2019 WL 3244612

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.
Darryl RAMOS, Plaintiff,
v.
CMI TRANSPORTATION, LLC, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 3:18-CV-968 JD
|
Signed 07/19/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Candace C. Williams, Michael E. Tolbert, Tolbert & Tolbert LLC, Gary, IN, for Plaintiff.
Jennifer M. Carpenter, Edward W. Hearn, Johnson & Bell Ltd., Crown Point, IN, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
JON E. DEGUILIO, Judge
*1 Plaintiff Darryl Ramos was hit by a semi-truck driven by defendant Miguel Gonzalez. Mr. Ramos sued Mr. Gonzalez and two entities that he alleges employed Mr. Gonzalez—CMI Transportation, LLC, and NFI Industries, Inc. The claims against those two entities assert two theories upon which those entities could be held liable: that they are vicariously liable for Mr. Gonzalez’s negligence, and that their own negligence led to the collision. In an amended answer, CMI Transportation admitted that Mr. Gonzalez was negligent and one hundred percent at fault for the collision, and that CMI Transportation is vicariously liable for Mr. Gonzalez’s negligence. Because those admissions suffice to establish liability, CMI Transportation moves for judgment on the pleadings on the negligence theory, arguing that that alternative theory is now superfluous. The Court agrees, and grants the motion.

I. BACKGROUND
In October 2017, plaintiff Darryl Ramos was driving in LaPorte, Indiana. Defendant Miguel Gonzalez was driving a semi-truck on the same road in the opposite direction. As the vehicles approached, Mr. Gonzalez lost control of his truck, crossed the center line, and struck Mr. Ramos’ vehicle. Mr. Ramos later filed suit seeking damages for the losses and injuries he sustained in that collision. He sued Mr. Gonzalez along with CMI Transportation and NFI Industries, which he alleged employed Mr. Ramos. The complaint contains three counts, one against each of the three defendants. In the counts against the two entities, the complaint alleges two theories: that the entities are vicariously liable as Mr. Ramos’ employer, and that they are liable for their own negligence that led to the collision.

In the operative answer, Mr. Gonzalez admitted that he was negligent and one hundred percent at fault for the collision, while NFI Industries denied any liability. For its part, CMI Transportation denied that it was negligent, but it admitted that it was vicariously liable for Mr. Gonzalez’s negligent acts. In particular, CMI Transportation admitted that Mr. Gonzalez was operating a commercial motor vehicle on behalf of CMI Transportation, under authority granted to CMI Transportation by the Department of Transportation. Thus, CMI Transportation admitted that it was “vicariously responsible for any negligent acts and/or omissions, chargeable to Mr. Gonzalez.” [DE 24 ¶¶ 14, 16, 17]. It further admitted that Mr. Ramos sustained injuries as a result of the collision, and contested only the amount of damages that resulted. On the basis of those admissions, CMI Transportation moved for judgment on the pleadings on the theory of negligence, arguing that that theory is redundant now that liability has already been established. That motion has been fully briefed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment on the pleadings after the parties have filed a complaint and answer. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) is subject to the same standard of review as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 339 (7th Cir. 2017). In evaluating such a motion, the Court considers the allegations in the complaint and any admissions in the answer. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court construes the pleadings in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Guise v. BWM Mortg., LLC, 377 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2004). A motion for judgment on the pleadings can be granted when, viewed in that light, the pleadings establish that the non-movant is not entitled to relief. ADM Alliance Nutrition, Inc. v. SGA Pharm Lab, Inc., 877 F.3d 742, 746 (7th Cir. 2017).

III. DISCUSSION
*2 Mr. Ramos’ complaint asserts a single count against CMI Transportation, but that count includes two theories for holding CMI Transportation liable: negligence and vicarious liability. CMI Transportation moves for judgment on the pleadings on the negligence theory. It argues that the admissions in its answer establish liability under the vicarious liability theory, and that all that remains to be determined on the claim against it is the amount of damages caused by Mr. Gonzalez’s negligence, so the negligence theory is now superfluous.

