Cases

New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. ST Freight LLC

United States District Court, E.D. Wisconsin.

NEW YORK MARINE AND GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

ST FREIGHT LLC, Defendant.

Case No. 23-C-1268

Signed January 30, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Amber C. Coisman, James J. Hickey, Kennedys CMK LLP, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Justin F. Wallace, Wallace Law Inc., Sheboygan, WI, for Defendant.

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS

William C. Griesbach, United States District Judge

*1 Plaintiff New York Marine and General Insurance Company filed this declaratory judgment action against Defendant ST Freight LLC, seeking a determination of its rights and obligations under insurance policies it issued to ST Freight. This matter comes before the court on ST Freight’s motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay. For the following reasons, ST Freight’s motion to dismiss will be granted.

BACKGROUND

ST Freight is a Wisconsin limited liability company located in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, and operates as a freight broker for transporting the products of others by truck throughout the United States. New York Marine issued a package insurance policy to ST Freight containing a commercial general liability coverage part, an umbrella policy, and a commercial auto policy. ST Freight has been named as one of several defendants in a lawsuit filed on May 27, 2022, in the First Judicial District of New Mexico in connection with a September 1, 2021, accident arising from one of the loads ST Freight brokered. The accident occurred on a New Mexico highway and resulted in two fatalities.

ST Freight sought coverage under the policies issued by New York Marine in connection with the claims asserted against it in the New Mexico action. In response, New York Marine advised ST Freight in writing that it owed no obligation under the policies it issued to defend or indemnify ST Freight in the action. New York Marine subsequently filed this declaratory action on September 25, 2023, seeking a judicial declaration that, under the insurance policies, New York Marine owes no duty to defend or indemnify ST Freight in connection with the claims asserted against it in the New Mexico action. On October 31, 2023, ST Freight filed a third-party complaint in the New Mexico action against New York Marine, seeking a ruling regarding New York Marine’s coverage obligations under the policies. New York Marine filed a motion to dismiss in the New Mexico action, asserting that it does not owe a duty to defend or indemnify ST Freight. See Dkt. No. 19-1. On November 9, 2023, ST Freight filed the instant motion to dismiss or, alternatively, to stay.

ANALYSIS

“Under what is known as the Wilton/Brillhart abstention doctrine, district courts possess significant discretion to dismiss or stay claims seeking declaratory relief, even though they have subject matter jurisdiction over such claims.” R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 569 F.3d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 2009); see also Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995); Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). “This discretion arises from the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202 itself, which provides that district courts ‘may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration.’ ” Envision Healthcare, Inc. v. PreferredOne Ins. Co., 604 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2010). District courts have “substantial discretion in deciding whether to declare the rights of litigants and may, in the sound exercise of their discretion, stay or dismiss an action seeking a declaratory judgment in favor of an ongoing state court case.” Id. (citing Brillhart, 316 U.S. at 494–95; Wilton, 515 U.S. at 288). The federal court should consider, among other factors, “whether the declaratory suit presents a question distinct from the issues raised in the state court proceeding, whether the parties to the two actions are identical, whether going forward with the declaratory action will serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal obligations and relationships among the parties or will merely amount to duplicative or piecemeal litigation, and whether comparable relief is available to the plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment in another forum or at another time.” Nationwide Ins. v. Zavalis, 52 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted).

*2 Under the Zavalis framework, dismissal of this declaratory judgment action is appropriate. In this case, the third-party action in the First Judicial District of New Mexico involves the same parties as the instant action—ST Freight and New York Marine—as well as the same legal question—whether New York Marine owes ST Freight a duty to defend and indemnify it for any loss in the New Mexico action. See Envision Healthcare, 604 F.3d at 986 (upholding district court’s decision to abstain when “the third-party suit in Minnesota involve[d] the same parties as the federal case” and “the same precise legal question [would] be answered in both suits:” whether the insurance broker owes the insurer a duty to indemnify it for any loss incurred in the state court lawsuit). Allowing the declaratory judgment action to proceed further will not serve a useful purpose in clarifying the parties’ legal obligations and relationships. Instead, it will be duplicative of litigation that is already taking place in state court. Importantly, the New Mexico action, unlike this one, includes the plaintiff estates in the underlying action, both of whom are interested, if not indispensable parties, to the claim asserted in this case. For this reason, complete relief is clearly available to New York Marine in the New Mexico action. It is less clear that such relief would be available here. Accordingly, the court finds it appropriate to exercise its discretion under the Wilton/Brillhart doctrine and abstain from proceeding further with this declaratory judgment action.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, ST Freight’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 10) is GRANTED. This declaratory judgment action is dismissed. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment accordingly.

