck professionally for short distances, typically around three to ten miles per trip. (Doc. 11-4 at 7, 24). He continued doing commercial short-distance driving until 2020. (Id. at 23–25; doc. 11-8 at 3). In December 2020, NAPA hired Mr. Thompson as a commercial interstate truck driver. (Doc. 11-8 at 3 ¶ 6). Before hiring him, NAPA reviewed Mr. Thompson’s driving history for the previous seven years and found no accidents, citations, or license suspensions or revocations. (Doc. 11-8 at 4 ¶ 10; doc. 11-4 at 15). NAPA also required him to take a road test, complete a safety course, and obtain a valid medical examiner certificate certifying that he was physically qualified to drive commercial motor vehicles.¹ (Doc. 11-8 at 4 ¶¶ 10–11; doc. 11-4 at 13; Doc. 11-6 at 10–11); see 49 C.F.R. § 391.41(b). NAPA’s director of safety, Joseph Salisbury—who was hired after the accident with Mr. Simmons occurred—testified that if a driver has a medical examiner certificate, NAPA does no further investigation into the driver’s ability to operate commercial vehicles. (Doc. 11-6 at 3, 6).

Mr. Thompson testified that NAPA required him to “go over their policies,” but when asked if his head injuries would make him forget those policies, he said he did not know. (Doc. 11-4 at 13). He also testified that he disclosed his 1998 accident to NAPA, but he could not remember if he disclosed his ongoing memory problems. (Id. at 13–14).

The accident in this case occurred seventeen days after NAPA hired Mr. Thompson. (See doc. 11-8 at 3 ¶ 6; doc. 11-2 at 14). Because of Mr. Thompson’s memory problems, he remembers very little about the circumstances surrounding the accident, including the date of the accident, how long he had been driving that day, where he was driving from, and where he was driving to. (Doc. 11-4 at 12–13, 16–23). The only thing he clearly remembers is that seeing a green light before getting to the intersection. (Id. at 19).

Mr. Salisbury attended Mr. Thompson’s deposition. (See doc. 11-6 at 6). Having watched Mr. Thompson’s testimony, Mr. Salisbury testified that he would have been “concerned” about hiring Mr. Thompson to drive tractor–trailers. (Id.).

II. DISCUSSION

NAPA and Mr. Thompson seek summary judgment on all claims except the claim of negligence against Mr. Thompson. (Doc. 11 at 1). Summary judgment is appropriate if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “A genuine issue of material fact exists when the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Bowen v. Manheim Remarketing, Inc., 882 F.3d 1358, 1362 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted).

1. Count One (Wantonness)

Count One asserts claims of wantonness and negligence against Mr. Thompson. (Doc. 1-2 at 12–13). Under Alabama law, wantonness is “the conscious doing of some act or the omission of some duty while knowing of the existing conditions and being conscious that, from doing or omitting to do an act, injury will likely or probably result.” Ex parte Essary, 992 So. 2d 5, 9 (Ala. 2007); see Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(3) (defining wantonness as “[c]onduct which is carried on with a reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.”). This stands in contrast to negligence, which “is usually characterized as an inattention, thoughtlessness, or heedlessness, a lack of due care.” Essary, 992 So. 2d at 9 (quotation marks omitted).

*3 Mr. Thompson concedes that he was negligent (see doc. 2 at 3 ¶ 10), but seeks summary judgment on the claim of wantonness (doc. 11 at 1). He contends that he did not mean to run the red light and glanced away from the road for only a moment. (Doc. 12 at 24–27). And he argues that his memory problems do not interfere with his ability to operate a truck safely. (Id. at 14–15). Mr. Simmons does not argue that Mr. Thompson behaved wantonly by glancing away from the road or by running the red light; he contends instead that Mr. Thompson’s memory loss makes driving a commercial vehicle unsafe such that a jury could find he acted with reckless disregard of the safety of others. (See doc. 14 at 3–10).

Mr. Simmons has not presented any evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Thompson acted wantonly by driving a tractor–trailer despite his memory problems. After his accident in 1998, Mr. Thompson began driving trucks commercially again in 2003. (Doc. 11-4 at 7, 24). Since that time, he has not been in any accidents or had any driving-related citations. (Doc. 11-8 at 4 ¶ 10; doc. 11-4 at 15). No doctor has opined that his memory problems prevent him from driving (doc. 11-4 at 25–26), and to the contrary he has a medical examiner’s certificate opining that he is physically qualified to drive commercial motor vehicles (doc. 11-8 at 4 ¶ 11). In short, there is no evidence that Mr. Thompson’s memory problems interfered with his ability to drive such that he consciously disregarded the rights or safety or others. See Ala. Code § 6-11-20(b)(3); Essary, 992 So. 2d at 9. As a result, the court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the claim of wantonness asserted against Mr. Thompson.