In opposing the motion, Mr. Ramos first expresses doubt that CMI Transportation has actually admitted that it is vicariously liable for Mr. Gonzalez’s negligence. The Court disagrees. As Mr. Ramos notes, CMI Transportation does not admit that Mr. Gonzalez was its employee and was acting in the scope of his employment, which is a conventional basis for vicarious liability. But commercial trucking companies can be vicariously liable even absent a traditional employee–employer relationship. Indiana courts have held that “a [Department of Transportation]-authorized motor carrier will be held liable for the negligence of its ‘employee’ as that term is defined in 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.” Ill. Bulk Carrier, Inc. v. Jackson, 908 N.E.2d 248, 255 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). That regulation, in turn, states that the term “employee” “ ‘includes a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle).’ ” Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 390.5); see Carroll v. Kamps, 795 F. Supp. 2d 794, 799–800 (N.D. Ind. 2011) (holding that the “distinction between employees and independent contractors has been eliminated for motor carriers operating pursuant to equipment lease agreements”). Here, CMI Transportation admitted that it is a Department of Transportation-authorized motor carrier and that Mr. Gonzalez was operating a commercial motor vehicle on its behalf at the time of the accident. As CMI Transportation concedes, that admission establishes that it is vicariously liable for Mr. Gonzalez’s negligence.

Even if CMI Transportation was mistaken in that respect, its own admissions and statements in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings would preclude it from contesting liability. In support of its motion, CMI Transportation repeatedly confessed its liability for the collision. It states, for example, that “Gonzalez is at fault and CMI is responsible for that fault; the pleadings establish this. No further proof of liability is necessary.” [DE 32 p. 6]. It likewise states that the “only thing [Mr. Ramos] needs to establish is the nature, extent, and proximate cause of his damages.” Id. p. 7. CMI Transportation is bound by those concessions and cannot later take a position to the contrary. Milwaukee Ctr. for Indep., Inc. v. Milwaukee Health Care, LLC, No. 2019 WL 2912487, at *3 (7th Cir. July 8, 2019); Birchmeier v. Caribbean Cruise Line, Inc., 896 F.3d 792, 798 (7th Cir. 2018). Thus, between the admissions in its answer and the express concessions in its briefs, CMI Transportation’s vicarious liability for the collision has been established.

The remaining question, then, is whether Mr. Ramos should be permitted to proceed on his negligence theory when he has already prevailed on liability on other grounds. Mr. Ramos argues that he should be allowed to proceed on that theory because his complaint adequately alleges negligence. The issue is not the adequacy of the complaint, though, but whether the negligence theory has any work left to do now that CMI Transportation’s liability has already been established. It does not. In short, there is no need to keep litigating an issue on which Mr. Ramos has already won—CMI Transportation is liable for the damages Mr. Ramos suffered as a result of the collision. All that remains to be decided is the amount of those damages, but Mr. Ramos can collect those damages only once no matter how many theories of liability he may have. The negligence theory is thus superfluous, as prevailing on that theory would have no effect on his recovery in this case.

*3 Indiana courts have addressed this situation many times, and they routinely dismiss alternative theories of negligence once vicarious liability has been established. For example, in Sedam, the plaintiff was injured in a collision with a pizza delivery driver. Sedam v. 2JR Pizza Enters., LLC, 84 N.E.3d 1174, 1178 (Ind. 2017). The plaintiff asserted two claims against the driver’s restaurant for that injury: that the restaurant was liable under respondeat superior for the negligence of its employee, and that the restaurant was liable for its own negligence in hiring the employee. After the restaurant admitted the facts necessary to establish vicarious liability on the first claim, the court dismissed the second claim as redundant. The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed:
Under each claim, the plaintiff seeks the same result—employer liability—and recovery is based on the same negligent act—the employee’s. To allow both claims would serve only to prejudice the employer, confuse the jury, and waste judicial resources when ultimately the result—that the employer is liable—is the same and the employer has stipulated as much. Such an admission exposes an employer to liability for any and all fault assessed to the employee’s negligence, and thus a negligent hiring claim becomes duplicative since a plaintiff may not recover twice for the same damage.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (also noting a line of precedent “spanning nearly five decades” to that same effect).

