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Ocean Reef Charters, LLC v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

OCEAN REEF CHARTERS, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

TRAVELERS PROPERTY CASUALTY COMPANY OF AMERICA, Defendant.

CASE NO.: 23-CV-81222-RAR

Signed February 26, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Benjamin C. Hassebrock, Kimberley Paige Ver Ploeg, Stephen A. Marino, Jr., Ver Ploeg & Marino, P.A., Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Richard James McAlpin, Magbis Sanchez, Stephanie Cardelle, McAlpin & Conroy PA, Miami, FL, for Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON MOTION TO DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT [ECF No. 53]

BRUCE E. REINHART, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

*1 After getting a judgment in excess of its insurance policy limits, Plaintiff filed a statutory bad faith claim against its insurer. Defendant has paid the judgment in full, including pre- and post-judgment interest. Plaintiff is now seeking compensatory and punitive damages along with attorneys’ fees and costs. The Court previously held that the First Amended Complaint did not plead a plausible claim for punitive damages but gave Ocean Reef leave to try again. ECF No. 34. This is round two.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

A. Failure to State a Claim

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) says a complaint states a claim for relief only if it “contain[s] a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P 8(a)(2) (emphasis added). A party attacks the sufficiency of the pleading by filing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). In resolving that challenge, the Court must view the well-pled factual allegations in a claim in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dusek v. JPMorgan Chase & Co., 832 F.3d 1243, 1246 (11th Cir. 2016). Viewed in that manner, the factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the claim are true (even if doubtful in fact). Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted).

While a claim “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Id.; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Nor can a claim rest on “ ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U. S. at 557 (alteration in original)). In sum, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U. S. at 570).

When evaluating a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6):

[A] court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Iqbal, 556 U. S. at 679. Factually unsupported allegations based “on information and belief” are not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Scott v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., No. 18-cv-60178, 2018 WL 3360754, at *6 (S.D. Fla. June 29, 2018) (J. Altonaga) (“Conclusory allegations made upon information and belief are not entitled to a presumption of truth, and allegations stated upon information and belief that do not contain any factual support fail to meet the Twombly standard.”). These pleading standards apply to a request for punitive damages. In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 20-MD-2924, 2021 WL 2685632, at *12 (S.D. Fla. June 30, 2021) (J. Rosenberg).

B. Punitive Damages

Under Florida law, punitive damages are available in a bad faith insurance case only if:

the acts giving rise to the violation occur with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice and these acts are:

(a) Willful, wanton, and malicious;

(b) In reckless disregard for the rights of any insured; or

(c) In reckless disregard for the rights of a beneficiary under a life insurance contract.

§ 624.155(5), Fla. Stat. (2017). “To establish that an insurer committed violations with such frequency as to indicate a general business practice, the insured must provide evidence of violations beyond his own claim.” Lord v. FedNat Ins. Co., 363 So. 3d 1160, 1162–63 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2023). Punitive damages must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Pozzi Window Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins., 446 F.3d 1178, 1189 n.6 (11th Cir. 2006).

More generally, under Florida law, “no claim for punitive damages shall be permitted unless there is a reasonable showing by evidence in the record or proffered by the claimant which would provide a reasonable basis for recovery of such damages.” Fla. Stat. § 768.72.

C. Anti-Technical Statute

Florida Statute § 627.409(2) says:

(2) A breach or violation by the insured of a warranty, condition, or provision of a wet marine or transportation insurance policy, contract of insurance, endorsement, or application does not void the policy or contract, or constitute a defense to a loss thereon, unless such breach or violation increased the hazard by any means within the control of the insured.

In sum, an insurer cannot deny coverage “on a technical omission playing no part in the loss.” Pickett v. Woods, 404 So. 2d. 823, 824-25 (Dist. Ct. App. 1981) cited in Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Ocean Reef Charters LLC, 996 F.3d 1161, 1170 (11th Cir. 2021). Florida law makes it an unfair claim settlement practice to have a general business practice of failing to adopt and implement standards for the proper investigation of claims. Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(i)(3)(a).

DISCUSSION

The Second Amended Complaint now includes the following allegations that purport to state a claim for punitive damages:

26. In the preceding breach of contract action, Travelers testified that it has not adopted or implemented standards for the proper investigation of claims where anti-technical statutes may apply, as required by Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(i)3a.