2. Count Two (Negligent or Wanton Hiring, Training, and Supervision) and Count Three (Negligent or Wanton Entrustment)

Count Two asserts that NAPA negligently or wantonly hired, trained, and supervised Mr. Thompson, and Count Three asserts that NAPA negligently or wantonly entrusted the truck to Mr. Thompson. (Doc. 1-2 at 13–14). Although these are distinct claims, they have some common elements. All require the plaintiff to establish that the employee was incompetent to drive and that the employer either knew or should have known of the employee’s incompetence. See Jones Exp., Inc. v. Jackson, 86 So. 3d 298, 305 (Ala. 2010) (negligent or wanton hiring, training, and supervision); Halford v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, LLC, 921 So. 2d 409, 412 (Ala. 2005) (negligent entrustment); Bruck v. Jim Walter Corp., 470 So. 2d 1141, 1144 (Ala. 1985) (wanton entrustment).

NAPA contends that Mr. Simmons has not presented evidence of Mr. Thompson’s incompetence to drive or of NAPA’s actual or constructive knowledge of any incompetence on Mr. Thompson’s part. (Doc. 12 at 11–20, 30–32). Mr. Simmons responds that Mr. Thompson’s memory problems made him incompetent to drive and that NAPA was aware of his incompetence because Mr. Thompson disclosed the 1998 accident to NAPA. (Doc. 14 at 10–11, 16–17).

As discussed above, although it is undisputed that Mr. Thompson has serious memory problems, there is no evidence that his memory problems affect his ability to drive safely. See supra at 7. As a result, Mr. Simmons has not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Mr. Thompson was incompetent to drive, and the claims of negligent or wanton hiring, training, supervision, and entrustment must fail.

But even if there were evidence of Mr. Thompson’s incompetence to drive, there is no evidence that NAPA had actual or constructive knowledge of his incompetence. Although Mr. Thompson testified that he disclosed his 1998 accident, he could not remember if he disclosed his ongoing memory problems. (Doc. 11-4 at 13–14). And he obtained and gave NAPA a medical examiner certificate that he was physically able to drive commercial vehicles. (Doc. 11-8 at 4 ¶ 11). Finally, NAPA reviewed his driving history in the preceding seven years and found that he had no citations, license suspensions, or license revocations. (Id. at 4 ¶ 10). In short, NAPA had no reason to know or suspect that Mr. Thompson was incompetent to drive. Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Counts Two and Three.

3. Count Four (Negligent/Wanton Maintenance)

*4 Count Four asserts that NAPA and Mr. Thompson negligently and wantonly maintained the truck. (Doc. 1-2 at 15). NAPA and Mr. Thompson seek summary judgment on this court because the only evidence in the record is that the truck was in good working order. (Doc. 12 at 27–28). Mr. Simmons does not make any arguments about this count. (See generally doc. 14). And the only evidence in the record about the maintenance of the truck is Mr. Salisbury’s affidavit attesting that the truck had not been “improperly maintained, repaired, or serviced” and was not “defective in any way.” (Doc. 11-8 at 5 ¶ 15). Accordingly, the court WILL GRANT Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Count Four.

III. CONCLUSION

The court WILL GRANT the motion for partial summary judgment and WILL ENTER SUMMARY JUDGMENT in Defendants’ favor and against Mr. Simmons on the part of Count One asserting wantonness and on all of Counts Two, Three, and Four. The part of Count One asserting negligence against Mr. Thompson will proceed.

The court will enter a separate partial summary judgment consistent with this opinion.

DONE and ORDERED this March 28, 2023.

All Citations

Slip Copy, 2023 WL 2671356

Footnotes

Neither party has submitted the medical examiner’s certificate.

End of Document

Aspen America Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, Inc.

ASPEN AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Tessco Technologies Inc., Plaintiff-Appellant,

LANDSTAR RANGER, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-10740

Filed: 04/13/2023

Synopsis

Background: Following theft of insured’s cargo by thief posing as carrier registered with transportation broker, insurer brought Florida negligence claims against broker, alleging that broker inadequately selected motor carrier to transport insured’s cargo in interstate commerce. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, No. 3:21-cv-00578-BJD-LLL, Brian Davis, J., 2022 WL 806086, granted broker’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which was based on federal preemption grounds. Insurer appealed.

Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Brasher, Circuit Judge, held that:

^[1] Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) and its implementing regulations expressly preempted state-law negligence claims related to selection of shipping carrier;

^[2] Florida’s common law negligence standard was genuinely responsive to safety concerns, and thus was within Florida’s safety regulatory authority; but

^[3] as a matter of first impression, negligence claims did not fall within FAAAA safety exception to federal preemption.

Affirmed.

Jordan, Circuit Judge, filed concurring opinion.

West Headnotes (19)

[1] Federal Courts

Preemption in general

Court of Appeals reviews a district court’s dismissal on federal preemption grounds de novo.

[2] States

Conflicting or conforming laws or regulations

The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution preempts, that is, invalidates, state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law. U.S. Const. art. 6, cl. 2.

[3] States

Preemption in general

Courts recognize three types of federal preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.