The same is true here. As already discussed, CMI Transportation has admitted facts sufficient to establish that it is vicariously liable for the collision. Mr. Ramos will thus prevail on his claim against CMI Transportation, and he only needs to prove the amount of damages he suffered as a result of that injury. Mr. Ramos does not suggest that his damages would be any different under his alternative theory of negligence, nor does he identify any purpose that theory could serve now that liability has been established on other grounds, so that theory is superfluous and can be dismissed. Therefore, the Court grants CMI Transportation’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on the negligence theory.

IV. CONCLUSION
The Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings on the negligence theory against CMI Transportation under Count 2. [DE 25]. CMI Transportation is vicariously liable on that claim, so all that remains to be determined on the claim against CMI Transportation is the measure of Mr. Ramos’ damages.

SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3244612

2019 WL 3021220

United States District Court, W.D. Tennessee, Eastern Division.
Tony EDMONDS and Wanda Edmonds, Plaintiffs,
v.
Abraham BERHE, Yonas H. Ghebreyesus, and Model Transport, LLC, Defendants.
No. 1:18-cv-1222-STA-jay
|
Signed 07/10/2019
Attorneys and Law Firms
Eric Joseph Lewellyn, Law Offices of Lauren L. Holloway, Jennifer Hinds Collins, Reaves Law Firm, Memphis, TN, for Plaintiffs.
Terrill L. Adkins, Trammell Adkins & Ward, Knoxville, TN, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING VOLUNTEER EXPRESS’S MOTION TO INTERVENE
S. THOMAS ANDERSON, CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
*1 Before the Court is a Motion to Intervene filed by Volunteer Express, Inc. (ECF No. 39) on May 9, 2019. The original Complaint alleges that on February 16, 2018, Plaintiff Tony Edmonds was driving a tractor-trailer owned by Volunteer Express when another tractor-trailer owned by Defendant Yonas H. Ghebreyesus and driven by Defendant Abraham Berhe struck his vehicle. Compl. ¶¶ 10, 12. Volunteer Express now seeks leave of court to intervene in this matter under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24. According to Volunteer Express, Mr. Edmonds has filed a workers’ compensation claim, seeking benefits for his injuries arising out of the collision. Volunteer Express has already paid $34,000 in benefits on Edmonds’s behalf and will be liable for additional benefits as they accrue. Volunteer Express also holds a claim for damages to its tractor-trailer sustained in the accident. Based on these interests, Volunteer Express argues that the Court should allow it to intervene in these proceedings. Volunteer Express has prepared a proposed intervenor complaint and attached its pleading to the Motion to Intervene. No other party to the action has responded to the Motion to Intervene, and the time to do so under the Local Rules has now passed.1

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), district courts have the discretion to permit a party to intervene by “timely motion” and where the party “has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(1)(B). The Rule requires a court to “consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3). “So long as the motion for intervention is timely and there is at least one common question of law or fact, the balancing of undue delay, prejudice to the original parties, and any other relevant factors” is a matter left to the discretion of the court. League of Women Voters of Mich. v. Johnson, 902 F.3d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1248 (6th Cir. 1997)).

The Court finds good cause to allow Volunteer Express to intervene. Timeliness is a threshold issue for a motion to intervene under Rule 24. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365 (1973) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24). The Sixth Circuit has articulated a five-factor test for courts to consider in determining the timeliness of a motion to intervene: (1) the point to which the suit has progressed; (2) the purpose for which intervention is sought; (3) the length of time preceding the application during which the proposed intervenor knew or should have known of its interest in the case; (4) the prejudice to the original parties due to the proposed intervenor’s failure to promptly intervene after they knew or reasonably should have known of their interest in the case; and (5) the existence of unusual circumstances weighing in favor of or against intervention. Blount-Hill v. Zelman, 636 F.3d 278, 283 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jansen v. Cincinnati, 904 F.2d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 1990)).

*2 Volunteer Express’s Motion easily qualifies as timely. Volunteer Express has acted promptly to assert its interests in the outcome of this action by filing its Motion only one week after the entry of the initial scheduling order (ECF 36) and six weeks prior to the deadline for amending pleadings and joining parties (June 19, 2019). And because Volunteer Express has made its request to intervene at an earlier stage of the proceedings, the Court has no reason to find that Volunteer should have acted sooner or that its failure to take action has prejudiced the other parties. At this early juncture, there is little or no risk that Volunteer Express’s intervention will require the other parties to duplicate any step they have already completed in getting the case ready for trial. Id. at 286. The Court finds, therefore, that intervention will not delay the progress of the case.

