United States District Court,

D. New Jersey.

RAZOR ENTERPRISE INC., and Razor Freight Services, Ltd., Plaintiffs,

v.

AEXIM USA INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 11–6788 (ES). | Signed Feb. 24, 2015.

Attorneys and Law Firms

Joseph J. Perrone, Matthew M. Gorden, Bennett Giuliano McDonnell & Perrone LLP, Ridgewood, NJ, for Plaintiffs.

 

 

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

SALAS, District Judge.

*1 This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Plaintiffs Razor Enterprise Inc. and Razor Freight Services, Ltd. (collectively “Razor”) for default judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55, and the Court having considered Razor’s submissions, (D.E. No. 33), and it appearing that:

 

1. On November 18, 2011, Razor commenced this action by filing a Complaint against Aexim USA, Inc. (“Aexim”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See D.E. No. 1). Plaintiff Razor Enterprise Inc. is a New York entity, Plaintiff Razor Freight Services, Ltd. is a foreign entity, Razor Cargo Services is an unincorporated division or “d/b/a” of Razor Enterprise Inc., Defendant Aexim is a New Jersey Corporation, and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. (D.E. No. 33–1, Declaration of Matthew M. Gorden, Esq. in Support of Plaintiffs’ Request for a Default Judgment (“Gorden Decl.”) ¶ 2).

 

2. On January 24, 2012, Razor filed an amended complaint. (D.E. No. 4).

 

3. On April 6, 2012, Razor filed their first motion for default judgment with respect to the amended complaint. (D.E. No. 11).

 

4. On November 9, 2012, Razor’s first motion for default judgment was denied by Letter Order for failure to comply with the Local Civil Rules. (D.E. No. 12).

 

5. On November 12, 2012, Razor filed a second motion for default judgment. (D.E. No. 13).

 

6. On May 20, 2013, this Court denied the second motion for default without prejudice for failing to provide evidence demonstrating why substituted service was proper or evidence of a sufficient cause of action. (D.E. No. 14).

 

7. On September 23, 2013, Razor filed a third motion for default judgment. (D.E. No. 19).

 

8. On May 8, 2014, this Court held oral argument on the third motion for default judgment, during which the Court dismissed the motion without prejudice and instructed Razor to file a second amended complaint. (D.E. No. 21; see also D.E. No. 22).

 

9. On May 15, 2014, Razor filed a second amended complaint. (D.E. No. 23).

 

10. Razor conducted a business entity search and instructed a process server to effect personal service on Aexim at three separate addresses. (Gorden Decl. ¶¶ 11–12). The process server was unable to serve Aexim at any of the three addresses. (Id. ¶ 13; D.E. Nos. 27–29).

 

11. Razor then instructed the process server to serve Aexim pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15–30.1, i.e., substituted service, by serving Aexim through the State of New Jersey’s Department of the Treasury. (Gorden Decl. ¶ 14). On June 17, 2014, the process server successfully effectuated substituted service. (D.E. No. 30).

 

12. The time for answering the complaint has expired, and Aexim has neither been granted an extension of time within which to answer, nor interposed an answer or otherwise responded to the complaint.

 

13. On July 11, 2014, Razor sent the Clerk of Court a letter requesting that default be entered against Aexim. (D.E. No. 31).

 

*2 14. On July 16, 2014, the Clerk of Court entered default as to Aexim. (D.E. dated July 16, 2014; D.E. No. 32).

 

15. On July 22, 2014, Razor filed the instant motion for default judgment as to the claims set forth in the second amended complaint. (D.E. No. 33).

 

16. “Before granting a default judgment, the Court must determine (1) whether there is sufficient proof of service, (2) whether a sufficient cause of action was stated, and (3) whether default judgment is proper.” Teamsters Health & Welfare Fund of Phila. & Vicinity v. Dubin Paper Co., No. 11–7137, 2012 WL 3018062, at *2 (D.N.J. July 24, 2012) (internal citations omitted).