27. Upon information and belief, as a general business practice, Travelers does not properly investigate claims involving a breach of warranty under anti-technical statutes because of its admitted failure to adopt and implement appropriate standards for such investigations.

28. Upon information and belief, as a general business practice, Travelers denies claims without conducting reasonable investigations into the protections afforded by anti-technical statutes, as prohibited by Fla. Stat. § 626.9541(1)(i)3d, because of its admitted failure to adopt and implement appropriate standards for such investigations.

*3 29. Upon information and belief, Travelers violates Fla. § 626.9541(1)(i)3f as a general business practice – failing to promptly provide a reasonable explanation in writing to the insured of the basis in the insurance policy, in relation to the facts or applicable law, for denial of a claim or for the offer of a compromise settlement – where anti-technical statutes apply, because of its admitted failure to adopt and implement appropriate standards for such investigations.

30. Since 2021, at least two other Travelers’ policyholders – Zayne Acquisitions, LLC and Party Book Hill Park, LLC – have publicly alleged that Travelers engaged in similar bad faith conduct, including the failure to properly investigate claims before denial or underpayment.

Travelers argues that the SAC must meet the substantive pleading standards of both Rule 8(a)(2) and Florida law. That is, it must plead both a plausible claim for, and a reasonable basis for, awarding punitive damages. I need not resolve whether both standards apply, or whether the Florida standard raises the bar above the requirements of Rule 8(a), because the SAC fails to meet the Rule 8(a) standard.

The sole allegations in the SAC entitled to the assumption of truth are paragraphs 26 and 30. Paragraph 26 merely recites the elements of a statutory unfair claims settlement practice without providing any factual detail about specific trial testimony or about what specific required procedures have not been implemented or why Travelers did not implement them. So, it does not exclude the equally plausible conclusion that Travelers has acted negligently rather than with the higher mens rea needed for punitive damages. Am. Dental Ass’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682) (“courts may infer from factual allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanations, which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct that plaintiff would ask the court to infer.”). Therefore, even viewed in the light most favorable to Ocean Reef, Paragraph 26 does not plausibly imply willful, wanton, and malicious behavior nor a reckless disregard for insureds’ rights.

Paragraph 30 cites two other cases where claims were denied based on “similar bad faith conduct, including the failure to properly investigate claims before denial or underpayment.” The allegation of “similar bad faith conduct” is a legal conclusion not a fact. And the allegation that an insurer failed to properly investigate a claim, standing alone, does not necessarily imply willful, wanton, or malicious behavior, or reckless disregard for the rights of its insureds. Moreover, two other instances of conduct are not sufficient to plausibly allege a general business practice. Howell-Demarest v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 673 So.2d 526, 528 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (three other similar instances of conduct did not show sufficient general business practice for punitive damages).

Finally, Ocean Reef says, in a footnote, “Ocean Reef recently deposed Travelers’ representative in this case and has identified additional facts supporting its punitive damages claim. If this Court finds the current allegations insufficient to permit a punitive damages claim for any reason, Ocean Reef respectfully requests another opportunity to amend.” ECF No. 60 at 8 n.2 (emphasis added). This kind of “heads I win, tails you lose” request is not procedurally proper. “Where a request for leave to file an amended complaint simply is imbedded within an opposition memorandum, the issue has not been raised properly.” Posner v. Essex Ins. Co., 178 F.3d 1209, 1222 (11th Cir. 1999). If Ocean Reef wants leave to file a Third Amended Complaint, it must file a separate motion that attaches the proposed amended pleading. See S.D. Fla. Local Rule 15.1.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

*4 Accordingly, this Court RECOMMENDS that the District Court GRANT the Motion to Dismiss the punitive damages claim. ECF No. 53.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

A party shall serve and file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation with the Honorable Rodolfo A. Ruiz II, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida, within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. Failure to timely file objections shall constitute a waiver of a party’s “right to challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions.” 11th Cir. R. 3-1 (2016).

If counsel do not intend to file objections, they shall file a notice advising the District Court within FIVE DAYS of this Report and Recommendation.