[4] States

Congressional intent

“Express preemption” occurs when Congress displaces state law by so stating in express terms.

[5] States

Congressional intent

The task of statutory construction when deciding whether express preemption displaces state law must, in the first instance, focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.

[6] Removal of Cases

Allegations in Pleadings

The complete preemption doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case to federal court on the ground that a preemption defense creates federal question jurisdiction.

[7] Brokers

Right of action and defenses

States

Motor vehicles; highways

Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) and its implementing regulations expressly preempted insurer’s negligence claims under Florida law, alleging that transportation broker inadequately selected motor carrier to transport in interstate commerce insured’s cargo, which was thereafter stolen by thief posing as carrier registered with broker, unless claims were to fall within one of FAAAA’s preemption exceptions. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 13102(2), 13102(23), 14501(c)(1); 49 C.F.R. §§ 371.2(a), 371.2(c).

[8] Statutes

Legislative Construction

When judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.

[9] Brokers

Right of action and defenses

States

Motor vehicles; highways

Florida’s common law negligence standard, which allows claims against a broker based on negligent selection of a carrier, was genuinely responsive to safety concerns, and thus was within Florida’s safety regulatory authority for insurer’s state-law negligence claims, alleging that transportation broker inadequately selected motor carrier to transport insured’s cargo in interstate commerce resulting in theft of cargo, as required to be exempt from federal preemption under safety exception to preemption in Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), which provides that FAAAA’s preemption clause shall not restrict safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles, irrespective of type of damages that insurer sustained. 49 U.S.C.A. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

[10] Products Liability

Nature and elements in general

The fundamental purpose of products liability actions is to further public safety in the use of consumer goods.

[11] Products Liability

Nature of Injury or Damage

A cognizable injury in a products liability action is not limited to personal injury; a plaintiff may also bring a products liability action in Florida if a defendant’s unsafe product damages the plaintiff’s property. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A.

[12] Labor and Employment

Negligent Hiring

In a negligent-hiring claim under Florida law against an employer based on injury caused by an employee, the ultimate question of liability to be decided is whether it was reasonable for the employer to permit the employee to perform his job in the light of information about him which the employer should have known.

[13] Labor and Employment

Negligent selection, hiring, or retention

Florida law recognizes an action for negligent selection of an independent contractor, which may be brought against a principal who fails to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor.

[14] Automobiles

Owner’s Liability for Acts of Third Person in General

Florida’s “dangerous instrumentality doctrine,” under which liability is imposed on the owner of an automobile who voluntarily entrusts the vehicle to an individual who causes damage to others through the negligent operation of the vehicle, reflects a special safety concern with those who negligently place unfit drivers on the road.

[15] Brokers

Right of action and defenses

States

Motor vehicles; highways

Insurer’s state-law negligence claims, alleging that transportation broker inadequately selected motor carrier to transport insured’s cargo in interstate commerce resulting in theft of cargo, had only an attenuated, indirect connection with motor vehicles, and thus claims were not “with respect to motor vehicles,” and therefore claims did not fall within Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s (FAAAA) safety exception to federal preemption, which provides that FAAAA’s preemption clause shall not restrict safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles; complaint said nothing about motor vehicles. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 13102(16), 14501(c)(1), 14501(c)(2)(A).

[16] Statutes

Plain Language; Plain, Ordinary, or Common Meaning

Statutes

Context

To determine a statute’s ordinary meaning, courts look to many sources, including canons of interpretation and the statute’s context.

[17] Automobiles

Concurrent and conflicting regulations

States

Motor vehicles; highways

Phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” in Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act’s (FAAAA) safety exception to federal preemption, which provides that FAAAA’s preemption clause shall not restrict safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles, limits application of exception to state laws that have a direct, rather than only an indirect, relationship to motor vehicles; Supreme Court had determined that phrase “with respect to the transportation of property” in statute’s immediately preceding subsection massively limited scope of that provision, court could ensure that phrase had an operative effect only by requiring direct connection between state law and motor vehicles, and Congress’s inclusion of a separate exception to allow states to impose highway route controls and cargo limits would almost certainly have been redundant if only an indirect connection to motor vehicles was required. 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 14501(c)(1), 14501(c)(2)(A).

[18] Statutes

Similarity or difference

It would be odd if, in two consecutive subsections of a statute, the same words were read to mean one thing in the first subsection but another in the second; instead, all else being equal, courts prefer a reading of the second that coheres with binding precedent as to the first.

[19] Statutes

Superfluousness

A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 3:21-cv-00578-BJD-LLL

Attorneys and Law Firms

Robert Borak, Spector Rubin, PA, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Kristen Marie Jarvis Johnson, Taylor Johnson, PL, Winter Haven, FL, John Marchione, Taylor Johnson, Clearwater, FL, for Defendant – Appellee.

Before Wilson, Jordan, and Brasher, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

Brasher, Circuit Judge:

*1 In this appeal, we must decide whether the express preemption provision of the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (“FAAAA”) bars Florida negligence claims against a transportation broker based on the broker’s selection of a motor carrier and, if it does, whether the Act’s “safety exception” allows those claims to proceed. See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1)–(2).

