United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Francisco PAGAN, Plaintiff,

v.

Richard D. DENT, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION No. 21-cv-01621

|

Signed January 30, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

James L. DeCinti, Joshua D. Leaver, Pion, Nerone, Girman, Winslow & Smith PC, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

JOSEPH F. SAPORITO, JR., United States Magistrate Judge

*1 This diversity action arises out of a motor vehicle accident which occurred on January 31, 2021, on Interstate 81 in Hazle Township, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. The case is assigned to us upon the consent of the parties, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The matter is now before us on the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim. (Doc. 39)¹. This motion is fully briefed. (Doc. 42; Doc. 44; Doc. 46). We heard oral argument on the motion on September 7, 2023. The matter is now ripe for decision. For the reasons set forth herein, we will deny the motion.

I. Statement of Facts

On January 31, 2021, at approximately 9:00 p.m., defendant Richard D. Dent, a holder of a valid Commercial Driver’s License, was operating a tractor trailer for defendant P&S Transportation, Inc., and defendant P&S Transportation, LLC, d/b/a P&S Transportation (collectively “P&S”) on Interstate 81 near Exit 143, Hazle Township, Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. It was snowing, and Interstate 81 was covered with about eight inches of snow. Travel restrictions limited speed to 45 miles per hour, and tractors were prohibited from towing lightly loaded open trailers. Dent was carrying a load that weighed approximately 60,000 lbs. At that time, and due to the inclement weather, the plaintiffs were sitting inside their disabled vehicle which was parked off the road within the triangle shaped section immediately before the exit ramp sign. However, plaintiff Markham Pagan testified that the front wheels of his vehicle were “three feet onto the road.” (Doc. 39-7, at 172.) Nonetheless, a PennDOT highway foreman, James P. Lewis, observed the plaintiffs’ vehicle before the accident and said that the plaintiffs’ vehicle was completely off the roadway. (Doc. 44-6, at 6, 9.)

Dent was operating the tractor–trailer at about 53 mph when he lost control of the vehicle as he attempted to change lanes, causing it to jackknife and land on top of the plaintiffs’ vehicle. Dent, a lifelong resident of Louisiana, testified that he had some training on space management, visual surroundings, ice and snow, and speed reduction on ice and snow. But he also testified that he did not have any training in extreme driving conditions at the time of the accident. (Doc. 44-8, at 8.)

II. Legal Standards

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment should be granted only if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” only if it might affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute of material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence “is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. In deciding a summary judgment motion, all inferences “should be drawn in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and where the non-moving party’s evidence contradicts the movant’s, then the non-movant’s must be taken as true.” Pastore v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 24 F.3d 508, 512 (3d Cir. 1994).

*2 The party seeking summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” and demonstrating the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If the movant makes such a showing, the non-movant must set forth specific facts, supported by the record, demonstrating that “the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52.

III. Discussion

Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages apply only when the “defendant’s actions are so outrageous as to demonstrate willful, wanton, or reckless conduct.” Hutchison v. Luddy, 870 A.2d 766, 770 (Pa. 2005) (quoting Feld v. Merriam, 485 A.2d 742, 747 (Pa. 1984)). In Pennsylvania, punitive damages are “an extreme remedy” available in the most exceptional matters.” Phillips v. Cricket Lighters, 883 A.2d 439, 445 (Pa. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). This type of damage is not compensatory in nature, but is meant “to heap an additional punishment on the defendant who is found to have acted in a fashion which is particularly egregious.” Id. at 446. In Pennsylvania, a punitive damages claim must provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate that (1) a defendant had a subjective appreciation of the risk of harm that the plaintiff was exposed to, and (2) the defendant acted or failed to act in conscious disregard of that risk. Hutchison 870 A.2d 766, 772 (2005). “[T]he determination of whether an individual was reckless inherently involves a fact-intensive inquiry.” Mulholland v. Gonzalez, No. 08-3901, 2008 WL 5273588, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 18, 2008).