DONE and ORDERED in Chambers this 26th day of February, 2024, at West Palm Beach in the Southern District of Florida.

All Citations

End of Document

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K&M Handling, LLC v. Seaboard Marina, Ltd., Inc.

United States District Court, S.D. Florida.

K&M HANDLING, LLC, Plaintiff,

v.

SEABOARD MARINA, LTD., INC., Defendant.

Case No. 23-cv-23180-BLOOM/Torres

Signed March 7, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Ryan Matthew Clancy, Ainsworth & Clancy, PLLC, Miami, FL, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan Scott Cooper, Blanck & Cooper, P.A., Miami, FL, for Defendant.

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

*1 THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon the Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (“Motion”), ECF No. [16], filed on December 28, 2023. Plaintiff filed a Response, ECF No. [17], to which Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. [18]. The Court has reviewed the Motion, the record in the case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. The Motion is denied.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff K&M Handling, LLC is the forwarding agent of two separate shipments of flowers from Colombia to Miami. Defendant Seaboard Marine, Ltd. Inc. was contracted by non-party Orange Flowers Connect Inc. (“Orange Flowers”) to deliver those shipments. Plaintiff requested that Defendant stow both cargo in a refrigerated container set at a certain temperature and a “Datalogger” be placed in the boxes to keep track of the temperature throughout the shipping process. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to stow the flowers in a refrigerated container during transport, rendering the flowers unusable. Plaintiff brings two claims against Defendant: Count I for Violation of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), 46 U.S.C. 30701, et seq.; and Count II for Breach of Contract.

Plaintiff alleges that “Orange Flowers executed a transfer of rights authorizing Plaintiff to collect on their behalf for the loss of the flowers.” ECF No. [1] at ¶ 16. To demonstrate the transfer, it attaches a Transfer of Rights document, signed by Orange Flowers’ Operations Manager and dated September 9, 2022. ECF No. [1-14]. The Transfer of Rights states that Orange Flowers “authorize[s] K&M Handling LLC to collect on our behalf recovery against liable third parties for the loss or damage sustained by the above goods and assigns all our rights in connection with the aforesaid loss or damage.” Id. at 2. The Transfer of Rights describes the goods as “fresh cut flowers” and includes the numbers of the bills of lading for both shipments. Id.1 Plaintiff also attaches electronic Bills of Lading between Orange Flowers and Seaboard Marine, Ltd., for both flower shipments. ECF Nos. [1-3], [1-5]. The Bills of Lading indicate that Plaintiff was the forwarding agent for both shipments. ECF Nos. [1-3] at 2, [1-5] at 2.

Defendant moves for a judgment on the pleadings under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(c), contending that Plaintiff lacks standing as it lacks interest in the subject cargo or the Bills of Lading.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

“After the pleadings are closed — but early enough not to delay trial — a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) is appropriate when “no issues of material fact exist, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[,]” Ortega v. Christian, 85 F.3d 1521, 1524 (11th Cir. 1996), or when “the complaint lacks sufficient factual matter to state a facially plausible claim for relief that allows the court to draw a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct.” Jiles v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 413 Fed.Appx. 173, 174 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)).

*2 A judgment on the pleadings is limited to consideration of “the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Bankers Ins. Co. v. Fla. Residential Prop. & Cas. Joint Underwriting Ass’n, 137 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998). In evaluating a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the Court must “accept the facts alleged in the complaint as true and draw all inferences that favor the nonmovant.” Id. However, the court need not credit a nonmoving party’s legal contentions. See Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1304 n.12 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Honduras Aircraft Registry, Ltd. v. Government of Honduras, 129 F.3d 543, 545 (11th Cir. 1997)). If it is clear that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, the court should dismiss the complaint. As with a motion to dismiss, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Validity of Assignment

The Court first turns to the question of whether Plaintiff is the real party in interest in this action, which hinges on whether Orange Flowers’ Transfer of Rights to Plaintiff is valid. In its Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not a party to the Bills of Lading and cannot bring this action. Plaintiff responds that the Bills of Lading contain Plaintiff’s name as forwarding agent and Plaintiff has a valid Transfer of Rights from Orange Flowers, all of which are attached to the Complaint.2 Defendant replies that the assignment is invalid as it only assigns the rights in connection with the loss or damage to the flowers to Plaintiff, and not title to the flowers or the Bills of Lading themselves.