SO ORDERED at Green Bay, Wisconsin this 30th day of January, 2024.

All Citations

End of Document

Taylor v. Dupree

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Columbus TAYLOR, Plaintiff,

Kenneth DUPREE and Landstar Inway, Inc., Defendants.

Civil No. 1:23-CV-00298

Signed February 1, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

Eugene Gitman, Law Offices of Eugene Gitman, Feasterville, PA, Gary Schafkopf, Schafkopf Law, LLC, Bala Cynwyd, PA, Louis Anthony DiJiacomo, Matthew B. Weisberg, Weisberg Law, Morton, PA, for Plaintiff.

John T. Pion, Pion Nerone Girman Winslow & Smith, P.C., Pittsburgh, PA, Joshua D. Leaver, Pion Nerone Girman Winslow & Smith, PC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JENNIFER P. WILSON, United States District Judge

*1 Before the court is a motion to dismiss and strike the punitive damages claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 12(f), filed by Defendants Kenneth Dupree (“Dupree”) and Landstar Inway, Inc. (“Landstar”). (Doc. 18.) The first amended complaint alleges that Plaintiff Columbus Taylor (“Taylor”) suffered injuries due to Defendants’ negligence in a crash between two tractor trailers. (Doc. 16.) The court finds that it is premature and inappropriate at this stage to dismiss the punitive damages. The court also finds that Taylor has sufficiently pleaded enough facts to survive the motion to strike. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied.

Factual Background and Procedural History

The first amended complaint alleges that, on February 1, 2021, Taylor was travelling north on Interstate 81 (“81”)¹ in Franklin County, Pennsylvania in a red tractor trailer. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 8, 10.) Dupree was travelling north in the same area in a gold tractor trailer. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.) At the time the parties were travelling, the road was “covered in windblown snow.” (Id. ¶ 13.) At all times, Dupree was in front of Taylor. (Id. ¶ 12.) At some point, Dupree lost control of his tractor trailer and eventually became perpendicular to the highway, blocking all northbound lanes. (Id. ¶ 14.) In order to avoid hitting a passenger vehicle on his left, Taylor collided with Dupree, ultimately sustaining “serious, disabling and permanent physical injuries[.]” (Id. ¶¶ 15, 16.)

The first amended complaint alleges that “Dupree breached his … duties by operating [his tractor trailer] in a careless, reckless, and unsafe manner, without abiding all traffic regulations and without consideration for the conditions of the road, including the adverse weather conditions[.]” (Id. ¶ 19.) The complaint then goes on to list actions that Dupree either failed to do or did recklessly, including recklessly violating traffic laws, driving while distracted, in a fatigued condition, at an unsafe speed, and at unsafe distances from other vehicles. (Id.) Count I alleges negligence against Dupree, Count II alleges vicarious liability against Landstar, and Count III alleges negligence against Landstar. (Id. ¶¶ 17–38.) The first amended complaint requests compensatory and punitive damages.

Landstar and Dupree removed this action from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas on February 21, 2023. (Doc. 1.) Thereafter, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on February 27, 2023. (Doc. 2.) Taylor then filed the operative first amended complaint on May 18, 2023, after a stipulation by the parties to extend the amount of time to do so. (Docs. 13, 16.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss and strike on June 1, 2023. (Doc. 18.) The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

Jurisdiction

*2 This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties have complete diversity and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.² Venue is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all events occurred within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.

Standard of Review

A. Motion to Dismiss

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Conclusory allegations of liability are insufficient” to survive a motion to dismiss. Garrett v. Wexford Health, 938 F.3d 69, 92 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79). To determine whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court identifies “the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief,” disregards the allegations “that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of truth,” and determines whether the remaining factual allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012).

B. Motion to Strike

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f), a party can move a district court to “strike from a pleading … any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.” This rule is “designed to reinforce the requirement in Rule 8 … that pleadings be simple, concise, and direct.” 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1380 (3d ed. 2020 update). To that end, the purpose of any motion to strike should be to “clean up the pleadings, streamline litigation, and avoid the unnecessary forays into immaterial matters.” United States v. Educ. Mgmt. Corp., 871 F. Supp. 2d 433, 460 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).

Motions to strike should not be used to persuade a court to determine disputed questions of law. See Tonka Corp. v. Rose Art Indus., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 200, 218 (D.N.J. 1993) (citations omitted). They also “may not serve as an avenue to procure the dismissal of all or part of a complaint.” Davila v. N. Reg’l Joint Police Bd., 979 F. Supp. 2d 612, 624 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2013), vacated in part on reconsideration, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102143 (July 28, 2014) (citing Giles v. Phelan, Hallinan & Schmieg, L.L.P., 901 F. Supp. 2d 509, 530–31 (D.N.J. 2012)).