Although “ordinary negligence will not support an award of punitive damages, ‘punitive damages are appropriate for torts sounding in negligence when the conduct goes beyond mere negligence and into the realm of behavior which is willful, malicious, or so careless as to indicate wanton disregard for the rights of the parties injured.’ ” Young v. Westfall, No. 06-CV-2325, 2007 WL 675182, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 1, 2007) (citing Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 770). In making such a determination, the state of mind of the actor is an essential consideration. Id. Further, there is not a general proscription against pursuing damages in the context of a negligent supervision claim, if the facts allow for it. Hutchison, 870 A.2d at 773.

Here, the defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on the issue of recklessness and punitive damages because the plaintiffs have failed to cite any facts of record which support or lead to a reasonable inference that the defendants had a subjective appreciation and chose to ignore it. The plaintiffs contend that the motion should be denied because the evidence demonstrates that defendant Dent was aware of the approaching winter storm as he received weather alerts all week, and that, in snow and ice conditions, he had been trained to pull over and find a place to park when he was not under any time restraints for the delivery of his load, as here. Further, PennDOT issued a “Tier 1” warning, which prohibited certain vehicles from operating on the interstate, and which reduced the speed limit to 45 mph. (Doc. 44-5, at 3-6.)

As to Dent’s speed, the defendants concede that PennDOT reduced the speed limit to 45 mph because of the weather conditions, but they argue that there is no evidence that Dent saw those warnings, and that if he had, he was only exceeding the speed limit by 8 mph. (Doc. 42, at 23.) The plaintiffs point to Dent’s deposition testimony where he, too, conceded that he was traveling in excess of the speed limit immediately before the accident. (Doc. 44-8, at 35.) Further, the plaintiffs proffered the expert testimony of Walter A. Guntharp who opined that, given the conditions that existed at the time of the accident, if Dent traveled at 30 mph or less, he would have had more time and distance to make a gradual movement that would have allowed him to maintain control of his vehicle. (Doc. 44-12, at 8-9.)

*3 Next, the defendants contend that Dent was neither fatigued nor distracted at the time of the accident. (Doc. 42, at 24.) Further, they maintain that Dent tried to stop at an earlier truck stop, but it was full. (Id.) A review of the dashcam video provided by counsel demonstrates that Dent was driving with one hand while holding a soda bottle in his other hand. (Doc. 44-7.) The video shows it was snowing and that there may have been an ice build-up on a portion of the windows. (Id.) Based upon Dent’s deposition testimony, the plaintiffs posit that Dent was running up against his 11-hour hours-of-service limitations because, had the accident not happened, he would have ended his travel for the day within the next five minutes after that. (Doc. 44-8, at 32.) In addition, the plaintiffs’ expert, Christopher Shapley, opined that Dent’s plan to travel to exit 145 before stopping for the day required him to average 50 mph to avoid violating the 11-hour limit imposed on his hours of driving. (Doc. 44-10, at 2.)

Next, P&S argues that there is no evidence it was reckless because it told Dent to get to a safe place if he encountered bad weather, it provided its drivers with continuing training, and it monitored their hours of service. In their opposition to the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiffs argue that the applicable standard of care for operation of a commercial tractor–trailer truck, such as that driven by Dent, is derived from the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations promulgated by the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration. The plaintiffs have proffered expert witness evidence that, based on weather conditions at the time of the vehicular collision at issue here: Dent failed to reduce his speed to a reasonable degree in response to the adverse weather conditions; that his speed was in excess of the Tier 1 snow emergency requirements set by PennDOT and violated the training set forth in Section 2 of the CDL manual; Dent’s excessive speed and failure to find a safe location to park his tractor–trailer violated the adverse weather conditions requirements of Part 392.14 of the FMCSRs; Dent could not safely apply his breaks because he was travelling at or in excess of 50 mph; Dent failed to use both hands to steer because he was holding a soda in one of his hands; Dent should have stopped well before entering into the storm area as he had advance notice of the storm; and Dent was operating in excess of his hours of service. (Doc. 44-12, at 7.)

The plaintiffs have further proffered evidence that P&S: failed to provide Dent with a road test; failed to provide Dent with any training on driving in adverse weather conditions until after the crash; had no written policies regarding dispatching drivers into areas that were experiencing adverse weather conditions; took no steps to delay the load or require Dent to stop until the storm passed; and failed to properly monitor Dent’s logs and discover his speeding violations. (Id.) The plaintiffs seek punitive damages from the employer directly, based on its purportedly wanton failure to train or supervise Dent with respect to the safe operation of his vehicle, failure to monitor Dent’s logs and discover that he was speeding on a regular basis, failure to adjust load dispatch and reschedule freight for transport, and failure to control Dent’s activities and require that he wait until the storm had passed before entering into the area that was affected by it. (Id. at 15.)