 

17. First, the Court finds that Razor has provided sufficient proof of service. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a plaintiff serve a defendant corporation, partnership, or association with a summons and complaint “in a judicial district of the United States: (A) in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e)(1) for serving an individual.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(h)(1)(A). Rule 4(e) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that when serving an individual with a summons and complaint, service of process may be accomplished by “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located or where service is made.” Id. 4(e)(1). “Under New Jersey law, personal service is the primary method to serve an individual located within the state. N.J. Ct. R. 4:4–4(a). Rule 4:4–4(b), however, permits substituted service when personal service cannot be effectuated in accordance with Rule 4:4–4(a).” Howard Johnson Int’l v. C.C. Host L.L.P., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25153, at *3 (D.N.J. Oct. 21, 2005). New Jersey law permits plaintiffs to serve process on corporate defendants by serving the State of New Jersey’s Department of the Treasury. LimoStars, Inc. v. N.J. Car & Limo, Inc., 2011 WL 3471092, at *3 (D.Ariz. Aug.8, 2011) (citing B & B Realty Assocs. v. J & S Mgmt. Enters., 2008 WL 4681981, at *5 (N.J.Super.Ct.App.Div. Oct.22, 2008) (“We are satisfied that there was good service on” the corporate defendant when service on statutory agent could not be effectuated, counsel served the New Jersey Department of Treasury on behalf of corporation pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2A:15–30.14)). As detailed in the declaration of Mr. Gorden, after attempting to serve Aexim at three different locations-two of which the defendant listed as proper addresses with the State of New Jersey’s Department of the Treasury–Razor served the second amended complaint on Aexim via substituted service. (Gorden Decl. ¶¶ 11–14 and accompanying exhibits). Thus, the Court is satisfied that Aexim was served with the second amended complaint via substituted service.

 

18. Second, the Court finds that there has been a sufficient cause of action stated. Razor’s second amended complaint sets forth allegations of breach of contract and account stated. (D.E. No. 33–3, Brief In Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Default Judgment (“Razor Br.”) at 3–6).

 

*3 19. To establish a breach of contract claim under New Jersey law, “a plaintiff has the burden to show that the parties entered into a valid contract, that the defendant failed to perform his obligations under the contract, and that the plaintiff sustained damages as a result.” Peck v. Donovan, 565 F. App’x 66, 69–70 (3d Cir.2012) (citing Murphy v. Implicito, 392 N.J.Super. 245, 920 A.2d 678, 689 (N.J.App.Div.2007). A bill of lading is a contract for the carriage of goods and the Carmack Amendment governs the liability thereunder. See Usinor Steel Corp. v. Norfolk S. Corp., 308 F.Supp.2d 510, 517–18 (D.N.J.2004). As detailed more fully in the Declaration of Shahryar M.A. Haq and the accompanying exhibits, in or about October and November of 2009, Razor and Aexim were engaged in a business relationship governed by bills of lading involving the shipment of garments. (D.E. No. 33–2, Declaration of Shahryar M.A. Haq in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Default Judgment (“Haq Decl.”) ¶¶ 3–6). Razor performed their duties under the contracts by safely shipping, delivering, and/or releasing certain goods to Aexim, but Aexim failed to fully pay for their transport, despite taking possession. (Id. ¶¶ 7–17). As a direct result, Razor incurred damages in the amount of $50,000.00. (Id. ¶¶ 18–22).