Tessco Technologies Inc. hired Landstar Ranger, Inc. as a transportation broker to secure a motor carrier to transport an expensive load of Tessco’s cargo to a purchaser across state lines. But Landstar mistakenly turned the shipment over to a thief posing as a Landstar-registered carrier, who ran off with Tessco’s shipment. Tessco’s insurer, Aspen American Insurance Company, sued Landstar, claiming Landstar was negligent under Florida law in its selection of the carrier.

The district court dismissed Aspen’s negligence claims against Landstar, concluding those claims were expressly preempted by the FAAAA, which bars state-law claims “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” Id. § 14501(c)(1). The court also determined that the statute’s safety exception—which states that the preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” id. § 14501(c)(2)—was inapplicable to negligence claims against a broker based on stolen goods. We affirm.

The domestic trucking industry consists of several players, including the shipper, the broker, and the motor carrier. The shipper is the “person who … owns the goods being transported”—like a manufacturer, retailer, or distributor. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(13) (defining “individual shipper”). The motor carrier is the truck driver—the person who transports the goods from the shipper to the purchaser. See id. § 13102(14) (defining “motor carrier”). The broker is the person who connects the shipper and carrier; he acts as the middleman between the two to arrange for the transportation of the shipper’s goods by the carrier by, for instance, negotiating rates and routes. See id. § 13102(2) (defining “broker”); 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (same).

The following facts come from Aspen’s complaint. In this appeal from a dismissal for failure to state a claim, we accept these factual allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to Aspen. Newbauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022). Landstar Ranger, Inc. is a transportation broker. To provide motor–carrier services to Landstar’s shippers, carriers must register with Landstar and submit bids through its online system. As part of the registration process, carriers create an online profile, where they input company information such as the carrier’s physical address, point of contact, email address, and phone number. Landstar’s “protocol” when dispatching a shipment to a carrier is to verify that the carrier’s company information matches the data in Landstar’s online system.

*2 One shipper, Tessco Technologies, Inc., hired Landstar to arrange the transportation of an expensive shipment of cargo (valued at over half a million dollars) from Colorado to Maryland. Landstar selected L&P Transportation LLC to transport Tessco’s shipment. L&P was a Landstar-registered carrier, and its online profile included detailed company information.

But Landstar did not follow its usual carrier-verification protocols when dispatching Tessco’s shipment. When it came time for Landstar to turn the shipment over to L&P for transport, Landstar received a call from someone named “James” claiming to represent L&P and attempting to collect the scheduled shipment. Despite noticing discrepancies between the company information provided by “James” and that listed for L&P in Landstar’s system, Landstar dispatched Tessco’s shipment to James. Unsurprisingly, James was a fraud, and he stole Tessco’s cargo.

Tessco filed a claim with its insurance provider, Aspen American Insurance Company, to recover the cost of the cargo. Aspen paid the claim and sued Landstar in the Middle District of Florida, seeking damages caused by Landstar’s allegedly negligent selection of a motor carrier. Aspen alleges that Landstar breached its duty as a transportation broker “to retain a reputable motor carrier” to transport Tessco’s shipment by “ignoring its own protocols and the information readily available in its system” and was thus either “grossly negligent” or “negligent” in its selection of the carrier.

The district court dismissed Aspen’s suit as expressly preempted by the FAAAA, 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). And it rejected Aspen’s argument that the statute’s so-called “safety exception,” id. § 14501(c)(2), shielded Aspen’s negligence claims from preemption.

Aspen appealed.

II.

^[1]We review a district court’s dismissal on federal preemption grounds de novo. Lawson-Ross v. Great Lakes Higher Educ. Corp., 955 F.3d 908, 915 (11th Cir. 2020).

III.

The FAAAA’s express preemption provision provides, in relevant part, that “States may not enact or enforce a law … related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). But the Act also contains certain exceptions to its preemptive scope. Relevant here is the statute’s safety exception, which states that the preemption provision “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. § 14501(c)(2). On appeal, Aspen argues that its negligence claims do not fall within the FAAAA’s preemption provision and that, even if they do, they may nonetheless proceed because they fall within the Act’s safety exception. We address these arguments in turn.

^[2] ^[3] ^[4] ^[5] ^[6]We start with the scope of the FAAAA’s preemption provision. The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution preempts—that is, invalidates—state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to” federal law. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211, 6 L.Ed. 23 (1824). We recognize three types of federal preemption: express preemption, field preemption, and conflict preemption.¹ Marrache v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 17 F.4th 1084, 1094 (11th Cir. 2021). Express preemption, the only category at issue here, occurs when Congress displaces state law “by so stating in express terms.” Taylor v. Polhill, 964 F.3d 975, 981 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab’ys, Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 713, 105 S.Ct. 2371, 85 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). In such a case, “the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ pre-emptive intent.” CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993).