Based upon our review of the motion papers and the evidence proffered by the parties in support and opposition to the motion, we find that there are genuine issues of material fact precluding a finding of summary judgment. In particular, we find that, viewing the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving parties, a reasonable jury could find that Dent operated his vehicle in a reckless manner, and that P&S exhibited reckless disregard in its failure to train and supervise Dent. Thus, the motion will be denied.

*4 An appropriate order follows.

All Citations

Footnotes

1. By separate order (Doc. 52), we granted the unopposed motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Blair Logistics, LLC (Doc. 38), and we dismissed it as a defendant.  

End of Document

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United States District Court, M.D. North Carolina.

WILLIAM FULP WRECKER SERVICE, INC., Plaintiff,

v.

MILLER TRANSFER AND RIGGING, CO., Defendant.

1:23CV368

|

Signed February 2, 2024

Attorneys and Law Firms

ANDREW G. BROWN, FINGER, ROEMER, BROWN & MARIANI, L.L.P., JONESVILLE, NC, ROBERT BENJAMIN LAWS, BOWDEN GARDNER & HILL, P.C., WINSTON-SALEM, NC, for Plaintiff.

ANDREW BREHM, SCOPELITIS, GARVIN, LIGHT, HANSON & FEARY, P.C., MILWAUKEE, WI, CHRISTOPHER M. KELLY, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD PA, CHARLOTTE, NC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Joi Elizabeth Peake, United States Magistrate Judge

*1 This case is before the Court on Defendant Miller Transfer and Rigging, Co.’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Plaintiff William Fulp Wrecker Service, Inc. brings this claim for unjust enrichment based on Defendant’s failure to pay an invoice for work that Plaintiff did cleaning up the site of a single-vehicle accident involving one of Defendant’s trucks. In the Answer and present Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Defendant argues that it paid an invoice for clearing wreckage from the site, and that the settlement of that invoice also applies to bar suit related to a separate invoice for environmental remediation at the site. For the reasons stated below, the Court concludes that the settlement and release on the first invoice is ambiguous with respect to whether it included the second invoice for environmental remediation. Therefore, the Court recommends that Defendant’s motion be denied, without prejudice to further consideration after discovery on dispositive motions or at trial.

I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On April 7, 2020, a tractor trailer operated by Defendant Miller Transfer and Rigging Co. overturned on the side of a highway in Forsyth County, North Carolina. (Compl. [Doc. #3] ¶¶ 10-11.) The overturned truck spilled approximately twenty-five gallons of hydraulic fluids and over fifty gallons of motor oil and diesel fuel in the roadway and surrounding area. (Compl. ¶ 12.) Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this spill of hazardous material, the Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Office of Emergency Management contacted Plaintiff’s company and directed it to “contain, clean-up, and remediate the impacted areas.” (Compl. ¶ 14.) Plaintiff alleges that its hazmat crew arrived and worked on April 7, 2020, “to contain and minimize contamination of the impacted area and clear[ ] the roadway,” and then returned again on April 10, 2020 “to complete the clean-up and remediation.” (Compl. ¶¶ 15-16.) This work related to “hazardous material cleanup and remediation” and ground contamination. (Compl. ¶¶ 17-19, 22.) Plaintiff invoiced Defendant “for the hazardous material cleanup and remediation services” under Invoice 2111, dated April 22, 2020. (Compl. ¶¶ 19-20; Compl. Ex. A [Doc. #3-1] (Invoice 2111).) Invoice 2111 details emergency response and remediation work done by Plaintiff on April 7 and April 10, 2020, as well as subsequent testing and assessment by a geologist. The total cost of the work and fees billed in Invoice 2111 was $77,852.78. Defendant did not pay the invoice, despite Plaintiff’s performing the remediation work on its behalf. (Compl. ¶¶ 20, 24-28, 33.)

Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brought this action in state court claiming that Defendant had been unjustly enriched by the environmental remediation work Plaintiff performed following the accident and for which Defendant had not paid. (Compl. ¶¶ 28-33.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant received the benefit of Plaintiff’s “hazardous material clean up and remediation services” without paying for the services. The matter was removed to federal court in this District on the basis of diversity jurisdiction on May 5, 2023 [Doc. #1]. Discovery is underway and closes on April 30, 2024.

*2 In its Answer, Defendant states that the Parties reached a negotiated settlement related to Plaintiff’s work “associated with the April 7, 2020 accident.” (Answer [Doc. #5] at 5.) Defendant attached, as part of its Answer, a Release and Settlement Agreement and the invoice to which that Release referred, Invoice 2108 [Doc. #5-1]. The Release is dated April 23, 2020, and signed by Defendant on April 24, 2020, and the factual recitals in the Release state:

A. An incident occurred where Fulp’s was called in to provide towing, storage and related charges for a roll over (the “Incident”) [.]

B. As part of its services related to the Incident, Fulp’s issued Invoice 2108 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

C. The invoice claims a total due of $185,377.50, related to removal of the tractor, trailer and oversized cargo from the Incident site, transportation of the same to Fulp’s yard, and storage at Fulp’s yard thereafter.

D. Miller Transfer disputes that the sum charged is fair and reasonable for the services performed.

E. After consultation and negotiations, Fulp’s and Miller Transfer have concluded that it would be in their best interests to fully settle and compromise the controversies among them on the terms and in the manner provided for in this Agreement.

….

3. Mutual Release Related to Invoice 2108. Each party to this Agreement shall and does immediately RELEASE and DISCHARGE the other, including all officers, directors, members, agents, employees together with customers, business partners, representatives, insurers, affiliated or parent companies, successors and assigns, from all rights, claims, actions, causes of action, suits, debts, accounts, contracts and demands whatsoever and however arising, whether known or unknown, foreseen or unforeseen, patent or latent, which they may now have or may have after the signing of this Agreement related in any way to Invoice 2108 attached hereto as Exhibit A.

(Release and Settlement Agreement [Doc. #5-1] at 1-2.)

Invoice 2108 lists various charges, primarily based on a “[p]rice per pound” for a “super load recovery” of a rollover tractor trailer off the roadway. It also includes a charge for “hauling” and for “light towers.” It does not detail what date the work reflected in it was performed, but the invoice itself is dated April 9, 2020, prior to the additional environmental remediation work performed on April 10, 2020.

Defendant now moves for judgment on the pleadings [Doc. #13], on the basis that the release as to Invoice 2108 [Doc. #5-1], unambiguously applies to bar Plaintiff’s claim as relates to Invoice 2111 [Doc. #3-1].

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The standard for granting judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) is the same as for granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Burbach Broad. Co. of Del. v. Elkins Radio Corp., 278 F.3d 401, 405-06 (4th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) when the complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

In deciding a defendant’s Rule 12(c) motion, the court assumes the facts alleged in the complaint are true and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Priority Auto Grp., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 757 F.3d 137, 139 (4th Cir. 2014); accord Benitez v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 992 F.3d 229, 235 n.5 (4th Cir. 2021). In addition, the court may consider the answer to the extent it does not conflict with the complaint, and may consider documents attached to the complaint or to the answer if the documents are integral to the plaintiff’s claims and their authenticity is not challenged. See Massey v. Ojaniit, 759 F.3d 343, 347 (4th Cir. 2014); Occupy Columbia v. Haley, 738 F.3d 107, 116 (4th Cir. 2013).

*3 A Rule 12(c) motion should be granted only if, when taking all of the non-moving party’s factual allegations as true, no genuine issues of material fact remain and the case can be determined as a matter of law. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 724 (M.D.N.C. 2012).

Notably, because the burden of establishing an affirmative defense, such as a release agreement, rests on the defendant asserting it, a motion under Rule 12(c) is generally not the appropriate vehicle to mount such a challenge. It is only in the rare circumstances where all facts necessary to deciding the issue clearly appear on the face of the pleadings that the Court will reach an affirmative defense through a motion under Rule 12(c).