 

20. To prevail on an account stated action in the District of New Jersey, where diversity jurisdiction exists, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) there was either an express or an implied agreement as to the amount due; and (2) the account was in fact stated or agreed to. ASCO Power Techs., L.P. v. PEPCO Techs. L.L.C., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76368, at *21 (D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2006). “[S]ilence on behalf of the debtor can result in acquiescence to the sum due if the debtor does not respond for a reasonably long period of time.” Id. at *21–22. Additionally, beginning in September 2009 and concluding in January 2010, Razor provided freight forwarding services directly to Aexim. (Haq Decl. ¶¶ 23–25). Razor performed its freight forwarding duties with respect to nineteen containers and Aexim took possession of the underlying goods. (Id. ¶ 26). Razor issued nineteen invoices to Aexim, with an outstanding total amount due of $49,163.25. (Id. ¶¶ 27–30). To date, Aexim has neither disputed the nineteen invoices, nor made any additional payments towards them. (Id. ¶ 31). As a direct result, Razor incurred damages in the amount of $49,163.25. (Id. ¶ 32). Between the two causes of action, Razor incurred damages in the amount of $99,163.25. (Id. ¶¶ 33, 34).

 

21. Third, to determine whether granting default judgment is proper, the Court must consider three factors: (1) whether the party subject to default has a meritorious defense, (2) the prejudice suffered by the party seeking default, and (3) the culpability of the party subject the default. See Chanel, Inc. v. Gordashevsky, 558 F.Supp.2d 532, 537 (D.N.J.2008) (citing Emcasco Ins. Co. v. Sambrick, 834 F.2d 71, 73 (3d Cir.1987)). “However, these factors are more applicable to situations where the defaulting party has made an appearance, particularly where the party wishes to reopen a previously entered default.” Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Mayu & Roshan, LLC, 2007 WL 1674485, at *3 (D.N.J. June 8, 2007) (citation omitted). In cases similar to the instant matter, where the defendant has failed to plead or otherwise defend, courts have held that they are “not in a position then to determine whether [defendants have] a meritorious defense or whether any delay is the result of culpable misconduct.” Id. (quotation omitted). In those same cases, the courts have also held that because plaintiffs have no other recourse to pursue against the defendants, the plaintiffs would be prejudiced if a default judgment were not granted. Id. at 5. Here, the Court adopts the same rationale. Aexim has not answered the complaint or availed itself of the opportunity to defend against Razor’s allegations, and if default judgment is not entered, there are no other avenues available to Razor.

 

*4 Accordingly, IT IS on this 24th day of February 2015,

 

ORDERED that Razor’s motion for default judgment, (D.E. No. 33), is hereby GRANTED; and it is

 

ORDERED that judgment is entered against Aexim in favor of Razor in the amount of $99,163.25 plus pre-and post-judgment interest, as well as litigation costs, from the date(s) of breach(es) until the entire amount is paid, given the following showing by Defendants:

1. $50,000.00 for breach of contract related to bills of lading. (See Haq Decl. ¶¶ 3–22 and accompanying exhibits).

2. $49,163.25 for account stated related to freight forwarding services. (See Haq Decl. ¶¶ 23–32 and accompanying exhibits).

 

ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall mark this case CLOSED.

 

United States District Court,

E.D. New York.

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff,

v.

GOLD COAST EXPRESS INC., et al., Defendant.

No. 12 CV 4847(DRH)(ARL). | Signed March 10, 2015.

 

 

ORDER

HURLEY, Senior District Judge.

*1 Great American Insurance Company (“plaintiff”) commenced this interpleader action to resolve competing claims to the proceeds of a $10,000 bond issued by plaintiff on behalf of defendant Gold Coast Express, Inc. (“Gold Coast”). Many of the named defendants (“defaulting defendants”) failed to appear in the action, and plaintiff currently seeks a default judgment against them1 and a judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond at issue.

 

After the defendants’ default was noted by the Clerk of the Court pursuant to Rule 55(a), plaintiff moved for entry of a default judgment under Rule 55(b). On May 12, 2014, this motion was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Arlene R. Lindsay to issue a Report and Recommendation as to whether plaintiff demonstrated that default judgment and judgment under Rule 54(b) is appropriate against the defaulting defendants.