*3 ^[7]Turning to the text of the statute, the FAAAA expressly bars states from “enact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). There is no dispute that Aspen’s state-law negligence claims seek to enforce a “provision having the force and effect of law” subject to FAAAA preemption. See Nw., Inc. v. Ginsberg, 572 U.S. 273, 281–84, 134 S.Ct. 1422, 188 L.Ed.2d 538 (2014) (holding “that the phrase ‘other provision having the force and effect of law’ includes common-law claims”). The parties also agree that Landstar is a “broker” as the FAAAA defines it. See 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2); accord 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a). And Landstar does not suggest that Aspen’s negligence claims relate to the “price” or “route” of a broker, arguing only that those claims relate to a broker’s “service.” See 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1).

^[8]With those preliminaries out of the way, the relevant interpretive question becomes whether Aspen’s Florida negligence claims are “related to a … service of any … broker … with respect to the transportation of property.” Id. Considering the phrase “related to,” the Supreme Court has stressed that “[t]he ordinary meaning of these words is a broad one … and the words thus express a broad pre-emptive purpose.” Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992) (interpreting the preemption provision of the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA), 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1)); see Rowe v. N.H. Motor Transp. Ass’n, 552 U.S. 364, 370, 128 S.Ct. 989, 169 L.Ed.2d 933 (2008) (following Morales in interpreting the FAAAA).² Consistent with the statute’s breadth, the Court held that a state law is “related to” rates, routes, or services if the law has “a connection with, or reference to” them. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 370, 128 S.Ct. 989 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031) (emphasis omitted). Even if the connection “is only indirect,” preemption will follow, so long as the connection is not “too tenuous, remote, or peripheral.” Id. at 370, 375, 128 S.Ct. 989 (quoting Morales, 504 U.S. at 386, 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031); cf. Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 112 S.Ct. 2031 (holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempts states from regulating how airlines advertise prices but suggesting state laws forbidding “gambling and prostitution” would survive because “the connection [to airline rates] would obviously be far more tenuous”).

To be sure, the FAAAA’s preemption provision does contain a caveat that “massively limits the scope of preemption”: the statute will not bar state-law claims that relate to a broker’s services “in any capacity”—only those services that are “with respect to the transportation of property.” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 261, 133 S.Ct. 1769, 185 L.Ed.2d 909 (2013); 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). But this limiting language poses no obstacle to preemption here because the text of the FAAAA makes plain that Aspen’s negligence claims relate to a broker’s services with respect to the transportation of property. The Act defines “transportation” to include “services related to” “the movement of … property,” “including arranging for, receipt, delivery, elevation, transfer in transit, … and interchange of … property.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(23) (emphasis added). And a “broker” is one who “sells, offers for sale, negotiates for, or holds itself out by solicitation, advertisement, or otherwise as selling, providing, or arranging for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” Id. § 13102(2) (emphasis added); accord 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (“Broker means a person who, for compensation, arranges, or offers to arrange, the transportation of property by an authorized motor carrier.”). The Act’s implementing regulations further define “brokerage service” as “the arranging of transportation … of a motor vehicle or of property … on behalf of a motor carrier.” 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(c) (emphasis added).

*4 The FAAAA and its implementing regulations thus define the “service” of a “broker” covered by the statute as arranging for the transportation of property by a motor carrier. A “core” part of this transportation-preparation service is, of course, selecting the motor carrier who will do the transporting. E.g., Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir. 2020). Indeed, Aspen itself acknowledges that “the broker has but a single job – to select a reputable carrier for the transportation of the shipment. That’s all.” And this is precisely the brokerage service that Aspen’s negligence claims challenge—Landstar’s allegedly inadequate selection of a motor carrier to transport Tessco’s shipment. Accordingly, these claims have “a connection with or reference to” the service of a broker with respect to the transportation of property. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 112 S.Ct. 2031.

We realize that some district courts have held claims like Aspen’s to be outside the scope of FAAAA preemption on the ground that such claims “are generally applicable state common law causes of action” that “are not targeted or directed at the trucking industry.” E.g., Nyswaner v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide Inc., 353 F. Supp. 3d 892, 896 (D. Ariz. 2019). But those decisions are incompatible with Morales, where the Supreme Court rejected this very line of reasoning in interpreting the similar language of the Airline Deregulation Act. See 504 U.S. at 386, 112 S.Ct. 2031. In holding that the ADA’s preemption clause barred states from using their general consumer protection statutes to challenge deceptive airfare advertising, the Court rejected the argument that the ADA preempts only “state laws specifically addressed to the airline industry,” not “laws of general applicability.” Id. Such an interpretation, the Court reasoned, would read the broad phrase “relating to” out of the statute entirely. Id. The same reasoning applies to the FAAAA. “Had the statute been designed to pre-empt state law in such a limited fashion,” Congress would have worded it differently. Id. at 385, 112 S.Ct. 2031.