The burden rests with the moving party to show that the challenged matter should be stricken. In re Ry. Indus. Emp. No-Poach Antitrust Litig., 395 F. Supp. 3d 464, 496 (W.D. Pa. 2019). Thus, the movant must demonstrate that the matter falls within one of the categories listed in Rule 12(f). “Immaterial” matter is that which “has no essential or important relationship to [any] claim[s] for relief.” Wagner v. Holtzapple, 101 F. Supp. 3d 462, 488 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (citing Del. Health Care, Inc. v. MCD Holding Co., 893 F. Supp. 1279 (D. Del. 1995)). “Impertinent” matter consists of “statements that do not pertain, and are not necessary, to the issues in question.” Id. (citation omitted). And “scandalous” matter is that which “casts a derogatory light on someone, uses repulsive language, or detracts from the dignity of the court.” Id. (citing Carone v. Whalen, 121 F.R.D. 231, 232 (M.D. Pa. 1988)).

Discussion

*3 Defendants argue that Taylor has only provided conclusory allegations and boilerplate legal conclusions to support the allegation that Dupree and Landstar acted with the requisite mental state to warrant punitive damages. (Doc. 19, p. 12.)³ Taylor responds that, under Pennsylvania law, a plaintiff must only generally aver a defendant’s state of mind because such evidence is most commonly available after discovery has been completed, and he has alleged sufficient facts to plausibly support reckless conduct. (Doc. 21, p. 8.)

In Pennsylvania, punitive damages are available as a remedy in negligence actions where “(1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm to which the plaintiff was exposed and that (2) he acted, or failed to act, as the case may be, in conscious disregard of that risk.” See Hutchison ex rel. Hutchison v. Luddy, 582 Pa. 114, 870 A.2d 766, 772–73 (Pa. 2005).⁴ This remedy is only available “in cases where the defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton or reckless conduct.” Id. at 770.

The court notes that it is rare to dismiss a claim for punitive damages in motor vehicle accident cases at the outset of litigation. See, e.g., Alexander v. W. Express, No. 1:19-CV-1456, 2019 WL 6339907, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 18, 2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-CV-1456, 2019 WL 6327688 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 26, 2019). Further, courts have generally deemed these motions to dismiss as premature and inappropriate where the complaint alleges reckless conduct. See, e.g., Harvell v. Brumberger, No. 3:19-cv-2124, 2020 WL 6947693, at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 4, 2020).

Here, Taylor alleges recklessness, which is generally sufficient to avoid dismissal at this stage. (Doc. 16, ¶ 19.) Further, because an individual’s state of mind usually determines whether an award of punitive damages is warranted, it would be premature to dismiss a punitive damages claim at the outset of litigation. See Harvell, 2020 WL 6947693 at *8 (“[B]ecause the question of whether punitive damages are proper often turns on the defendants’ state of mind, this question frequently cannot be resolved on the pleadings alone but must await the development of a full factual record at trial.”) (citing In re Lemington Home for the Aged, 777 F.3d 620, 631 (3d Cir. 2015)). For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the punitive damages claim will be denied.

On the motion to strike, Defendants argue that facts alleging recklessness are immaterial and should be stricken because the first amended complaint sounds in negligence. (Doc. 19, pp. 14, 15.) Taylor does not respond to the motion to strike.

A defendant acts recklessly when “his conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another [and] such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 584 Pa. 179, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005). Taylor alleges Dupree failed to maintain control of his tractor trailer, properly manage space around him, and observe the existing traffic and weather conditions. (Doc. 16, ¶19.) Taylor also alleges that Dupree recklessly operated the tractor trailer while distracted, fatigued, at an unsafe speed, and at unsafe distances comparatively to other vehicles. (Id.) Although not argued by Taylor, these allegations are not immaterial, but rather are included to support the allegation of reckless behavior of Dupree. Therefore, the court will deny the motion to strike references to recklessness.

Conclusion

*4 For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss and strike will be denied. (Doc. 18.) An order follows.

All Citations

Footnotes

The court notes that the first amended complaint consistently refers to the road the parties were traveling as “Route 181.” However, while there is a Route 181 in York County, PA, there is no Route 181 in Franklin County, PA. There is an Interstate 81, which may be referred to as “I81” for short. The court will assume that the reference to “181” was a typographical error and that the events alleged occurred on Interstate 81.
Taylor is a citizen of Mississippi, Dupree is a citizen of Louisiana, and Landstar is a business incorporated and with a principal place of business in Delaware. (Doc. 16, ¶¶ 4–6.)
For ease of reference, the court utilizes the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
Because the accident occurred in Pennsylvania, the court applies Pennsylvania law.

End of Document