Furthermore, Volunteer Express has shown that intervention will serve its important legal interests. Volunteer Express seeks to intervene for the purpose of protecting its subrogation interest in the Edmonds’s possible recovery as well as to assert its own claim for $105,000 in property damage. These interests qualify as the kind of important legal interests intervention is designed to protect. Davis v. Lifetime Capital, Inc., 560 F. App’x. 477, 491 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Clarke v. Baptist Mem’l Healthcare Corp., 427 F. App’x 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2011)); Moore v. Indus. Maint. Serv. of Tenn., Inc., No. 11-2938-STA-tmp, 2012 WL 1100707, at *2 (W.D. Tenn. Apr. 2, 2012) (finding that an employer’s subrogation rights to recover workers’ compensation benefits was an important legal interest and justified intervention). And no party has shown that this case implicates any unusual circumstance that would make intervention particularly more or less appropriate. Based on its consideration of all of these factors, the Court concludes that Volunteer Express has easily satisfied Rule 24’s timeliness requirement.

Likewise, all of the other factors for intervention are met in this case. Volunteer Express’s claims share at least one common question of fact and law with the Edmonds’s claims. In fact, the proposed intervenor complaint has adopted by incorporation all of the Edmonds’ allegations of negligence and vicarious liability against Defendants. See Proposed Intervenor Compl. ¶ 3 (ECF No. 39-1). The Court has no indication that Volunteer Express’s intervention will prejudice the adjudication of the other parties’ rights. As Volunteer Express correctly points out, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction in this case based on the amount in controversy and the complete diversity of citizenship among the parties. Volunteer Express is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Tennessee and therefore has its citizenship in Tennessee just like the Edmonds. Volunteer Express’s intervention will not impair the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction. For their part, neither Plaintiffs nor Defendants have responded to the Motion to Intervene or objected in any way to show why the Court should not allow Volunteer Express to intervene. All of this tends to show that Volunteer Express’s presence in this suit will not prejudice any right of the other parties.

It is true that Volunteer Express and Mr. Edmonds may have some identity of interest in the case. Identity of interest is sometimes a “relevant criterion” under Rule 24(b) and can weigh against permissive intervention of this sort. Johnson, 902 F.3d at 579 (citations omitted). Volunteer Express asserts a subrogation right over any award of damages recovered by Mr. Edmonds. But in this case the identity of interest between Volunteer Express and Mr. Edmonds is not exact. Volunteer Express seeks to protect its subrogation rights as far as Mr. Edmonds’s possible recovery and also to recover $105,000 in damages to its own property, claims that do not coincide entirely with the claims asserted by Mr. Edmonds. Proposed Intervenor Compl. ¶¶ 4, 7. There exists then at least the potential “for inadequate representation.” Grutter v. Bollinger, 188 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). So while Volunteer Express and Mr. Edmonds may share some common interests against Defendants, Volunteer Express has its own, clearly distinguishable interests in the outcome of this suit.

*3 Having met the requirements of Rule 24(b) and without opposition from any other party to the case, Volunteer Express’s Motion to Intervene will be GRANTED. Volunteer Express has complied with Rule 24(c) and attached a copy of its proposed intervenor complaint setting out its claims for relief against Defendants Abraham Berhe, Yonas H. Ghebreyesus, and Model Transport, LLC. For the sake of clarity on the docket, Volunteer Express is directed to re-file its proposed intervenor complaint as a new docket entry.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

All Citations
Slip Copy, 2019 WL 3021220

Footnotes

1
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(c) requires a party to serve a motion to intervene on the parties in accordance with Rule 5. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(c). Rule 5(b), in turn, authorizes several methods by which a party can serve a paper on another party, including mailing and sending the paper to a registered user through a court’s electronic-filing system. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C) & (E). According to Volunteer Express’s certificate of service, counsel served a copy of the Motion to Intervene on counsel for the other parties by U.S. Mail and the Court’s ECF filing system on May 9, 2019.