To be sure, the FAAAA does not preempt “general” state laws (like “a prohibition on smoking in certain public places”) that regulate brokers “only in their capacity as members of the public.” Rowe, 552 U.S. at 375, 128 S.Ct. 989. But Aspen’s negligence claims do no such thing. They do not present us with the “general” universe of common-law tort claims that could arise within the domestic supply chain. They assert specific allegations of negligence and gross negligence against a transportation broker for its selection of a motor carrier to transport property in interstate commerce. This application of the negligence standard would regulate brokers, not “in their capacity as members of the public,” but in the performance of their core transportation-related services. Id. Consequently, the FAAAA expressly preempts Aspen’s claims unless they fall within one of the Act’s preemption exceptions.

We now consider whether an exception to the preemption statute saves Aspen’s claims. Aspen’s backup argument for reversal is the FAAAA’s so-called “safety exception.” That provision provides, in relevant part, that the FAAAA’s preemption clause “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). According to Aspen, its claims against a broker based on negligent selection of a motor carrier fall within this provision and are thus exempt from preemption. We disagree. For Aspen’s claims to fall within the safety exception, (1) the negligence standard must constitute an exercise of Florida’s “safety regulatory authority,” and (2) that authority must have been exercised “with respect to motor vehicles.” Id. Although Aspen’s claims satisfy the first requirement, they do not satisfy the second.

*5 ^[9]We agree with Aspen that the negligence standard it seeks to enforce is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority.” The Supreme Court has explained that a law is within “the safety regulatory authority of a State” only if the law is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns.” City of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 442, 122 S.Ct. 2226, 153 L.Ed.2d 430 (2002). Although “[t]he Court expressed no opinion as to the scope of [state and] local regulations that are indeed ‘genuinely responsive’ to public safety concerns,” Galactic Towing, Inc. v. City of Miami Beach, 341 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 2003), the Court reasoned that the exception’s “clear purpose” is to ensure that the preemption provision does not encroach upon “the preexisting and traditional state police power over safety,” Ours Garage, 536 U.S. at 439, 122 S.Ct. 2226.

Landstar argues that the Florida negligence standard is not sufficiently related to safety because Aspen’s claims seek damages for property loss instead of bodily injury. The district court, too, distinguished cases holding the exception applicable to negligent-carrier-selection claims arising out of personal injuries sustained during transit. See, e.g., Miller, 976 F.3d at 1030–31 (holding negligent-selection claims against brokers stemming from motor vehicle accidents satisfy the safety exception); Lopez v. Amazon Logistics, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 3d 505, 515 (N.D. Tex. 2020) (holding “that personal injury tort claims, including a negligent-hiring claim, are within the scope of section 14501(c)(2)’s exception”).

But it makes little sense for the safety exception to turn on whether a plaintiff seeks damages for property loss or bodily injury—the common law negligence standard is the same no matter the damages a breach has caused. Aspen simply alleges that,“[a]s a transportation broker,” Landstar “owed a duty” to Tessco “to retain a reputable motor carrier for the transportation of the subject shipment”; Landstar breached this duty by “ignoring its own protocols and the information readily available in its system” in selecting the carrier; and “[a]s a direct result,” Aspen “was damaged.” It is Landstar’s alleged unreasonableness in selecting a carrier to transport Tessco’s shipment that Aspen claims violates Florida law, irrespective of the type of damages Aspen sustained as a result.

^[10] ^[11]Moreover, we see no basis to conclude, as Landstar seems to suggest, that tort actions for property damage under Florida law are categorically divorced from safety concerns. Take products liability actions, “[t]he fundamental purpose” of which “is to further public safety in the use of consumer goods.” Porter v. Rosenberg, 650 So. 2d 79, 81 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995). A cognizable injury in such an action is not limited to personal injury; a plaintiff may also bring a products liability action in Florida if a defendant’s unsafe product damages the plaintiff’s property. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976) (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (Am. L. Inst. 1965)). Safety concerns thus clearly animate some tort standards, even if a breach of those standards leads only to property loss instead of bodily injury.

^[12] ^[13] ^[14]In fact, safety concerns animate the very sort of tort action that Aspen asserts here. The allegations in Aspen’s complaint, we realize, do not specify any subspecies of Florida negligence law that Aspen contends subjects Landstar to liability in this case. Nor was it required to. See Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 530, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 179 L.Ed.2d 233 (2011) (“[U]nder the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint need not pin plaintiff’s claim for relief to a precise legal theory.”). But Aspen’s allegations are comparable to those underlying claims like negligent hiring, negligent selection, and negligent entrustment of a dangerous instrumentality, each of which is premised on public safety concerns under Florida law. In a negligent-hiring claim against an employer based on injury caused by an employee, for instance, “the ultimate question of liability to be decided is whether it was reasonable for the employer to permit the employee to perform his job in the light of information about him which the employer should have known.” Tallahassee Furniture Co. v. Harrison, 583 So. 2d 744, 751 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). And Florida courts have described the employer’s duty in such an action as “a duty to exercise reasonable care in hiring and retaining safe and competent employees.” Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 439 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986). Florida law also recognizes an action for “negligent selection of an independent contractor,” which may be brought against a principal who “fail[s] to exercise reasonable care to employ a competent and careful contractor.” Davies v. Com. Metals Co., 46 So. 3d 71, 73 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Suarez v. Gonzalez, 820 So. 2d 342, 345 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)). Finally, Florida’s “dangerous instrumentality doctrine” reflects a special safety concern with those who negligently place unfit drivers on the road. “Under that long-established doctrine, liability is imposed on the owner of an automobile who voluntarily entrusts the vehicle to an individual who causes damage to others through the negligent operation of the vehicle.” Chandler v. Geico Indem. Co., 78 So. 3d 1293, 1296 (Fla. 2011).