Rule 17(a) requires that “[a]n action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a). “As used in Rule 17(a), the real-party-in-interest principle is a means to identify the person who possesses the right sought to be enforced.” 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1542 (3d ed. 2023) “[I]f the person has assigned all interest in the claim before the action is instituted, the person no longer is the real party in interest.” Id. “Under present law an assignment passes the title to the assignee so that the assignee is the owner of any claim arising from the chose and should be treated as the real party in interest under Rule 17(a).” Id. at § 1545.3 Accordingly, “[t]he validity of an assignment is important for the purpose of determining ‘whether an action should be dismissed.’ ” Univ. Creek Assocs., II, Ltd. v. Bos. Am. Fin. Grp., Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 1998) (quoting 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. at § 1545 (2d ed. 1990)). “In construing assignments, the court must determine (1) exactly what has been assigned to make certain that the plaintiff-assignee is the real party in interest, and (2) that a valid assignment has been made.” Id. (quoting the same).

To determine whether the Defendant has established it is entitled to judgment on the pleadings, the Court looks to “the substance of the pleadings and any judicially noticed facts.” Bankers Ins., 137 F.3d at 1295. Here, the Transfer of Rights document attached to Plaintiff’s Complaint, ECF No. [1-14], establishes “exactly what has been assigned” to Plaintiff. Univ. Creek, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1339. The Transfer of Rights states that Orange Flowers “authorize[d] K&M Handling LLC to collect on our behalf recovery against liable third parties for the loss or damage sustained by the above goods …” ECF No. [1-14] at 2. Furthermore, it “assigns all [of Orange Flowers’] rights in connection with the aforesaid loss or damage.” Id. Since Orange Flowers has assigned its “rights in connection” with the loss or damage to the two flower shipments, it assigned to Plaintiff the relevant rights in the Bills of Lading regarding the flower shipments. ECF No. [1-16]. The Bills of Lading, ECF No. [1-16], detail the rights and liabilities of Defendant and Orange Flowers. See also Bills of Lading, ECF Nos [1-3], [1-5]. Pursuant to the assignment, Plaintiff is the real party in interest for the loss or damage of the flower shipments at issue in this case.4

*3 Defendant does not establish why Orange Flowers’ assignment via the Transfer of Rights to Plaintiff is invalid because it does not include the title to the flowers or the Bills of Lading. Defendant fails to cite any authority establishing that an assignment for the collection of recovery on claims, and rights connected to this recovery, is invalid.5 In general, “contracts are assignable unless forbidden by the terms of the contract, or unless the assignment would violate some rules of public policy or statute, or unless the terms of the contract are such as to show reliance on the personal credit of the purchaser.” Univ. Creek, 100 F. Supp. at 1339 (quoting Kitsos v. Stanford, 291 So.2d 632, 634 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1974)). “It is well-established that an assignment transfers to the assignee all the interests and rights of the assignor in and to the thing assigned.” Laws. Title Ins. Co. v. Novastar Mortg., Inc., 862 So. 2d 793, 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003). The “thing assigned” here is “recovery against liable third parties for the loss or damage sustained by the above goods [the two flower shipments] and assigns all our rights in connection with the aforesaid loss or damage.” ECF No. [1-14] at 2.

Plaintiff alleged that it was assigned Orange Flowers’ rights pertaining to recovery for the shipments at issue. ECF No. [1]. It attached to the Complaint the Bills of Lading at issue, ECF Nos. [1-3], [1-5], and the Transfer of Rights Document, ECF No. [1-14]. Reviewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, there is no basis to find Orange Flowers’ assignment of its interest in the action to Plaintiff invalid. Cannon, 250 F.3d at 1301. Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

B. Standing

The Court turns to the question of whether Plaintiff has standing to bring this action, as “plaintiff must both be the real party in interest and have standing.” 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1542. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has no standing as it has suffered no injury in fact here, since it was not assigned title to the flowers and Bills of Lading. It argues the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 12(b)(1). Plaintiff responds that it has a valid assignment and therefore standing to bring this action.