 

On February 17, 2015, Judge Lindsay issued a Report and Recommendation which recommended that a default judgment be entered against the defaulting defendants and that plaintiff “is entitled to a judgment that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.” (Report and Recommendation at 6.) More than fourteen days have elapsed since service of the Report and Recommendation and no party has filed an objection.

 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, this Court has reviewed the February 17, 2015 Report and Recommendation for clear error, and finding none, now concurs in both its reasoning and its result. Therefore, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation of Judge Lindsay as is set forth therein. Accordingly, the Court hereby directs that the clerk of the Court enter default judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defaulting defendants and enter judgment that defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.

 

SO ORDERED.

 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LINDSAY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff Great American Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) brings this interpleader action to resolve competing claims to the proceeds of a $10,000.00 bond issued by Plaintiff on behalf of defendant Gold Coast Express, Inc. (“Gold Coast”). This matter was referred to the undersigned by District Judge Denis R. Hurley for the purpose of issuing a report and recommendation on whether Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment should be granted and, if so, the appropriate relief to be awarded. Plaintiff has submitted an affidavit or Eric M. Eusanio, dated May 8, 2014, along with exhibits, in support of its motion. Despite having been served with the motion, the defaulting defendants1 have not submitted papers in opposition to the motion. Based upon the papers submitted, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for a default judgment be granted.

 

 

BACKGROUND

*2 The following facts are taken from the complaint and the motion for default judgment.

 

Plaintiff, as surety, issued a bond—expressly limited to $10,000 .00—on behalf of its principal, Gold Coast, with respect to Gold Coast’s contracts or agreements for the supply of transportation. Prior to the filing of this action, defendants asserted claims under the bond, claiming that Gold Star failed to pay them for the alleged transportation of freight and goods. Because these claims vastly exceeded the bond’s express limit of $10,000.00, defendants’ claims were adverse and conflicting and could not be satisfied by the bond. Accordingly, in order to avoid multiple liabilities and inconsistent rulings, Plaintiff filed the instant interpleader action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, seeking Court direction as to distribution of the bond.

 

Plaintiff commenced this lawsuit on September 27, 2012 and filed an amended complaint on October 10, 2012. On August 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a “third amended complaint” adding several new defendants but otherwise adding no new claims for relief.

 

With regard to the appearing defendants, Plaintiff has agreed, in principle, to a Stipulation and Order for Entry of Final Judgment. With regard to the defaulting defendants, Plaintiff has filed the instant motion. All of the defaulting defendants named in the amended complaint were served with that pleading, and all of the newly added defaulting defendants were served with the third amended complaint.2 The defaulting defendants have not interposed an answer or otherwise responded to the complaint.

 

On April 15, 2014, Plaintiff requested a Certificate of Default with the Clerk of the Court. Although the request was initially denied on April 23, 2014, it was thereafter granted. Thus, on April 29, 2014, the Clerk of the Court issued the Certificate of Default and certified the defendants’ default.3 On May 9, 2014, Plaintiff served and filed the instant motion.

 

 

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard Governing Defaults

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 establishes a two-step process regarding default judgments. First, the Clerk of the Court enters the party’s default. Then, as here, a motion for a default judgment is made to the district court judge. A default constitutes an admission of all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, except those relating to damages. See Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir.1992); see also Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. El Norteno Rest. Corp., No. 06–CV–1878, 2007 WL 2891016, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) (“[A]ll well-pleaded factual allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to liability are deemed true”). However, even if a plaintiff’s claims are deemed admitted, a plaintiff must still demonstrate that the allegations set forth in the complaint state valid claims. See City of New York v. Mickalis Pawn Shop, LLC, 645 F.3d 114, 137 (2d Cir.2011) (suggesting that “a district court is ‘required to determine whether the plaintiff’s allegations establish the defendant’s liability as a matter of law’ “ prior to entering default judgment) (quoting Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir.2009)) (alterations omitted). Thus, the Court examines Plaintiff’s allegations to determine if they state a valid claim.