*6 Accordingly, the relevant question for our purposes is whether Florida’s common law negligence standard, which allows claims against a broker based on negligent selection of a carrier, is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority.” Our review of Florida negligence law convinces us that it is. Cf. Galactic Towing, 341 F.3d at 1251–53 (holding that a city towing ordinance declaring that “the unauthorized parking of vehicles that cannot be removed constitutes a public nuisance and public emergency effecting the property, public safety and welfare of the citizens” is within the state’s safety regulatory authority). In reaching this conclusion, we express no opinion on whether the allegations in Aspen’s complaint suffice to state a claim under Florida law. Nor do we suggest that all of Florida negligence law reflects a genuine safety concern as opposed to, for instance, an interest in cost-spreading. See Jews For Jesus, Inc. v. Rapp, 997 So. 2d 1098, 1105 (Fla. 2008) (expressing “the view that the primary purpose of tort law is that wronged persons should be compensated for their injuries and that those responsible for the wrong should bear the cost of their tortious conduct”) (cleaned up). We hold only that Aspen’s particular claims seek to enforce a standard that is “genuinely responsive to safety concerns” and thus within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority” under 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A).

^[15]That Aspen’s state-law claims seek to enforce a standard that is within “the safety regulatory authority of a state” is necessary, but not sufficient, to sidestep FAAAA preemption. That standard must also be “with respect to motor vehicles.” And, here, we agree with Landstar that it is not.

Neither we nor the Supreme Court has ever squarely interpreted this language in the FAAAA. The Supreme Court has previously “interpreted ‘with respect to’ in a statute to mean ‘direct relation to, or impact on.’ ” In re Appling, 848 F.3d 953, 958 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Presley v. Etowah Cnty. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 491, 506, 112 S.Ct. 820, 117 L.Ed.2d 51 (1992)) (emphasis added)), aff’d, Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 1752, 1761, 201 L.Ed.2d 102 (2018) (holding “that a statement is ‘respecting’ a debtor’s financial condition” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(B) “if it has a direct relation to or impact on the debtor’s overall financial status” (emphasis added)). Nonetheless, such phrases can “ha[ve] different relevant meanings in different contexts.” See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 563 U.S. 1, 7, 131 S.Ct. 1325, 179 L.Ed.2d 379 (2011); cf. Patel v. Garland, ––– U.S. ––––, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1632, 212 L.Ed.2d 685 (2022) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“[T]he word [‘regarding’] can have either a broadening or narrowing effect depending on context.”). Accordingly, we must determine the ordinary meaning of “with respect to motor vehicles” in the context of the FAAAA’s safety exception.

^[16] ^[17]To determine a statute’s ordinary meaning, “we look to many sources,” including “canons of interpretation” and the statute’s “context.” United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1252 (11th Cir. 2021). Having examined these sources, we believe that the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” limits the safety exception’s application to state laws that have a direct relationship to motor vehicles. This is so for three reasons.

^[18]First, as we have already explained, the Supreme Court has determined that the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property” in the statute’s immediately preceding subsection “massively limits” the scope of that provision. Pelkey, 569 U.S. at 261, 133 S.Ct. 1769. Given that reading, it only makes sense to read the similar phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” as similarly limiting the scope of the safety exception that follows. “It would be odd if, in two consecutive subsections of the Code, … the same words were read to mean one thing in the first subsection but another in the second.” Hylton v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 992 F.3d 1154, 1159 (11th Cir. 2021). Instead, “[a]ll else being equal, we prefer a reading of the second that coheres with binding precedent as to the first.” Id.; see Regions Bank v. Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1192 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[A] word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout a text ….” (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 170 (2012))). Just as the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property” “massively limits” the preemption provision, we read the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” to impose a meaningful limit on the exception to the preemption provision.

*7 ^[19]Second, we can ensure that the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” has an operative effect only by requiring a direct connection between the state law and motor vehicles. The safety exception comes into play only when a state law is covered by the preemption provision because that law is “related to a price, route, or service of any motor carrier …, broker, or freight forwarder with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(1). Of course, every state law that relates to the prices, routes, or services of a motor carrier, broker who contracts with a motor carrier, or freight forwarder who “uses … a [motor] carrier,” id. § 13102(8), will have at least an indirect relationship to motor vehicles—motor vehicles are how motor carriers move property from one place to another. See id. § 13102(14). Accordingly, if an indirect connection between a state law and a motor vehicle satisfied the safety exception, then the phrase “with respect to motor vehicles” would have no meaningful operative effect. That interpretation would thus violate the “basic premise of statutory construction … that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.” United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991).