When asked to enter judgment on the pleadings on the basis of a plaintiff having signed a release agreement, the Court conducts a two-step analysis to determine (1) whether the release agreement is valid; and (2) if it is, whether the agreement’s plain language bars the plaintiff’s claims. Under North Carolina law, when the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous, construction of the agreement is a matter of law for the Court, and the Court cannot look beyond the terms of the contract to determine the intentions of the parties.

Justad v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 1:17CV219, 2017 WL 3432293, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Aug. 9, 2017) (internal brackets, ellipses, and quotations omitted), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-219, 2017 WL 11019067 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 11, 2017); accord Harris v. Ann’s House of Nuts, No. 4:13-CV-0039-BO, 2013 WL 5592936, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 10, 2013).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the April 23, 2020, Release and Settlement Agreement [Doc. #5-1] unambiguously applies to any claim related to the underlying incident which gave rise to Invoice 2108. In response, Plaintiff argues that the release unambiguously applies only to claims related to Invoice 2108 for removal of the rollover, but not to Invoice 2111 related to the separate environmental response and remediation. Because the Parties do not dispute the validity of the release, the Court will instead focus on whether the agreement contains plain, unambiguous language on its face that bars Plaintiff’s claim related to Invoice 2111.

Under North Carolina law,

Written contracts are to be construed and enforced according to their terms. They must receive a reasonable interpretation, according to the intention of the parties at the time of executing them, gathered from the language employed by them. When the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, effect must be given to its terms, and its terms may not be contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.

Further, a contract’s meaning and effect is a question of law for the court—not the jury—when the language of the contract is clear and unambiguous. And the terms of an unambiguous contract are to be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense, and harmoniously construed to give every word and every provision effect.

An ambiguity exists in a contract when either the meaning of words or the effect of provisions is uncertain or capable of several reasonable interpretations. An ambiguity can exist when, even though the words themselves appear clear, the specific facts of the case create more than one reasonable interpretation of the contractual provisions. If a written contract is ambiguous, the contract’s meaning and effect is a factual question for the jury and parol evidence may be introduced not to contradict, but to show and make certain what was the real agreement between the parties.

*4 Galloway as Tr. of Melissa Galloway Snell Living Tr. Dated May 1, 2018 v. Snell, 384 N.C. 285, 287-88, 885 S.E.2d 834, 836 (N.C. 2023) (internal quotations and citations omitted). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has further observed that:

Ambiguity arises only when a contract may be understood in more than one way or when it refers to two or more things at the same time. Stated differently, a contract’s term is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction. Such ambiguity may be patent or latent. Patent ambiguity exists when the language of the contract itself reveals that it can be interpreted in more than one way. Latent ambiguity, although less common than patent ambiguity, arises where language although appearing perfectly clear at the time the contract is formed, because of subsequently discovered or developed facts, may reasonably be interpreted in either of two ways.

Lion Assocs. v. Swiftships Shipbuilders, LLC, 475 F. App’x 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal citation, brackets, and quotations omitted).

Here, in considering the Parties’ briefs, the Court notes first that, unlike the case upon which Defendant primarily relies, the Release in this case did not include broad language releasing Defendant from “any and all past, present or futu[ ]re claims, demands, obligations, actions, causes of action which the Plaintiff now has, or which may hereafter accrue.” (Def. Br. [Doc. #14] at 11-13 (citing Goodwin v. Cashwell, 102 N.C. App. 275, 279, 401 S.E.2d 840, 843 (N.C. App. 1991) (ellipses and parenthetical omitted).) Rather, the language in the Release was much more limited and qualified and, while using sweeping and final language, limited that release language to claims specifically “related in any way to Invoice 2108.” (Release and Settlement Agreement ¶ 3.)

Invoice 2108 in turn did not mention the incident at all and simply includes the fee for the “Roll over off road ways super load recovery,” plus hauling and storage work that all appears to be separate from the environmental remediation and hazardous material disposal work reflected in Invoice 2111. While Invoices 2108 and 2111 are both apparently related to work performed after the April 7, 2020, incident, Invoice 2111 is not thereby necessarily “related” to Invoice 2108. Indeed, Invoice 2108 was issued on April 9, 2020, prior to the additional remediation work on April 10, 2020. Invoice 2111 does not appear to be a change order to Invoice 2108. It does not appear to be an amendment or addenda to Invoice 2108. Thus, Invoice 2111 could reasonably be interpreted as an entirely separate invoice, though involving the same Parties and, presumably, arising from the same incident, though neither the Release and Settlement Agreement nor the invoices make this clear.