One element of the case-or-controversy requirement under Article III of the United States Constitution is that plaintiffs “must establish that they have standing to sue.” Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). Standing is a threshold question establishing “whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” Sims v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc).6 To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) it “suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) “the injury is fairly traceable to conduct of the defendant;” and (3) “it is likely, not just merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Kelly v. Harris, 331 F.3d 817, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2003). Defendant alleges only that Plaintiff has suffered no injury in fact.

*4 Defendant cites no law that an assignee cannot establish injury in fact under Article III. The Supreme Court has made clear that “an assignee of a legal claim for money owed has standing to pursue that claim in federal court, even when the assignee has promised to remit the proceeds of the litigation to the assignor.” Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 271 (2008). This Court has authorized an assignee to sue for breach of contract and any cause of action in tort arising from the contracts, noting that “[a]n assignment is a transfer of all the interests and rights to the thing assigned.” Sierra Equity Grp., Inc. v. White Oak Equity Partners, LLC, 650 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1227 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (citation omitted). The Transfer of Rights states that Orange Flowers “authorize[d] K&M Handling LLC to collect on [their] behalf recovery against liable third parties for the loss or damage sustained by the above goods and assigns all our rights in connection with the aforesaid loss or damage.” ECF No. [1-14] at 2. Plaintiff has established it has standing.

Moreover, the pleadings evidence that Plaintiff suffered at least a monetary harm, which is sufficient to make out a concrete injury in fact. See TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 425 (2021) (stating that monetary harms are “traditional tangible harms” that “readily qualify as concrete injuries under Article III”). Plaintiff paid Miami-Dade County Solid Waste Management for the disposal of the damaged flowers, as demonstrated by the check it attached to its Complaint. ECF No. [1-13] at 2. Plaintiff paid the damage survey report for the flower shipments, as demonstrated by the invoice attached to the Complaint. ECF No. [1-9] at 2. Finally, Plaintiff was the forwarding agent in the shipments at issue, for which Orange Flowers paid $23,608.69 and $6,689.98, respectively. See ECF Nos. [1-4], [1-6]. Orange Flowers assigned the claims for this monetary loss to Plaintiff. ECF No. [1-14].

Accordingly, taking the allegations in the Complaint as true and considering the exhibits attached to it, Plaintiff has alleged an injury-in-fact and has standing to sue under Article III.

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, ECF No. [16], is DENIED.

DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida on March 7, 2024.

All Citations

Footnotes  

  1. The Bills of Lading numbers are SMLU 7294078A, ECF No. [1-3] at 2, and SMLU 7294078A002, ECF No. [1-5] at 2.
  2. Plaintiff does not contend that it is a party to the Bills of Lading.
  3. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a “chose” as “[a] thing, whether tangible or intangible; a personal article; a chattel.” Chose, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).  
  4. A bill of lading is “the basic transportation contract between the shipper-consignor and the carrier; its terms and conditions bind the shipper and all connecting carriers.” Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commercial Metals Co., 456 U.S. 336, 342 (1982). While the Bills of Lading include Plaintiff’s name as the forwarding agent for the flower shipments at issue, ECF Nos. [1-3] at 2, [1-5] at 2, Plaintiff does not argue that it is a party to the Bills of Lading. ECF No. [17] at 2-4.  
  5. Neither Defendant nor Plaintiff establishes which law would apply here. COGSA applies to the transfer under the terms of the Bills of Lading, ECF No. [1-16] at ¶ 4(a), but COGSA does not cover whether causes of action that arise under it are assignable. See 46 U.S. Code § 307. By way of example, the Court notes that “[u]nder Florida law, parties can assign causes of action derived from a contract or a statute.” Forgione v. Dennis Pirtle Agency, Inc., 701 So. 2d 557, 559 (Fla. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Cowan Liebowitz & Latman, P.C. v. Kaplan, 902 So. 2d 755, 757 (Fla. 2005). In contrast, “purely personal tort claims cannot be assigned under Florida law.” Id.
  6. “Standing is similar to the real party in interest rule inasmuch as both terms are used to designate a plaintiff who possesses a sufficient interest in the action to entitle him to be heard on the merits.” Univ. Creek, 100 F. Supp. 2d at 1339 (citation omitted). However, unlike the real party in interest determination, standing relates to the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts. 6A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 1542.  

End of Document  

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