 

 

B. The Court Recommends that Plaintiff’s Motion Be Granted

*3 In the instant default motion, Plaintiff does not seek damages or attorneys’ fees. Rather, Plaintiff asserts a claim for interpleader pursuant to the Federal Interpleader Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1335. Essentially, Plaintiff’s complaint seeks to deposit the proceeds of the bond with the Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1335, with a discharge of liability, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2361. By instant motion, Plaintiff requests that the Court direct that, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), there being no just reason for delay, Plaintiff is entitled to a final judgment of default against the defaulting defendants directing that such defendants are entitled to no relief under the bond at issue in this action.4 For the reasons that follow, the Court reports and recommends that Plaintiff’s motion be granted.

 

Interpleader is designed to “protect stakeholders from undue harassment in the face of multiple claims against the same fund, and to relieve the stakeholder from assessing which claim among many has merit.” Fidelity Brokerage Servs., LLC v. Bank of China, 192 F.Supp.2d 173, 177 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (citing Wash. Elec. Coop. v. Paterson, Walke & Pratt, P.C., 985 F.2d 677, 679 (2d Cir.1993)). Interpleader actions normally proceed in two stages. First, the stakeholder must demonstrate that “the requirements for interpleader have been met and that it is entitled to a discharge.” Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Little, No. 13 cv 1059, 2013 WL 4495684, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2013). Second, the court “determines the adverse claims between the claimants.” Id.

 

“As to the first stage, the interpleader statute applies only where there is minimal diversity,’ i.e., where there are two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship, and when money or property worth $500 or more is involved.” Perlman v. Fidelity Brokerage Servs. LLC, 932 F.Supp.2d 397, 415 (E.D.N.Y.2013) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, once subject matter jurisdiction is show, “a court must assess whether the stakeholder legitimately fears multiple liability directed against a single fund, regardless of the merits of the competing claims.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, plaintiff “must state that he has deposited or is depositing the fund with the court.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

 

Here, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied all of the requirements of the first stage of an interpleader action. First, there is “minimal diversity” because there are adverse claimaints of diverse citizenship and the value of the bond exceeds $500.00. Next, Plaintiff is a neutral party that takes no position as to the proper disbursement of the proceeds of the bond, against which there are multiple and competing claims. Lastly, Plaintiff has stated that it is depositing the value of the bond with the Court.

 

As to the second stage of the inquiry, there can be no question that the defaulting defendants have forfeited any claim to the proceeds. See Metropolitan Life, 2013 WL 4495684, at *2 (“ ‘The failure of a named interpleader defendant to answer the interpleader complaint and assert a claim to the res can be viewed as forfeiting any claim of entitlement that might have been asserted .’ ”) (quoting Gen. Accident Group v. Gagliardi, 593 F.Supp. 1080, 1089 (D.Conn.1984)). Accordingly, as both stages of the interpleader inquiry have been met, the Court reports and recommends that Plaintiff’s motion for a default be granted and that there being no just reason for delay under Rule 54(b), Plaintiff is entitled to a judgment that the defaulting defendants are not entitled to any relief under the bond.

 

 

OBJECTIONS

*4 Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of the Court within 14 days. Failure to file objections within this period waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72; Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile, P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir.2010); Beverly v. Walker, 118 F.3d 900, 902 (2d Cir.1997); Savoie v. Merchants Bank, 84 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir.1996).

 

Filed Feb. 17, 2015.