Third, this reading leaves a separate field of operation for the other exceptions in the statute. In addition to excluding from preemption “the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles,” the statute also preserves “the authority of a State to impose highway route controls or limitations based on the size or weight of the motor vehicle or the hazardous nature of the cargo.” 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2)(A). If an indirect connection to motor vehicles made a state law “with respect to motor vehicles” for the purposes of the safety exception, then Congress’s inclusion of a separate exception to allow states to impose highway route controls and cargo limits would almost certainly be redundant because such controls and limits are indirectly related to motor vehicle safety, too.

Accordingly, a mere indirect connection between state regulations and motor vehicles will not invoke the FAAAA’s safety exception. But we believe an indirect connection is all that exists between Aspen’s broker-negligence claims and motor vehicles. Once again, a “broker” is “a person … that … sell[s], provid[es], or arrang[es] for, transportation by motor carrier for compensation.” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(2). A “motor carrier,” in turn, is “a person providing motor vehicle transportation for compensation.” Id. § 13102(14). And a “broker,” by definition, may not provide motor vehicle transportation for compensation; only a “motor carrier” may perform that task. See id. § 13102(2) (A “broker” is “a person, other than a motor carrier”) (emphasis added); 49 C.F.R. § 371.2(a) (“Motor carriers … are not brokers within the meaning of this section when they arrange … the transportation of shipments which they … have accepted … to transport.”). Finally, a “motor vehicle” is “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation.” Id. § 13102(16). In light of these definitions, a claim against a broker is necessarily one step removed from a “motor vehicle” because the “definitions make clear that … a broker … and the services it provides have no direct connection to motor vehicles.” Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The specifics of Aspen’s complaint make us even more confident that Aspen’s claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles” within the meaning of the safety exception. Aspen’s complaint says nothing at all about motor vehicles. It explains how carriers register with Landstar, Landstar’s protocol for verifying a carrier’s contact information prior to dispatch, and how Landstar allegedly neglected this protocol when dispatching Tessco’s shipment to “James.” And Aspen’s negligence and gross negligence counts challenge only Landstar’s “selection of the motor carrier.” The complaint does not purport to enforce any standard or regulation on the ownership, maintenance, or operation of “a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semitrailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation,” 49 U.S.C. § 13102(16)—indeed, it doesn’t even specify whether James was driving such a device when he absconded with the cargo. Such an “attenuated connection” between Aspen’s claims and motor vehicles “is simply too remote” to fall within the safety exception. Miller, 976 F.3d at 1031 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see Creagan v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, 354 F. Supp. 3d 808, 814 (N.D. Ohio 2018) (“Because the negligent hiring claim seeks to impose a duty on the service of the broker rather than regulate motor vehicles … the exception does not apply”).

*8 Aspen’s negligence claims are not “with respect to motor vehicles” under the FAAAA’s safety exception. They are thus barred by its express preemption provision.

IV.

The district court is AFFIRMED.

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I join Parts I, II, III.A, III.B.2, and IV of Judge Brasher’s well-written opinion, and concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the district court.

Our determination in Part III.B.2 that the negligence claims at issue are “not with respect to motor vehicles” dooms Aspen’s reliance on 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c)(2), the FAAAA’s safety exception. In my view, it is therefore unnecessary to address in Part III.B.1 whether the negligence standard Aspen seeks to enforce is within Florida’s “safety regulatory authority.”

All Citations

— F.4th —-, 2023 WL 2920451

Footnotes

The district court mentioned the “complete preemption” doctrine as potentially relevant. That doctrine allows a defendant to remove a case to federal court on the ground that a preemption defense creates federal question jurisdiction. Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 813 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2015). Because we have federal jurisdiction in this case because of the parties’ diverse citizenship, we take no position on whether the FAAAA satisfies the standard for complete preemption.
When Congress sought to preempt state trucking laws as part of its ongoing effort to deregulate the trucking industry, it borrowed language from the ADA’s preemption provision. Rowe, 552 U.S. at 368, 128 S.Ct. 989. The only language unique to the FAAAA’s preemption clause when compared to the ADA’s is the phrase “with respect to the transportation of property.” Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. 251, 256, 133 S.Ct. 1769, 185 L.Ed.2d 909 (2013). “And when judicial interpretations have settled the meaning of an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language in a new statute indicates, as a general matter, the intent to incorporate its judicial interpretations as well.” Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 85, 126 S.Ct. 1503, 164 L.Ed.2d 179 (2006) (cleaned up). So, we look to cases interpreting similar language in the ADA to help guide our analysis of the FAAAA’s preemption provision here.

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