The primary basis upon which Defendant relies to argue that Invoice 2108 is related to Invoice 2111 is the fact that both invoices involve the same Parties and that they both “bill $3,500 for one lane closure.” (Def.’s Br. at 7-8.) However, a review of the invoices with all inferences made in Plaintiff’s favor, reveals that this was not one lane closure but two: one that occurred before April 9, 2020, when invoice 2108 was issued [Doc. #5-1], and one that occurred on April 10, 2020, according to Invoice 2111 [Doc. #3-1]. Additionally, simply because the same parties are involved in multiple transactions does not mean that a release as to one is a release to all if the release itself is silent on this point and qualifies itself as to only one transaction.

*5 Relatedly, as to Defendant’s argument that the Release should be read to include claims related to Invoice 2111 because, had the Parties wanted to exclude claims related to Invoice 2111 from that agreement they could have specifically done so (Def.’s Br. at 8, 10-11), the inverse is equally true: had the Parties wanted to include claims related to Invoice 2111 in that agreement they could have specifically done so. They did not. The Release is entirely silent as to Invoice 2111. Despite presumably knowing of Invoice 2111—dated April 22, 2020—at the time of the settlement agreement on April 23, 2020, and therefore knowing that it, from its face, involved work apart from the “removal of the tractor, trailer and oversized cargo from the Incident site, transportation of the same to Fulp’s yard, and storage at Fulp’s yard thereafter,” (Release and Settlement Agreement at 1), the Parties nevertheless specified that the release in this case related only to Invoice 2108, and not the underlying incident itself, and with no reference to Invoice 2111 or environmental restoration and remediation.

Indeed, the Parties specifically identified the April 7, 2020 crash as the “Incident” but nevertheless chose to qualify the release as applying not to claims arising from or related to the “Incident,” but rather to disputes about Invoice 2108 itself, which the agreement recognized reflected only “part of [Plaintiff’s] services related to the Incident.” (Release and Settlement Agreement at 1-2.) Neither did the Parties use universal release language but rather, again, qualified the release as being “Related to Invoice 2108.” And, again, that invoice, rather than being related to all of the work performed as a result of the “Incident,” reflected only a “part of [Plaintiff’s] services related to the Incident” and in fact “related to removal of the tractor, trailer and oversized cargo from the Incident site, transportation of the same to Fulp’s yard, and storage at Fulp’s yard thereafter,” only. Plaintiff’s Complaint does not raise a claim based on Invoice 2108, or apparently, any of the work detailed and billed in that invoice.

Thus, while Defendant is right that the language in the release denotes finality and an intention to “fully settle,” it is not clear that this finality extends beyond an agreement that the controversies arising from Invoice 2108 and its discrete charges are fully settled. Either the phrase “related in any way to Invoice 2108” means “related in any way to the incident underlying Invoice 2108”—which is possible but by no means unambiguously clear from the document—or “related in any way to the charges and services detailed in Invoice 2108”—which would not bar the separate charges in Invoice 2111 and is also possible but by no means the only reasonable reading of the document.

Thus, while the Court concludes that the contract language does not unambiguously support Defendant’s purported clear reading of the release, neither does it wholly preclude it. The language of the Release and Settlement Agreement is such that either Party could be correct, thus highlighting the nature of the ambiguity. To the extent that Defendant seeks judgment in its favor on the basis that the Release unambiguously reads in its favor to bar Plaintiff’s claims related to Invoice 2111, Defendant has failed to meet its burden under Rule 12(c).¹ Therefore, the Court will recommend that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings be denied. The Court notes that the Parties are presently in discovery, and these issues can be considered further after the close of discovery on dispositive motions or at trial.

IV. CONCLUSION

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED that Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [Doc. #13] be DENIED.

All Citations

Footnotes

1. Defendant’s argument that no parol evidence is permitted or required to understand the scope of the Release is essentially the same as the one it makes in terms of ambiguity. However, as noted above, the Court has concluded that the Release is ambiguous.  

End of Document

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