 

 

Footnotes

 

1

 

The defaulting defendants are as follows: Gold Coast Express Inc.; Greatwide American Trans–Freight, LLC; ABC Transport LLC, Aleksandr I. Yatchuk d/b/a AL–EX Transportation; R.B. Humphreys, Inc .; Juan Alcalde d/b/a Triplets Transport; A & R Logistics LLC; George E. Huntley; I & J Transport Services, Inc.; Challenge Trucking LLC; Paul Allan Morgan d/b/a Works 2 Wheel Transport; KYS Express, Inc.; Bill’s Trucking Service, Inc.; Speedway Express, Inc.; Kiswani Trucking, Inc.; CTL Express LLC; North Florida Hauling, LLC; Rapid Response Inc.; Hauling Inc.; Blaine Evans Trucking Inc.; Go Trucking Services, Inc.; Cook Logistics, LLC; Wehunt Contract Hauling, Inc.; Reliance Transportation, Inc.; GGS Transport, Inc.; Taylor Truck Line Inc.; Rosedale Transport Inc.; Express Roadside Assistance, Inc .; Viktar Palukoshka d/b/a VIK Transport; Hempel Transportation, LLC; Buchanan Hauling & Rigging Inc.; Master Trucking, LLC; J.C.’s Xpress Transport Solutions, LLC; Graval Corporation; AD Trucking Inc.; University Towing & Transport, Inc.; Road King Unlimited Inc.; Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.; Werner, LLC; Northern Lights Specialized, LLC; E and V Services, Inc.; Zen Transport, Inc.; Samuel J. Wallis d/b/a Wallis Flats, Inc.; B S L Express, Inc.; Maximum Speed Transportation Inc.; Sammons Transportation Inc.; J.H. Sims Trucking Company, Inc.; Pro–Trans Logistics Inc.; Apex Capital Corporation; Baxter, Bailey & Associates, Inc.; Comdata Network, Inc .; Sunbelt Finance, LLC; and First Bank & Trust d/b/a Firstline Funding Group.

 

1

 

The defaulting defendants are as follows: Gold Coast Express Inc.; Greatwide American Trans–Freight, LLC; ABC Transport LLC, Aleksandr I. Yatchuk d/b/a AL–EX Transportation; R.B. Humphreys, Inc .; Juan Alcalde d/b/a Triplets Transport; A & R Logistics LLC; George E. Huntley; I & J Transport Services, Inc.; Challenge Trucking LLC; Paul Allan Morgan d/b/a Works 2 Wheel Transport; KYS Express, Inc.; Bill’s Trucking Service, Inc.; Speedway Express, Inc.; Kiswani Trucking, Inc.; CTL Express LLC; North Florida Hauling, LLC; Rapid Response Inc.; Hauling Inc.; Blaine Evans Trucking Inc.; Go Trucking Services, Inc.; Cook Logistics, LLC; Wehunt Contract Hauling, Inc.; Reliance Transportation, Inc.; GGS Transport, Inc.; Taylor Truck Line Inc.; Rosedale Transport Inc.; Express Roadside Assistance, Inc .; Viktar Palukoshka d/b/a VIK Transport; Hempel Transportation, LLC; Buchanan Hauling & Rigging Inc.; Master Trucking, LLC; J.C.’s Xpress Transport Solutions, LLC; Graval Corporation; AD Trucking Inc.; University Towing & Transport, Inc.; Road King Unlimited Inc.; Admiral Merchants Motor Freight, Inc.; Werner, LLC; Northern Lights Specialized, LLC; E and V Services, Inc.; Zen Transport, Inc.; Samuel J. Wallis d/b/a Wallis Flats, Inc.; B S L Express, Inc.; Maximum Speed Transportation Inc.; Sammons Transportation lnc.; J.H. Sims Trucking Company, Inc.; Pro–Trans Logistics Inc.; Apex Capital Corporation; Baxter, Bailey & Associates, lnc.; Comdata Network, Inc .; Sunbelt Finance, LLC; and First Bank & Trust d/b/a Firstline Funding Group.

 

2

 

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(a)(2), “[n]o service [of an amended pleading] is required on a party who is in default for failing to appear” unless the amended pleading “asserts a new claim for relief against [the defaulting party].” Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(a)(2).

 

3

 

The Court has independently reviewed all of the executed summons and has confirmed valid service.

 

4

 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) provides that “the court may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b).